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Subject:
Analyzing Draft, Exit and Continuity Variables: The Iraq Dilemma
BraddockCaesar
1/6/2006 4:50:02 PM
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Analyzing Draft, Exit and Continuity Variables: The Iraq Dilemma
By Terrance Jones
In a post 9/11 world that has necessitated an increased focus on global terrorism, America led the world in making a significant stand against terrorism by instituting a regime change in Iraq, therefore, severely reducing the possibility of Iraq be used as a storage place and or conduit through which weapons of mass destruction could be strategically moved through the Middle East. Much has been written about our failure to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, however, many fail to mention Sadaam Hussein?s fervent desire to acquire and proliferate weapons of mass destruction that could be used against America and Israel in addition to his regional neighbors and opponents. As Hussein instituted a significant paradigm shift by his willingness to work with diametrically opposed Islamic fundamentalist led terrorist nation-states like Iran and Syria, there is no refuting the fact that declaring war on Iraq was a plausible military option geared towards eliminating the high probability of a Iran/Iraq/ Syria conduit for terrorist training and weapons of mass destruction development, proliferation and placement throughout the Middle East. As we look back on our initial mission offensive strategy, we can not ignore the fact that we now face multiple comprisement factors that will determine the success or failure of our efforts in Iraq.
Diametric Regime Change Strategy (DRCS)
This strategy was clearly based on the fact that their have been few peers to the barbarian manner in which Sadaam Hussein and his henchmen heaped atrocities on the Iraqi population while also threatening the regional neighbors of Iraq. However, we have learned a valuable lesson in regards to successfully implementing a DRCS. We
based our strategies on the optimist view that an Iraqi population that has been oppressed for decades would be disciplined enough to free itself of partisan compliance with national and cultural policies and doctrines that would set the Iraqi citizens up for oppression of a different and more systemic sort. Iraq has a Shiite Muslim population of between 60-70%. Hardliner Shiite insurgency leaders have control over the majority Shiite Muslim voting bloc in Iraq. These are the same Shiite insurgents who launched attacks against American coalition forces who liberated them from Hussein?s oppressive regime. As if this is not bad enough, the majority Shiite voting bloc in Iraq is heavily influenced by Shiite fundamentalist led Iran. Iran and Syria publicly announced their reciprocal diplomatic and military relationship with each other last year. Iran?s influence over the Shiite majority Iraqi government facilitates the Iran/Iraq/Syria strategic triumvirate that we wished to avert. We have allowed some of Hussein?s Baath party members to participate in the new Iraqi government. This leads us to the question of why did we not resort to a more concentric/diverse Iraqi nation building strategy that could have been facilitated by a more strategic paring down of the Baath led Iraqi government infrastructure? We clearly made a mistake in placing our hopes on a people that will need decades to truly ascertain what is good for themselves and their nation after decades of oppression.
Hard Pursuit Strategy
Our chosen IMOS strategy was geared towards instituting a diametric regime change and swift transferal of authority to Iraqi officials. What actually transpired was a complete diametric regime change and a swift transferal of authority to Iraqi officials while under attack from insurgent forces from regions and provinces within Iraq. In modern times, there has never been a military conflict that has employed this type of strategy without the continuity and containment benefits of a hard pursuit strategy. There have been significant casualty projection implications concerning these factors in regards to America?s military forces in Iraq, as America?s military forces have sustained twice as many casualties in 2004(486) and 2005(845) than they sustained in 2003(841).
*Note
The problems noted in the diametric regime change and hard pursuit sections of this essay bring us to the realization that our mission in Iraq still presents significant obstacles in the form of strategic variables which must be decisively addressed in order to ensure that our significant efforts and sacrifices have not been in vain:
Region Specific and Global Implications of our Mission in Iraq
As is always the case in theatre engagements between opposing forces, the war in Iraq has dramatically affected global and region specific actions by our adversaries and competing nations:
Example
Russia has become a public supporter and proxy war ally of Iran through the nuclear technology they are sharing with Iran. It is clear that Russia is willing to accept being seen as an ally of Iran who clearly is using the nuclear technology they are getting from Russia to accelerate their nuclear weapons program that experts project could facilitate a functional nuclear weapons capability in a time frame as early as a few months. The proliferation threat posed by Iran threatens to destabilize the Middle East. This scenario have damaging effects on multiple regions across the globe who depend on Middle East resources from either Iran or its neighbors who could potentially become a part of the Iran/Iraq/Syrian alliance. Some would suggest that it is premature to imply that Iraq is significantly influenced by Iran, however, all one has to do is ascertain and reconcile the fact that Iraqi leaders are pushing for a full U.S. withdrawal of forces in the next year in addition to Iraqi leaders publicly stating that they will accept Iran?s offer to train its military forces upon a U.S. withdrawal of troops. These factors increase the possibility of a continued U.S. presence in Iraq and or a military option to attack Iran or Syria in order to prevent the threat of nuclear proliferation and the spread of terrorism terrorist nation-states who harbor terrorist organizations.
