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Subject: Magic Mossies
Aussiegunneragain    7/11/2010 9:01:10 AM
There was a thread on here a few years ago put up by a fellow named Shooter, who was trying to make the argument that the Dehavilland Mosquito was a strategically insignificant aircraft which should never have been produced for the RAF, because it represented a waste of engines which could have better been used in Avro Lancasters. Shooter, an American, had a hobby of trying to diss any non-American type that had an excellent reputation (the Spitfire was another favourite target) and most people here told him he was being a clown with that being the end of it. However, the thread has stuck in the back of my mind and made me wonder whether in fact the Mossie, despite its widespread usage in a variety of roles, was in fact underutilised in the daylight strategic bombing role? It did perform some very important low level raids such as the daylight raid on the Phillips radio works (along with Ventura's and Bostons - far less Mossies were shot down)in Holland during Operation Oyster. However, I can't find many references to the Mossie being used for the sort of regular high altitude daylight strategic bombing missions that the B-17 and other USAF daylight heavies conducted. Consider its characteristics: -It could carry 4 x 500lb bombs all the way to Berlin which meant that you needed three mossies to carry a slightly larger warload than one B-17 did, which upon this basis meant more engine per lb of bomb in the Mossie. -However, the Mossie was hard to catch and was more survivable than the Heavies. The latter only really became viable with the addition of long-range escort fighters, something that the mossie could have done without. -It only required two crew versus ten on a B-17. Without intending to be critical of the USAF daylight heavies, because they were one of the strategically vital assets in winning WW2, I am wondering whether had the RAF used the Mossie in the role at the expense of night bombing operations in Lancasters? I have read accounts that suggest that the later were not really directly successful in shutting down German production, with the main contribution being that they forced the Germans to provide 24/7 air defence. If they had used Mossies more in the daylight precision role is it possible that the impact that the fighter-escorted USAF bombers had on German production might have been bought forward by a year or so, helping to end the War earlier? Another idea that I have is that if Reich fighter defences had started to get too tough for unescorted Merlin powered Mossies on strategic daylight missions, that they could have built the Griffon or Sabre powered versions that never happenned to keep the speed advantage over the FW-190? Up-engined Fighter versions of the Mossie would also have probably had sufficient performance to provide escort and fighter sweep duties in Germany in order to provide the bombers with even more protection. Thoughts? (PS, in case anybody hasn't worked it out the Mossie is my favourite military aircraft and my second favourite aircraft after the Supermarine S-6B ... so some bias might show through :-). I do think it has to rate as one of the best all round aircraft of all time based on its merits alone).
 
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45-Shooter       4/5/2013 8:31:32 PM

I had a word with someone who knows what he is talking about, his first question was
what kind of failure are we talking about?
Sudden excursion of the aircraft's CoG! In that a bomb, 1000 pounds, hung up on any of the last three racks while all the other bombs that might counterballence it's Mass dropped as usual!
 
In that even if the weight was sufficient to cause the plane loss (which he doubted - see later) thier was two possibilities,
1, that it would cause structual failure
I do not think so!
2, it would make the aircraft uncontrolable in pitch
Almost certainly resulting in a sudden pitch up, followed by a stall, or PIO= Pilot Induced Occilation resulting in ecessive loads beyond the aircraft's stress limits! With the CoG range AFT exceeded by more than one foot, or almost two feet, depending on who's guess you favor.

    he stated that 1 1000lb bomb would have been well within the structual tollerance of the Lancaster even if it was twice the distance from the CoG
I agree, see answer to question/posit one above.

