Military History | How To Make War | Wars Around the World Rules of Use How to Behave on an Internet Forum
World War II - West Front Discussion Board
   Return to Topic Page
Subject: Wegener & Donitz were smarter than Raeder
Black Hornet    10/30/2010 5:39:17 PM
He said that Germany could not match Britain in naval strength and that attempts to do so were a waste because geography had stacked the deck against Germany. While imperfect in its details, Wegener's thesis was essentially correct, but by making these statements during the war, he made himself something of an outcast. As you might imagine, the upper echelons didn't want to hear that message, so they tapped one of their talented up-and-comers to write a rebuttal which pointed out Wegener's errors--the fact that it couldn't rebut the fundamental argument was overlooked. The author of this rebuttal was named Raeder.... This explains how it was possible for the Germans to commit the same grotesque miscalculation in WWII. The German naval build-up of the 1930's was one without strategic purpose, http://www.worldnavalships.com/forums/showthread.php?t=3328 A large U-boat fleet and Pocket Battleships better than Z-plan with attendant large Battleships. As a side note, distance from Egilsstadir airport, ( east Iceland) to Bergen is 704 miles, Herdla airbase even less. JU 52 with extra fuel goes 790 miles with 4000 pound load. The jest of which is that an air bridge between Iceland/Norway is feasible. Distance from Egilsstadir, Iceland to Flesland, Bergen, Norway is 704.7 miles, 1134.1 km, or 612 nm http://www.distancefrom.info/Egilsstadir/Iceland/ JU 52. The normal range is 530 miles with a 5,000 pound load, or 790 miles with maximum fuel and a 4,000 pound load. http://www.fjr2.be/Pagina%2025%20-%20Airplanes%20of%20the%20fallschirmj%E4ger.htm Egilsstadir airport http://www.photo.is/fly/pages/kps0704%20881.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Egilssta%C3%B0ir
 
Quote    Reply

Show Only Poster Name and Title     Newest to Oldest
Pages: 1 2 3 4   NEXT
Factfinder    Wegener & Raeder   10/31/2010 12:38:54 PM
Anyone who wishes to know the true nature of the Wegener/Raeder debate should read the appropriate article in 'Naval War College Review' Autumn 2005, by Kenneth Hansen. This demonstrates that the statement that Wegener was smarter than Raeder is simplistic in the extreme. The facts are that Wegener, at the relevant time, was retired and was freely able to pursue his theme that Britain, and particularly British Sea Power, stood in the way of German expansion and greatness.
 
Raeder, on the other hand, was obliged to take into consideration German foreign and domestic policy, and for much of the late thirties, Poland and France, rather than Britain, were seen as the main threat to Germany, although national socialist dogma always saw the Soviet Union as the eventual true enemy. Thus, the fleet which came into being was designed to combat the French navy, not the British.
 
Hitler told Raeder that the signing of the Anglo-German naval treaty in 1935 was 'the happiest day of my life' and he seems genuinely to have believed that it would keep the British Empire out of a European war. Only in 1938 were the Kriegsmarine allowed to carry out theoretical tactical exercises involving operations against the Royal Navy, and the Z Plan fleet was never anything more than a fantasy, given the political & military situation at the time it came about.
 
The fact is not that Raeder was unintelligent and Wegener much smarter, but that Wegener was attempting to put right errors made before and during World War 1, whilst Raeder was dealing with the political and military reality which applied in and from the mid-30s onwards.
 
 
 
 
Quote    Reply

Black Hornet       11/13/2010 9:02:10 PM
Wegeners book was written in 1929, well ahead of the events you mention. 1935 treaty etc. As it happenned, part of Wegeners strategy was followed, that being the taking of Norway, which was a brilliant move. Raeder was against it. Therefore, as I stated above, Wegener was smarter than Raeder.
 
 In 1929, Vice-Admiral Wegener had published a book (?The Sea Strategy of the World War?) that stated that Germany should seize Norway in a future war so that the German Navy of the future would have an easier time getting to the Atlantic. The commander of the German Navy (Raeder) did not agree with his theory but it did attract the attention and support of many other German naval officers.

