RUSSIA-INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC TRIANGLE CONTOURS EMERGE: An Estimative Analysis
by Dr. Subhash Kapila
The prospect of a Russia-India-China strategic triangle?s emergence has been the subject of continuing analysis by political and strategic analysts ever since Russia mooted the proposal in the late 1990s. The emergence of such a triangle, if and whenever it takes place, would alter the global strategic balance in a strikingly significant manner.
A well-acknowledged fact today is that not only the global economic centre of gravity has moved to Asia but also that the global strategic centre of gravity too is in the process of decisively moving towards Asia . The emergence of a workable Russia-India-China strategic triangle would mark the culmination of such a process.
The emergence of a Russia-India-China strategic triangle would herald the arrival on the global strategic calculus of a ? TRINITY OF THREE ASIAN POWERS? all of whom are nuclear weapons states and combining preponderant military strength. Two of them are Permanent Pembers of the UN Security Council. Two of them, India and China have witnessed remarkable economic growth. Obviously, this would raise hackles in world capitals, and subtle attempts will be made to thwart such an emergence.
The meeting of the Russian, Indian and Chinese Foreign Ministers in Vladivostok in the beginning of June 2005 is an indicator that Russia , India and China are seized actively in exploring the prospects of such a strategic triangle. Admittedly, it cannot emerge overnight but one cannot also dismiss the fact that contours, however faint presently, have begun to take shape.
In international relations and ?realpolitik?, the approaches to regional and global strategic balances keep changing with the changes in the strategic formulations of the major powers and the inter-se relationships amongst these powers. Therefore , the emergence of a Russia-India-China strategic triangle, therefore, does not seem to be all that far-fetched or inadvisable. The international strategic dynamics are impelling Russia , India and China to move in the direction of such a strategic combination.
Before moving further into the analysis, it needs to be recorded that the major contributory factor which impels Russia, India and China to explore the prospects of a joint strategic triangle lies in the United States unilateralism, its propensity to seek military solutions to global security issues outside the framework of the United Nations and its selective approaches on issues of global terrorism, nuclear proliferation and strategic delinquencies of its regional protégés.
After the end of the Cold War, President Bush Sr. promised the world a ?New World Order? and ?peace dividends? in its wake ensuring peace and stability. Today, the world perceives that what President Bush Jr. is engaged in is a ?New World Order? fashioned and crafted to serve American national security interests exclusively, even if regional stability in differently parts of the world is disordered.
Russia , India and China, in different ways are being faced with regional challenges, generated by United States strategic policies. Hence the urge in these three major nations to explore convergence of strategic interests amongst themselves.
The Joint Communiqué issued after the meeting of the Russian, Indian and Chinese Foreign Minister at Vladivostok on 2 June 2005, reflects this urge.
Vladivostok Foreign Ministers Meeting of Russia-India-China Foreign Ministers Joint Communiqué (2 June 2005) Analysed:
The significant points incorporated in this Joint Communiqué are:
?The ministers reiterated that the three countries share similar views on the major global development issues in the 21st century, support the democratization of international relations and establish a just international order on the basis of adherence to the rules of international laws, equality and mutual respect, as well as cooperation and promotion of multi-polarisation.(first paragraph of the Communiqué)
?The ministers also stressed that as the most comprehensive international organization, the United Nations should play a central role in this respect.?
?The ministers believed that it is necessary to reform the UN including the Security Council, in a comprehensive manner, to ensure the UN reflects the reality of today?s world and fulfills its functions more effectively.?
?The ministers indicated the willingness to conduct three party cooperation to cope with new threats and challenges. They stressed that any form of terrorism represents one of the most serious threats to international peace and security regardless of its roots and motives. The ministers agreed that the fight against terrorism should be continued unswervingly and no double standards should be adopted.?
?The ministers discussed the prospects of economic cooperation among the three parties, identifying significant potential for mutually beneficial cooperation among China , Russia and India in transportation, agriculture, energy and high-tech industries.?
?The ministers expressed satisfaction with the rapid development of bi- lateral relations between China and Russia , China and India and Russia and India which creates conditions for further development of the three party cooperation.?
?The ministers believed that the meeting in Vladivostok would inject new vitality into the three-party cooperation in areas of common interest. They emphasized that it is in the long term interests of the three countries to enhance the partnership among China , Russia and India .?
On analysis, reflected in the lines of the above incorporations in the Vladivostok Communiqué can be found the following strategic approaches of the three countries:
Russia , India and China , seem to be committed to the ?promotion of multi-polarization in the international order?.
The first paragraph of the Communiqué is reflective of the concerns of Russia , India and China and their dissatisfaction with the existing world order as crafted by the United States .
As opposed to the United States views, Russia , India and China view the United Nations as a ?centrality? in the conduct of international peace and stability.
The reference that ?no double standard should be adopted? in combating terrorism seems aimed at the United States approaches to terrorism in Chechnya (Russia), Xinjiang (China) and Pakistan?s proxy war and Islamic Jehad in Jammu and Kashmir (India).
In the seven paragraphs of the Vladivostok Joint Communiqué (June 2005), there is only one paragraph which emphasizes ?economic cooperation? between the three countries. The remaining six paragraphs are all of a politico-strategic nature. While Russia , India and China have jointly stressed that the Vladivostok Communiqué is not aimed at anyone, the contents betray that the Vladivostok Conference?s main concern was to explore ways and means to address the global strategic imbalance and strategic infirmities generated by United States unilateralism and resultant strategic approaches to international problems.