    as for pitch, a 1000lbs bomb would cause the most delta change in the moments post the previous row's drop as you not only get the weight of the hung bomb but the sudden loss of weight of the previous row, he again asks why, if this was an issue, did they drop from nose to tail maximising the issue.
I did not know they dropped from Nose to tail. I thought it was one from the Nose, one from the back, one from the second row forward, one from the second row aft, one from the middle row, etc... Untill they were all gone!
But in any case, ALL of the bombs would have been dropped in less than two seconds at "Slow interval", or less than one second at "fast interval". The total polar moment of inertia of the entire ~45,000 pound plane, Inc crew, fuel, oil, etc.... would have been such to cover the stuck bomb untill such time as the tail started to drop, possible a second or two later. Then the Pilot subconchously applies down, IE forward stick, to the elevator to corect the imballence. The nose goes down, but the inertia causes it ti over shoot and droop just a scooch, the the pilot over corects up and the PIO is started! Mayby three to five seconds later the plane disintigrates in mid-air But in any case the crew who are being tossed about by thye sudden violent vertical positive and negitive G maneuvers can do nothing to escape when they are alternately flung from floor to ceiling!
 
    if it was not the sudden change in CoG that was the cause the the other possibility was that it resulted in an uncontrolable nose up attitude but he was certain a 1000lbs would not have resulted in suffcient node up attitude to result in a stall, in fact he was under the impre4ssion that 1000lbs would be well with the limits of control surfaces but even if not it would result in a fairly leasurely stall that would have had alarm bells ringing at Avro, something that never happened even post war.
  See above.

    but his basic oppinion was that the whole idea was rubbish, whilst a CoG change of this order was not nice it certainly wouldnt have moved the plane out of control flight parameters.
So I looked back over your posts as relised that all the supporting evidence you have comeup wityh (like CoG positioning and MAC etc) were from your self , even thge initial point was you guessing, a guess you have supported with more guesses  supported by more guesses, in short a right house of cards
No, I got the CoG "Ideal point from a post by others and the CoG range from someone elses post. I use those Datums because they are larger than I would have expected, but are still exceeded by a hung 1,000 pound bomb in the last row aft!
Also note that I am prepaired to argue the whole point again, should any one post copies of the realivant documents! 



 
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45-Shooter       4/5/2013 8:38:51 PM

well as the floor was not changed between Manchesters and Lancaster of any variant how do you explain this
mouse holes? If that was a lanc, and do not doubt that it is as there is no way to tell from the pic, they do appier to be inspection hatches.
So if the later planes had them, they must have known there was a problem? Don't you think?
What like landing with bombs on board (potentially armed bombs) was not a proble in its own right?
They certainly did do that on more than one occaision! 
 
you havent explaned HOW this change would cause "near instantainious destruction" when a 500lbs bomb in the same location was not considered a flight hazzard, or why bombs were dropped for to aft if this rear shift of CoG was such a danger
500 times 13 feet is only 6,500 foot pounds, Vs 13,000 foot pounds, so I can see the differance and why it might be a danger. 
As to the rest, Did you Google PIO? How it happens and why? Because if you did, you probibly would not have written this.
 


 
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45-Shooter       4/5/2013 8:45:09 PM

All true! Thank you for making my point! Total RAF-BC KIAs were the larger figure and included those of the Sterling and the other Heavy Bomber, which name escapes me now. But I figure that it was more like 24,496 just from Lancasters because some of the crew made it out of stricken bombers. On the other hand American Casualties from Heavy Bombers in the ETO never exceeded 26,XXX, that from all types. The rest of America's 52,000 casualties were from Medium Bombers and fighter planes. so 815 medium bombers and the fighter losses equate to 26000ish casualties yet 5500 heavy losses only accounted for 26000?
Well, yes. 5,500 heavies would have had about 55,000 crew onboard when hit and since over 60% of our crews escaped after critical damage to create the 35-40 thousand POWs previously mentioned by you and others, that leaves about 26,000 KIA. So once again, I say yes, it is about 26,000 casualties.
Or you could do more research in the archives of the USAF in Daton Ohio. By the way, going back next week if you have any vital matter you want me to look up?


