The Implausibility of Nuclear War: A Comparative
Analysis
By Terrance Jones
Military planning for nuclear war is greatly
complicated by the difficulties one encounters in
conceiving of plausible circumstances for its
outbreak. The difficulty lies mostly in two
developments:
1.deterrence seems to be working; and
2.world leaders have a basic disinclination to go to
war, or
even to run great risks.
Jones Note
While expert analysts have clearly subscribed to
talking points one and two, the realities of war have
always thoroughly refuted those who believed in the
implausibility of nuclear war. The low intensity
conflicts of the 1980s have proven to be the precursor
to the asymmetrical, theatre specific battles that
threaten to destabilize multiple regions across the
globe as more and more nations gain access to nuclear
weaponry through technological advancements or proxy
war relationships. There have always been plausible
reasons to plan for a nuclear exchange. Note the
following:
Example
?World leaders have a basic disinclination to go to
war, or even to run great risks?
Any and all deterrence initiatives that are based on
the above quote will only yield short term results and
stopgap measures. There are those who would suggest
that over fifty years of deterrence is very good,
however, fifty years is not that impressive when
considering how volatile the current age of
proliferation really is. Rogue and terrorist nations
(North Korea, Pakistan) currently have nuclear
arsenals that pose severe threats to their regional
neighbors. These nations have also set a precedent in
regards to rogue and terrorist nations establishing
their own nuclear weapons programs. Because of these
developments, it is highly probable that a nuclear
exchange will be initiated by one or more of these
nations within the next decade or two.
For the first time in history, external aggression is
one of the least effective ways for a nation to
increase its wealth, power, influence, or prestige. In
fact, the pressures against war, and especially
against nuclear war, tend to be overwhelming.
Kahn, ?Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s?
Jones Note
Clearly, well over 20 years later, the above quote has
proven to be relevant in every sense of the word, as
nations like Russia and China have adopted its
holistic principles as a means to facilitate their
expansionist agenda. However, the region specific and
global threat of terrorism increases the risk factor
for nations who forego participatory roles in
counterterrorism endeavors in order to benefit from
Dr. Kahn?s ?neutrality? based approach to
international relations. Neutrality does not work in
the current age of proliferation due to the fact that
there are too many participants and variables to
assess as well as address in a decisive manner. Note
the following:
Example
Regional Efficacy of Terrorist Nations/Organizations
The threat of terrorism has allowed terrorist nations
to emerge as regional powers fully capable of
acquiring nuclear capabilities through proxy war
alliances, technology sharing and or terror based
activities be they covert or overt. These variables
have led to precedent setting political victories for
terrorist organizations like Hamas and Hezbollah in
Palestine and Lebanon. These groups and nations are
firmly positioned to receive strategic assistance and
support from both globally viable nations like Russia
and regional powers like Iran and Pakistan, therefore
bringing proliferation factors into the picture
through the aforementioned variables that will benefit
heavily from flashpoint intervention factors as well.
The Middle East is but one example of how strategic
efficacy can prosper in neutrality based environments
that are devoid of any semblance of a formidable
coalition opposition force.
Almost all analysts believe that the enormous
prospective risks of a central nuclear war-even one
that did not escalate to mutual annihilation-would
normally prevent decision makers from considering it a
practicable option.
Kahn, ?Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s?
Jones Note
Widespread proxy war relations between globally viable
nations with nuclear arsenals and despotic nation
states with terrorist ties and inclinations have
dramatically increased the possibility and probability
that a central nuclear war will take place in the near
future. The participants in this unholy alliance need
such an occurrence to take place in order to
reconfigure the balance of power abroad.
Theoretically, nations like China and Russia have much
to gain in scenarios where their proxy war
subordinates use region specific conflicts to become
catalysts for flashpoint intervention factors that
will spark a nuclear war after a lengthy period of
asymmetrical warfare with an American led coalition
that could conceivably force a total withdrawal of
coalition members who wish to preserve their current
standing in the world through concessions rather than
endure a risky nuclear exchange.
?Some defense experts accept the existence of a
?window of vulnerability,? a hypothesis that the
Soviets have, or soon will have, a significant
strategic advantage over the United States that
supposedly makes this country particularly vulnerable
to certain kinds of Soviet nuclear attacks.?
Kahn, ?Thinking about the Unthinkable in the 1980s?
Jones Note
Theoretically, there are several strategic options
that Russia appears willing to employ against the
United States, therefore giving Russia strategic
advantages concerning nuclear attacks. These options
are based on increased Russian activity be it overt or
through proxy war provocations. Note the following:
Task Facilitation
This strategy is base upon the assumption that a given
nation can stretch the forces of its enemy across a
diverse spectrum of the globe individually or through
the use of its proxy war subordinates. Russia has
clearly benefited from this strategy in regards to
their being able to convince American defense experts
that the Russian threat is serious enough to warrant
the realignment of America?s strategic forces in
Europe as part of a global effort that is geared
towards building an asymmetrical warfighting posture.
Theoretically, to form an asymmetrical warfighting
posture in one region is tantamount to doing the same
in all other regions, as balance is needed to sustain
such a strategy. Therein, task facilitation is
facilitated based on threats that have not been fully
articulated or implied by the enemy through tangible
acts that can be deemed as against the peaceful
inclinations of any region of the international
community. These factors lead to costly
reconfigurations and mobilization variables that will
exert major strains on vital American interests abroad
before a single strike has been executed.
Proxy War Provocation
Task facilitation will always lead to proxy war
provocations. This is why switching to an asymmetrical
warfighting posture is extremely risky, as these
reconfigured forces must be maintained across the
globe without verifiable threats or the implication of
the same. In the current age of proliferation, proxy
war provocations can be extremely lethal and
debilitating because of the new precedent and paradigm
that has conventional and globally viable nations with
nuclear arsenals taking on rogue and terrorist nation
states as its proxy war subordinates, therefore
increasing their ability to stretch the asymmetrical
forces of their enemies. These capabilities can be
extremely difficult to counter from a asymmetrical
warfighting posture that in many cases can be forced
into self defeating exertions in regards to costs and
strategic deficiencies.
Strategic Points of Intervention/Attack
When considering nuclear strategy, task facilitation
and proxy war provocations in many cases will lead to
flashpoint intervention at which a nation like Russia
will have strategic advantages because of the
aforementioned variables of task facilitation and
proxy war provocations and the deficiencies of
asymmetrical warfighting postures. Because the
paradigm that has seen a fundamentalist/terrorist
nation become a member of the world?s society of
nations with a nuclear arsenal has been set, the
strategic partnership between Russia and rogue and or
terrorist nation states will give Russia the ability
to wage nuclear attacks against American interests
from conventional and asymmetrical positions,
therefore having the potential to negate the numerical
superiority of America?s nuclear arsenal. These
factors validate the assertion that Russia is more
dangerous today than they ever were in the past when
their thinking was more rigid and less diverse
concerning nuclear strategy.
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