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Subject:
Thinking About the Unthinkable (Part Two Excerpts)
Jonzey
3/8/2007 8:48:06 AM
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Twelve Nonissues and Twelve Almost Nonissues (Excerpts)
(From Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980?s, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, pp. 23-35; © Hudson Institute)
January 1, 1990
by Herman Kahn
*Additional Notes and analysis by Terrance Jones
Deterrence must fail eventually, and probably will fail totally.
There is no way we can ignore this possibility. But many doomsayers argue that since it might fail, it eventually has to fail. This is technically incorrect, but not entirely unreasonable (unless it assumes that the failure must be total). My guess is that nuclear weapons will be used sometime in the next hundred years, but that their use is much more likely to be small and limited than widespread and unconstrained. Deterrence would then have failed?but not totally. This is why the following points are so important.
Jones Note
Deterrence Failure Theory (Total)
Based on the prevalent logic of nuclear warfare, one would suggest that a total deterrence failure is when nuclear exchanges have simultaneously taken place in two or more areas or regions. These types of attacks have the potential to spark a catalysis effect across additional regions due to flashpoint intervention variables and precepts. There are those who also would suggest that this type of scenario is not a total deterrence failure, but a predetermined battle scenario that can be won. Thus, a deterrence failure that is total is based on semantics or opposing views of logic to many strategists and military planners. This reality puts a significant amount of credence on the topic of partial deterrence failures through limited nuclear exchanges.
Deterrence Failure Theory (Partial)
While Dr. Kahn clearly believes that the limited use of nuclear weaponry represents the partial failure of deterrence, there is theoretically alternative view concerning the same.
Example:
Limited Nuclear Exchange Paradigm (LNEP)
The parameters of limited nuclear exchanges will definitively clarify the success or failure of deterrence. The possibility of a nuclear exchange has been present from the inception of the ?atomic age.? Theoretically, because of this fact, the failure of deterrence should not be based on a nuclear exchange, as this type of occurrence is inevitable. However, the failure of deterrence must be judged on the limited nuclear exchange paradigm (LNEP) that is tasked with providing manageable nuclear conflict capabilities to responsible members of the international community. The LNEP is tailored to combat the regionally based proliferation threats of the current ?age of proliferation.? Russia, China, North Korea and Iran either have or are dangerously close to having a functional nuclear arsenal. In fact, Iran is the proxy war subordinate of both Russia and China, therefore making the success of their nuclear program highly probable in the near future.
A nuclear war can be reliably limited;
There is no possibility of a limited war.
No one can guarantee that either of these predictions would accurately describe an actual nuclear war. In some circumstances, some kinds of limited nuclear war are clearly possible. There are very large and very clear "firebreaks" between nuclear and conventional war. In nuclear war, the primary firebreak might be "no attacks on the homeland," the next might be "no attacks on cities," and so on. Both sides may choose to observe these firebreaks, though no one can absolutely guarantee they will. But one also cannot be sure they will be totally flouted.
Jones Note
There are divergent circumstances that will determine the feasibility of whether or not nuclear exchanges can be reliably limited or if that particular scenario is impossible. We first must come to the realization that a nuclear exchange can only be limited in a reliable fashion as long as the society of nuclear nations can be contained in regards to expansion. This strategy has kept the world safe for over five decades, however, the time has come for us to also realize that proliferation is inevitable, as the current society of nuclear nations differ on matters of economics, war and diplomacy. These variables have caused irresponsible acts of complicity concerning the sharing of nuclear technology between seemingly responsible nuclear powers and rogue and terrorist nations. This reality has brought about an environment where there is a very small window for controllable yet limited nuclear exchanges. Note the following:
The Nuclearization of Terrorist Nations
As a proxy war subordinate of Russia and China, Iran already enjoys a significant amount of influence and control over events in the Middle East. Iran also has a considerable amount of control over terrorist operations across the globe. Iran is very close to obtaining nuclear weapons due to the aforementioned proxy war relationship with Russia and China that has given them peripheral benefits through technology sharing and economic treaties with the same. An Iran with nuclear weapons would have the ability to destabilize the Middle East at will in addition to setting a precedent in regards to becoming the first fundamentalist nuclear power to operate independent of the United States of America. Pakistan would be under immense pressure to sever ties with the U.S. in order to maintain a strategic pace with Iran in regards to influence in the Middle East. This would affect both the current war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq, as US troops would be faced with inserting a considerable amount of combat forces that would dwarf the current projected force level of 21,000. These are threats that we will have to consider for the next several years, therefore, placing America in an unenviable position of maintaining its combat posture in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The cumulative effect of these variables encourages and enhances the aggressive stance of Iran and possibly Pakistan in the future in regards to proliferation and flashpoint intervention issues throughout the Middle East.