 
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45-Shooter       4/5/2013 11:30:15 PM
I love this paper! It supports my contentions very well. Read the quotes below! The last one most!
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.pdf

This is a single source compilation and is from OFFICIAL sources. It violently disagrees with some numbers you provided.Note some key findings? p.20;  graphs p21 (sorties), p22 (sorties)Graphs based on the data in the official history clearly show the trends in both operational sorties despatched and aircraft lost, the latter also shows the number of crashed aircraft. Half of all the sorties flown during the war took place after April 1944, during the last year of the war period . But 73% of aircraft that went missing did so before this date. Also from that report. On balance it would appear with little doubt that the fatal
casualty ratein Bomber Command for aircrew was the
highest of any similar large unitwithin the British Forces
during World War II, and a similar distinction broadly applies to
the aircrew of the 8th and 9th United States Army Air Forces in
relation the US forces in general. even though it is difficult to
find the statistics to prove so.
Between July 1942, when detailed analysis started and May 1945, 5807 aircraft went missing on night operations. Of these 2278 (39%) were shot down by fighters, 1318 (23%) by flak and 112 (2%) were lost in collisions. But in 2069 (36%) cases the cause of loss is not known. Based on these figures the ratio of fighter to flak losses was very roughly 2 to 1. However because of the large number of cases when the cause was not known this ratio can only be a rough estimate. On night raids losses through fighter attack increased rapidly in the first half of 1943, but declined sharply following the introduction of the radar countermeasure "Window" in July 1943. It then increased again and only declined after the invasion of Europe, when the allied attacks were mainly against tactical targets and included many daylight raids. At this period many fighters wer grounded due to fuel shortage. It reached a low in October 1944 and then again increased slightly during the final throes before Germany surrendered.


"The precise weight of bombs dropped by the
strategic air forces will never be known. Confusion
is also liable to occur as to whether the tonnages
related to bombs claimed to have found targets
or merelyto bombs expended. For these and
other reasons no two sources bear each other
out exactly about the same events." 

Quote "If lucky enough to complete a tour of operations, generally lasting 6 to 9 months,  I find this very interesting, in that it took between 6 and 9 months for a crew lucky enough to do it to complete the required number of missions in the RAF.
 
The history of the "Royal Air Force 1939-1945", Vol III
(HMSO,London,1954) gives the total RAF killed and missing as
being 70,253 up to 14th August 1945. It also says 47,293 of these
losses occurred on operations with Bomber Command. This
figure is rather misleading as it includes about 17,000 killed and
missing who were from the Dominion & Allied Air Forces, only
about 38,000 of the killed were RAF personnel recruited in the UK.
 
From the annual totals for the whole war the official historygives
364,514 Sorties despatched and 8325 aircraft missing, whereas
according to data contained in ACM Sir A Harris' Despatch a total
of 389,809 Sorties of all categories were despatched during the
war and 8655 aircraft went missing.
 
W R Chorley, in his monumental series of books " RAF Bomber
Command Losses" Vol 1-9 ( published 1990-2009), gives figures
which total 11,099 operational aircraft losses, 1,098 non
operational and 101 ground losses. Whilst Chorley's figures are
well supported the offical figures are used in this paper. Chorley's
independent research would suggest that the official figures on
aircraft losses may have been under calculated by as much 10%
to 20%.
 
 
 
 
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Maratabc       4/5/2013 11:52:12 PM
As with most liars, Shooter you quote and misrepresent what the author said.

I love this paper! It supports my contentions very well. Read the quotes below! The last one most!
http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.pdf

This is a single source compilation and is from OFFICIAL sources. It violently disagrees with some numbers you provided.Note some key findings? p.20;  graphs p21 (sorties), p22 (sorties)Graphs based on the data in the official history clearly show the trends in both operational sorties despatched and aircraft lost, the latter also shows the number of crashed aircraft. Half of all the sorties flown during the war took place after April 1944, during the last year of the war period . But 73% of aircraft that went missing did so before this date. Also from that report. On balance it would appear with little doubt that the fatal
casualty ratein Bomber Command for aircrew was the
highest of any similar large unitwithin the British Forces
during World War II, and a similar distinction broadly applies to
the aircrew of the 8th and 9th United States Army Air Forces in
relation the US forces in general. even though it is difficult to
find the statistics to prove so.
Nowhere does the two statements support your lies about these casualties being restricted to the Lancaster, but refer to all Bomber Command sorties in total and all aircraft.
 
And note in yellow the error.
 
The data is easy to find. 
 