At the start of the war, Germany imported about 10 million tons of iron ore from Sweden. Therefore it was important for Germany?s war effort. Nine million tons of this came from north Sweden via the port of Luleå. However, this port freezes over for the winter months and the Norwegian port of Narvik does not. Therefore control of Narvik, in the north of Norway, would have been very important to the Germans in easing the movement of iron ore to Germany.

Rather than seize Norway, Raeder wanted to rely on Norway remaining neutral in the war and the Allies respecting this neutrality.
 
 
Quote    Reply

Factfinder    Wegener & Raeder   11/14/2010 9:24:56 AM
I urge you to read the Hansen article. I would recommend a second article on the 'Wegener Thesis' which I saw recently, but had better not as it is by your nemesis Doveton Sturdee (under his real name, of course).

Wegeners' book 'Maritime Strategy of the Great War' was indeed published in 1929, (and republished in 1941, by the way), but it consisted as nothing more that the re-issue of three Staff Papers he had produced as a Lt-Commander in 1915. He viewed, and continued to the end of his life to view, Britain as Germany's primary enemy, and he placed his emphasis on the North Sea. Thus, he argued that Norway should be occupied by Germany in order to enable the High Seas Fleet to widen its area of operations, and even send raiding forces into the Atlantic in order to drew off British strength. The fact is, however, that Wegener retired from the German navy in 1926, and his arguments and theories looked backwards, to the Great War.
 
Raeder, on the other hand, was dealing with the political and economic realities of the 20s and 30s, in which the Weimar Republic and subsequently Hitler initially saw Poland and France as the main threat to Germany. Consequently, Raeder sought to produce a navy best able to meet these threats. Only in the late 30s, in fact as late as 1938, did he and his staff give any consideration to planning for a confrontation with the Royal Navy.

However, far from hoping that the neutrality of Norway would be respected, Raeder was well aware of the threat to German iron ore supplies that an Anglo-French occupation of Norway would produce, and it was he who urged Hitler to pre-empt this threat by launching an invasion. Unlike Wegener, who had argued that this would be an offensive move, Raeder saw it as a defensive, economic, move.

In the event, Germany secured Norway, but Raeder lost the use of most of his fleet for the crucial period between June & October 1940. Raeder was not less intelligent than Wegener, he was simply dealing as best he could with the realities of the time. Wegener, already retired, had no such constraints and could happily indulge his idee fixe about Britain.
 
Quote    Reply

Black Hornet       11/14/2010 4:02:06 PM
You were saying something about the French?


In his memoirs, entitled "Struggle For The Sea", Raeder admitted
that his real intention in building a formiddable navy was to avenge the defeat of 1918 and bring England to her knees.
 
As it was, Norway was both an offensive & defensive base. Defended the ore traffic, allowed surface shipe easier transit to & fro Atlantic. Bismarck, Raider Atlantis etc.
 
Quote    Reply

Factfinder    Wegener & Raeder   11/15/2010 1:55:27 AM
I didn't say anything in particular about the French; I simply pointed out what every historian of the period will happily confirm, thatin the 20s and 30s, at least until 1937 or so, France was regarded as the main threat to Germany, with Poland as a close second.
 
Yes, Norway was used as an offensive base, but the original reason for the invasion was defensive, to secure ore supplies before the allies cut them off.
 
As to the rest, I urge you to read the article I have recommended twice. It is on the internet if you care tio look for it. 
 
Quote    Reply

Black Hornet       11/26/2010 6:23:23 PM

You did say this in particular about the French..

 

Hitler initially saw Poland and France as the main threat to Germany. Consequently,

 
Quote    Reply

heraldabc    If you ever read this, Factfinder...    12/19/2010 2:10:28 PM

Anyone who wishes to know the true nature of the Wegener/Raeder debate should read the appropriate article in 'Naval War College Review' Autumn 2005, by Kenneth Hansen. This demonstrates that the statement that Wegener was smarter than Raeder is simplistic in the extreme. The facts are that Wegener, at the relevant time, was retired and was freely able to pursue his theme that Britain, and particularly British Sea Power, stood in the way of German expansion and greatness.