Example 2
The strategic relationship between Russia and China cannot be ignored as it affects the diplomatic, economic and military options of both Russia and China in the Middle East and on the Korean Peninsula. China and Russia have contributed significantly to the missile technology program of Iran that has a functional means of dispersal awaiting any success by Iran in obtaining nuclear weapons capability. China has provided little success in convincing its North Korean ally to roll back its nuclear weapons capabilities that threatens its regional neighbors. In fact, a strong case can be made that China has used its leading role in the 6 party talk?s debacle to expand its diplomatic, economic and military influence over Southeast Asian nations. It is hard to refute the possibility that China?s non threatening posture towards a seemingly non progressive North Korean nation that has achieved global military viability due to its nuclear weapons capability has played a major role in convincing 9 Southeast Asian nations to become a part of a China led economic coalition that can facilitate an environment where these 9 nations can attempt to achieve global viability of a military nature similar to North Korea?s position as a nation with a nuclear weapons capability in addition to obtaining diplomatic and economic viability similar to China?s expansion rate. These factors have a dramatic affect on America?s ability to neutralize North Korea?s nuclear capabilities, as America would have to consider military options that are expansive, highly exertive and protracted by the most rational of threat assessments.
*Note
The high probability of ?reasonable occurrence? factors presented in examples 1 and 2 expand the list of variables to be considered in regards to our current mission in Iraq, regional appreciation initiatives must be weighed against short and long term factors that can dramatically threaten America?s strategic interests in region specific areas across the globe.
After Action Review Factors
As with any war, some of America?s initiatives were not realized due to anomalies and miscalculations. However, the commitment, competency and professionalism of America?s military forces have allowed America to adjust to ?theatre occurrences? in Iraq. This has allowed American commanders to assess what has and has not been successful concerning our current mission in Iraq. American commanders now have the daunting task of acknowledging and effectively addressing the following threat variances in Iraq:
Triumvirate Conduit for Region Specific and Global Terrorism (Post U.S. Forces Withdrawal) - The current situation in Iraq presents significant obstacles for American commanders in regards to our short and long term plans in regards to our mission in Iraq. Wahabi (Al Qaeda), Sunni and Shiite fundamentalists have clearly decided that Iraq is big enough for all of them to accomplish their operational initiative concerning their wish to see American forces withdraw from Iraq. The Shiite insurgents in Iraq have even displayed their willingness to allow Sunni and Wahabi attacks on secular Shiites to go unpunished due to their relationship with Iraqi Shiite leaders who hold a majority share of parliamentary seats in the Iraqi government. This is clearly a paradigm shift between three diametrically opposed Islamic sects that have been unable to work together in this manner. A U.S. troop withdrawal that occurs without disarming and disbanding these insurgency factions will lead to an environment where the Shiite insurgents will use the cumulative effect of the highly exertive measures of all three factions to ensure that the Shiite(non-secular) majority will strengthen their strategic relationship with Iran and Syria. This will form an expansive regional bloc with which the strategic triumvirate can be used as a conduit for the training and deployment of terrorist in addition to reducing the transparency of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by this Iran led triumvirate.
Principle Based Transferral/U.S. Withdrawal Initiative
?The Vietnam conflict often is portrayed as proof of a lack of American resolve, but for over a decade the United States remained involved in a war that some of its leading decision makers, such as Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, initially assessed as unwinnable unless the South Vietnamese could be inspired to take ?effective action.? This shows how difficult it is to estimate the will of an opponent.?
Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II
?Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths?
