|The New York Times is reporting that the US military is getting set to publish a new field manual on counterinsurgency. The effort was headed-up by Lt. Gen. David H. Patraeus and Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, while Col. Douglas King and Lt. Col. John A. Nagl apparently played a major role in drafting the new doctrine (for those that are interested, Nagl is also the author of "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife:Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam"). The manual, which is scheduled to be released next month, outlines nine "Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency:"
1) The more you protect your force, the less secure you are.
2) The more force used, the less effective it is.
3) The more successful counterinsurgency is, the less force that can be used and the more risk that must be accepted.
4) Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction.
5) The best weapons for counterinsurgency do not shoot.
6) The host nation's doing something tolerably is better than our doing it well.
7) If a tactic works this week, it might not work next week; if it works in this province, it might not work in the next.
8) Tactical success guarantees nothing.
9) Most of the important decisions are not made by generals.