The Evolution and Relative Effectiveness of the Interim Brigade Combat Team

Michael K. Robel, LTC, USAR

Introduction

The article consists of six parts: a synopsis of the Interim Brigade Combat Team (ICBT) Mission and Organization, a historical survey of predecessors to the IBCT Brigade, a lethality comparison of various US battalions, and a wargaming section. Finally, I make some recommendations concerning the continued development and fielding of this organization.

Part 1 Brigade Organization and Mission

The brigade's mission is:

The brigade deploys very rapidly, executes early entry, and conducts effective combat operations immediately on arrival to prevent, contain, stabilize, or resolve a conflict through shaping and decisive operations. The brigade participates in major theater war (MTW), with augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. The brigade also participates with appropriate augmentation in stability and support operations (SASO) as an initial entry force and/or as a guarantor to provide security for stability forces by means of its extensive combat capabilities."

This brigade would likely arrive in theatre after the initial entry forces but before heavy forces arrive via maritime prepositioned ship, thus providing a significant improvement in combat power available to theater commanders in the opening stages of a campaign.

While organization and equipment are still in flux, the IBCT will be organized like current separate brigades as shown in Figure 1. It will have three motorized infantry battalions; carried in a "medium weight infantry-fighting vehicle". This vehicle will be armed with the a gun from 7.62mm to 25mm in a wheeled vehicle similar to the LAV-25 currently used by the Marines, but also comes in other variants including an Anti-tank Vehicle, Air Defense Vehicle, Mortar, command and control, logistics, and recovery variants. The vehicle must fit on a C-130. It also will have a field artillery battalion, possibly based on a wheeled vehicle, and/or a HIMARS battery. However, the significant difference between these brigades and existing ones is the armored cavalry squadron. Normally, brigades only have a cavalry troop. An anti-tank company and a engineer company round out the brigade. Like all US brigades, the IBCT would be capable of accepting other units to command such as tank battalions, additional artillery, or air defense units.

Figure 1.
Proposed Medium Brigade

Part 2 Battle Cruisers, Tank Destroyers, and Armored Cars

This section examines the evolution of the IBCT through some of its historical precedents: battle cruiser, tank destroyers, World War II Cavalry Groups of World War II, and the 2^nd Armored Cavalry Regiment (Light). While there is no direct relationship between these organizations and the medium brigade, they all share features and it is instructive to look at the IBCT through historical eyes.

These seemingly disparate groups all have one thing in common: they were designed to fulfill a scouting or defense function and to allow the concentration of other forces for the main effort.

Battle Cruisers and Battle Ships

Admiral John "Jackie" Fischer invented both battle cruisers and the dreadnought or modern battleship giving the British Navy a significant advantage at the beginning of the twentieth century. The dreadnaught was a radical departure from earlier battleships because it concentrated on having a large single caliber main gun battery as opposed to several guns of mixed caliber.

The battle cruiser was designed to function independently, carried battleship armament and was faster then the battleship through increased power plants and lighter armor. Its job was to out gun, out run, and absorb hits from smaller vessels such as heavy cruisers, while evading other capital ships.

Figure 2.
USS Alaska Battle Cruiser

Tragically, the idea, which looked good on paper, did not fare so well in the real world. Germany quickly built its own battle cruisers with more armor and less speed and firepower, negating the British ships.

As a counter, the British formed their ships into squadrons and in this role; they functioned as scouts for the battle fleet. Once the enemy fleet was located, they would engage enemy battle cruisers in a fleet action or use their speed to engage the enemy battleships in conjunction with the friendly battle line.

This philosophy proved to be tragically flawed as shown at the Battle of Jutland   where no less than three out of the five British battle cruisers were sunk with catastrophic explosions and the loss all but a handful of crewman while a fourth was severely damaged. Almost as Admiral Hood, commanding the Invincible, was killed, the HMS Hood was nearing the end of its construction.

