Combined Arms Division ... Part 1

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division ... Part 2 (completed) 6/7/2003 6:49:32 AM

We all know what a division is composed of don't we? Its ok if you don't. Usually you get the standard combat formations followed by "and numerous other battalions". Here is a typical US division. Some of my terms may be dated, so feel free to correct me. There is variation among the composition of the Aviation Brigade and Division Artillery depending on the type of Division, but this works for our purposes. Division HQ and HQ Company Three (3) Brigade HQs and HQ Companies Combat Aviation Brigade Divisional Artillery (DIVARTY Brigade) Engineer Brigade Six (6) Armor Bn's and Four (4) Armored Inf Bn's OR Five (5) Armor Bn's and Five (5) Armored Inf Bn's OR Nine (9) Infantry Bn's (Air Assualt, Airborne, Infantry) Division Support Command (DISCOM Brigade) Military Police Company Division Band Signal Bn Military Intelligence Bn Air Defense Bn NBC Company Lets strip out the units that are in the Combined Arms Brigades and see what we have left. We'll also add approximate number of personnel. Division HQ and HQ Company (200 men) DIVARTY HQ and HQ Company (500) DIVARTY General Support Bn (500) Engineer Brigade HQ and HQ Company (200) DISCOM HQ and HQ Company (250) DISCOM Base Support Bn (250) Division Band (?) Lastly, lets get rid of the units that will be "pushed" up to Corp. Division HQ and HQ Company (350 men) DIVARTY HQ and HQ Company (500) DIVARTY General Support Bn (500) Engineer Brigade HQ and HQ Company (200) DISCOM HQ and HQ Company (250) DISCOM Base Support Bn (250) Division Band (?) That gives me about 2,000 people. Here is what I need. Training Group (300) ... Job is to provide the expertise and maintain the Divisional training facilities used to get a Brigade during its 6 month "training" ready for deployment. This allows the Brigade HQs to do some training themselves. In other words, these are the people who pass on the expertise the other Brigades have learned as well as knowledge from the Army in general. Depot Admin (50) ? Historical archives, museum, personnel admin, etc. Standby (150) ? These are Officers and NCOs who are either assigned outside of the Division or are awaiting assignment within the division. That?s 1500 personnel slots that have been eliminated. There are various ways to accomplish the above. Details of how to do it are way beyond any position I held in the military. The method doesn?t matter, as long as we achieve the same result. A permanent Training Group, a pool of officers and NCOs that can be assigned outside the division and someone to handle the paperwork for the various brigades under the division. Let?s not forget that there is a ?pool? of labor from the Brigade doing its 6 month ?training? that can be used. This includes the recruits fresh from MOS school who during half of the day get to paint rocks and pick up trash, but during the other half go to classes to learn the ?traditions? of the division. And since these are domestic bases, there is a lot to be said for having civilians doing the jobs that a lot of the military people do.

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division ... Part 2 (edited) 6/7/2003 1:25:58 PM

This should have been the "leftovers". Sorry for the mistake. ================================================== Lastly, lets get rid of the units that will be "pushed" up to Corp. Division HQ and HQ Company (500) DIVARTY HQ and HQ Company (500) DISCOM HQ and HQ Company (250) DISCOM Base Support Bn (250) Division Band (?) That gives me about 1,500 people. Here is what I need. ... That?s 1000 personnel slots that have been eliminated. ==================================================

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Thomas RE:Combined Arms Division - Shaka 6/10/2003 8:48:27 AM

If I understand You right You have the following issues: Division is to take over the basic training task from the regiments, and the combined arms BTN is to undertake the task-oriented training. The training today is highly inefficient, as stone-painting contributes little to combat effectiveness. Ad DIV: why not do away with div and let reg do its job: produce combat-ready BTN: four Active BTN to a regiment: 2 fully qualified and ready for action, 1 on rest and recreation - holiday etc., 1 training the new BTN. BTN - 5-8 are reserve regiments. thats the Preussian model. It has worked before. Inefficient training: I concur with that. After 9 months of "training" in the air force light infantry I was as ready as a Home Guardsman af 1 week - I'm unfortunately not joking. The Home Guardsman is NOT combat ready after a week - it takes 2 years of forthnightly training in the unit to be combat ready for the limited task the HOme Guard has.

