This is something we won't know for awhile. There may be leaks from various places about the reason why, but unless you were there or have access to classified info, it will be unknown for awhile.

I guess we will have to wait for a "book" to come out to solve this military mystery. In the last war, 1st Cav jumped off several hours early up Wadi al Batin. The only result of that command breach was that 1st Cav Hq Main was relegated to reserve status several Km North of the start line for the duration of the 100 hour war. 1st Cav became the last Div to move thru the the III Corps start line after being called back by the CINC.

Do we know why 1st Cav started early? Or is that another book? Hmmm... does Schwarkpof(?) book cover this?

From the books I have read (The General's War & Into the Storm), the 1st Cav's attack up the wadi was a diversionary attack. 1st Cav was VII Corps reserve and was brought into battle near the end of the ground war while executing a pincer movement on VII Corps north flank. FYI The British 1st Armored was in the process a pincer movement on the southern flank; a double pincher - wet dream for an armour commander.

To get back to the why it took 3 days. At first I thought you were kidding around. Since they were fighting in the canal zones and conducted 3-5 opposed river crossings during those days 3 days isnt bad. Until the Gulf wars (1 &2) the amount of ground gained per day was often measured in yards not miles. We tend to forget about that. In the Korean war, the drive from Inchon to Seoul took 5 Days, and that was only 19 miles. TO wonder why it took 3 days to cover 90 miles just shows how far we've come.

I wonder who the 1st Cav was trying to divert by going up Wadi al Batin ? Weeks before the ground war started the Army knew were every Iraqi battalion size unit was located in the AO. With one exception; the only major intel surprise in DS was the Iraqi 3rd Armd Div showing up around the Al Jaber airfield impeding the 1st Marine Div for a short time. Why the 3rd Iraqi Amd Div failed to make the enemy OB tables is a another military mystery. Note: A few months after DS the 1st Cav Div commander got his 3rd star.

It has been years since I read those books but, according to the authors, a feint was made towards the wadi because the Iraqi's considered this the most plausible axis of attack. The Iraqi's believed the deserts to the west of the wadi were not suitable for tank warfare. It might have been elements of the 1st Mech Inf that made the feints into the wadi. I definately remember that the probing unit took casualities and a few KIA when it engaged Iraqi troops dug into well prepared defenses. Tom Clancy's book "Into the Strom," which he co-wrote with Gen Franks, the VII Corps CG, is a very informative book. The book is a narrative from the perspective of Gen. Francks and not an objective historical account. Given the amount of criticism of Gen. Franks during the war, this book is his apologia.

Oregon, you were correct in your statement when you said that 1st Cav (with two Bdes) advanced for several hours up Wadi al Batin and then retraced their march to follow up VII Corps through a breach in the Iraqi berm line farther West. Bde elements of 1st Cav advanced all the way to Highway 8. VII Corps did not lose access of 1st Cav Bdes only the Hq Main and the 1st Cav commander was relegated to a "time out" or the said "Corps Reserve status" 30 km N of the line of debarkation. I do not think Schwarzkopf would mention this minor incident in his book because he would not spread anything derogatory about his beloved Army. A Liddel Hart, Peters, or a Hackworth would because they owe no allegiance to fellow generals. The incident of jumping off early was and is typical in exercise play at III Corps at Ft Hood. Starting earlier than play allows gives the agressor force the initiative that usually could not be regained by the opposing force, unless the war game was started over when the other side cried foul. This time the penality for this kind of gamesmenship was a Div commanders "time out" ordered by the CINC.

I remember reading and hearing a lot of criticism of General Franks during and after the war. In the book “The Generals War,” which was co-written by LTG Bernard Trainor USMC ret., Schwartzkopf is reportedly to have been very upset due to VII Corps “lack of progress.” In “Into the Storm,” Franks explains his “slowness” and the changing of the attack time. The Marines, who were to essentially “hold” Iraqi forces in place while the VII Corps delivered the knockout left hook, had screwed up the timing of the one-two punch due to the Marines success. Schwartzkopf wanted to get VII Corps moving and ordered Franks to attack on the first evening of the ground war. Franks wrote that launching the attack that evening was much easier said than done due to the fact that many units had to pass through each other’s lines, which is a potentially very dangerous operation. If my memory serves me well, Franks ordered the ACR and some lead elements of the armored divisions through that night; he didn’t press hard because he concluded that “friction” would be dramatically reduced if he didn’t push hard that night. Franks was also very concerned about maintaining “mass” for the eventual clash with the Republican Guard divisions. Franks often quoted Guderian’s dictum of “fists, not fingers” when discussing his battle strategy. Franks inferred that Schwartzkopf just didn’t understand armored warfare. Does Franks account square with what you know of this attack?

I remember reading and hearing a lot of criticism of General Franks during and after the war. In the book “The Generals War,” which was co-written by LTG Bernard Trainor USMC ret., Schwartzkopf is reportedly to have been very upset due to VII Corps “lack of progress.” In “Into the Storm,” Franks explains his “slowness” and the changing of the attack time. The Marines, who were to essentially “hold” Iraqi forces in place while the VII Corps delivered the knockout left hook, had screwed up the timing of the one-two punch due to the Marines success. Schwartzkopf wanted to get VII Corps moving and ordered Franks to attack that evening, the first evening of the ground war. Franks wrote that launching the attack was much easier said than done due to the fact that many units had to pass through each other’s lines, which is a potentially very dangerous operation. If my memory serves me well, Franks ordered the ACR and some lead elements of the armored divisions through that night; he didn’t press hard because he concluded that “friction” would be dramatically reduced if he didn’t push hard that first night. Franks was also very concerned about maintaining “mass” for the eventual clash with the Republican Guard divisions. Franks often quoted Guderian’s dictum of “fists, not fingers” when discussing his battle strategy. Franks inferred that Schwartzkopf just didn’t understand armored warfare. Does Franks account square with what you know of this attack?