The Hood of course, suffered from the same weaknesses of all battle cruisers, and was sunk by the Prinz Eugen or Bismark in the early days of World War II.

US Tank Destroyers in World War II

Tank Destroyers (TD) are rooted to the initial use of field artillery as anti-tank guns in World War I.   The US developed TDs as a defensive measure in a very offensively minded army, perhaps dooming it to failure from the start against the rampage of the German panzers in the opening stages of World War II.

Colonel (later General) Andrew D. Bruce (who also commanded the very successful 77^th Infantry Division in the Pacific) founded the US tank destroyer force. Initially, tank destroyers were to be employed in anti-tank platoons in infantry battalions, companies in infantry regiments, and independent battalions at the divisional level.   Although initially successful in wargames in the US, their combat performance never quite lived up to the "live simulations" of the pre war years.

Figure 3.
Tank Destroyer Battalion

The US planned to employ TDs offensively, for this reason, like battle cruisers, they had big guns to kill enemy tanks and were fast with only light, open topped armor to allow them to concentrate.

The 1943 Self-propelled Tank Destroyer battalion was organized as shown in Figure 3. It was armed with the M10 (Sherman based with a 3 inch gun in an open turret), the M18 (a smaller, purpose built TD, with a high velocity 76mm gun), or the M36 (another Sherman variant with a 90mm gun � essentially identical to the M26 Pershing�s). The units were not to "slug it out with enemy tanks," instead, their cavalry units would find the enemy and guide the TD�s onto the enemy flanks, while their security detachments protected them from enemy infantry.

Tank destroyer were supposed to be employed in groups and even brigades to mass and defeat large groups of enemy armor, but by the time the US entered ground combat in World War II, the Germans seldom presented such large groups of tanks. Instead, they were usually attached out to divisions in small units. In the one or two instances when large groups of enemy tanks presented themselves, the TDs were unable to concentrate due to the poor communications of the period and the time it took to assemble.

They were useful as indirect fire artillery, direct fire artillery (knocking out bunkers or AT positions in support of infantry and armor attacks), and as reinforcements to tank platoons, able to deal with the heavily armored Panther and Tiger tanks.

Mechanized Cavalry In World War II

Mechanized cavalry evolved from the Army�s horse cavalry regiments between the two world wars and during the early years of World War II. Intended as a reconnaissance and security organization, it initially relied on stealth for its success. However, early failures in North Africa showed that cavalry doctrine and organization, with few weapons and dismounts, was flawed at the start.

After its initial use in combat, mechanized cavalry evolved into a combat arm as opposed to a purely reconnaissance arm. Results were successful, but costly, because cavalry units were not equipped with the heavy armor of tank units and had far fewer scouts for dismounted work than an armored infantry battalion.

Unlike tank destroyers units, cavalry groups actually commanded their squadrons, instead of having them routinely detached out to other units. The cavalry group, however, was comparatively weak, only consisting of two squadrons. It therefore had to put all its combat power in the line or only retain a small reserve. Also unlike tank destroyers, there were divisional cavalry squadrons. As such, the role and employment of cavalry has remained fairly steady up to the present day.

The 1943 cavalry squadron was organized much like today�s cavalry squadrons, with a headquarters troop, three cavalry troops, a tank company, and a howitzer battery. The cavalry troops had three reconnaissance platoons, as shown in Figure 4. This organization was stealthy enough to gain information without fighting and heavy enough to fight to gain information.

Figure 4.
Mechanized Cavalry Squadron

Key to the tactical success of the cavalry squadron was the Jeep, small, quiet, and nimble, it could get the cavalrymen out of trouble as quickly as it got him into it. Together with the dedicated 60mm mortars and high proportion of automatic weapons, and backed up with the M-8 Armored Car (a tank destroyer cast off), supported by the tank company and the assault gun battery, the squadron could also defend and attack, as well as carry out traditional cavalry missions.