Vladivostok Conference- The Salient Features:
The Vladivostok Conference (June 2005) has acquired a certain significance for political and strategic analysts because of the following salient features:
Selection of Vladivostok as the venue can be viewed as emphasizing Russia ?s status as an Asian power along with India and China .
In the past the Foreign Ministers of Russia , India and China have been meeting on the sidelines of international conference. Vladivostok Conference was the first ?independent? and ?exclusive? conference to formally discuss the direction and intent of Russia , India and China to enhance the partnership between these three powers on a long term basis.
Some observers view the Vladivostok Conference as the emergence of a new dialogue mechanism in the Asian heartland. It is being termed as akin to the peace dialogue between Russia , France and Germany .
In the economic field, the highest point on the agenda was cooperation between Russia , India and China in the energy sector. India ?s recent emphasis on the creation of an ?Asian Oil Market? system seems to have a certain resonance here.
Despite the promising features outlined above, there are many who view the emergence of a Russia-India-China strategic triangle with skepticism. It would therefore be in order to re-examine the inter-se relationships that have lately developed between Russia-India-China and what it portends for the future.
Russia-India-China Strategic Triangle-Challenges and Prospects:
Russia is the main proponent and moving force of a Russia-India-China strategic triangle. Russia as an erstwhile superpower and the foremost military power (strategic assets) today after the United States , obviously, forms the ?apex? of the Russia-India-China triangle. Russia also has significant bi-lateral strategic relationships with India and China , as the two points at the base of the triangle.
The main challenge to the emergence of an effective Russia-India-China strategic triangle lies at the base of this triangle. India and China , at the opposite ends of the base of this triangle have to forge strong bonding, overcoming the deficit of trust that has existed ever since 1962. Both China and India appear to have a vested interest in establishing a Russia-India-China strategic triangle to meet respective national security interests. India and China have moved significantly forward in economic and trade cooperation in the last five years, despite their boundary dispute and India ?s misgivings on China ?s ?strategic alliance? with Pakistan .
India is the regional power in South Asia . Russia already concedes this status.
India ?s moment has come for emergence as a key global power. This necessarily does not imply that confrontation would accrue in Asia between China and India , Complimentarity and cooperation have to be the watch-words.
Asian ?strategic space? cannot be the exclusive preserve of one power, however predominant. China needs to learn that this ?strategic space? has to be shared.
The above seems to be already being recognized as a recent Russian commentary (NOVOSTI; 3 June 2005) alludes. It states to the effect that India is not afraid of common interests in one and the same space with Russia or China , as it does not tie its hands in other spheres; also that Russia and China share this view.
India has never strategically embarrassed China nor attempted to build up ?regional spoiler states?. China needs to reciprocate the same in South Asia, vis-à-vis India . China needs to reassure India that it is not working at strategic cross-purposes in South Asia so as to generate trust. Russia , at the apex of this triangle has to motivate China to move in this direction.
China has recognized the merits of economic and trade collaboration with India as evident from the growth of China-India bi-lateral trade from $1 billion in 2000 to $12 billion today and projected at $20 billion in the next couple of years. China needs to recognize that if the same intensity is applied in the political field to build a partnership with India , the strategic outcome could be miraculous.
What follows from the above is that the prospects of a Russia-India-China triangle today are not that dim as it was five or ten years ago. Challenges do exist, especially in the China-India equation, but they are not insurmountable. China has historically demonstrated since 1949, that it can make strategic U-terns in its strategic policies. It needs now to do so with respect to India . This could secure its own strategic future.
Concluding Observations:
The centre of gravity of the global strategic balance and so also of economic power is moving into Asia . Russia , India and China as major integral Asian powers can ill-ignore this shift. What this augurs is that the Asian strategic space needs to be accommodatively shared by Russia , India and China . It also implies that Russia , India and China synergise their comprehensive strategic strengths to contribute not only to Asian peace and stability but also to global peace and stability,
In terms of declaration of intent to forge a Russia-India-China strategic triangle, the Russian and Chinese leaders have done so during their visits to India in the recent past. Curiously, India does not seem to have come out with a similar public declaration of intent.
President Putin during his visit to new Delhi in December 2004 publicly intoned the immediate need for : ?a strategic alliance between Russia , China and India as the foundation of a multi-polar world- a worldwide alliance that will curb the American superpower?.
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on his visit to New Delhi in April 2005 declared: ? China , India and Russia are all influential countries. The cooperation among these three countries will help democratise international relations and achieve world peace, coordination and cooperation which serves the interest of the region as well as the world. China is positive about this trilateral cooperation for peace and stability in the world.
India seems to be indicating its implied consent for such a tri-partite partnership through signals like in the case of Russia being declared as ? Russia is India?s foremost strategic partner? (India?s Prime Minister and Defence Minister) and in the case of China by a declaration in the Joint statement of Prime Ministers (New Delhi, April 2005) that ?India-China relations have now acquired a global and strategic character? and the agreement to establish an ?India-China Strategic And Cooperative Partnership For Peace?.
All of the above coupled with the last paragraph of the Vladivostok Joint Communiqué emphasizing ?that it is in the long term interests of the three countries to enhance the partnership among China , Russia and India ? and the stress on ?to inject new vitality into the three-party cooperation? heralds the efforts to add contours to a Russia-India-China triangle
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