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Subject: Enhanced Company Ops & DO
SCCOMarine    8/24/2008 8:13:36 PM
I wrote a few months ago that Distributed Operations as an Overall concept was not dead, but had moved away fr/the Tactical side, concerning the Distributed Squad/Plt, to now focus on the Operational side, Housed at the Company Level, in the form of 'Enhanced Company Operations'. For those who thought that DO was Dead only needs to look at BN 2/7 in A'stan, which I said early was the more interesting of the 2 Marine Depl's in A'stan. 2/7 is Operating in the very Infantile stages of what the USMC envisions for DO. Presently 2/7 is Dispersed thru-out & Controlling an Area of Operations of over 16,000 sq miles in Plt-sized elements w/70 miles of dispersion btwn them. This is w/out the support of the MAGTF, this is on straight Organic FirePower. They're Operating in 3 ways that are crucial to the way the USMC plans to fight in the Future. 1) These Distributed Reinforced Plt's are not only conducting Combat Ops but like the Combined Action Plts could simultaneously running continuous Civic Actions. 2) Like the CAPs they are also simultaneously running embbed training operations w/local indigenous forces. 3) Combined w/1&2 like the CAPs the Small Dispersed Units are conducting their own Combat Ops, developing their own Intel independent of but in coordination w/ Higher HQ. The Tactical portion of DO is sound and is partially in place in the PTP. The rest of the tactical portion I believe will come on line when the Pipeline can support it. Which is where ECO comes into play. Its the Logistical/Operational side of DO.
 
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SCCOMarine       8/24/2008 8:15:31 PM

Enhanced Company Operations

A logical progression to capability development by Col. Vincent J. Goulding, Jr.
 

From 2004 through 2006 the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) focused its experimentation on the evolving concept of distributed operations (DO), itself focused on better trained, manned, and equipped platoons and squads. The DO project deliberately took a bottom-up approach, guided by the notion that a company is only as good as its platoons, its platoons only as good as its squads, and its squads only as good as its Marines.

The results of this 2-year program were outlined in the April 2008 Marine Corps Gazette.1 Collateral efforts in direct support of DO experimentation were SQUAD FIRES and COMBAT HUNTER, the former to create, through simulation, Types II and III Close Air Support capability at the Squad Level and the latter to increase tactical situational awareness of individual Marines. Both projects were successful.

In June 2007 the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force hosted a Tactical Capabilities for Irregular Warfare Conference. Participants were assigned to one of three subgroups and asked to identify irregular warfare required capabilities in terms of "find, fix, or engage."  Each group produced a list of required capabilities within its specific assigned topic. While there were redundant findings in several areas among the three groups, the required capability that all three identified (and the one that precipitated the liveliest discussion) had to do with standardizing a company-level intelligence cell.

It was clear that company commanders were creating this capability ad hoc and out of hide. It was equally clear that what they wanted was a standardized "train, man, equip" model.

The small contingent of MCWL participants returned to Quantico, assessed what had taken place over those 2 days at Camp Pendleton, and decided that the time had come for experimentation to shift from the squad- and platoon-focused DO program to the company level. For all intents and purposes, enhanced company operations, or ECO, was born.

Why the Company Level? Why CLIC?
Many battlefield functions previously thought of as "battalion level" have gravitated to the ever-broadening shoulders of the company commander. The problem, of course, is that the company is not trained, manned, or equipped to accomplish many of these critical tasks. Savvy company commanders and their Marines make it happen, but they do so more often in spite of than because of institutional support.

Add to this the Marine Corps ethos of maneuver warfare predicated on intelligence-driven operations, and the company-level intelligence cell (CLIC) became the logical starting point. A final consideration was the less obvious one that the company is probably the smallest tactical formation capable of conducting independent operations—and frequently does on today's battlefield.

CLIC experimentation began with development of a best practices model, based on a series of face-to-face meetings with combat veteran company commanders from across the Marine Corps. Based on those meetings, a task list was created, manning straw man developed, and "experimental" equipment list procured. Just as importantly, and in conjunction with Training and Education Command's (TECom's) Marine Corps Intelligence School, an extant training package was modified to suit the task.