USMC Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

The LAR Battalion (Figure 5) arose with the USMC�s realization that they were too light for contingencies in places like the Middle East, where nearly every country had large numbers of armored vehicles.

Figure 5.
Marine Corps LAR Battalion

Although it was conceived of as a reconnaissance organization, the battalion was initially named the light armored infantry battalion. It has a similar organization to the Army�s proposed medium infantry battalions, consisting of 4 companies, each with three platoons of LAV-25, 4 LAV-Anti-tank TOW vehicles (wheeled versions of the M901 ITV), and 2 LAV-Mortar (81mm Mortars), plus assorted support vehicles. The battalion suffers from a lack of Anti-tank fires (no Javelin or Dragons) and only has four dismounts per carrier. It therefore requires augmentation from infantry, tank, and Assault Amphibian battalions for many missions. This is somewhat mitigated by the fact that it operates as part of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and as such, has an lethal air component to call upon for support.

The LAR battalion�s main roles are reconnaissance and security. Because the LAV is not armored to protect against anything larger than 7.62mm machine gun fire or 152mm artillery bursts at ranges of greater than 50 feet, it relies on its speed and stealth to avoid decisive engagement, just like battle cruisers, tank destroyers, and cavalry groups.

The LAR is at a severe disadvantage in offensive or defensive operations where the enemy has mobility equal to or greater than its own. Again, these faults are compensated for by the awesome combined arms power of the MAGTF.

LAR battalions performed well in the Gulf War, although one battalion suffered severely due to friendly fire. It has also performed well in large scale exercises in the southwestern United States.

The 2^nd Armored Cavalry Regiment is the army�s "light" cavalry regiment and is descended from the 9^th Infantry Division (Motorized) and the 199^th Separate Infantry Brigade (Motorized) � themselves orphan�s of the high technology test bed division.

Its squadrons are organized much as a standard ACR (Figure 6), except armed with HMMWVs equipped with machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and TOW missiles instead of fighting vehicles and main battle tanks. It has a large amount of anti-tank weapons in the form of its TOWs and Javelins, but has virtually no armor protection. The HMMWVs were intended to be surrogate vehicles for more advanced vehicles to be developed, notably the M8 Armored Gun System, but these were all cancelled, and the result is an organization with high strategic mobility, poor armor protection, that is more dependent on stealth than its heavier brother.

Figure 6.
 2nd ACR

The 2^nd ACR could be characterized as a combination and evolution of World War II Tank Destroyer units (with its heavy hitting TOWs instead of tank destroyers) and the mechanized cavalry groups (with their HMMWVs instead of jeeps.)

The 2^nd ACR has not been tested in combat, but has faired well in peacekeeping operations; however, it has not proved as successful as its heavy counterparts at the National Training Center. It is more fit for low intensity warfare and peacekeeping than high or medium intensity combat.

Historical Lessons Learned

• Speed, stealth, and firepower are no substitute for protection
• If it looks like a tank (battleship), it will get used like a tank (battleship).
• Dismounted scouts or infantry are necessary for successful combat / reconnaissance operations.
• If there is flawed doctrine, the troops will invent their own ways of employing a system.
• Surrogate vehicles tend to become permanent.

Part 3 The Medium Battalion

Examination of the medium battalion (Figure 7) does not show any revolutionary concepts. It is organized in the triangular pattern of most US Army organizations since World War II, but it does have a departure in that the companies have a fourth platoon, a trait usually found only in US Armored Cavalry Units.

As we have seen from our historical trait, its probable use of wheeled vehicles is not historically unique in the US Army. Many other armies, notably the Russian and French, use a combination of wheel and tracked combat vehicles.

