For crying out loud, you are talking about an underdeveloped country reeling under 10 years of sanctions, with no significant air force, air defense, or navy.  Further we had been flying over their territory at will with zero casualties for 10 years, didnt even control all of their own territory, and fielded ill-trained conscripts primarily armed with light weapons. Yes, it was *very* much like Mike Tyson knocking out a 12 year old.

As for Thunder Run, yes, I've read it.  Same with Heavy Metal, which covers much of the same material.  Both are entretaining reads - and clearly illustrate my point.  *One* brigade riding on M1A2s, shoots up any opposition they meet along the way (most of whom didnt realize what was going on until they were looking at the business end of a 120mm barrel), and within a month were driving their tanks into Baghdad.

 

What does the strength/skill/quality/whatever of the opposition have to do with anything?

because in EUs mind, the strength of the opposition is somehow correlated with the morality of the army. Double standards, immoral equivalency, etc. that somehow is supposed to delegitimize the effectiveness of our military, and to denigrate the WELL-THOUGHT out plans of our commanders. Very simple, you see.

 

 

swhitebull

Actually it means alot. There was no doubt the US would overwhelm the Iraqi military. No one in their right mind could imagine the Iraqis being able to repel the invasion. The US had superiority in technology, air power, land power, quality of troops. It does not take a great general to win a war when everything is stacked in your favor. 

 

Turkey did undermine us as no nation or "ally" had ever undermined us. I fully believe their refusal to allow the 4th infantry division into the war directly led to troop shortages and we should hold them responsible especially for some of the chaos and anarchy after the invasion.  Either way, Turkey should not ever be considered an ally of the USA.

LTC Yingling wrote the article as a general critique so that the system of grooming and selecting general officers gets fixed.  It is broken, and General Franks is an example of why it is broken.  Officers are rewarded and promoted from O1-O6 based on their tactical performance, primarily.  Time spent away from troops is considered dead space in your file, and so developmental assignments such as civilian graduate school, language training, assignments with other governmental agencies, in foreign countries, etc. are ignored as they aren't a path to the top.  Thus, the first 20-25 years of one's career is shaped and molded by excelling in tactics.  However, you cannot just flip the switch and become someone well versed in strategy, especially when you have over two decades of tactical experience that can skew how you look at problems.  Thus, General Franks is a symptom of the system.

Now, let's look at his mission.  Defeat regime, transition to a stable regime that is a partner in the war on terror.  So, part of General Franks' mission was to ensure a stable government, which includes being prepared to fight an insurgency and manage the after effects of the campaign against the regime.  Bottomline, he didn't get it done, and much of this is due to the fact that he lacked strategic vision and had a poor command climate.  He's not the only one to lay blame on, but, he was part of the problem and not part of the solution.  

So, in the end, General Franks only completed half the mission, and laid the groundwork for many of the problems we face today.

 

BTW, I thought the article was excellent. 

 

What does the strength/skill/quality/whatever of the opposition have to do with anything?

DJ,

The tragedy of OIF is that Rumsfeld/Franks spent over a year refining a plan that cut 2-3 weeks off of the fall of regime.  From Cobra II, Franks is quoted as saying that he originally thought that it would take only 5-6 weeks to topple the regime.  None of the refinements proved to be decisive in preventing some of the worries of the invasion (for example, the destruction of Iraqi oil wells).  Thus, we saved these weeks at the cost of a severly underdeveloped Phase IV plan that I believe is the major factor that we face the morass in Iraq right now. 

The fact that the Iraqi Army was severely overmatched doesn't take away from the courage and skill demonstrated by the units driving to Baghdad, but there was never any doubt about the outcome.  Imagine if the one year spent on the Phase I-III plan, decreasing the time needed to topple the regime by 2-3 weeks, were instead spent on Phase IV.  That is why a discussion of the opposition is relevant.

Shek

Thank you for your response. EU was just making his usual cut and paste statement - for political reasons - in an attempt to denigrate the military, and without any background or understanding of what he posted from a military POV. He played a bogus logical hand, and could not respond with any knowledge of what he posted except to say nyah nyah nyah.

You, on the other hand, present a succinct, excellent military analysis, to which I can understand and admire - and can see the context in which you write.  This is the type of argument I can read and draw my own conclusions from, since you address the specific problems, with details, and devoid of political rhetoric, innuendo, and hyperbolic recitations. His mission was to make it morally reprehensible that the US dared to beat a 3rd rate power, and therefore tarnish the accomplishment, so nothing the US armed forces accomplished mattered. That is what I object to - this moral equivalency crap of his. It's transparent of him, and a craven approach.

 

swhitebull  -   job well done, Shek. Thankyou.

 

 

I can see where a lot of criticism is warranted for the senior military leadership. The US military is a huge government bureaucracy ... of course it's inefficient and rewards those that focus on continuing the perpetual inefficiency. Most people call that job security. However, I can't seem to shake the feeling that a lot of that criticism is a subtle attempt to make the buck stop about halfway up the chain of command.

 

I'm sure most of y'all read Gen. Frank's book. I know my opinion of him was considerably lower after I finished it. He came across as far from inspiring and way too concerned about conveying what a bad ass he seems to consider himself to be, to me at least. That made me go back and reconsider my view of his actual performance ... and I think, for better or worse, that attitude was apparent in his conduct of the ground campaign.

Now, let's look at his mission.  Defeat regime, transition to a stable regime that is a partner in the war on terror.  So, part of General Franks' mission was to ensure a stable government, which includes being prepared to fight an insurgency and manage the after effects of the campaign against the regime.  Bottomline, he didn't get it done, and much of this is due to the fact that he lacked strategic vision and had a poor command climate.