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Subject:
LEADERSHIP: Jessica Lynch Was Not Prepared for Combat
Texican
8/18/2003 2:55:15 PM
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Mr Guillory,
I agree there were leadership failures here but I think you're looking in the wrong place. Go back to the accounts of PFC Lynch's fellow soldiers which stated that their weapons were so jammed with sand they would not fire. It had nothing to do with aiming, driving, or qualifications, but BASIC TRAINING which teaches that that no matter what, a soldier's weapon weapon must be properly lubricated to prevent rust. The problem is that this very necessary rule does not take into account exceptionally cold environments (Korea in winter) or exceptionally sandy environments (Iraq and the KTO) in which a soldiers weapon can fail to function due to even normal levels of lubricant use and that is what happened here. Further the same tale is told by various combat units as well (a story from a Fox News analyst who was a loader in an Abrams during Desert Storm being unable to close the ammo door as he went into combat because it was clogged with sand, thus endangering his tank and crew is typical of this, and he was TRAINED for combat). A few extra minutes of instruction on when NOT to lubricate and how to strip the old lubricant out of the weapons could have saved lives or at least given the 507th a fighting chance before they ever got near the enemy.
Furthermore, if you and the grunts on the ground in Iraq want someone to blame, might I suggest the S-3 who didn't properly plan the use of MP's at key intersections that might have prevented this incident from occurring the in the first place? Traffic control is their job after all and if it wasn't worked into the planning, we should ask why. How about flank security elements, could a 10 second conversation when in doubt have saved lives?
Before we in our comfortable homes and offices go second guessing the grunts on the ground too hard, let's also factor in a few other things. First of all, like most support elements, it's always understrength (meaning more work and longer hours for everyone), and with a major offensive looming as well as the threat of what was believed to be SCUD NBC attacks, the 507th was far too busy preparing both their combat unit and their own equipment to be worrying about whether or not their M16's were properly maintained (perhaps anti-dust bags and ?don't open till you really NEED it or you see rust? instructions might help here?). Fighting is the job of combat units after all, which is why support units don't lead the way. Second, everyone was operating on little to no sleep for the 48-72 hours pre-invasion, degrading their critical thinking skills and ability to function when it counted most. Now factor in route maps with (most likely) no land marks specified and you have the standard formula for wrong turns in unfamiliar terrain (with today's photo recon capabilities and the availability of computer hardware and printing facilities to distribute it, I am strongly tempted to ask why support units aren't provided with some low resolution photos to go with the maps for situations like this). The SNAFU factor is always present, and that day it hit the 507th. I for one am not going to dump too hard on them past what I have said, but if you still think they should have more combat training, I would suggest teaching all support units exactly one unit combat drill: a break contact and return to friendly lines drill that requires little practice and less of a support unit's critical maintenance time.
Soldiers are human beings and there are only 24 hours in the day to accomplish mission critical tasks and if you expect support elements to be able to do their essential jobs and be effective combat soldiers you are living in a dream world, so let the grunts bitch and let the staff officers and instructors conduct a few more pre-combat preparations/training and maybe, just maybe, the problem will take care of itself and we'll save some lives in the process.
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