This organization is designed to prevail through dismounted infantry assault instead of mounted combat.   To accomplish this it has 8 � 10 dismounts per carrier instead of the four of the Marine�s LAR battalion. This requires a larger vehicle than the LAV-25 such as the LAV III+¹ or a variant of the LAV-Logistics vehicle mounting only a M240, M2, or MK-19 machine gun on a skate mount. Instead of the LARs AT vehicles, it probably will use LAV-Assault Gun vehicles with a 105mm cannon.

There is significant debate over the "worthiness" of wheels versus tracks. Wheels are supposed to be more maintainable, faster in some circumstances, more strategically mobile. They can carry armament sufficient to knock out main battle tanks at the cost of armor protection � a trait shared with battle cruisers and tank destroyers. Tracked vehicles have better off road mobility and are generally considered more robust.

Figure 7.
Proposed Medium Battalion

For anti-tank fires, the battalion has 45 Javelins but no TOWs. Unfortunately, Javelins have a range of only 2000 - 2500 meters and most OPFOR ATGMs out range them. The brigade AT company will provide long range fires, probably initially with 12 LAV-AT type vehicles with TOW missiles. Perhaps later, the Line of Sight Anti-Tank or FOG-M systems will take the TOW�s place. Many OPFOR ATGMs also outrange the TOW with its 3,750-meter reach. This lack of range could leave the battalion and its companies at a severe disadvantage when faced with Former Soviet Union equipment equipped with long range AT missiles.

Each company probably will have two 120mm LAV mounted mortars, with four more at battalion for a total of ten mortars.    A tracked version of this force is also under consideration, centering on the M113 and the M8 Armored Gun System. It is also possible that it will have a mix of wheels and tracks.

New doctrine will have to be invented to provide this organization a method to fight. Its four-platoon organization will be new to anyone except armored cavalry troop commanders. As such, it will require some learning and experimentation to find the best way to employ it and this is being done by the heavy use of JANUS at Fort Knox and Fort Benning.

Even though this unit is not supposed to stand and slug it out with heavy armored forces, we can imagine many situations where it may have to. Since it will likely be the first unit to arrive behind the assault forces of the 82^nd Airborne Division or the US Marines, it may well be called upon to do so as we can no longer expect an enemy to sit idly by while we leisurely expand beach or air heads.

Observations

This organization shares many of the characteristics of its predecessors in that it:

• Seeks to substitute speed and stealth for armor.
• Lacks long-range anti-tank fires.
• Has systems that may well be regarded as tanks (the LAV-AG or AGS) when tanks are not available.
• Will more than likely have to fight against enemy forces it was not designed to (the T-80/BMP combination) instead of a lower tech unit such as the T-55/BTR combination.

On the positive side:

• In a rush to get fielded, is adopting off the shelf vehicles after a "shoot out" instead of planning on new acquisition.
• Doctrine is being developed, in conjunction with existing weapon systems, to provide a fightable organization from the start.
• Simulations are being used to develop tactics, tips, and procedures for its employment.
• Has a large dismounted infantry component, which delivers a high volume of general purpose and anti-tank fires in the 0 to 2,000 meter range band.
• Its large infantry component corrects weaknesses of the Bradley and LAR battalions.

Part 4 Comparative Lethality

This portion compares the lethality values of various current and proposed organizations using lethality values from TACOPS^[2]. The organizations compared are:

• Mechanized Infantry Task Force with 2 Mech and 1 Tank Companies.
• Mechanized Infantry Task Force with 3 Mech and 1 Tank Companies.
• Balanced Infantry Task Force with 2 Mech and 2 Tank Companies.
• Medium Infantry Battalion with 3 Medium Infantry Companies using the LAV III+^[1].
• USMC Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions with 4 LAR Companies.
• Medium Infantry Battalion with 3 Medium Infantry Company using the M113and AGS.

These battalions rate in comparative lethality (as compared to the Mech-heavy task force of 2 mech companies and 1 tank company) as shown in Figure 8:

The lethality index is graphically portrayed in Figure 9 and the weapon system strength is shown in Figure 10.

