IIRC, from Bill Slims memoirs of the Burma campaign, each Japanese divisional unit was expected to fight for 2 weeks before pausing and another unit took over the fighting. They were supplied with 2 weeks ration per man before being deployed. No real thought was given to the logistics train and there were vastly fewer troops assigned to that role than was the norm in the allied armies. Consequently, as the Japanese advanced further into Burma, the supplies for the frontline troops dwindled and what was shipped forward was focussed mainly on ammunition.
Slims tactics were to retreat to defensive positions on the India/Burma border and to fight them to a standstill: until they were out of ammunition and food. At Imphal, he based that defensive line on an airfield so that he could fly in all the supplies he needed and at the same time it offered the enemy a tempting target to aid their own resupply.
His whole tactics at this stage of the campaign was to use this logistics advantage to defeat an army high on success and to show his own troops that the previously invincible Japanese Army was beatable.
I disagree on both points.
Japan German cooperation went as well as could be expected given their geographical separation, particularly after Germany invaded Russia. But there was technological exchange. Japan got form Germany and even components for radar, aircraft engines and even the ME-262 and ME-163. They had prototypes of both flying by the end of the war. Some aircraft like the Kawasaki Ki-61 Hien had German designed engines. Japan in return tried to get as much raw materials as it could to Germany through what were allied controlled oceans. Not an easy feat when consider how much trouble Japan had keeping itself supplied.
Many in Japanese leadership felt that fighting spirit would overcome any material short comings and you cannot fault their tactics given their successes in Indochina, Singapore and the Philippines early in the war.
Granted Germany and Japan may have been able to cooperate more concerning operations in the Indian ocean early the war but looking at it they simply did not have the resources to pull it off given other priorities each faced.
It was a black and white situation. There is nothing ambiguous about the rape of Nanking, biological warfare, medical experiments on humans (to include vivisection), sex slaves etc. The nuking of Hiroshima or Nagasaki killed fewer Japanese than the conventional bombing of Tokyo. The fact that Japan had decentralized their manufacturing into cottage industries made such bombing inevitable. By 1945 Japan had militarized its entire population with children as young has 8 being trained how to ?defend the homeland? from invasion. I would argue that nuking those cities saved some GI from having to kill children coming at him in a Banzai charge. A gun is not particularly concerned about the age of its user and the bullets kill you just as dead be the shooter 10 years old or 100. Hard to point to a "innocent civilian" in those situations.
In the first 10 days of the occupation, over one thousand rapes were committed in Kanagawa prefecture alone. John W. Dower reports that, according to one calculation, the number of rapes and assaults on Japanese women amounted to around 40 a day until the spring of 1946, when the figures rose to over 300 rapes a day due to the criminalization of prostitution.
On April 4, 50 GIs broke into a hospital in Aomori prefecture and raped 77 women, including a woman who had just given birth. It is also reported that the woman's baby was killed during the assault. On April 11, forty US soldiers cut phone lines to a housing block in Nagoya city, and simultaneously raped "many girls and women between the ages of 10 and 55 years."
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