 Wegener's thesis, as Hansen noted, was flawed on three fundamentals.
1. an outdated  notion of colonialism.
2. a complete misread of Mahan, whose doctrine of sea control was ultimately that decisive battle at sea was on the enemy use of the sea and not just the enemy fleet.  
3. under-appreciation  of Germany's green-water problems and opportunities.
 
Raeder, on the other hand, was obliged to take into consideration German foreign and domestic policy, and for much of the late thirties, Poland and France, rather than Britain, were seen as the main threat to Germany, although national socialist dogma always saw the Soviet Union as the eventual true enemy. Thus, the fleet which came into being was designed to combat the French Russian  navy, not the British.

The Baltic was the first and primary concern of the Nazi era Navy before 1938, which is what we see in their construction program, as they shift to the first (short tanged) heavy cruisers. It was not until the the first battleships, that the long ranged heavy cruiser escorts that could pair with them are seen.  At that point only did the KM admit that the IK might be a problem. The French Marine as in WW I would be the Landwehr's headache. as the Nazis saw it  (They were right, the French Navy was rather useless in the French war effort and national military problem as it turned out-much as it is today.).  The panzerschiffen were Weimar creations and actually a continuation of the old outdated 19th Century armored cruiser raider concept and were aimed like the early American heavy criuisers as commerce destruction vessels) This just showed how confused  much of the contemporary naval thought was at the time (not just German by the way.)
 
The true change and revolution in the Mahanic decisive battle concept had not occurred in WW I as supposed, but was to occur in WW II, and the Germans and the British were to stumble into it though they had a taste of it in WW I. The decisive battle was the U-boat war, which was less a battle than a campaign. Neither side really planned it. The myth that Doenitz had dreamed up a new style of warfare us what always torques  me off. All he did was apply contemporary torpedo boat tactics to submarines  and apply wrong jeune ecole commerce warfare theory and misused the submarine  weapon he had..
 
At least the Americans tried to follow a  strategic employment policy with their subs (tankers  refrigerator ships and aircraft carriers targets were the priority targets)
 
Hitler told Raeder that the signing of the Anglo-German naval treaty in 1935 was 'the happiest day of my life' and he seems genuinely to have believed that it would keep the British Empire out of a European war. Only in 1938 were the Kriegsmarine allowed to carry out theoretical tactical exercises involving operations against the Royal Navy, and the Z Plan fleet was never anything more than a fantasy, given the political & military situation at the time it came about.

The Z-plan was an actual program based on the 1935 Anglo.-German treaty. Ir was at least initially matched to that treaty's limits.  That bulid program is all that needs to be produced to show how out of touch with reality the German naval staff was.  
The fact is not that Raeder was unintelligent and Wegener much smarter, but that Wegener was attempting to put right errors ma
 
Quote    Reply

Factfinder    heraldabc   12/27/2010 11:32:42 AM
I can't find much to disagree with in your excellent post. My own earlier replies were responses to the claim that 'Wegener & Doenitz were smarter than Raeder' and were intended to demonstrate that, whilst a retired officer like Wegener could refight past wars, Raeder was obliged to deal with the current situation. I was not claiming that he made the right decisions.
 
I still believe that, in the Weimar period, the main danger to Germany was seen as France & Poland, rather than Russia. The navy itself argued strenuously that the initial aim should be to build up to parity with France (until such time as what most naval officers saw as the temporary aberration of democracy had run its course, at which time more ambitious plans could be proposed), although interestingly Raeder himself, in command of the Baltic station, was opposed to the construction of the pocket battleship, and would have preferred a heavily-armoured, short range, coast defence vessel better suited to Baltic operations. 
 
