| http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Report_08.pdf
China’s ability to sustain military power at a distance remains limited but, as noted in the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, it “has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional
U.S. military advantages.”
China’s near-term focus on preparing for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, including the possibility of U.S. intervention, is an important driver of its modernization. However, analysis of China’s military acquisitions and strategic thinking suggests Beijing is also developing capabilities for use in other contingencies, such as conflict over resources or disputed territories.
By November 2007, the PLA had deployed between 990 and 1,070 CSS-6 and CSS-7 short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. It is increasing the size of this force at a rate of more than 100 missiles per year, including variants of these missiles with improved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.
The PLA is acquiring large numbers of highly accurate cruise missiles, such as the domestically produced ground-launched DH-10 land attack cruise missile (LACM); the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) outfitted on China’s two SOVREMENNYY and two SOVREMENNYY II-class guided missile destroyers (DDG), also acquired from Russia; and, the SS-N-27B/ SIZZLER
supersonic ASCM, outfitted on the last eight of twelve total Russian-built KILO-class diesel electric submarines China has acquired.
China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) as a component of its anti-access strategy. The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km and, when incorporated into a sophisticated command and control system, is a key component of China’s anti-access strategy to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships
at sea, including aircraft carriers, from great distances.
China is modernizing its longer-range ballistic missile force by adding more survivable systems. Most notably, the DF-31 and longer range DF-31A are now being deployed to units within the Second
Artillery Corps.
The PLAAF received four battalions of upgraded Russian SA-20 PMU-2 long-range (200km) SAM systems in July 2007. Another four battalions are expected to be delivered in 2008. The SA-20 system
reportedly provides limited ballistic and cruise missile defense capabilities.
Several high-profile legal cases highlight China’s efforts to obtain sensitive U.S. technologies (e.g., missile, imaging, semiconductor, and submarine) illegally by targeting well-placed scientists and businessmen. ICE officials have rated China’s aggressive and wide-ranging espionage as the leading threat to U.S. technology.
The system of conscription used by the PLA differs from Western practices. Instead of a general requirement of service for citizens of a certain age, the PLA’s conscription system functions more as a “levy,” in which the PLA establishes the number of conscripts needed, which produces quotas that are imposed on local governments which are charged with providing a set number of soldiers or sailors. If the number of volunteers fails to meet quota despite efforts to cajole or convince candidates, local government officials may compel unwilling individuals to enter service. China does not release data on what share of recruits are compelled rather than volunteers. Annual quota numbers for both the PLA and PAP are estimated to be 500,000.
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