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division - Thomas 6/10/2003 11:51:26 AM

Unlike European nations or those who follow the Commonwealth model, America doesn't have a "regimental" tradition. There are a handful of US "regiments" that can go back past WWII. Most of those are post civil war. On the other hand, WWII is really when the US Army started its "traditions". There are roughly 89 US divisions from that period, and the current US Army and Marine divisions are based on those units. We also cannot follow the concept of reserve units the same way. Our Army Reserve is equivalent to your concept of reserves, but our National Guard is not. Our National Guard is in many ways a independent military service. Thats why we have to take a different approach. Also, while the Combined Arms Battalions can follow that model you are asking for, I want the Brigade to be the unit that is trained and tested. The practice of detaching battalions for independent operations should not be allowed for those battalions within the brigade. I tried to allow for that by having the ability to have independent battalions or even composite battalions within the division that can be used for those purposes. Especially for the special missions like Peacekeeping.

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division ... Proof it works 6/10/2003 5:28:24 PM

My o My. Either I have access to classified documents, or someone else thinks this is a good idea. While not exactly the way I outlined, this does prove that it works. Also notice the reference to keeping the lower level officers in the same positions. Sounds like the thing I talked about in the Combined Arms Battalion. And guess what the reward was for the guy who made this happen? They fired him. ================================================== An Invisible Revolution Sparked 3ID?s Success As Americans look back on Operation Iraqi Freedom, the most visible aspect of the stunning campaign was the performance of the U.S. Army?s 3rd Infantry Division, whose brave soldiers ? along with hundreds of thousands of personnel from the other U.S. and British units ? deserve our applause for their excellent performance. During Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the division raced again boldly into the heart of Iraq, reaching Baghdad in only three weeks. In terms of distance, speed and time, the division?s pace equaled the great ?blitzkrieg? thrusts of the German Army in World War II. In retrospect, it is no surprise that the American people focused on the period from March 21 to May 1, the duration of the ground combat phase, and to a lesser degree, on the harsh post-combat occupation that continues today. On the other hand, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld and other Pentagon leaders are reportedly concentrating on the technological wonders of the war. They clearly hope to convince Congress for more money to buy even newer weapons and command-and-control systems to further advance the technological transformation of the U.S. military. It is distressing, but no surprise, that neither Pentagon officials nor the American people recognize one crucial factor that led to the 3rd Infantry Division?s stellar performance: A radical shift in the existing U.S. Army personnel replacement system in time of war and supported by then-Secretary of the Army Thomas E. White that allowed most of the division?s commanders and soldiers to remain with their units throughout pre-war training, deployment and combat. For most of a century, the Army has managed, transferred and promoted its officers and soldiers using a production-line personnel system known as the Individual Replacement System (IRS). That system rigidly focuses on the individual soldier or officer, setting arbitrary lengths of assigned tours and creating career development requirements that define who will receive promotions and who will not. The existing personnel system is oblivious to the needs of the service as a whole and to any Army unit?s quality of leadership, deployment requirements and combat readiness. But five months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, White supported steps to ensure that the 3rd Infantry Division would be fully prepared for war. He allowed it to be liberated from the Army?s obsolete and inflexible personnel system to ensure that its soldiers would be commanded by experienced officers and senior NCOs who had served in the unit long enough to master their responsibilities and ? equally important ? to be recognized and known by the troops themselves. Beginning last October, White and Vice Chief of Staff Gen. Jack Keane directed the Army?s Unit Manning Task Force to implement a different personnel program for the Army. Known as the ?Unit Manning System,? the program?s top priority was on unit, rather than individual soldier, needs. Its goal was to maximize unit cohesion ? continuity of personnel within each brigade, battalion, company and platoon ? and unit rotations, where the division?s component units as a whole would train, deploy and fight together over the duration of the campaign. The actions of the personnel community to stabilize the 3rd Infantry Division for combat fortunately paralleled the future vision of White and Keane and also provide insight to where the Army can go when Unit Manning evolves Armywide. In the shorthand of personnel management, the 3rd Infantry Division was ?unit manned by default.? What the Army did to enhance the 3rd Infantry Division?s killing power was not terribly complicated: As the division began preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it waived a number of peacetime personnel practices which otherwise would have seriously undermined unit cohesion and combat effectiveness: * Keeping the commanders: The first step was to extend command tours of key division leaders beyond the normal tenure of 24 months. A prominent example was that of Lt. Col. Terry Ferrell, commander of the now famous 3-7 Cavalry Squadron that was so well documented by Ted Koppel of ABC News. Ferrell took the reigns of his command Jan. 5, 2001. When his unit crossed the ?line of departure? into Iraq on March 21, 2003, he had been in command for 27 months, and the soldiers benefited from his extensive experience. Had the Army not waived its Individual Replacement System, Ferrell would have been arbitrarily relieved by another lieutenant colonel just 90 days before the start of combat, thrusting an untested stranger into command of the squadron. This was not an isolated case. Throughout the 3rd Infantry Division, commanders at the battalion and brigade level had at least eight months in command before going to war. Many had 19-20 months in command. Also, all commanders had had either a rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) or substantial field training in Kuwait before the commencement of combat operations. Eight commanders were extended. (The Army planned that many of these officers could rotate out this summer after the war had ended. * Protecting critical staff: Equally important, the unit manning effort guaranteed that critical staff positions were also stabilized. These included battalion and brigade operations officers and executive officers, intelligence officers, supply officers and fire support officers at all levels. * Continuity of junior leaders: Down at the junior officer level, several lieutenants were promoted to captain before the division crossed the line of departure into Iraq. Critically important, those junior leaders were not mindlessly transferred out, but were retained in their platoon leader or executive officer positions. The White-Keane initiative recognizes that their experience in a combat unit heading to war was more important to the Army than individual career progressions. * Unit training and deployment: Yet another element of the personnel ?revolution? involved how the 3rd Infantry Division trained and protected the stability of its component units. The division?s actual deployment to Kuwait began in a ?unique manner,? as one officer at PERSCOM described it. Movement began with a series of Deployment Operations Orders (or DEPORDs) for the pre-planned Operation Desert Spring exercises in Kuwait starting in early spring 2002 ? a year before Operation Iraqi Freedom itself. This form of ?stealth buildup? enabled the division to get into theater and perform normal Kuwait defense field maneuvers months ahead of time. The division?s 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) was in Kuwait from March 2002 to September 2002 for its six-month Operation Desert Spring rotation. The 2nd BCT arrived in September 2002. Thus, both brigades had six months of intense ? seven days a week, later evolving to five days per week ? training that focused on gunnery and company/team-level exercises. The 1st BCT did not arrive in Kuwait until January 2003, but it had conducted a two-month NTC rotation that ended in November, followed by one month of focused training in Kuwait. Other division assets, such as the 3/7 Cavalry Squadron, arrived in Kuwait in January 2003, but it was well-trained and led by then. (The squadron also had participated in a very large NTC rotation with the 2nd BCT during March-April 2002.) The division?s aviation brigade had had large elements in Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Spring during