The Mech Heavy TF (ratio 1.0) is the study baseline because it is the objective organization for US Army heavy units in the near future. (Some units have already begun to convert.) It is based on the premise that digital C4I systems will provide a combat multiplier equal to or greater than the lost combat power represented by the fourth company. The Mech Heavy TF, with three company teams, has extensive long-range killing power, centered on its tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, but lacks the close in killing power of the Medium Infantry.

The USMC LAI Battalion has relatively little combat power when compared to the other forces due to the lack of dismounted ATGMs and small dismounted infantry element.

The medium battalion�s high lethality rating is due to the high number of Javelins, large number of dismounts, the organic assault gun platoon, and the ten 120mm mortars in the battalion. This organization, while it only has three companies is, due to its four platoon structure, essentially a four company unit. The medium battalion could reasonably expect to include 4 LAV-AT systems, which increase its lethality, but is not included in its totals here.

The Medium Battalions converted to the M113 and the M8 AGS is slightly more powerful than the LAV based Medium Infantry Battalion. While there is a significant lethality difference between the .50 caliber machine gun and the 25mm cannon, this seems to be offset by the improved mobility of the tracked vehicles and increased armor protection and lethality of the AGS when compared to the LAV-AG. Otherwise, these two battalions are structured the same.

The four-company heavy task force is more lethal than the medium battalion due to a greater number of tanks and TOW missiles, as well as armor protection of the vehicles. The balanced TF (2 tank and 2 mech companies) was, in the author�s experience, the favored task organization in heavy divisions for battalion task forces. It provided a reasonable balance between tank heavy killing power and infantry dismounts.

Observations

Figure 9.
Comparative Lethality

Figure 10.
Weapon Systems

Part 5 Gaming it out

In order to evaluate the effectiveness of this organization, TACOPS 3.0 was used to compare and contrast the Medium Battalions with a three-company team mechanized infantry task force in various scenarios. Different organizational variations were also considered. Brigade Combat Team^[3] was also used to supplement this work.

The enemy in each case used the BTR-80 and T-80 based on organizations found in FM 100-60 Armor and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force Organization Guide. ^[4] Each test was run five times.

Offensive Scenario Development

Defensive Scenario Development

Engineer Support for the Medium Brigade

LAV or AGS for the Medium Brigade?

Vehicle Comparison

At first glance, from a comparison of TACOPS vehicle characteristics, the observer would expect these two organizations to perform pretty much the same.

As can be seen, the LAV III is both better protected and more lethal than the M113 while the M8 Level II is much better armored and armed than the LAV-AG. It is the M8�s armor and reach that makes the M8/M113 battalion more lethal.

Organizational Comparison

To continue to evaluate engineer issues, the scenario was played out in hasty and deliberate defense. Except for substituting M113 variants and M8s for the different LAV variants, the two organizations were structured the same. The OPFOR was a BTR-80/T-80 Regiment.

Without engineer support, the M113/AGS organization did rather poorly. Its lethality, on average was diminished to an average of 3828 (47.6%) out of 8027, with its high being 3999 (49.8%) and its low being 3897 (48.5%). On average it had 88 (48.3%) systems left out of 152, its high being 96 (52%), and its low being 73 (40.1%). It reduced the OPFOR to an average lethality score of 9896.4 (46.4%) out of 21298 and reduced the total weapons systems to an average of 142 out of 344 (41.3%).

When dug in, the battalion�s performance was much better. Average lethality at the end was 4932 (61.5%), with a high of 6208 (72%) and a low of 3895 (48.5%), while reducing the OPFOR to an average of 9135 (42.8).

These results compare to an average LAV lethality value (without engineer support) of 4094 out of 8027 (51%) and ending OPFOR strength of 9330 out of 21298 (43%). With Engineer support, the LAVs ended at an average of 4639 out of 8027 (57%) and the OPFOR at 7687 / 21298 (36%). (Figures 18and 19)

Figure 18.
AGS BLUFOR Lethality

Figure 19.
AGS OPFOR Lethality versus Blue Organization

Battle Taxi�s or Fighting Vehicles?