 
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Maratabc       4/6/2013 12:20:40 AM
"The precise weight of bombs dropped by the
strategic air forces will never be known. Confusion
is also liable to occur as to whether the tonnages
related to bombs claimed to have found targets
or merely to bombs expended. For these and
other reasons no two sources bear each other
out exactly about the same events." 
 
The author merely reports what honest scholars know. Exact certitude in war is impossible. it has nothing to do with the bombs unloaded in combat sorties. Bombs expended is THE MEASUREMENT. 
 
From the annual totals for the whole war the official history gives
364,514 Sorties despatched and 8325 aircraft missing, whereas
according to data contained in ACM Sir A Harris' Despatch a total
of 389,809 Sorties of all categories were despatched during the
war and 8655 aircraft went missing.
 
See first comment.
 
W R Chorley, in his monumental series of books " RAF Bomber
Command Losses" Vol 1-9 ( published 1990-2009), gives figures
which total 11,099 operational aircraft losses, 1,098 non
operational and 101 ground losses. Whilst Chorley's figures are
well supported the official figures are used in this paper. Chorley's
independent research would suggest that the official figures on
aircraft losses may have been under calculated by as much 10%
to 20%.
 
That was Chorley's opinion. he had no published data to confirm it, therefore his opinion is  actually worthless.  
 
The history of the "Royal Air Force 1939-1945", Vol III
(HMSO,London,1954) gives the total RAF killed and missing as
being 70,253 up to 14th August 1945. It also says 47,293 of these
losses occurred on operations with Bomber Command. This
figure is rather misleading as it includes about 17,000 killed and
missing who were from the Dominion & Allied Air Forces, only
about 38,000 of the killed were RAF personnel recruited in the UK.

Quote "If lucky enough to complete a tour of operations, generally lasting 6 to 9 months,  I find this very interesting, in that it took between 6 and 9 months for a crew lucky enough to do it to complete the required number of missions in the RAF.
 
I find that the person named Shooter neglected to READ and analyze the section for the USAAF, which showed that average survival rate for USAAF personnel was no better than RAF personnel
 
 
Also
p39 (includes graph)
The tonnage of bombs dropped by the USAAF against all targets "
VS. Germany" from bases in both the European (ETO) and
Mediterranean (MTO) Theaters of Operation amounted to
1,388,000 tons (Table 141), of this 638,000 [LONG] tons were dropped by
the heavy bombers ( Table 143 ) of the 8 & 9 AAF operating from
bases in the United Kingdom.
 
 
p40 (includes graph)
 
However the resultant tactical, morale and economic effect of the
different techniques used by the two forces are almost impossible
to evaluate comparatively in numeric terms. Whilst British and
American bombing surveys were carried out immediately after the
war, when examined in retrospect neither appear to have been
without some bias in assessing the overall effect of the other's
efforts on German war production or Morale.
It should be noted that ‘Germany' in this context includes the
occupied territories. All RAF Bomber Command raids, including
those against Italy from bases in the UK, are included. However
raids carried out by the 12th & 15th US Army Air Forces, and the
9th US Army Air Force before October 1943, from bases in the
‘Mediterranean Theater of Operations' are not included e.g. the
raids on Ploesti in Roumania.
 
==================================>
 
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Maratabc       4/6/2013 12:45:56 AM
(p40)
The data used for the above graphs is only an indication of the tonnage bombs which was loaded on to aircraft. The actual amount dropped on targets was undoubtedly considerably less.
The accuracy of bombing was generally low in the early days of
the campaign but improved considerably during the latter stage of
the war.
Although the usual objective of the RAF was the night
bombing of industrialised areas and that of the USAAF the
precision bombing in daylight of specific targets, the latter was by
no means “precise” in actual operations. In practice, if not by
intent, the two objectives often complimented each other, leading
to a relentless assault against Germany during the last year of the
war.