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division ... Proof it works (the rest) 6/10/2003 5:31:33 PM

(continued) The division?s aviation brigade had had large elements in Kuwait as part of Operation Desert Spring during February-June 2002. * Avoiding loss of experienced troops: The Army implemented a ?Stop Move? order in January 2003 that held in place all 3rd Division soldiers who were scheduled for reassignment during the duration of the anticipated mission against Iraq. This preserved in the division?s ranks more than 200 officers and 1,700 soldiers who otherwise would have transferred out at that critical time. Military Reporter Sig Christenson of The San Antonio Express-News was embedded with one of the division?s task forces during the campaign. Christianson recalled how all the soldiers he met remarked about the level of trust between commanders and soldiers that had been established through months of training and living together. It is critical for future Army combat effectiveness that the Defense Department and Army leaders recognize that this was not something that automatically happened. The cohesion and morale of the troops that led them to operate and fight so effectively was a direct consequence of the Army scrapping its outmoded and self-destructive personnel policies. The 3rd Infantry Division?s success, unfortunately, exacted a toll on the rest of the Army, which continued (and continues) to use a personnel system focused on individual replacements to the detriment of unit strength and stability. In fact, turnover in other units was even higher due to other commitments and contingencies ? something the White-Keane initiative is trying to resolve. Just as deploying one brigade of a division impacts the remaining two brigades, deploying three Army divisions for Operation Iraqi Freedom, coupled with ongoing operations in Afghanistan, severely disrupted the rest of the force. The yearlong period of readying the 3rd Infantry Division for battle essentially involved the first two phases ? the ?train up? and readiness phases ? of the revolutionary three-phase unit manning system that the Unit Manning Task Force is examining for the Army of the 21st century. (The third phase is where the unit redeploys and disbands, turns in its equipment, sends soldiers to schools or non-combatant but essential duties around post, and prepares a new cadre of leaders for the next new unit cycle). Twelve days before he was ousted as Army secretary on Apr. 26, 2003, White spoke of the unit manning initiative: ?Why [unit man] do it by default in time of war? Why not all the time?? It would be a tragedy for the Defense Department and the Army to ignore this invaluable ?lesson learned? from Operation Iraqi Freedom.

