Guys what you think are the days of antu tank artillery numbered. I mean now days we have much lighter equipment that take out tanks, also we have the swift tank hunter killers, you know hummvees with ATGMs (cant remember the official name)? So what you guys think?

gets down to theatrev situation - eg, if you had a UAV running FAC, and you had the distance and capability, you could use guided MLRS. The russian battlefield doctrine looks at using battlefield rockets and MLRS as anti-tank weapons for massed formations. anti tank artillery is just a variation of the above. if the distance is right, the co-ordinates are right, and you have the capacity to engage at a distance, why would you bother exposing troops to getting in close and personal? In FIBUA situations, the ATGM etc is a whole lit easier and more likely to be able to do the job -unless you intend to level the neighbourhood with a "shotgun approach". so - it's situation specific.

I wont dispute your point (Im not armed with the facts). Maybe I just have trouble imagineing a ceramic could possibly provide the protection of depleted uranium. Call me an old guard; Im outdated :))

Easy way to settle this, one of you lot in the UK can attend this conference and fill in the blanks for the rest of us. :) Dear Mr xxx, The Conference will address the key Military's Armour & Anti-Armour requirements in relation to current and future Military operations from an operational and unit level perspective. It will also look at rapid deployment concentrating on lessons learned from recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. This Conference will focus on the changing nature of land warfare and the advances and developments that are being made in both armour and anti-armour munitions. It will look at tank's survivability using active protection systems. It will also examine the recent and future developments that are driving research and development for armour and anti-armour technologies. Benefits of Attending: * MAXIMISE your understanding of armour and anti-armour future requirements * GAIN invaluable insight into the status of armour and anti-armour programmes * EXPAND your knowledge of system developments * INCREASE your awareness of country-specific advances * DEVELOP key contacts through this focused networking forum A unique opportunity to learn from leading military and industry experts including: * Brigadier Ian Rodley, Director Equipment Capability, Ground Manoeuvre, Ministry of Defence, UK * Brigadier General Martin Rutledge, Director Royal Armoured Corps, British Army * Colonel Erich Lang, Section Chief Armoured Vehicles, Ministry of Defence Germany * Colonel Curtis McCoy, Project Manager, Combat Systems, US Tank Automotive & Armament Command * Colonel Mike Beasock, Infantry System Manager, US Army TRADOC * Colonel Anders Carell, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters * Lieutenant Colonel Chris Shalosky, Product Manager, FCS Special Programs, US Army * Professor Manfred Held, Scientific Adviser, EADS * Dr Bryn James, Group Leader Physical Protection, DSTL * Major Paul Moore, Project Officer, Anti-Armour Systems, US Marine Corps * Christian Herren, Director of Innovation and Quality, RUAG Munition * Gerald Lefebvre, Business Development - UK & Germany, GIAT Industries * John Davidson, Business Development Manager, Alvis Vickers Please scroll down to view the Conference agenda Day One – 18th February 2004 8.30 Registration & Coffee 9.00 Chairman's Opening Remarks Professor Richard Ogorkiewicz, Visiting Professor, RMCS, Cranfield University OPENING ADDRESS 9.10 The future of land warfare and British Army engagement capability * Examining the future of armoured forces * UK initiatives to prepare for future armoured combat * The tank in the modern battlespace * Tank modernisation * Improved protection * Capability for the future: requirements and responses Brigadier Ian Rodley, Director Equipment Capability, Ground Manoeuvre, Ministry of Defence, UK LESSONS FROM IRAQ THE IRAQI WAR AND THE RENAISSANCE OF THE BATTLE TANK 9.40 Case study and lessons learned * Overview of operations * Modifications implemented before engagement * Necessary improvements identified * Lessons learned - tank armour - munitions and armaments - all arms integration * Considerations and developments for the future Brigadier Martin Rutledge, Director Royal Armoured Corps, British Army US MECHANIZED FORCES BATTLEFIELD DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FROM THE IRAQI WAR 10.20 US tanks and AFVs in the Iraqi War * Army readiness in Iraqi War - mobility - lethality - survivability * Investigating the warfighting capacity * Operational assessment Colonel Curtis McCoy, Project Manager, Combat Systems, US Tank Automotive & Armament Command 11.00 Morning Coffee VEHICLE SURVIVABILITY AND PROTECTION DEFENSIVE AID SUITES 11.20 Integrating DAS within AFV design * Evaluating technical and tactical performance - optimum combination of technologies - correct tactical employment * Improvements in battlefield effectiveness * Developments of operating procedures * Design, construction and integration of a DAS * Key features and requirements for future systems Lieutenant Colonel Luc Petit, Directorate Land Requirements 3, National Defence Headquarters, Canada REACTIVE ARMOUR AND AFV PROTECTION 12.00 New concepts and world-wide developments * Developments of reactive armour * The threat of shaped charge warheads * The benefits of add-on armour * Required protection against Kinetic Energy (KE) attack * Recognising and preparing for all elements of attack * Evolving threats to AFV’s and possible protection developments Dr Manfred Held, Scientific Adviser, EADS 12.40 Networking Lunch ELECTRIC ARMOUR 1.40 The armour of the future? * Protection requirements against RPG’s or other shaped charged warheads - recognising and reducing the threat - the demand for lighter armour * Background of the ‘Pulsed Power’ system * Benefits and limitations * Areas of development * Implementation Dr Bryn Jam

No well trained adn well armed enemy would be on mike_golfs and True North hill. They would be behind that hill firing indirect PGM on the ACR tanks and other AFV. But the tanks and helicopters can't hurt them. If the angle is wrong even the howitzers can't hit this well concealed enemy (just the mortars, they always can). Battalionsized or regimentsized attacks would be answered with whollys of PGM delivered by artillery rockets or tube artillery; maybe we can add some fiber optic missiles or armed UAV. Line of sight engagements between an ACR and and dug in infantry are a battle of the past. All we need is some imagination.

