 The Perfect Soldier: Special Operations, Commandos, and the Future of Us Warfare by James F. Dunnigan
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Dirty Little Secrets
Fear and Loathing
by James Dunnigan June 6, 2006
Discussion Board on this DLS topic
The new Iraqi government, finally
assembled six months after the elections for the new parliament,
finally gets to work. The long negotiations were a reminder, to both
Iraqis and foreigners, that democracy isn't easy, and Iraqis don't come
naturally to the give and take required to make it work. Americans in
Iraq, especially those who go outside the wire to fight or aid in
reconstruction, get a bit of culture shock once they see how Iraq
functions in its natural state. Unlike the United States, trust is in
short supply. This makes cooperation difficult, and violence a
convenient alternative. Much more than the U.S., this is a gun culture,
and always has been. While there is also a tradition of palaver and
negotiation, it is backed by the potential for violence. Many Iraqis,
raised on regular exposure to American movies and TV shows, think that
the United States is the same. There is some disappointment, and not
just about the violence, when Iraqis learn the truth.
The
truth is that Iraqi is a beat up society that has not yet decided where
it will go, and who will lead the move. That's why it took so long to
form the new government. The new Iraq requires a lot of Iraqis to get
familiar with new realities, and try to adjust to them. The main new
realities are this;
- The Shia
Arabs, who are about 80 percent of the population, are in charge for
the first time in five hundred years. That takes some getting used to.
But the Shia Arab community is split into many factions (mainly
tribal), which generally line up as either pro-theocracy (religious
dictatorship like in Iran) or pro-democracy. Nearly all Shia Arabs
agree that it is most important that they remain sufficiently united to
keep the Sunni Arabs from taking control once more.
- Sunni Arabs, the main supporters of Saddam Hussein (and many more Sunni
Arab tyrants before him) may be out of power, but thousands of them,
mainly men who used to work for Saddam, want back in. Not a government
job, but the government. Control. To these men, the Shia Arabs are a
bad joke, and will sell out the country to the hated (by all Arabs)
Iranians. Many Sunni Arabs are Islamic conservatives, and no fan of
Saddam, but they agree with the concept of Sunni Arab supremacy, mainly
because they consider the Shia form of Islam to be heretical. And
heretics must recant, or die. Sunni Arabs are only 15-20 percent of the
population. They used to be closer to 20 percent, but increasing
numbers of Sunni Arabs have been fleeing the violence, and Iraq. Most
missed are the middle and upper class Sunni Arabs who form the backbone
of the Sunni Arab community, and the Iraqi economy and business
community. Harassed by gangsters and terrorists, these Iraqis are
giving up on the new Iraq, at least for now, and heading to nearby Arab
nations or, for the most disenchanted, the West. To many Kurds and
Sunni Arabs, all Sunni Arabs should be expelled from Iraq. For these
bitter victims of Saddams decades of abuse, Sunni Arabs have been the
cause of most of Iraqis problems, and don't seem to have changed their
attitudes much since 2003. But many Sunni Arabs have changed their
attitudes, and are trying to work out deals that will give them a place
in a democratic Iraq. But first, the Sunni Arab community has to purge
itself of its thugs and gangsters. This isn't easy.
- The Kurds are not Arabs, and don't really want much to do with Arabs,
be they Shia or Sunni. For the Kurds, the Arabs have been nothing but
trouble. While the Turks (who ran things for some five centuries) were
bad, the Arabs (who took control of Kurdish northern Iraq in the 1920s)
have been worse. The Kurds won't say it unofficially (they will
unofficially), but all they want is the northern oil fields (or just
the right to control new wells), and as little to do with Iraqi Arabs
as possible. The Kurds share one thing with the Turks, a loathing of
the Arabs. The Turks, who tend to be very disciplined and businesslike,
considered the Arabs more prone to factionalism and vendetta. An old
Turkish adage warned about getting involved in the affairs of Arabs.
This is one bit of Turkish culture that the Kurds agree with.
Meanwhile, however, they have to pretend they believe in a united
Iraq.
- The Americans won't go as
long as there are Islamic terrorists in residence. The Americans would
like Iraqis to settle all their differences, and live in peace and
prosperity, but mainly the Americans want Iraq, and the rest of the
Middle East, to stop plotting violence against the United States. The
Americans are, the Iraqis fear, prepared to stay as long as it takes.
Moreover, the Americans know a lot more about what goes on in Iraq than
they let on. American intelligence has collected, and continues to
collect, a lot of information on what Iraqis are up to. American
advisor teams are present in every Iraqi battalion, and these men
report a lot about the Iraqi troops they are advising. All this
information is analyzed to provide a remarkably accurate picture of the
state of Iraqi politics, and society. It's largely kept secret, lest
the process be corrupted by politics and media manipulation. What the
U.S. intel picture shows is that the Iraqis are making progress, but
it's slow going. There are so many traditionalists, or vested
interests, that resist change, and resent the American presence.
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