There can be no victory in nuclear war (i.e., "nobody wins a suicide pact")
Jones Note
While many would suggest that a widescale nuclear exchange would be tantamount to a suicide pact, the fact remains that victory is never impossible in war. One or more sides will go to and through a significant amount of theatre based realities to achieve victory. It is uncommon for opposing forces to reach a breaking point at the same time, as the variables of war are ever changing and thus these same variables will mean different things to all parties involved. Flashpoint intervention factors are chief catalysts for victory in such scenarios.
Example
Regional Catalysis: Iran vs. Pakistan
As Iran rapidly derives economic, strategic and tactical benefits from the technological assistance it receives from China and Russia, they are ever closer to defying the realm of possibilities in regards to their nuclear program and their increasingly influential status in the Middle East. Conventional wisdom suggests that Iran should not be a threat to Pakistan?s strategic dominance over the Middle East due to Pakistan?s nuclear arsenal that is currently believed to be in the neighborhood of 48 nuclear warheads. However, as previously mentioned, flashpoint intervention factors could easily put Iran
in the drivers seat in a strategic sense upon their becoming the second fundamentalist Islamic nation to develop a nuclear weapons capability. As a proxy war subordinate of Russia and China, Iran is poised to challenge Pakistan for regional dominance due to Pakistan?s alliance with America that is sure to advocate restraint over reciprocal aggression in policy and or action. In fact, Iran is counting on this initial reaction while also preparing for the alternative, as their strategy of aggression is also steeped in the belief that they can force Pakistan away from their alliance with America through actions similar to the Shia/Sunni based conflict in Iraq. This alternative would put China and Russia in the role of mediator while polarizing American interests in the Middle East. The cumulative effect is that both China and Russia would gain an equally influential and powerful ally (Pakistan) in regards to proliferation based endeavors in the Middle East. This is but one example of how regional catalysis can lead to eventual victory in a nuclear exchange. It is also important to mention that with the continued peripheral and covert backing of China and or Russia, Iran could use its terrorist alliances to force Pakistan away from its alliance with America by inflicting only several thousand casualties due to the volatile internal environment in Pakistan if Iran is not decisively deterred by coalition forces. These casualty numbers are extremely minimal for actions that will dramatically affect the proliferative posture in the Middle East.
Either the United States or the Soviet Union could rely on victory.
These issues have become a morality test: to say that "a nuclear war might be limited" or that "there might be a victor in a nuclear war" is to label oneself as a nuclear war hawk (one who seeks to start a nuclear war) or a defender of similarly monstrous positions. To me, it is outrageous to make a morality test out of a realistic and important observation?and both of the quoted remarks are realistic and important. It is incorrect to say that victory in nuclear war is impossible. It is especially possible if either side, or both, have low levels of nuclear forces that are vulnerable to destruction through creative or clever enemy tactics. Unfortunately, it is even quite conceivable at current levels of nuclear armament?but neither nation is likely to choose to go to war just because it has developed some ingenious war plan that might work; the risk is too frightening, and the present governments on both sides are too prudent and cautious. However, that differs from saying that victory could not happen. Indeed, some reasonable facsimile of victory could be achieved even by a nation forced into war. The Soviets, for example, won the war started by Nazi Germany despite suffering 20 million deaths and losing a quarter of their capital stock. It is unwise to judge realistic analyses and preparations as a lust for war. There are no two sides to the nuclear debate: no one is "for" war; everyone is against it?some categorically so and others only to the degree that it does not result in an even less desirable alternative.
Jones Note
The regional catalysis example preceding this section clearly proves that Russia believes it can rely on sound strategy for victory in a nuclear exchange.
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