Further: 
(p44-45)
Combined "Battle casualties - Died, Missing, Interned
and Captured" in "Theaters against Germany" (Table
35 in the Digeat) ,i.e. European Theater of Operations
(ETO) plus the Medeiterranean Theater of Operations
(MTO), amounted to 81,205, (i.e. 94,565 total casualties
less 13,360 wounded and evacuated), of which 30,099
are classified as "Died" and 51,106 as "Missing, Interned and Captured"
.
No breakdown is given for the number of "Interned and
Captured" included in the 51,106 figure, however the
unofficial estimates of around 26,000 POW would give the
estimated total number of “killed and missing” as
about 55,000 (i.e. 81,205 less 26,000)
for the two"Theaters".
This figure includes both bomber and associated fighter crew members. The above unofficial estimated figure is comparable
with the United Kingdom RAF Bomber Command fatal
45
casualties of 55,500 killed and missing, presumed
dead, during the same campaign
.
The “Battle casualties, Died, Missing, Interned and
Captured" (Table 36 of the Digest) for the 8 & 9 AAF only,
operating from bases in Great Britain, amounted
54,997, (i.e. 63,410 less 8,413 wounded and evacuated),
of which 19,876 are classified as died and 35,121
as "Missing, Interned and Captured". No official separate
estimates are available for the "Interned and Captured" but
if it is assumed to be the same ratio as in the combined
European and Mediterranean theaters i.e. 69% in ETO,
then the POW, i.e.“interned and captured” would amount
to about 18,000, and the estimated number of
“missing” 17,121.
The estimate for the total number of died (i.e.killed) and missing (now presumed killed) on these operations becomes about 37,000, (i.e. 17,121 “missing” plus 19,876 officially “Died”),
 
=============================================
 
In simple 'French,' person called, Shooter; the book as properly quoted, calls you a false witness. 
 
p47 (example)
 
The combined number of heavy bomber sorties mounted by the 8 & 9 USAAF between August 1942 and May 1945 was 332,904 of which 274,921 were classified as "effective". [82%] A peak numbers of 28,925 sorties were mounted in the month of June 1944. and 31,169 in March 1945. (Table 119)
 
In summary, the numbers Shooter quoted repeatedly were carefully selected 'lies', that omitted important ancillary information to put the data in true context.
 
The number of heavy bombers "lost" by the 8 & 9 AAF
amounted to 5,548, of which 2,452 were shot down by
enemy fighters and 2,439 by anti aircraft fire. 607 bombers
were lost through other causes. 5,324 fighter aircraft
of the 8 & 9 AAF were also lost, but it is not clear whether all
the fighter losses occurred during protection cover on
bombing raids.(Table 159). Because operations were in
daylight and losses were observed by other aircraft these
figures are probably accurate.
 
Note that number of USAAF heavy bombers lost... 5,548. That is Flying Fortresses and Liberators. When Shooter argues Lancaster numbers he includes Halifaxes and Stirlings Wellingtons etc, when he claims 55,000 dead. I can call him a liar on this since 3394 Lancasters x 7 = 23758 maximum number that could have died from Lancasters reported lost over Germany.   
 
Quote    Reply

Maratabc       4/6/2013 1:23:40 AM
p56. 
Only 669 RAF and 303 USAAF( in the UK/ETO) heavy bombers
were on squadron strength on 4th March 1943 at the beginning of
the combined strategic bombing offensive, operation“Pointblank”.
By the 5th April 1945 the number of RAF heavy bombers had
increased to 1848, comprising 475 Halifaxes and 1373
Lancasters. The growth in the number of US bombers and crews
was even greater, In March 1945 the number of 8th & 9th USAAF(
in the UK/ETO) heavy bombers "on hand" had increased to 3332,
comprising 2291 B17 and 1041 B24 aircraft, with 4204 crews
( each of ten aircrew) available. A massive and overwhelming
increase in the bombing force available against Germany within
two years.
 
Marat speaks:
When people argue the merits of British and American efforts in the air war, it must be remembered that both nations used what they learned about air warfare. In retrospect, it seems that the Americana were one to two years behind in equipment and experience compared to the British when the USAAF arrived in strength in mid 1943. Neither the British nor the American waged a true air bombardment in force that lasted more than a year (1944-1945). The British when they finally had the means in 1944 were unable to compose a proper air campaign to hit the proper fuel targets because their navigation assistance means and bombing accuracy aids (as well as their utter lack of formation tactics until the middle of 1944) made it impossible for the massed bombing of synthetic fuel plants with H2S, GEE, and OBOE neutralized by German jamming.           
 