Two limited objective experiments (LOEs) were conducted. They included all facets of training, manning, and equipping—culminating in mission execution during Exercise MOJAVE VIPER. The results were positive. As a result, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command's (MCCDC's) Combat Development Directorate established an integrated planning team to assess the results and inject the appropriate takeaways across doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

Additionally, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Office brokered a number of meetings with the U.S. Army and has expressed interest in funding requisite training facilities and equipment for the execution of CLIC training in both Services.

Company-Level O

 
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SCCOMarine       9/2/2008 2:53:29 PM

I wrote a few months ago that Distributed Operations as an Overall concept was not dead, but had moved away fr/the Tactical side, concerning the Distributed Squad/Plt, to now focus on the Operational side, Housed at the Company Level, in the form of 'Enhanced Company Operations'.

For those who thought that DO was Dead only needs to look at BN 2/7 in A'stan, which I said early was the more interesting of the 2 Marine Depl's in A'stan.

2/7 is Operating in the very Infantile stages of what the USMC envisions for DO.

Presently 2/7 is Dispersed thru-out & Controlling an Area of Operations of over 16,000 sq miles in Plt-sized elements w/70 miles of dispersion btwn them. This is w/out the support of the MAGTF, this is on straight Organic FirePower.

They're Operating in 3 ways that are crucial to the way the USMC plans to fight in the Future.

1) These Distributed Reinforced Plt's are not only conducting Combat Ops but like the Combined Action Plts could simultaneously running continuous Civic Actions.

2) Like the CAPs they are also simultaneously running embbed training operations w/local indigenous forces.

3) Combined w/1&2 like the CAPs the Small Dispersed Units are conducting their own Combat Ops, developing their own Intel independent of but in coordination w/ Higher HQ.

The Tactical portion of DO is sound and is partially in place in the PTP. The rest of the tactical portion I believe will come on line when the Pipeline can support it.

Which is where ECO comes into play. Its the Logistical/Operational side of DO.


For those who wondered "what happened to DO, or those who thought haha", haven't accounted for the fact that the Marine Corps does everything Full Spectrum, addressing its impact across all levels for Maximum Implementation.
 
When you look at past Marine Corps publications in the context of what its doing now you'll see that DO, ECO, SC MAGTFs are all developmental stages of a larger Construct.  Part of that larger construct is structuring itself to fight "Hybrid Wars".

"Hybrid Wars" is a construct the Marine Corps labeled & has been structuring towards since 1989.  The "Three Block War", the "Strategic Corporal", "Career Marine Regional Specialists", etc. have all been developed to address this, at times, dirty form of warfare.

This is not Counter-Insurgency or Small Wars; its a blend of Insurgency w/Terrorism, w/the ability to conduct limited Convention Actions by Non-State Actors w/some State Power & Legitimacy.

The 1st true example of this was the 2006 conflict btwn Israel & Hezbolla.

a) You had a Non-State Actor (Hezbolla) w/some State Legitimacy (being part of the Lebanese Parliament). 
b) Using Terrorism (Kasaam Rocket Terror Attacks) to bait a State (Israel) into attacking another State (Lebanon). 
c) Pulling it into a Counter-Insurgency (attacking &trying to hold ground in S. Lebanon) to stop the Terror attacks. 
d) While keeping Israel's Navy fr/pulling close to shore for shelling w/Arial Bombing Drones, a Crude guided missile.

This is an article written in 2005 about a yr b4 the Israel-Hez confllict. It briefly foreshadows a similar conflict and some foreshadowing (though not in name) of how DO/ECO/SCMAGTF would take shape.

In a DO/ECO format Infantry Units are constantly shifting formation fr/ Concentrated Conventional Strike Forces to dispersed concealed Reconnaissance & Surveillance Small Units w/1000 eyeballs & then back.  Using these tactics they don't have to hold territory b/c they're constanly keeping the enemy of balance, therefore limiting the Insurgents ability to Bog down the Gr. Forces. 

They strike & leave, however while 1 unit strikes another was takes up multiple concealed positions, tracking enemy any who may have melted back in w/the civilians during the strike & try and counter-attack after the strike force leaves.

Here's the article fr/2005.  Doesn't go into tactical detail, more strategic & operational.  But when its put together w/ what has been learned about DO/ECO/SCMAGTF since '05 it puts a lot into perspective.

 
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