Perhaps my language was a little slack when I described the Z Plan as a fantasy; I appreciate that such a plan was actually drawn up, but when you consider that Ludwig, of the Naval Ordnance dept., had demonstrated in a report to his boss, Admiral Witzell, how unrealistic the plan was as early as December 1938, then it never really had any chance of attaining reality.
 
Finally, in the inter-war period, it was generally accepted by all major navies that the submarine threat had been largely negated by the development of asdic/sonar. Experience would show this to be a rather optimistic view, but I doubt whether proposals to build large numbers of submarines (Germany) or of escorts (Britain), would have been accepted.
 

 
Quote    Reply

heraldabc       12/27/2010 5:09:57 PM

I can't find much to disagree with in your excellent post. My own earlier replies were responses to the claim that 'Wegener & Doenitz were smarter than Raeder' and were intended to demonstrate that, whilst a retired officer like Wegener could refight past wars, Raeder was obliged to deal with the current situation. I was not claiming that he made the right decisions.

I agree with that assessment. I stipulate within the limits of just not Raeder's understanding, but of most of his German French, and British contemporaries that the solutions he sought seemed logical. 
 
I still believe that, in the Weimar period, the main danger to Germany was seen as France & Poland, rather than Russia. The navy itself argued strenuously that the initial aim should be to build up to parity with France (until such time as what most naval officers saw as the temporary aberration of democracy had run its course, at which time more ambitious plans could be proposed), although interestingly Raeder himself, in command of the Baltic station, was opposed to the construction of the pocket battleship, and would have preferred a heavily-armoured, short range, coast defence vessel better suited to Baltic operations. 

That was the other reason I suggested there was a change in the KM thinking. Raefer was oriented east in his naval thinking (I kove puns!).  Note that the Weimar Dieutschlamds were all pre-National Socialiat regime, while the Hippers were under Hitler. Raeder didn't take over the KM until 1936, but the second thing he did, after formulating Plan Z (revised 1936), was to lay down plans for the naval invasion of Norway (and Denmark) in the event of  an early war, as that was the only way  how he saw to keep the French (and the British) off Germany's back while the Herr dealt with Poland (and Risssia.) and then turned west.
 
When you look at Raeder's opening planning and moves with the tools he had, those are actually quite good, much better than the British planning; or the French-especially the French (who had an Italy mania) . Still it was only an opening German naval move; it was not a plan of naval campaign such as the Japanese Plan for Decisive Battle (Their southern resources area campaign) or the US Plan Orange
.         
Perhaps my language was a little slack when I described the Z Plan as a fantasy; I appreciate that such a plan was actually drawn up, but when you consider that Ludwig, of the Naval Ordnance dept., had demonstrated in a report to his boss, Admiral Witzell, how unrealistic the plan was as early as December 1938, then it never really had any chance of attaining reality.

Of course, but it wasn't Ludwig who had to be convinced. It wasn't even Raeder, who appreciated wartime industrial policy. even if he didn't understand it as well as the RN Chief of Docks and Shore Establishment, or the US Bu-ships. It was the civilian German leadership who were clueless. They were sold Plan Z as an anti-Luftwaffe ploy to make sure that the KM got something more than crumbs. Inside  Plan Z, I submit was the seeds of a more limited and realistic surface ship program, that someday might fight the Royal Navy, or in the immediate future fight the Russians.(and the French, there are the Scharnhorsts which were a reaction to the Richelieus)      
Finally, in the inter-war period, it was generally accepted by all major navies that the submarine threat had been largely negated by the development of asdic/sonar. Experience would show this to be a rather optimistic view, but I doubt whether proposals to build large numbers of submarines (Germany) or of escorts (Britain), would have been accepted.

