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Subject: China/Taiwan Deterrence (softwar et al)
Yimmy    1/7/2008 9:44:04 AM
I am writting an essay on the China/Taiwan issue with focus on deterrence theory, military and other, and was hoping people may be able to reccomend some good (referenceable) internet links or books. Mind I've left it to the last minute where getting books is concerned. I assume some of the information which gets floated on these boards does origionate from reliable sources?
 
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Blue Seadragon       1/7/2008 10:02:41 AM
What do you mean by "deterrence theory?"  In the modern era, this term is usually reserved for "nuclear deterrence" - and it is very different (virtually the inverse) of classical deterrence theory (which always existed).
 
There ARE nuclear dimensions to the China/Taiwan issue - the US and PRC are both open nuclear powers - and Japan and ROC are nuclear capable powers - after all.  On the other hand, just about everybody has concluded that nuclear weapons are NOT likely to be involved no matter what is happening re China/Taiwan - and China has formally pledged NOT to use them on ROC even in a fight.  It was not always so:  both Nixon and Eisenhauer claimed to have threatened to use nuclear weapons in 1952 and 1954 - specifically in Taiwan Straits crisis situations - and these were the cause of the PRC nuclear weapons program getting funded when it did (instead of later no doubt).  There have been noises in the Chinese press - if a USN carrier approaches Taiwan it will be "attacked with a neutron bomb" kind of thing.  And there have been papers saying it might be a good idea to take out electronics with a nuclear EMP - although that might not technically violate the "we won't use nuclear weapons on Taiwan" pledge.  Anyway - there is a pretty firm sense now that - however much we may disagree - even fight - we are not going to nuke each other.  This is more or less what modern deterrence theory predicts.  [Note it is the diametric opposite of the ORIGINAL nuclear theory in the USA - "atomic diplomacy" was supposed to deter CONVENTIONAL wars - make it not needed to have a big army or navy - and that did not work out as expected - see the Korean War.  NOW "deterrence theory" is alleged to say all you deter is NUCLEAR wars.]
 
If you want to know about general military deterrence - or even other kinds of deterrence - you need to clarify this. 

There are thousands of materials to read and cite.  But what do you want to write about?
 
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Softwar    2007 Rand & DoD reports   1/7/2008 10:07:53 AM
 
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Yimmy       1/7/2008 10:18:16 AM
Seadragon, I don't know what your talking about.  Massive Retaliation was an American (short lived) policy with obvious short-falls.  It does not effect deterrence theory, which has not changed, and has existed long before the bomb.
 
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Yimmy       1/7/2008 10:29:24 AM
Thanks for the links softwar.  I can't get the firt one to work for some reason, I'm not quite sure why...
 
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Softwar    Yimmy   1/7/2008 10:45:18 AM
If you still have trouble with the Rand link - feel free to email me ([email protected]) and I will arrange to either download the PDF or email it to you (about 1 meg in size).
 
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YelliChink       1/7/2008 11:34:24 AM
Agree with BDS on this one. There is no such thing as "deterence theory" in Taiwan strait, and, Yimmy, you're probably the first one to present such theory. Once upon a time some people in ROC high command thought about that, but the reality had been shaped by the US such that deterence by Taiwan alone is just mere fantasy. The thing that kept commies at the other side of the strait was their inability to invade, and they are currently unwilling to take heavy losses. "Strategic ambiguity" is what played by US government since 1979, and some people think it's successful policy -- so far. As a matter of fact, Taiwans are happy with status quo, but commies are doing their best to change the quo to their own favor, inch by inch. That's cooking frog theory in their own pocket. Taiwans know that very well, that's why there's a lot futile noise been made since 1990s by both KMT and DPP admin. They aren't idiots, and ROC foreign policy is not always due to domestic concern. Things won't change either Ma or Hsieh to take office in May this year.
 
Strategic ambiguity has been studied inside out by various institutions. Cooking frog strategy, however, has not been addressed other than in Chinese sources.
 