Your arguement leaves out mobility.. they are only "behind" the hill from one direction. You are also assuming that your "beyond the line of sight" sensors are work as advertised.. and are not jammed, fooled, or PGMed into oblivion. The MK I eyeball is still often the most effective "sensor" on the battlefield. UAV's are vulnerable targets (they just haven't been used against an enemy thats really geared to deal with them) Ground / Air radars can be jammed and fooled.. Thermal sensors can be fooled... etc.. What would happen to your light infantry / towed artillery / light vehichles if Mikes ACR got to that LOS engagement range? Just something to think about...

joe6pack wrote: What would happen to your light infantry / towed artillery / light vehichles if Mikes ACR got to that LOS engagement range? They would evade. They would try to avoid a duel situation. They would look for another stelthy observation point (next forest or town), maybe behind a river or a marsh to be safe for the ACR line of sight weapons. And countermeausures are likley to eleminate some PGM and some net centric warfare capabilitys (especially emitters), but most will do there job. And that will inflict casualties the ACR could not sustain.

The first problem is that TrueNorth picked a current scenario to put up against heavy cavalry. And then, to compound the problem, he chose a scenario that fixed his forces in both time and space. Once he did that he had no real hope of standing up to heavy cavalry. Now Clausewitz, on the other hand is trying to match a future force to a current force. This would be no different than me stacking up a modern US ACR against a WWII era unit. Of course I'm going to easily dominate and destroy them. At least against TrueNorth's theoretical force I will take signficant casualties achieving my objective. My objective, by the way, was not the same as his. He wanted to keep me from "taking the hill" and I wanted to destroy his force as an operational force. His infantry is optimized for the objective he chose, but mine is optimized for the objective I chose. Now, the problem that Clausewitz will have, if I did take a year 2000 ACR against his year 2020 force of the future is that IF I can find and fix his force, which is quite possible, he is in serious trouble. But, in the scenario Clausewitz posits my objective is no longer to destroy his force operationally. Instead it will be to fix him and find his logistics and headquarters. He is going to be very dependent on them for his operations and if I can fix his manuever force while driving the battle deep in both time and space he is in trouble. By doing so I can potentially get inside his decision cycle. Now, if we decide that over the next 20 years first line states will develop new technology to enable heavy cavalry to continue to use mass and mobility effectively the scenario changes. I believe this will happen, looking back in history we see time and again where everyone decided the day of the heavy cavalry was done and then the paradigm changed yet again. So, if we opt for a scenario where technology advances on both the firepower and mass/mobility side of things, then I am right back to my original objective. The destruction of Clausewitz' force as an effective operational threat. Obviously this means that my cavalry is able to operate effectively in a PGM rich environment. They might take losses but they won't simply be swept aside. This means that the cavalry can do what it should. Use fire and manuever elements to find and fix the enemy while using a deep strike element to operate in depth against the enemy, creating the ability to shift to a battle of manuever and pursuit.

I admit that mike_golfs ACR will prevail if heavy cavalry could operate in an PGM rich envrionment. We don't know if this "if" will come true. And obviously my force and it's technology don't exist today. But we are on the way. Look at the first line countries armies around the world. They develop new UAV, net centric warfare capabilities and PGM to create the force I used in the scenario (therefore no really new tanks). TrueNorth light infantry with ATGM and tube artillery will have no chance against an 2020 future force too. If detected modern artillery rockets with cluster munitions would kill them quickly. Immobile tube artillery and infantry can't resist this ammount of fire. And bunkers on that hill fall victim to PGM. By the way. It would be possible for mike_golfs ACR to find my future force. But nearly impossible to fix it while constantly taking fire by my PGM. The future force is mobile too. So they can evade duel situations aginst the ACR tanks and destroy them by observation and PGM without giving them a chance to even fire back (they just won't see a target). Line of sight weapons have no chance against none line of sight weapons if the terrain allows some concealment.

"Line of sight weapons have no chance against none line of sight" True, but as mentioned earlier - the F-4 was a prime example of this thinking. But when the beyond the line of sight fight failed, not being able to adequately defend yourself in LOS combat prooved fatal. The military is all about redundancy. If one thing fails, have something else to back it up with. Why I like holding on to Mikes ACR is that technology will give it more power. The assets assigned to it may change somewhat.. but it would also own the same PGM's and such that it would be vulnerable to( if in lesser quantity than Clausewitz's notional future force). The redundancy here is, that if the beyond the line of sight failed... Your fall back is 60 tons of armor and a 120mmm HEAT round. Instead of a thin skinned 20 ton vehichle that a dismounted infantryman with an old school RPG could disable / destroy. Yes the future ACR may cost more and be harder to move around... but whats more improtant? high cost and winning, or lower cost and potentially loosing?