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macawman Soviet Combined Arms Army ... organization 6/10/2003 6:41:02 PM

The Soviet Army was organized very similarly to your proposed structure. In the "Great War" a full strength Soviet Div would go forward into combat leaving the XO and a small cadre to bring the follow-on Div up to strength. The Soviets let their Divs attrite down to less than 30% before they then replaced the whole Division with the follow-on Div. I do not recall how long this took to compete the cycle. I'm sure it depended a lot on operational neccessity.

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Thomas RE:Combined Arms Division - Shaka 6/11/2003 3:42:42 AM

You can generally call me anything You like, except an early riser. 1. Wether you call it REG or DIV is indifferent to me, so long the task is done. It might be the politically smart thing to do, as You have proven the superflousness of the DIV in the intended role - it just might work - politically. Maybe I haven't paid enough attention, but: 2. How do you propose to integrate the National Guard units? Leave them to secure supply-lines and peacekeeping as integrated BDE in that role? That would make a lot of sense, as the task is radically different from combat. The composition of these forces would be different: More Light Infantry on trucks, more hospitals, more engineers, more administrators - hell some of the guys might even be doing what they were educated and trained for professionally!

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division - Thomas 6/11/2003 1:24:26 PM

The difference in Regiment and Division is important here. Thats one of the reasons the COHORT system failed here. It was modelled on the British Regimental system, and at the lower levels worked fine. But as soon as Division got involved, everything went to hell. Thats another story. National Guard... this is where it gets tricky. As I mentioned, the National Guard is not under the control of the Federal Government. Its under control of the State Government. I don't know if you have anything similiar to that. So I have tried to keep enough flexiblity in my system to account for this. Certain National Guard brigades are designated as "enhanced readiness brigades". In the event of a war, they are suppossed to be able to reinforce the Regular Army. For political reasons, there is a Congressional Mandate that forces the Regular Army to provide a "divisional HQ" for two (2) National Guard divisions. It has none of the combat support and service support units a division needs, but its the law. There are 5,000 to 10,000 Regular Army guys tied up in this. There are 15 "enhanced" brigades. So here is what I would do. We have 10 Active divisions, each one can receive a NG "enhanced" brigade. The existing Division depot has officers and NCOs who can supervise those NG brigades when its time for thier weekend duty. Those five (5) remaining Brigades depends on the following. I would have the mandate removed, then simply add those five (5) extra brigades to five (5) of the existing 10 active divisions. If I couldn't remove the mandate, I would stand up two (2) regular Army divisions or the two existing NG divisions and model them as Divisional depots. That allows me to eliminate the positions left over from the current 5 to 10,000 men minus what I need for the two (2) depots. There are quite a few other units that could use the manpower. Now we come to "peacekeepers". I would have each divisional depot "stand up" a composite battalion for peacekeeping duties. They can be volunteers from the National Guard and Regular Army. I believe 30 day training is all that is required. Equipment wise they have trucks, APCs, armored cars, etc. No tanks. These Battalions, along with Engineers, Civil Affairs, Medical units, etc can now perform the required Peacekeeping missions without effecting the readiness of the regular combat brigades.

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11b10 RE:Combined Arms Division ... Part 1 6/11/2003 2:39:24 PM

How does your brigade rotate back from overseas are all Corps HQs in the States.

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11b10 RE:Combined Arms Division ... Part 1 6/11/2003 3:18:22 PM

Or does the Brigade rotate to FORSCOM.

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division ... 11b10 6/11/2003 3:30:12 PM

Good point. As you know, we have Corps and Army HQ's. They can be consolidated. I would like to think that merging them with other service commands can result in "Joint Commands", but thats way beyond my personal knowledge. Combined Corp/Army... would have some in the US, as well as a few postioned overseas like now. Example , currently we have a Corp HQ in Korea and a Army HQ in Japan. Station the "combined" Corp HQ in Japan and forward deploy elements of it in Korea (until we pull out). To clarify a point, the "ready" brigades don't have to be deployed overseas. They can stay within the US. Can even get fancy with the way equipment is pre-deployed. Example, have the equipment for three (3) brigades in Europe. One brigade can be permanently deployed in Europe, training with NATO and others, while being a onsite "guard" for the other two brigades worth of equipment. If required, fly in two brigades worth of personnel, and you know have three (3) brigades worth of troops. Give them a few weeks to "aclimate" (as in get the gear ready as well as getting used to the area), and they should be ready to go.

