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Subject: Was Sir Robert Menzies the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time...twice?
Volkodav    11/1/2009 4:26:14 AM
Australia did not begin full mobilisation (military and industrial) until early 1942 after Curtain took the Priministership. This was not because Curtain was a genius or a visionary but because he unlike Menzies thought it was better to something rather than nothing, infact a great many people of the time could probably have done better than Curtain. The issue, as I see it is that Menzies ignored the threat and failed, inspite of all advice, failed to rearm or mobilise. Upon being re-elected in 1948 he did the same thing again. He cancelled and delayed programs that would have been of great value to our forces in Korea and then emidiately after Korea, continued to cut existing and planned capabilities on the assuption our security was garanteed by others. Again he got it wrong and Australia was forced to spend huge sums of money rebuilding from a lower base to fend of the threat of Communisum in SEA. I do not argue that Menzies was an outstanding polititian but rather that he put his popularity and re-election before the security of the nation. Defence spending was not popular, financial sacrifice was not popular therefore he made the popular decissions to keep the majority of the people happy the majority of the time. In many ways Howard, although he idolised Menzies, was more of a leader, visionary and above all better for Australia than Ming ever was.
 
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StevoJH       11/20/2009 6:15:16 AM
A Trade Protection Carrier or two ordered in the mid 1930's at the expense of a new cruiser or two probably would have been worth the exchange, especially if the older cruisers could be kept, even if in reserve.
 
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bigfella    Population figures   11/20/2009 6:41:28 AM
Volkodav,
 
Australia's population hit 5 million in 1914 & was around 7 million by WW2. I agree that an army that size would still have been difficult to maintain - especially with the great depression hitting. A small, properly armed airforce would also have been nice.   
 
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Volkodav       11/20/2009 6:55:51 AM
A couple of carriers based on County Class cruiser hulls would have been interesting.
 
You right on the population BF, I slapped myself around over that.  For some reason I was thinking 5 million at the end of WWII but the second I read you post I remembered.
 
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Hamilcar       11/20/2009 7:43:53 AM


The G-3 is just about as bad as the Richelieus or the Lexingtons as conceived. Plus what about manpower and fleet logistics?





The recommendations were made irrelevant, first and foremost, by the Washington Treaty, but then by the Great Depression.  However manpower and logistics would have been doable in the early 1920's, remember this force was set as roughly twice the size of Australia's modest pre WWI navy but was well bellow the size and cost of the proposed 5 division post war army that was seriously proposed at the same time.






The planned navy squadron suggested  has a shore establishment that is huge (14,000) compared to the needs of a five division army. That is 100,000 men on a population of how many? And then you add the 14,000 man Navy onto it? .
 

A 100000 man Army was completely unrealistic, 5 Brigades would have been a challenge for our then population of about 3000000, as it was we didn't even keep 5 Battalions from the 1st AIF.  A 14000 man Navy on the other hand was realistic and could have been supported by this population apart from the fact it would have been of far greater value to our defence than a large standing army. 

All irrelevant as the world economy collapsed and there was no money to maintain existing force levels, let alone increase their size.


As to the design of the G3, it's armour scheme was similar to that of the Nelsons that were developed from them, but with much greater speed and range.  The Lexington design was quite odd, but Dunkerque and Richelieu made sense when you look at their design brief of running down surface raiders while being able defend themselves from lighter units on the aft quarters.






 The amidship C turret was a debacle.  Better to split fore and aft, thin the side armor and reduce the range and speed a bit. Tankers are cheaper than the proposed catastrophes


 


Thinner armour in the centre of mass would be a bigger issue than the small loss in the arc of fire directly over the stern.  Infact the arragement would have facilitated Q turret, or C if you prefer, to fire forward of centre which would have been very useful in the pursuit.

 


I wonder what would have happened had the RAN been allowed to keep and subsequently replace HMAS Australia under treaty rules?


With what would you replace her? Light cruisers would have been better than another dreadnought.  Light cruisers surperior to a dreadnought, in what reality?  Imagine the battle of Sunda Strait with a 12 or 14" gunned battle cruiser instead of HMAS Perth.  Then again why replace same with same, why not replace our battle cruiser with a carrier, HMS Ark Royal was designed for use in the far east after all.  Menzies looked at building a battleship in Australia in 1939 but it was all ready too late, not that a single BB would make that much difference


Long Lances don't care what size of guns you carry.Two or three British cruisers with good torpedoes are more useful at the Sunda Strait where Perth and Houston went down. The notional carrier requires a naval aviation that was not ready to use it before 1935 at the earliest. What British aircraft packed the punch to replace surface ship gunfire or torpedoes at the time? Its a common  mistake to assume 1943 capabilities in the late 1920s or early 1930s when these ships are built. Jellicoe wasn't a fool, Neither was Moffett. Both knew that aircraft would take a while to develop.
 