 
 
Quote    Reply

Maratabc       4/6/2013 1:47:00 AM
"Google PIO"
 
Marat speaks:
 
What Shooter, the devious one, seeks to imply is that a Lancaster with a hung bomb would assume a tail heavy configuration that would cause the pilot to over-control and pitch the nose down into a stall condition.  
 
He supplies no evidence that this even ever occurred and in fact contradicts his original argument that the Lancaster lacked the control means to correct the pitch event.
 
He again proves that he is utterly dishonest and seeks to change his argument claiming falsely that this is what he meant when he plainly DID NOT KNOW what it was when it was previously explained. 
 
Quote    Reply

45-Shooter       4/6/2013 2:31:41 AM
I love this paper! It supports my contentions very well. Read the quotes below! The last one most!http://homepage.ntlworld.com/r_m_g.varley/Strategic_Air_Offensive.pdf

This is a single source compilation and is from OFFICIAL sources. It violently disagrees with some numbers you provided.Note some key findings? p.20;  graphs p21 (sorties), p22 (sorties)Graphs based on the data in the official history clearly show the trends in both operational sorties despatched and aircraft lost, the latter also shows the number of crashed aircraft. Half of all the sorties flown during the war took place after April 1944, during the last year of the war period . But 73% of aircraft that went missing did so before this date. Also from that report. On balance it would appear with little doubt that the fatal
casualty ratein Bomber Command for aircrew was the
highest of any similar large unitwithin the British Forces
during World War II, and a similar distinction broadly applies to
the aircrew of the 8th and 9th United States Army Air Forces in
relation the US forces in general. even though it is difficult to
find the statistics to prove so.
Nowhere does the two statements support your lies about these casualties being restricted to the Lancaster, but refer to all Bomber Command sorties in total and all aircraft.
1. I have never stated that these were just lancaster casualties! Ever.
2. The note in red and yellow above is from the exact same paper you quoted just above that part!
3. Read the entire paper. In it it states many DIFFERENT figures that dispute each other AND which I have never made light of, but have repeatedly stated that I do not care the least of which you use!
4. From that very paper; They have seven or is it ten different "Average Bomb Load" figures, NONE of which agree with their total bomb loads/sorties calculations!
5. The TOTAL number of sorties flown by all types of British Heavy Bombers is only about 12% more than the TOTAL number of sorties flown by B-17s alone! 335K/298K! At least according to the report quoted above, and ALL other sources too! That figure alone makes the B-17 the more reliable of the two!
6. Given all of the above, I re-state my basic claims in this argument;
A. For any given load up to any that can be carried inside the B-17, the B-17 will fly farther, higher and more often than any Merlin engined heavy bomber flown in WW-II. The only real differance between the two is the typical mission profile.
B. The B-17 was much tougher plane to knock down than the Lancaster. See losses/missions in the report above.
C. The differances in bomb load delivered by the RAF heavies and American heavies was entirely due to the huge differances in mission profile, not Aerodynamic properties of the two planes. If the Lancasters had to climb to altitude and circle over their bases forming up for up to 80-90 minutes before departing toward Germany like their American counter parts, their range would be about 250-320 miles less than the typical B-17 mission and 380-450 miles less than the typical B-24 mission. (The longer the mission, the larger the differance.
D. Acording to the report cited above only a little over 40% of all bombs dropped by the RAF landed anywhere near their intended targets, most of those from their ~40,000 day light missions flown late in the war. Even then, the bomb scatter was excessive. See the above report.
E. The total weight that could have been carried, but was not, is about the same for the Lancaster and B-17G, IE 17,600 pounds and 18,000 pounds, ir-respectively!
F. While I can recently find no proof, the loads I stipulated COULD have been carried, there is no reason why they could not have been done IF they had chosen to do so! The loads are with in respective lifting abilities and the bombs fit dimentionally!
G. This late at night, if I have forgotten anything I could have said in the past, please enter it here!
 
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