"... A) IF Hitler had approved a rapid withdrawl to the Dneiper by August 1st, 1943, the Germans could have built a formidable defense against any further westward movement by the Soviets, and B)had Manstein and Model been given a more free hand in operations with Army Group Center and Army Group South, the Soviets would have been mauled badly by the time they reached the Dneiper." Some thoughts. Sicily/Italy was an "economy of force" mission already, as had been Africa. Any fewer troops by the Germans, and the true value of Italy would have been an avenue to the southern German border, unopposed. Terrain added immensely to the German effort, but anything less by the Germans would have actually made Churchill's "soft underbelly" soft. Hitler showed both flexibility and prescience in calling off the attack, though both Hoth and Von Manstein did have a point about attriting the Soviet forces continuing to arrive in the south (5th GTA and others of the Koniev's Steppe Front)- but in fact they were proposing to hold the wolf by the throat by this point. Hitler actually allowed Model to withdraw to the Hagan Line by late July, which sacrificed Orel but stabilized the Heer Groupe Mittre east of Minsk (around Vitebsk, Mogilev, and Orsha)until June, 1944. Secondly, without the S.S. Corps (minus Liebstandardte, with Viking)displacing south in late July, the Mius front cracks-with a direct path to Kremenchug and the lower Dnieper crossings. Your first point about a coherant, articulated defense of the Dnieper from, I presume, Kiev on south through the great bend by August 1 just isn't possible unless you forego Kursk altogether, and withdraw from the Crimea, something Hitler was adamantly opposed to. Remember, German forces from the South Ukraine Army Group were still fighting around Melitipol in the Spring of 44. I believe that Sevastopol was recaptured about the same time. Further, a withdrawal, in the absence of Kursk, would still have required massive planning and eloquent execution to extract the entire Army Groupe Sud from the Kharkov and Mius fronts 600km west to the lower Dnieper and into prepared defenses. Clearly, if accomplished, forces wasted at Kursk would have been available in this defense, but Soviet forces would have also been fresh, and sensitive to any wholesale withdrawal, even with significant forces behind to delay the Red Army's inevitable close pursuit. Here, by the way, is where, once again, Von Manstein would be in his element. If able to coherantly withdraw his immobile assets behind the Dnieper while leaving much of his panzer forces (48th Panzer Corps, II S.S. Panzer Corps, Breith's III Panzer Corps from A.Ab. Kempf)to cover the withdrawal, I'm sure he would have repeatedly spanked the Red Army all the way back to the Dnieper, but the correlation of forces may have been similar to actual events. By August 1, the Mius Front had been in battle for two weeks, and the Steppe Front attacked Kharkov, capturing Belgorod in three days. Huge battles were fought southeast of Akhtyrka, near Bogodukhov, and around Kharkov, captured in late August. Within a week, the race was on for the river. Equipment. In fact, the Panther still experienced considerable teething issues through the fall of 1943. Moreover, numbers were still inadequate with Panzer Abteilungs returning from Germany and immediately committed piecemeal, and without adequate maintanence/recovery capabilities in the retreat to the Dnieper. Not very comforting. These units were rendered nonfunctional within weeks under the circumstances, leaving much of the battle in the hands of the remaining Mk IVs, who were experiencing difficulties cleanly penetrating the new T-34/85 at normal engagement ranges.

I've seen this idea proposed before more than once. Last year it was on one of the discuassion boards on Consimworld. It is always good for a interesting exchange. My take is such a strategy would have prolonged the war by about four to six months. The Red Army would have been taking Warsaw in April 1945 instead of Berlin. But were the Reich still intact in August 1945 not only would Allied armys in the east & west still be in overwhelming strength, the US/Brit bombing campaigns would be increasingly effective, and at least two atomic bombs would have been available. In terms of total warfare the Nazi stratigic situation appears completely hopeless from late 1942.