Australian naval authorities had to operate within known technical limits I think a few British type trade protection cruisers would be a good investment. Most of the early ABDA.fights were cruiser fights after all. In fact most of the naval fights in Indonesia and the Solomons were cruiser fights. Makes sense therefore to use scarce Australian dollars (pounds then?) to buy a good general purpose cruiser and to invest in a land based nava
 
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Hamilcar       11/20/2009 7:58:34 AM

Thinner armour in the centre of mass would be a bigger issue than the small loss in the arc of fire directly over the stern.  Infact the arrangement would have facilitated Q turret, or C if you prefer, to fire forward of centre which would have been very useful in the pursuit.
 
Lets not do what the French did shall we?  What makes you think that lacking heavy guns astern or a properly distributed antiaircraft defense around a center of mass would be an advantage? Aircraft would love to attack a Nelson or a Rodney bow on. Richelieu was worse. Suppose its you that has to run? It happened you know. The Allies did have to run, and as the USS Houston found out, going into action without heavy guns astern  at Sunda Strait as the example (Her after turret was knocked out in a prior battle), meant that a chasing enemy could savage her astern without her able to answer.              . 
 
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Volkodav    Found it, good old wiki   11/20/2009 8:21:56 AM

At the time the final design of Indefatigable was approved, the Admiralty was already moving on, Fisher writing in September 1908 "I've got Sir Philip Watts into a new Indomitable that will make your mouth water when you see it", a design that was to eventually emerge as the Lion. In August 1909 the self-governing dominions met at the 1909 Imperial Conference, and in discussion of Imperial defence, the Admiralty proposed the creation of indigenous fleet units, each to consist of one Invincible class battlecruiser, three light cruisers of the Bristol class, and six destroyers. These were to be based in Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa in attempt to secure the naval defence of the dominions while the Royal Navy concentrated in home waters to meet the German threat. While the scheme was rejected by Canada and South Africa, Australia and New Zealand subscribed, each ordering a modified version of the Indefatigable, rather than the originally proposed Invincible class.[2] The Australia became a ship of the newly formed Royal Australian Navy, while the New Zealand became a ship of the Royal Navy. Eventually, only one fleet unit was formed, the Australian squadron in 1913.[3] New Zealand was retained in European waters as a wholly RN unit.[4]

 
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Volkodav    Found it, good old wiki   11/20/2009 8:56:54 AM
Hamilcar, we can argue about the configuration of the G3's but it's quite pointless, a new battle cruiser is better than no capital ships at all. 
When I speculated retaining Australia and replacing it at a latter date, I was assuming the latter date would be 1936, i.e. when Australia was 25 years old.  Replacement options would be Dunkerque, KGV, Schanhorst, or Ark Royal etc.
 
My arguement in this thread is that we had over a decades warning of Japans eventual actions in WWII yet ignored them.  Logic dictates that failing to aquire capital ships in time Australian should have done it upmost to obtain sea denial assets, such as submarines and land based torpedo and dive bombers.  We did too little too late and much of that was down to Menzies and his fear the Australian People would panic and run.
 
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Hamilcar       11/20/2009 8:02:18 PM

Hamilcar, we can argue about the configuration of the G3's but it's quite pointless, a new battle cruiser is better than no capital ships at all. 

Why? What is the mission justification?  
Australia  can afford, with British help, one. A carrier makes more sense, since you can buy aircraft or eventually build aircraft for it locally, and actually build one or two from local resources. (Something like a fast Sangamon is possible.)   

When I speculated retaining Australia and replacing it at a latter date, I was assuming the latter date would be 1936, i.e. when Australia was 25 years old.  Replacement options would be Dunkerque, KGV, Schanhorst, or Ark Royal etc.

Ark Royal is technically impossible to support. Something simpler us well within reach thpi8gh. Remember the local resource base. 

My arguement in this thread is that we had over a decades warning of Japans eventual actions in WWII yet ignored them.  Logic dictates that failing to aquire capital ships in time Australian should have done it upmost to obtain sea denial assets, such as submarines and land based torpedo and dive bombers.  We did too little too late and much of that was down to Menzies and his fear the Australian People would panic and run.

Australia is constrained by the Washington and London Naval Treaties. Her tonnage is counted against the Royal Navy limits. So whatever Australia builds has to be a dual use and quickly convertible. Hence something like fast oil tankers or a couple of ocean small ocean liners would be applicable as a ruse de treaty. 

 
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