Need to set variables on the opfor especially. eg are they landlcoked are the neighbours friendly or hostile to ingress force how far away is nearest port will the local airports support heavy reansports (runway length etc) SEAD issues etc etc etc....

I meant for it to be a general discussion of the considerations involved, but the thought came to me when responding to a post on a potential invasion of Canada by a nation other than the US. Clearly, there is no land route and the isolated geography of North America makes an invasion by sea very difficult and would most likely have to be done without surprise. Facing these obstacles, what scenario might you come up with as a military planner to effect an aerial invasion?

refer back to Canada thread.. :) Otherwise I'll be double posting

Look at Crete: It was heavily defended, with some port infarstructure, and some airfields. It was taken by a specialist Air bourne division, with a mountain division (lighter equipment than an infantry division) and no panzers Strategicly, Air control is paramount. Surprise equally so. The Germans took the airfield, and then expanded quickly before the New Zeelanders could react. So I'd say speed is the last strategic variable.

Okay, here is how you would do it today. Step 1. Jump-in and seize a large airfield with lots of ramp space. Have some ATGM vehicles and tube artillery as part of this package. Push out 360 degrees beyond mortar/light arty range. Step 2. Airland additional infantry, ADA, Arty, engineer and especially scout/attack helicopters. Get air force controllers & cargo handlers in to run the airfield. Step 3. Airland a medium/heavy reaction company of tanks and IFVs. (Somalia taught this lesson to the US the hard way) Make sure you include logistics package (if you didn't seize A LOT of fuel when you took the airfield, you need to set up a bag/tanker farm). Step 4. More lift aircraft and build up of forces sufficient to give you an offensive capability. Once you have that, air assault to the next airport and repeat the process. Step 5. If you are doing this against Canada, surrender (Its too big!) Oh, and if you do not have a STRATEGIC lift capability and can sustain this for months on end, don't bother doing step 1.

No one has the resources or strategic deployment to deploy and fight entirely by air. Any such action would have to be done on a wing and a prayer. In 1991 I understand that 95% of all weapons and logistics [ammo fuel food spares etc] were deployed by sea and both USA & UK were forced to rely on foreign ships to deploy the bulk of this force. Only 5% of this force and supplies were sent by air bridge. USA deployed the equivilent of maybe 11 divisional equivillents to Saudi Arabia, so if you extrapolate the best you could expect would be to deploy and support maybe 1/2 a mech division. That would include a slice of maybe 80 jets/planes in support. THis is the main impetus behind the stryker brigades since they require 1/4 of the logistics of a mech brigade.

The US did Afghanistan in 2001-2002 with almost only air...and it was only air until 2002 when we got some rail operations going into Uzbekistan and Tajikastan...but it was still coming by air from there into Afghanistan. In the Gulf War, the US did have to lease a lot of foreign flag shipping. However, the US military sealift capacity more than tripled in the 10 years from 1991 - 2001. No if you look what I said, teh only mechnized force I talked about was a company team. Everything else would be wheeld vehicle. It is doable and sustainable for the US...don't know too many other countries who could, hence my last bullet.

Not sure about this.USA strategic deployment has steadly declined since the cold war.At that point they had a theoretical lift/delivery of ~ 30 million tons,of which only 1/2 would be used at one time. By 1991 that was reduced to about 20 million tons . IN 2002/3 the amount of forces deployed was almost 1/3 the size of the force sent to ODS in 1991. The impression I get that the run down through out the 1990s has crippled the USA strategic deployment and Stryker/FCS fiasco is a direct off shoot from this mistake.

It will depend hevily on how far you need to travel by air. If the target is, say, San Marcos, and you can't use France or Spain, but you can use UK, Ireland, Italy, Africa, then fighters could fly in support, bombers could remain on station for a long time, etc. If the target is Canada and you can't use the Atlantic Ocean or the Pacific Ocean or the United States, you can only use, say, Greece, then you are very limited in what can be brought by air, both in terms of logistics and air power. If all you C-17s get shot down, it hardly mattes what they can carry. If they fly for 12 hours to get to their destination, then they aren't going to make many trips.

I don't understand what you meant by "Not sure about this." What I wrote about Afghanistan is not supposition...it happened. I agree the number of airframes are fewer in 2004 than 1991, but the availability rate for C-17 aircraft is higher than C-141....and they are a much more capable aicraft. We need more but we can do okay with what we have and leasing commercial to carry troops. And as for shipping capabilities....we have 3 times the amount of US flag ocean deployment vessels than we did in 1991. We have expanded greatly this area. As for Stryker "debacle"...I take the view (which is what the Army said from Day 1) that Stryker is an interim to FCS or whatever we end up with as the medium force. What a lot of people forget is that the SBCTs were originally IBCTs, where the I stood for Interim.