I often watch the movie "A Bridge Too Far" to remind me just how badly the best of planning and ideas can end. S-2 is absolutely correct in that Adolf would never have, of his own volition, sanctioned a withdrawl from the Crimea. Further, while I make the case for a coherent, organized and rapid withdraw to the Dneiper, I fail to mention that Hitler was going to do everything possible; militarily; to retain control of the Donbass. I was putting a heck of a lot of "what-if's" into the equation; but primarily some rational thought process on the part of the German political leadership. It's absolutely on the mark that the Pz IV's (even with the L/48 75mm and the decreasing amount of AP40 available) were having a heck of a time with the emerging T-34/85's. By the autumn of 1943, Soviet units that were expecting to face German armor could expect to have 7 or 8 rounds of their sub-caliber ammunition; and this scale began to tip in favor of the Soviets versus German supply and production beginning at the end of the summer of 1943. I conceede that the personnel on the Mius front were exhausted. However, I believe that only bolsters my argument for the organized retreat to the Dneiper before November 1st. I also recognize there was growing, and sustained, pressure on Army Group North---the poor stepchild to Army Groups Center and South. 2SS Panzer was lacking its full second Panzer battalion at Kursk, because they were off training in and acquiring new Panthers back in Germany. Hence the collection of 25 T-34/76 in the division TOE on July 4. IF the information I have is accurate, the training was cut short and the battalion dispatched to join Das Reich as it redeployed west. Yes, Italy was an example of ecomony-of-force defense; although I'm not so assured that the Western Allies would have had a clear road north were less force to have been deployed. Of course, the other side is that the Western Allies learned a great deal from the operations at Salerno and Anzio that payed great dividens during OVERLORD. Italy also highlighted less than sterling American leadership (re: General Mark Clark), and only contributed to the British disdain of American ground combat capabilities. But to Russia...Adolf simply was not going to approve a policy that involved wholesale evacuation of conqured turf. It's fairly evident that Germany did need the resouces of the Donbass, but it's also patently clear; post-Kursk; that there was not going to be any possible chance of effectively defending them. As to the delay of the Soviets entering Berlin 4 months later; that very delay would have put enourmous pressure on Eisenhower to move deeper into Germany. Given Churchill's behavior up to this point, I see no reason to doubt that; were the Soviets hung up on the Vistula and IF--IF--matters had played out identically on the Western front (failed Ardennes counter-offensive, penetration of the Ruhr), the political masters would have forced action on Ike no matter his protestations. Never-the-less, I return to my earlier point: Germany simply could not produce enough material, across the board, to meet the needs. While some of the results they acomplished were outstanding given what resources were avaialble...they were purely defensive accomplishments. I would submit that had Manstein and Model been given free reign (and yes, I recognize that implies the two could EVER learn to get along), the Soviets could have been bled, and massively so, in an organized withdrawl to the Dneiper. That the Germans were still able to perform local counter-attacks and defenses which produced disproportionate losses on the encroaching Soviet forces is testament to better leadership and training at the tactical level. But I also submit that, no matter the skill of the tactical leadership, personnel and equipment, it will never redress poor political decisions. "Wolf by the throat" is a very apt description; and it's awfully hard to stab or shoot if your hands are already full.

"...my argument for the organized retreat to the Dneiper before November 1st." I went back to your original thread where you said something about Hitler approving a withdrawal by Aug. 1. Approval or actually withdrawn? A couple odds and ends... you're correct about Das Reich. 1/S.S. Pz Regt. 2 returned from France in August equipped with 71 Pz V. Interestingly, from July 1 through Oct 31, 1943, the entire eastern front only received 106 Tigers, 238 Panthers, and 98 Mk IV (75mm/L48)as part of unit deployments to the front. Of course, individual tanks continued to be shipped east as replacement tanks to those Pz. Regt. engaged in battle. The above numbers represented one complete

heavy unit (s.Pz.Abt.506), and two w/only two companies (s.Pz.Abt.502/III/Pz.Regt.G.D.). I/S.S. Pz. Regt.2, II/Pz. Regt.23, and I/Pz. Regt.2 moved east w/Panthers. 14 Pz. Div. and 24 Pz. Div. deployed with a Regt. staff and a single mixed abteilung of stug.III and Mk. IV. That was it across the entire eastern front until early Nov. 1943. Since Hitler's adamance about the defense of the Crimea and Donbas made remote the possibility of a strategic withdrawal to the Dnieper, one alternative approach would have been a defensive battle along the Kursk salient. The primary advantage would be three and one-half months of defensive preparations on either side of the salient; fresh, trained, largely reconstituted forces (particularly the infantry divisions-for perhaps the last time); and the retention of a large number of Pz. Div. into an operational or strategic reserve. Clearly, German forces would have needed to reinforce the base of the salient to a far greater degree than actuality. The Soviet Union, regardless of foreknowledge of German intentions to DEFEND, would eventually need to attack somewhere-probably Kursk. Given significant mechanized operational reserves, and healthy infantry divisions, Von Manstein would have been endowed with capabilities far beyond his assets in Feb.-March, 1943. Too, were German forces able to withdraw from one side or the other of the salient, preferably both sides, defensive lines would have been considerably shorter for the German army. Perhaps even more troops freed. Of course, it was impossible for Hitler to consider a withdrawal from Orel and/or Kharkov. Finally, imagine a withdrawal from the Crimea in the Spring of 1943. Combined with the above, that would be a considerably stronger Wehrmacht than ultimately faced by the Soviets from their defensive positions in early July, 1943. THAT would have been a interesting scenario to me. Sorry to all about the writus interruptus.