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Subject:
Mobilization in the Nuclear Era
Jonzey
5/31/2007 11:23:00 AM
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Mobilization in the Nuclear Era: A Comparative
Analysis
By Terrance Jones
Mobilization can play a critical role in the current
U.S. ? Soviet political and military competition. U.S.
(and allied) mobilization capabilities can be used to
?regulate? provocative Soviet behavior and ?correct
for? the consequences of Soviet aggression.
Jones Note
For clarity purposes, let us analyze the above quotes.
Example
?U.S. (and allied) mobilization capabilities can be
used to ?regulate? provocative Soviet behavior?
Kahn, ?Thinking about the Unthinkable?
While mobilization strategies do have containment
properties, we must be careful to realize that Dr.
Kahn makes the assumption that any and all
mobilization strategies will have the participation
and support of our allies. In fact, in today?s
volatile region and global specific theatres, any
mobilization strategy must be preceded by a diverse
coalition that is committed to addressing the daunting
task of waging multiple front operations that may lead
to crises scenarios due to flashpoint intervention
factors. These variables require commitments that can
not be assumed as automatic or guaranteed, as the
current age of proliferation has placed many nations
in an unenviable position in regards to risking their
regional and or global standing for a strategy that
could possibly set their nations back decades due to
the possibility of a nuclear exchange. One must only
look to the current two front wars that America is
fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan to realize how
dangerous it would be to attempt to mobilize a
?regulatory? strategy of control and containment
(without significant allied support) against an
unengaged Russian enemy with allies that range from
competitor, rogue to terrorist nations with nuclear
weapons capabilities spanning across diverse regions
of the globe. A standoff of this nature threatens to
sever the current relationship between Pakistan and
America due to pressure from other Muslim nations who
are currently threatening to align themselves under
Iran?s leadership in the Middle East.
Nuclear war is unlikely to be started by a
bolt-out-of-the-blue surprise attack. Instead,
?protracted crisis? is the most likely prelude to war.
Kahn, ?Thinking about the Unthinkable?
Jones Note
It is imperative that we realize that much has changed
since the above quotes were made decades ago. There
are several variables that refute the above
assessment:
Terror based Nuclear Precedent
The moment that Pakistan became the first terror
sponsoring nation to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability, the probability of an out-of-the-blue
nuclear attack increased a hundred fold. In fact, this
type of threat is a major reason that Pakistan was
allowed to further develop their nuclear arsenal. This
threat is currently being opposed as America remains
committed to making sure that Iran does not become the
second state sponsor of terrorism to acquire a nuclear
deterrent capability.
Proxy War Threats
The precedent that was set by Pakistan exponentially
increased the threat of proxy war based provocative
actions by terrorist nation states who took on the
role of the proxy war subordinates of globally viable
but competitor nations like China and Russia. This
unholy alliance has set the stage for out of the blue
attacks as well through proxy war related flashpoint
intervention factors.
Exertion Strategy (out of the blue attacks)
The cumulative effects of the terror based nuclear
precedent and the proxy war threats is the
facilitation of a multi regional exertion strategy
that seeks to pose threats to vital U.S. interests
abroad simultaneously, therefore setting the stage for
out of the blue attacks of a strategic nature after
variable periods of exertion based threats. |
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