Somebody who knows more will discuss this better, I'm sure. Great article. I'd note the date-"Posted Wednesday, Feb. 25, 2004, at 10:44 AM ET". I'd be interested in more followup, and will also try. It WAS an excellent concept in Vietnam. Three thoughts stand out immediately, though- 1.) I believe that the USMC allocated some of it's finest infantry, volunteer basis only. That accounts for the relatively small numbers-four to six men if I recall. Probably similar to the core component of an Army Special Forces unit. 2.) Our language skills were better- from the D.L.I. to the bars of Da Nang our guys were much better immersed in Vietnamese language and customs, in general. Add intelligence, genuine interest, and good observation skills and, voila-instant diplomat. Iraq is a difficult society to understand. Our troops face an incredibly hostile environment, it seems. Unlike Vietnam, these guys are ALWAYS dressed for war. It appears to be a decidedly urban insurgency, yet isn't. It would also pose real challenges to a marine CAP that was once largely deployed in small very rural hamlets in SVN. Where now? I know that Iraq has numerous small farming communities. Which is the third point- 3.) In What Numbers- How pervasive shall we be along the Tigris and Euphrates? Can we control, institute the necessary agarian/health and infrastructure programs, protect them and the people, and, most of all-gain their trust in a society we understand far less than SVN? Will the ROI be worthwhile? How long would this be to take hold? Just some thoughts. This is a great topic that's needed a good discussion. CAP WAS a great and often unrecognized program in SVN. I hope others more capable will pile on.

There were I believe some mention of units being used that at least went by the name of CAP (Combined Action Platoon) I believe. I believe I read some mention of it in the Marine Corps Gazette. However this CAP seemed to be more a vehicle for training the Iraqi National Army (INA). One of the complaints about CAP during Vietnam was that it would take to many men to post in every hamlet of Vietnam. We had I believe a half million men in Vietnam; we don't have that in Iraq.

In Arab societies it appears (and particularly in Iraq) that the tribe has a greater say in the social organization of the society in general than would be the case in the RSVN. That being said it should still be profitable to insert some forces or arrange for some sort of formal relationship with the Tribal Chief and elders and with their entre' gain access to the various sub-sections of the tribe on an as need be basis. In fact this may be the ink blot strategy that we seem to be following in Iraq presently.

If the guerillas are to be considered the fish swimming amidst the population than the CAP would be the agent which separates the fish from the water. Stingray teams could be used to separate the fish into a known region with intelligence developed with the assistance of the CAP’s. Likewise a Phoenix operation would be used to eliminate the fish again with intel developed from the CAP’s.

I just posted an afghan rant on the "ARMED FORCES OF THE WORLD" board. I've been thinking about CAP more in this sense since my last post. Only the problem becomes bigger, not smaller. While seemingly much more rural, troops able to live among Afghan peasants would be "professionals" indeed! Were it possible to produce the large numbers of men, certainly anything might be possible then in Afghanistan. Ink-blotting that nation is exactly what's required, until their police can do so effectively. May be decades.

I believe what their useing in Afghanistan are what their calling now Provincial Reconstruction Teams(PRT's), which are I believe big CAP's with alot of access to reconstruction resources with multi-discipline task forces (CIA, AID etc, etc, etc...) to attack whats ailing the different provences down to the village level. Don't know if they have the CAP, Stingray, and Phoenix thing in action but I imagine they have some variation of it working.

I don't know if you should get to wraped around the axial when it comes to this spring offensive stuff in A'stan. Ther existance depends on their ability to maintain a presence in the Pushtun area's and I believe even the Pushtuns are becoming wary of the Talib's. This offensive was to be expected (spring you know), its mainly based on a practically ancient drug culture and we should have probably waited to start the anti drug war until after the Islamic radicals were routed out a couple of years (and for the last ones that is what your going to have to do route them out literely) and develope some intel on them but now we have given them an ally. The drug culture has been around probably for millennium and its not the sort of thing that you'll be able to make a couple of raids and they'll give up. We should have developed an alternate economy befor trying to take away the only livelyhood these people have ever known.

On the other hand as far as Iraq is concerned I believe the SOB (SADAM :who else)was in cahouts with Al Qaeda from 91 on and no one will ever be able to telll me differently.

In addition to the CAP, Stingray, and Phoenix dynamic you probably still need the Quick reaction team (QRT) to assist the CAP if an adversary company gets by the stingray screen. ALso we'd need a force big enough (brigades, batallions, whatever it takes) to take down any safe heavens the geurillas develope (and the to protect our own base area) and strategic recon to develope any intel on potential enemy safe heavens and to occupy them with Stingray tactics to keep them occupied and away from the area's we're protecting.

One more thing:
Once we clear an enemy safe haven we must insert CAP's, Stingray's and Phoenix to make sure the area is not re-infiltrated. On it goes until the enemy is cleared.

Mike, I just read this. The problem is the PRT is too large. We need troops in the hamlets-living there. All over the damn country. We're talking fire-team sized elements with special forces integrative skills...over and over again to adequately cover this nation. And that's just part of the bigger picture. I like it, but it will bear little final resemblance to SVN CAP, when fully promulgated. If, indeed, done at all. Pashtu and Dari, man. That's where it's at. We REALLY need the language skills at the bayonet level to even start. Hell, by 1967 we were cranking hundreds of Vietnamese speakers, in addition to all our other cold-war language requirements. Our best weapon may be DLI. I bet it's budget, even now, sucks.

"I don't know if you should get to wraped around the axial when it comes to this spring offensive stuff in A'stan." Mike, I've been thinking about Afghanistan since 1974, when I was part of a student group that represented Afghanistan at a college Model U.N. convention in NYC. Like I said earlier, I've a close bud who lived with the Muj three separate times between 1981-85. He wrote some extraordinary articles for the Milwaukee Journal then that WEREN'T picked up by any of the wire services, much to my dismay. It's nothing recent, nor is my concern directly attached to the "spring offensive". As a military force, I'm unconcerned about them. Their sanctuary today bears little resemblance to 1984. We aren't supplying them and Pakistan SAYS that they aren't supporting them, ISI past involvement, or otherwise. As a neo-political force, their impact, however, is a ground-truth. They OWN the streets and villages through intimidation. You'd be hard-pressed to convince me otherwise that virtually all tribal/village chiefs know, in the end, who butters their bread once it gets dark. So is it any surprise that moments after denying a local taliban presence in direct questioning by coalition officer shots are fired on that group from a nearby hillside? Or that the chieftain can still look at that officer with an expression that says, "Who, me? I didn't know they're two hundred meters away. Sorry, my guest. I guess your unsafe here, after all. Perhaps you should visit my enemies down the road. They're probably the criminals who've done this". I DO need to calm down, though.