Organizational Comparison

Just as for the previous tests, two scenarios were used: One in which the TF was dug in and one in which it was not. Organizationally, the TACOPS lethality values for the LAV-25 Battalion is 8027 and the LAV-LOG Battalion is 7782.

The difference between the two organizations is, of course, the lack of the 25mm gun on the LAV-L ^[8] carrier. This difference removes much of the ability of the battalion to fight at long range. The entire killing power of the organization beyond 1,000 meters is dependent upon the Javelin AT missile and the LAV-AG. My expectation was that this organization would do much worse in combat when compared to a LAV-25 based battalion.

Theoretically, the LAV-L organization is capable of destroying a BTR-80 regiment, as shown below:

# Javelins � 45 * 4 rounds = 180 shots

TACOPS Ph = .9

TACOPS Pk = .9^[9]

Theoretical Vehicles killed � 180 * .9 * .9 = 145

# LAV � AGS � 12 * 20 rounds = 240 shots

Tacops Ph (105mm @ 1500m) = .5

Tacops Pk = .6

Theoretical Vehicles Killed � 240 * .5 * .5 = 60

Total Kills � 205

Number Fighting vehicles in BTR-80 Regiment = 187.

Of course, this assumes a flat surface, perfect shooting, no supporting weapons, and no friendly losses. Still, it shows that the battalion should be able to defeat a BTR-80 based regiment.

Without engineer support, the LAV-LOG based organization did rather poorly. Its lethality, on average was diminished to an average of 3914 (51%) out of 7622, with its high being 4844 and its low being 3575. It reduced the OPFOR to an average lethality score of 11070 (51%) out of 21298.

Figure 20.
Lethality without Engineer Support

When dug in, the battalion�s performance was much better. Average lethality at the end was 4459 (57), with a high of 5659 (72%) and a low of 3667 (47%), while reducing the OPFOR to an average of 9037 (42%).

Figure 21.
Lethality with Engineer Support

These results compare to an average LAV lethality value (without engineer support) of 4094 out of 8027 (51%) and reduced the OPFOR to 9330 out of 21298 (43%). With Engineer support, the LAVs ended at an average of 4639 out of 8027 (57%) and reduced the OPFOR to 7687 / 21298 (36%) as shown in earlier sections of this study.

The difference in values when compared to the LAV-25 battalion is probably due to my increasing ability to initially deploy the battalion (although all deployments were fairly similarly) judge the best time to begin displacement of the force, and better use of artillery.

Without the 25mm cannons, units ran out of Javelins much faster. LAV-AG losses were high because I displaced them last when moving to subsequent battle positions. I found that the best time to begin moving to subsequent positions is when the enemy is at about the 2000-meter line. This of course negates the Javelin. If minefields do not delay the enemy, then displacement is a very near thing and minimizes the contribution of dismounted infantry in the delay or mobile defense.

Part 6 Observations and Recommendations

As expected, principles for a lightly armored wheeled force are the same as for a heavier tracked force, but their employment is different. Lessons learned included:

Lessons Learned

Recommendations

Some Other Thoughts

A Name

Bibliography

Armor in World War II: American Armored Doctrine, http://www.geocities.com/CapitalHill/Congress/1418/armor4.htm

Bernstein, Lewis, Army Experimental Formations and their possible influence on the Establishment of the Force XXI Experimental Force, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS October, 1996.

Demarco, Lou, Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine In World War II, http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/9517/page65.html

Gable, Christopher R, Leavenworth Papers Number 12: Seek, Strike, and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroy Doctrine in World War II, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, September 1985.

Gordon, John IV, and Wilson, Peter A., The Case for Army XXI "Medium Weight" Aero-motorized Divisions, a Pathway to the Army of 2020, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA. May 1988.