The above quotes by Dr. Echevarria II have very clear correlations to America?s current mission in Iraq. While much has been reported concerning the Iraqi forces ?improved? capabilities in regards to taking over the task of providing security in Iraq, a clear and transparent assessment must prove that Iraqi forces are capable and ?willing? to provide the type of stability that is in the best interest of Iraqi citizens and its regional neighbors. Iraqi forces must prove that the physical training they have received from American instructors is guided by principles that will free Iraqi citizens from the oppression they have known for decades. Once again, while much has been stated about their physical ability to take over the tasks of securing Iraq, nothing has been proven in regards to their willingness to neutralize the threats to Iraq?s security and stability. Iraqi leaders have publicly stated their intent to let Iranian forces take over the training of Iraqi forces. Iraq?s willingness to engage in diplomatic and military reciprocity with Iran puts Iraq and its regional neighbors in danger in addition to having the potential to affect diverse regions across the globe due to the natural resources of Iran and Iraq that are depended on by nations all over the world. Sunni and Wahabi insurgents are attacking secular Shiites on a continuous basis with the apparent approval of Shiite insurgents who wield significant influence over the Shiite leaders who hold the majority of the parliamentary seats in the Iraqi government. The reality of the matter is that Iraq?s leaders have not shown the willingness to let their word or actions prove that they are capable and or willing to display ?effective action? against the enemies of peace and stability in Iraq.
Deficiency Based Reversion Strategy
"I don't think the president ever takes any of his options off the table concerning anything to do with military force," Rice said.?
"I don't know how to speculate about what will happen 10 years from now, but I do believe that we are moving on a course on which Iraqi security forces are rather rapidly able to take care of their own security concerns," Rice responded.
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice
Rice: U.S. May Still Be in Iraq in 10 Years
By ANNE GEARAN, AP Diplomatic Writer
The Iraqi leadership?s unwillingness to commit to a policy of principled change in regards to its toleration of terrorism within its borders and its alliance with terrorist nation-states like Iran and Syria has made the unthinkable highly probable and necessary to provide security and stability to Iraq and the Middle East. Any failure by the leadership to commit to disarming the Sunni, Shiite and Wahabi(Al Qaeda) insurgent factions operating in Iraq, insures that an exponential set of threat variables will exist in and amongst Iran, Iraq and Syria. A set of threat variables of this type has the potential to cause a generational cycle of 2 decades of insurgency based rebellion the insurgency factions noted and provocative proxy war aggression from terrorist nation-states like Iran and Syria. We can not ignore Iran?s considerable influence over a significant amount of Iraqi leaders and insurgent groups. Al Qaeda presence in Iraq will surely increase the threat of strategic and doctrinal reversion in Iraq to an oppressive regime under the cover of a seemingly democratic form of government in an Iraq that is not deterred by American coalition forces. Al Qaeda?s 60 nation global networks will increase the strategic ascension of an Iran led triumvirate in the Middle East. Iraq would be capable of dispatching three divergent fundamentalist sects within Iraq and throughout the Middle East and across the globe if they so desired through Al Qaeda?s network. Russia and China?s strategic assistance and alliance with Iran increases the ease with which these scenarios could occur. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice could not have used a more appropriate term when she spoke of the tepid (half hearted) abilities of the Iraqi security forces. A withdrawal that clearly empowers our enemies demand that we entertain the option of implementing a deficiency based reversion strategy that will allow us to keep a controlling contingency force in Iraq. This type of initiative allows American commanders the latitude to correct deficiencies that are bound to develop due to Iraq?s relatively limited exposure to a democratic form of government. These deficiencies are compounded by the uninspired manner in which a significant amount of Iraqi leaders have addressed the noted threats to peace in Iraq and the Middle East that pose significant obstacles to Iraq?s democratic form of government in its infancy stages . This type of initiative also clearly gives American commanders military options that will allow us to prevent Iran from realizing their dream of acquiring a nuclear weapons capability in addition to allowing them to ensure that the Middle East remains stabilized through whatever engagement variances are necessary to protect American interests in the region. In this scenario 10 years is nothing compared to the alternatives of an undeterred Iran led triumvirate that includes a significant Al Qaeda presence.
*To be continued
Next: More variable and more importantly, solutions.
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