|
Part 6 Observations and Recommendations
As
expected, principles for a lightly armored wheeled force are the same as for a
heavier tracked force, but their employment is different.
Lessons learned
included:
Lessons
Learned
On
average, the LAV battalion faired better than an M113/M8 force in terms of
survivability and in inflicting casualties on the attacking OPFOR force.
I attribute this to
the overall better armor of the LAV force, together with the lethality of the
25mm cannon when compared to the .50 caliber machine gun of the M113.
The
M113/AGS force is more vulnerable to artillery fire than the LAV force.
Both are more
vulnerable to indirect fires than a heavy task force.
The US
needs a longer range ATGM and/or a countermeasure device to balance out the
long-range fires of the OPFOR ATGMS. The AT-6 and AT-10s outrange the TOW and
the M1A2 by at least 1,000 meters.
Engineer support made about a 7 � 10 % difference in the
survivability of the organization when defending.
The
large amount of mortars is a plus, enabling a massive amount of indirect fire on
the enemy.
(120mm PGM ammunition will make them more lethal still.)
The
best use of smoke is to smoke friendly positions to defeat the acquisition of my
units by the enemy.
Of course, if the enemy has thermals then this will have less
effect.
In an
age where our casualty tolerance is very low, it appears that a force that
relies on close in combat action to achieve decisive results is not the best
course of action.
The force should have sufficient long-range weapons to destroy and
suppress the enemy before the enemy closes to 1,000 meters.
The
attacking medium force must make shorter bounds then a heavy task force.
It is more similar
to an air assault battalion than it is to a mechanized infantry task
force.
Massive
overwatch fires are necessary (sometimes I would have as many as seven platoons
over watching the move of a single platoon). Infantry and Javelins must be
deployed whenever the carriers halt.
The
medium Scout Platoon is more lethal than the heavy TF Scout Platoon, but the
temptation to use it to fight is much greater, since they are not in HMMWVs.
Even
more than the heavy force, finding or creating a flank is a necessity.
The lighter
vehicles are much more vulnerable on the flanks than is a heavy force, making
being caught in a fire sack or against a mine field a real trap.
Recommendations
Each
battalion should have an anti-tank platoon of 4 � 6 LAV-ATs for long-range fire
support, then the brigade AT company could be used as a reserve and its fires
concentrated.
Provide
an engineer battalion as the minimum size engineer force for the medium brigade,
ensuring it has a mix of mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability
equipment.
Each
battalion should field a platoon of LAV-AD for short-range air
defense.
To
reduce vulnerability to artillery, one vehicle per platoon should be equipped
with the AN/VLQ-9/10 Shortstop Electronic Protection System (SEPS) designed to
counter artillery and mortar proximity fuses. A similar device should be
developed to counter ATGM�s.
To
reduce vulnerability to enemy air, the battalion should have an Air Defense
Platoon based on the LAV-AD.
Do not adopt as the primary combat vehicle of the
battalion the LAV-APC armed with a small caliber weapon.
The primary combat
vehicle of the battalion should carry a 25mm or 30mm cannon in order to provide
sufficient support to the dismounted infantry force and kill the enemy�s
supporting vehicles before they close to within 1,000 meters.
Some Other
Thoughts
As
we adopt the LAV organization, it will provide a distinctive footprint on the
battlefield, giving the enemy a vital clue about what type organization he is
fighting. WE should convert most, if not all, reconnaissance organizations to
the Medium Battalion Organization to deny the enemy knowledge of what type
organization he is fighting. Behind its reconnaissance screen, our force
could be airborne, air mobile, light, mechanized, or medium infantry and the
enemy would not know for sure until he was in the main battle area.
Specifically, we should consider some of the following options:
Convert
all battalion and brigade scout platoons to LAV-25 fighting vehicles.
This would
standardize training for scouts and provide more firepower to the
battalion.
With the reduction in maneuver companies from four to three, this would
give the scout platoon more capability in the counter-reconnaissance
fight.
Convert
the divisional armored cavalry troops to LAV-25s. This would again provide the
armor force some measure of standardization in training across the force as well
as significantly increase the combat power of these organizations.
Convert
the 2nd ACR to a LAV-25/LAV-AG structure as soon
as possible.
It should be third in priority to the IBCTs and would again improve
training across the armored force and provide increased combat power to the
corps commanders.
A Name
I
propose this organization be called Dragoons. Historically, dragoons were
mounted infantry, using their horses to get to the battle and then dismounting
for combat.
Much of the strength of this organization, regardless of what combat
vehicle is selected, will be in its infantry and this name will give them a
heritage and name that emphasizes their importance.