HMS Hood Association, Origins of the Royal Navy Battle Cruiser, http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Workshop/2966/history/BCorigins.html

Riggs, Scott, Strike Force: An Independent Proposal, (Personally published by Major Riggs and provided to the author.)

US Army Armor Center, Brigade Combat Team Website, http://knox-www.army.mil/center/mwfi/index.htm

Program Manager, Light Armored Vehicles, http://www.tacom.army.mil/LAV/

PM, Firefinder Shortstop Electronic Protection System (SEPS), http://www.monmouth.army.mil/prjbk97/pmfiref/17-9.html

USMC, MCWP 3-14 (Coordinating Draft), Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., January, 2000.

About the Author

Mike Robel is a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve, with 16 years of active duty as an Armor Officer. He served in the 11^th Armored Cavalry Regiment as a tank and cavalry platoon leader and a cavalry troop executive officer patrolling the very edge of the Free World along the border between East and West Germany. His other service was in the 1^st Infantry Division (Mechanized) {The Big Red One} in Fort Riley, Stuttgart, Germany, and the Persian Gulf, where he commanded companies in all three brigades of the division and served as a battalion maintenance officer, battalion supply officer, battalion assistant operations officer, division armor training officer, division assistant operations officer, and as a brigade supply officer.

After leaving active duty, he worked for Logicon Advanced Technology as a database manager for the 87^th Exercise Division in Birmingham, AL and managed the 2^nd ACR�s simulation center in Fort Polk, LA, where he used the Army�s Corps Battle Simulation, Battalion-Brigade Battle Simulation, and JANUS. He is now a Knowledge Acquisition and System Test Engineer working on WARSIM 2000, which is the Army�s next generation battle simulation.

He has played board wargames since he was 8 years old (Avalon Hill�s U-Boat), and computer wargames since Avalon Hill�s MIDWAY for the TRS-80 Computer. He worked for Intracorp/360 for a year as the 360 Product Manager and was involved in the final production of HARPOON 2 (ADMIRAL'S EDITION). He has play-tested and developed scenarios for a plethora of wargames including HARPOON CLASSIC, HARPOON II, V FOR VICTORY, STEEL PANTHERS, GREAT NAVAL BATTLES, ULTIMATE MILITARY SIMULATOR II, PATRIOT, TANKS, and HIGH COMMAND as well as Army simulations.

He has been published in a variety of publications including STRATEGY PLUS, www.cdmag.com, COMMAND Magazine, Armor, Infantry, Military Review, and Army Times on a variety of computer games and various historical and contemporary military and historical topics as well as a strategy guide for TANKS!

He now lives on Merritt Island, Florida where he has a front row seat for space shuttle launches and the beach.

Endnotes

[1] The LAV III+ is larger than the Marines LAV-25 at the cost of amphibious capability but it has heavier armor than the M2 Bradley.

[2] TACOPS is a commercial wargame developed by a retired Marine Officer. It assigns lethality values to each weapon.

[3] BCT is similar to JANUS is look and feel, thought it is a wholly commercial product.

[4] A BTR-80/T-80 organization was used as the basis for this evaluation because the author felt if the medium weight battalion could stand up to it, it would have no problem with other less capable threats.

[5] In TACOPS, there is no LAV-III AG combination. It can be assumed that should the US Army buy the LAV III, an Assault Gun version would have equal armor to the infantry support carrier.

[6] Probability of hit at the given range / armor penetration at the given range.

[7] While the AGS and the LAV-AG both have a 105mm gun, in TACOPS, the LAV-AG only has a 2500-meter range while the M8 has a 3000-meter range. This difference is probably due to fire control.

[8] In TACOPS, the only weapon possible is the 7.62mm Machine Gun.

[9] The Pk is a rough estimate from the armor penetration ability of the weapon against the armor rating of vehicles in the scenario.