I suggest that you can write the article in such order:
 
abstract
Pre-1950 situation in Taiwan strait
Korean War and US-Taiwan join security 1950-1979
Strategic Ambiguity 1979-now
Commie strategy 1979-1996: reconciliation, development and patience.
Commie strategy 1996-now: cooking frog in a pot
Taiwan's goal: survival in a change enviroment
 
I think you can find hell lot of refs for first three sections. There are some out there for 4th and 5th sections, but for the sixth part, not much is out there. This is an article about policy, not military. As for a study from pure military point of view, the following outline is suggested:
 
abstract
Geographics of Taiwan Strait
PLA strategy and capability
   PLA strategy
   PLAAF
   PLAN
       PLAN-MC
   PLA2A
   PLA Army
   Future development and viable strategies
ROC defensive capability
   ROC strategy
   ROC Missile Command
   ROCAF
   ROCN
   ROCA and ROCMC 
   Future development and viable strategies
Outter islands
   Penghu (Pescadores)
   Quimoy
   Matsu
   Islands in South China Sea
Conclusion
 
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YelliChink       1/7/2008 11:39:09 AM
China-Taiwan Military Balance
Cato Institute
 
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Softwar    2007 USCC report   1/7/2008 11:46:24 AM
 
USCC report has a couple of sections on Taiwan, and defense.
 
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Softwar    USCC Research Paper   1/7/2008 11:49:22 AM
LINK

Commission Contracted Research Papers

Research Papers

The US Role in Taiwan?s Defense Reforms

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

This report on US-Taiwan military ties since 1997 was commissioned by the USCC and prepared by the Commission's Senior Research Adviser Dr Michael Pillsbury. It was presented at an international seminar in Taiwan in February 2004.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Remarks by Dr. Michael Pillsbury February 29, 2004, ITDSS Conference, Taipei[1]

 

First, I want to thank the Institute for Taiwan Defense and Security Studies for inviting me to Taipei to discuss the US role in Taiwan defense reform. I will try to answer the questions you have posed, and to avoid discussing the subjects you have assigned to the many other speakers. I want to acknowledge the presence here of the Institute?s founder Dr. Michael Tsai who has been doing an excellent job as the deputy director of TECRO in Washington DC, and played a major role when he was in the Legislative Yuan in drafting and promoting defense reform. Also, the presence of the former defense minister of the Republic of Korea, and military leaders from several other nations promises a fruitful discussion.

 

Now, it is important to point out that I am just a private citizen, not a US official, and my comments today do not represent anyone but myself. My purpose is to describe the US role as best as I can, so I will be using the public testimony of senior US officials to illustrate all my points. I am not a critic of US policy, and I do not have any new and exciting recommendations of my own to make. I am speaking today more as a historian of what has happened so far. And this is an important story.

 

?President Chen Understands This Danger?

 

I will return to the subject of why the US has played a role in Taiwan?s defense reform, but first I want to set the context of this issue. AIT Director Doug Paal put it very well when in a speech [posted at September 30, 2003] he said, ?the Taiwan Strait remains one of the world?s most dangerous flash points and preventing conflict there remains a vital US national security concern.? In the same speech, the AIT Director provided the context for my comments today. He said, ?President Chen Shuibian has demonstrated that he understands this danger, and we salute his recent initiative to enhance Taiwan?s self-defense capabilities.? I too am going to praise the remarkable progress Taiwan has made in defense reform, in eight specific areas. I will say very little about China and the PLA today. But I agree completely with AIT Director Paal?s strong words ?We are hopeful that China will not slide back to a stance of confrontation. But until Beijing abandons its authoritarian political structure and forswears the use of force in the Taiwan Strait, it would be irresponsible for either Taipei or Washington to let down our guard.?

 

A Chronology of the US Role

 

It might be most helpful to our two days of discussions for me to provide a specific list of what the US role has been since 1997. I say this for two reasons. I have never seen such a list before, and a scholarly debate and discussion of Taiwan defense reform, which our host has in mind for us to do, ought to start with a few basic facts before we get into the issues of interpretation. Second, I think my chronology may surprise you, because the story begins when the seeds of defense reform were planted during the administrations of President Clinton and of Lee Teng-hui, the Democrats and the KMT. Republican President George W. Bush and Chen Shuibian have gone much further and made more remarkable progress, but they had a solid foundation on which to build. My chronology may also surprise you because I will highlight how the views of some US China experts who still oppose a US role in Taiwan?s defense reform have been rejected repeatedly, but their opposition continues.

 

The First Step ? The Monterey Talks

 

The first breakthrough was a decision to meet in Monterey California in December 1997 with Taiwan?s military and civil leadership for

 
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gf0012-aust       1/7/2008 5:11:28 PM
 
email.me at [email protected] and I'll send you a report on how the PLAN views the USN sub force as a real identifiable threat.
 
its 25 meg though - so you'll need a decent email capability.
 
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