Bibliography
Armor in World War II: American Armored
Doctrine, http://www.geocities.com/CapitalHill/Congress/1418/armor4.htm
Bernstein, Lewis, Army Experimental
Formations and their possible influence on the Establishment of the Force XXI
Experimental Force, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, KS
October, 1996.
Demarco, Lou, Mechanized Cavalry
Doctrine In World War II, http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/Quarters/9517/page65.html
Gable,
Christopher R, Leavenworth Papers Number 12: Seek,
Strike, and Destroy: US Army Tank Destroy Doctrine in World War II, Combat
Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
KS, September 1985.
Gordon,
John IV, and Wilson, Peter A., The Case for Army XXI
"Medium Weight" Aero-motorized Divisions, a Pathway to the Army of 2020,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA. May
1988.
HMS
Hood Association, Origins of the Royal Navy Battle
Cruiser, http://www.geocities.com/SoHo/Workshop/2966/history/BCorigins.html
Riggs, Scott, Strike Force:
An Independent
Proposal, (Personally published by Major Riggs and provided to the
author.)
US Army Armor Center, Brigade Combat Team Website, http://knox-www.army.mil/center/mwfi/index.htm
Program
Manager, Light Armored Vehicles, http://www.tacom.army.mil/LAV/
PM, Firefinder Shortstop Electronic Protection System
(SEPS), http://www.monmouth.army.mil/prjbk97/pmfiref/17-9.html
USMC,
MCWP 3-14 (Coordinating Draft), Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance
Battalion, Department of the Navy, Washington, D.C., January,
2000.
About
the Author
Mike Robel is a lieutenant colonel in the Army Reserve,
with 16 years of active duty as an Armor Officer. He served in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment as a tank and cavalry
platoon leader and a cavalry troop executive officer patrolling the very edge of
the Free World along the border between East and West Germany. His other service
was in the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)
{The Big Red One} in Fort Riley, Stuttgart, Germany,
and the Persian Gulf, where he commanded companies in all three brigades of the
division and served as a battalion maintenance officer, battalion supply
officer, battalion assistant operations officer, division armor training
officer, division assistant operations officer, and as a brigade supply officer.
After leaving active duty, he worked for Logicon Advanced Technology as a database manager for
the 87th Exercise Division in Birmingham, AL and
managed the 2nd ACR�s simulation center in Fort Polk, LA, where he used
the Army�s Corps Battle Simulation, Battalion-Brigade
Battle Simulation, and JANUS.
He is now a Knowledge Acquisition and System Test Engineer working
on WARSIM 2000, which is the Army�s next generation
battle simulation.
He has played board wargames since he was 8 years old (Avalon Hill�s U-Boat), and computer wargames since Avalon Hill�s MIDWAY for the TRS-80
Computer. He worked for Intracorp/360 for a year as
the 360 Product Manager and was involved in the
final production of HARPOON 2 (ADMIRAL'S EDITION).
He has play-tested and developed scenarios for a plethora of wargames including
HARPOON CLASSIC, HARPOON II, V FOR VICTORY, STEEL PANTHERS, GREAT NAVAL BATTLES, ULTIMATE MILITARY SIMULATOR
II, PATRIOT, TANKS, and HIGH COMMAND as well as
Army simulations.
He has been published in a variety of publications
including STRATEGY PLUS, www.cdmag.com, COMMAND Magazine, Armor, Infantry, Military Review, and Army Times on a variety of computer games and various
historical and contemporary military and historical topics as well as a strategy
guide for TANKS!
He now lives on Merritt Island, Florida where he has a
front row seat for space shuttle launches and the beach.
Endnotes
[1]
The LAV III+ is larger than the Marines LAV-25 at the cost of amphibious
capability but it has heavier armor than the M2 Bradley.
[2]
TACOPS is a commercial wargame developed by a retired Marine Officer.
It assigns
lethality values to each weapon.
[3]
BCT is similar to JANUS is look and feel, thought it is a wholly commercial
product.
[4] A
BTR-80/T-80 organization was used as the basis for this evaluation because the
author felt if the medium weight battalion could stand up to it, it would have
no problem with other less capable threats.
[5] In
TACOPS, there is no LAV-III AG combination. It can be assumed that should the US
Army buy the LAV III, an Assault Gun version would have equal armor to the
infantry support carrier.
[6]
Probability of hit at the given range / armor penetration at the given
range.
[7]
While the AGS and the LAV-AG both have a 105mm gun, in TACOPS, the LAV-AG only
has a 2500-meter range while the M8 has a 3000-meter range.
This difference is
probably due to fire control.
[8] In TACOPS, the
only weapon possible is the 7.62mm Machine Gun.
[9]
The Pk is a rough estimate from the armor penetration ability of the weapon
against the armor rating of vehicles in the
scenario.
Return to Introduction
|