Ir was not so accepted in Italy, nor in the US where the need was for cruiser scouts for a battle-fleet that could scout in enemy dominated waters . But aside from those two naval aberrations, you are quite correct. The operators of those period submarines were very well aware how slow the subs were as underwater launch platforms and how short ranged their primary weapon the torpedo was. Dollar for dollar, the destroyer made far more sense as long as those who used subs intended them to fight warships. Of course if you used the subs properly as intended (as merchant ship killers)? Not all the 'theoretical' ASDIC or  'escorts' in the world would save you at sea.  And that is the point that I think we both agree that shows how ad hoc and how poor the Allied and German naval planning for the decisive naval battle w
 
Quote    Reply

psteel    Balanced fleet was Germanies best option   5/15/2011 7:41:08 PM

Raeder was appointed Grand Admiral of the Fleet in 1928, not 1936, by Defense minister Groener. Groener orchestrated a build up of the Reichwehr starting in 1928, which the real start of Germanys rearmament drive. This was all focused around the development of an "anti Treaty of Versailles" force that was focused on defense of attacks from France and/or Poland.

 

  Groener?s 'tasks of the Wehrmacht' was the guiding principle of this rearmament drive right through until 1934-36 period when Hitler exerted his influence over the entire rearmament drive. Groener?s principle was Germany would not initiate a major war but prepare for a major defensive war on two fronts. However Germany had to be ready to mount a 'preemptive or preventative' war if an enemy appeared to be preparing to attack Germany. However it started, Germany had to have a 'reasonable chance of winning the wider European war', that would inevitably follow.

 

Raeder was appointed command of the Reichmarine because he promised to make the navy 'apolitical' to finally bring the navy 'in from the cold', after its shameful performance in the 1918 mutiny. Raeders first act was to formulate the 1928 naval plan which was not finalized until 1932. This programme envisaged a navy to dominate the Baltic and North Sea and protect commerce with Scandinavia countries. His fleet envisaged 6 Panzerschiffe plus an Aircraft Carrier + 6 Kreuzers all escorted by 44 small Zerstörer?s. This was to be backed up by 16 Uboats and 30-50 Minesweepers. The Carriers and U-Boats were in clear violation of the ToV, while the larger size of the Panzerschiffe should still be negotiating hurdle for Treaty talks.

 

The Panzerschiff were not conceived as strictly 'long range commerce raiding' vessels, however as vessels to conduct high speed attacks to break up convoys making it easier for Uboats to attack. Infact Groener refused to authorized these Panzerschiffe, until Raeder could show how they helped to secure the Baltic seas. While it is true that the primary focus of all this rearmament drive was to counter Polish and French fleets, the primary method of defeating those foes was through a land war. Infact in 1933 Lufthansa leader Knauss argued that for the cost of the Panzerschiffe programme, Germany could build a fleet of 400 multi engined bombers that would better deter any aggressor neighbors. While the argument didn't work at that time, it did ensured the further development of the Luftwaffe to fill this role by the mid 1930s.

 

 Commerce raiding could never be seen to be the end product of any such fleet, since it was an end in itself. German naval war games near the end of the 1930s did show that large wolf packs of Uboat could destroy a convoy conducting surface night attacks, however the conclusion was this would be transitory, since the enemy would quickly be in a position to mass produce enough disposable escorts, forcing the Uboats underwater and eliminating that threat. To be fair Admiral Raeder never saw commerce raiding as the desirable end product. What he wanted was to force the Royal Navy to displace critical assets overseas in pursuit of such raiders and thus weaken their forces at home in order to create opportunities at a pivotal time .

 

What he wanted to achieve with these actions was not clear. Perhaps he wanted another "Jutland" battle or maybe more importantly to create opportunities for amphibious invasion.

 

Needless to say Hitler changed all this after he assumed power. He demanded that the navy be nothing more than a 'coastal defense fleet' in order not to interfere with his plan to deal the Britain out of European affairs, in exchange for not attacking their empire. As always Hitler more or less got his demands. Raeder was able to mitigate this disaster by arguing Germany needed a parity with the French fleet, however this had the undesirable effect of making all future warship building "anti French design" in order to get approval. It meant fewer larger ships and m
 
Quote    Reply
1 2 3 4   NEXT



 Latest
 News
 
 Most
 Read
 
 Most
 Commented
 Hot
 Topics