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Thomas RE:Combined Arms Division - Shaka 6/12/2003 2:54:45 AM

Let me see, if I get this right: You have 2 NG division, that are not division; but a lot of BDE that are attacted whith staples to regular divisions? When do they train together? they must to pretend to UNITS! How do you propose to train the other units: Supply people, medical units, signal units and so on - it is not immediately apparent to me, that they fit in to the combined arms concept? I just have a sneaking suspition, that if I were a combat engineer, I would have liked to train with the armoured BTN, I was bridgelaying under fire for. Peacekeeping Do You mean 1 month training on top of basic 6 months? I disagree with You on the tank issue. The peacekeepers in Bosnia sure loved those Leopard 1 in Tuzla. They were used under operation B�llebank (roughly translated: Thugbuster). I would attach a squadron of medium to brigade level as a reserve when poppa gets really disappointed, not mad; but disappointed. How is this for size: 1 BDE = 2 BTN light INF 1 BTN Engineeres 1 BTN medics (3 hospitals, not only surgical) 1 BTN MP (or shore patrols) with a heavy linguistics section. The problem with an area like Iraq is the infrastructure is destroyed. Not so much due to war, though the odd housing project might be a bit dented, but through mismanagement. Look at the old eastern european states. To control an area after the battle, you need to ferret out the Al Qaida, the Saddam supporters, bend officials and other riff-raff. The easiest way to do it, is through denounciation from the local population - and belive me you are far more likely to get that cooperation from a man, whose wifes diabetes is treated. Then, when you got the information, you send in the sore feeted with an attitude.

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Shaka of Carthage RE:Combined Arms Division - Thomas 6/12/2003 9:40:01 AM

There are ten (10) NG divisions (?). These are mirror images of the typical division I outlined, in that they have the combat support and service support units. I think they are more varied than they are typical. All of the people in these divisions are NG. Remember now, that includes everyone upto the division HQ's. Then there are the 2 NG divisions that have Regular Army Division HQ, but no combat support or service support. Finally, the 15 "enhanced" brigades. All of the above are under control of the State. Thats one reason the Regular Army doesn't like the NG, cause it can't tell them what to do. Think about that, any thing the Regular Army asks them to do to improve efficiency, the NG can ignore or say no to if it wants to. The real problem is that the Regular Army cannot get rid of NG officers it feels are incompetent. Currently, the "enhanced" brigades are the only units the Regular Army really has any influence over. My system would change all that, and put the 15 under direct control of the depot. But those other NG divisions, I would leave alone, since its a political battle that probably can't be won. NG schedule is one weekend a month, then two weeks a year. I guess the only time a NG "division" gets together is during that two week time frame. Ain't it grand to be rich? Supply, medical, signal, etc... all those guys would be within the combat units. Combined Arms Brigade has one (1) Support Battalion that has Medical, Maintenance and Supply/Transport formations. The Military Intelligence, Military Police, Air Defense, Chemical, Signal companies are with the Brigade HQ's. The Engineer Battalion would have a company attached to each Combined Arms Battalion and the Engr Bn HQ would be attached to the Brigade HQ as part of the staff, to provide Engr expertise. If the Engrs are a 4 company Bn, that 4th company would be at Brigade HQ level. Peacekeeping trainig... Yes. From what I understand, before any unit goes on a Peacekeeping mission, they get roughly a month of training. I assume its along the lines of "this is a peacekeeping mission, so don't shoot anyone". I see your points about the tanks. I guess my point is why do I need a tank? For the armor protection? Intimidation? If I have them, couldn't Light Tanks or Armored Cars do the same thing? If so, then can't a Bradley IFV perform that role? Once I got the answer to those questions, I agree that having a Battalion of them as well wouldn't be bad. But I don't want to take tankers from my regular combat units. And if its tanks, I now have a problem in where they are coming from. Our "Composite" Brigade could contain the units you described. But remember, we can be very flexible here. If I need six (6) infantry battalions, I would ask six division depots to raise a composite battalion each. Then attach them to my "Composite" Brigade (probably be better off calling it a "command"). Same with Engineers, Medical, MPs, I can attach whatever I need. Only the infantry Battalions have to be trained as "Peacekeepers". The other units are "independent" units, outside of the divisions, that would be doing what they normally do, so no "special" training needed. And the US has something called "Civil Affairs" units. I have no idea what they are composed of. I keep meaning the look them up, but never get around to it. I gather they are some sort of "composite" infrastructure rebuilding unit.

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Thomas RE:Combined Arms Division - Shaka 1 6/13/2003 4:53:07 AM

In the incident I was referring to they were against tanks, so light tanks won't do, neither will Bradleys. So Nope. (Come back later for the rest of your answer)

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