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Subject: Australia looked at ordering a CVA-01 to replace Melbourne
Volkodav    1/16/2010 8:13:02 PM
Declassified documents and reports available through the national achives show that consideration was given to replacing HMAS Melbourne with a strike carrier operating F-4B Phantoms, S-2E Trackers and E-2 Tracers during the late 60's. The leading contender, due to delivery times and cost, was an SCB 27 Essex conversion which was expected to provide 18 years service through to the mid 1980's. The CVA-01 was also considered, with both local and overseas construction looked at. It was ruled out as it would not have been available to enter service until the mid 70's when it was believed the FAA would have been out of the fixed wing business for a decade. We now know that Melbourne was upgraded to operate Skyhawks and Trackers into the early 1980's making the CVA-01 viable. My assumption is instead of commiting additional forces to Vietnam Australia decided to boost our defence capability including ordering a CVA-01 as a strike carrier to replace Melbourne. She would have been built locally and entered service in the early 1980's. Her air group would have initially consisted of Skyhawks, Trackers and Seakings, but would have been upgraded to include Bug's, Vikings and Hawkeyes by the early 1990's.
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Volkodav   1/21/2010 4:28:32 AM
You are incorrect on the facts of the ground effort in Vietnam and about the value of the role played by National Servicemen. The first battalion into Vietnam was in fact 1 RAR, a regular unit, whose senior personel had a great deal of experience from prior conflicts. Essentially it was the same sort of ground commitment as we made in Korea. The 1 to 2 extra battalions committed as part of 1 ATF from 1965 to 1972 were an addtional capability which was sorely needed, even if they were largely made up of conscripts. That extra capability allowed us to operate our own show in the  Phuoc Tuy province and the 1 ATF cleared it of VC and were able to operate further afield. Pretty good for an outfit largely made up of conscripts. Your alternative plan would just have reduced our operational independence from the Americans and our meaningful contribution, because as I said the Americans didn't need any more airpower there.
As for the anti-war and anti-conscription sentiment generated by the deployment, that is true but has more to do with the fact that the war appeared unwinnable and because it was poorly run by the American political and military leadership. Those reasons were not good enough for us to fail to make the contribution that we did. A communist SEA would have been a nightmare for Australia and we were right to do everything that we could have to prevent this from becoming a reality. Even though we lost the war, we contributed to holding communism at bay long enough for the other countries in the region to secure themselves and that made it worthwhile IMHO.
 
As for your description of the strengths of fixed wing carriers for sea control, I agree but I don't think that this was relevant to Australia. There were really only two conflicts that we really had to plan for where this topic is even relevant. One is a conflict with Indonesia, if we wanted to blockade New Guinea or recover Christmas Islands or the Cocos. Given our proximity to those regions the best and cheapest way to win air superiority would be just to send bombers to destroy the airbases from which the Indonesians would be opeating from then send in the surface fleet to do its job. At least in the New Guinea situation trying to use carriers to defend blockading vessels would have been useless, the coast of New Guniea is very long and the air group on the carriers couldn't have provided air cover to a surface fleet that was so spread out.
 
The second conflict would have been a conflict with the Soviet Union, where we would have had to protect convoys in the Indian and Western Pacific oceans. In the Indian Ocean we wouldn't have needed to defend against air attack, as the Soviets didn't have bases there. The Majestics with ASW helo's would have been fine for the submarine threat and the surface threat could be dealt with by keeping neptunes with missiles covering the fleet, with the backup of maritime bombers if a large enemy force was detected. All that the convoy at risk would have had to do would have been to reverse course to stay out of range till the bombers arrived, then it would be all over. The Western Pacific would have involved a bomber threat but that would have been reduced a lot by the presence of US aircraft carriers, the many land based aircraft in the region and by bombing enemy airbases. In any case, we would have had a maximum of two carriers either way and somebody had to cover the Indian Ocean so it would be logical for us to make a major contribution to that with the Majestics, freeing the US carriers up for the Western Pacific.
 
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Volkodav       1/21/2010 6:25:39 AM

I'll make this point separately to the rest of my answer because I don't want it to be seen as a cheap attempt to win debating points. It is ok to politely question the merits of a volenteer versus conscripted force but it really is incredibly disrespectful of you to describe those National Servicemen who served in Vietnam as "cabbages". An immediate apology from you is in order in case any of them or their families read this.

This was poorly worded on my behalf and considering the considerable number of National Servicemen I know, have known and am related to I can assure you I did not intend to suggest that Australian National Servicemen were cabbages or turnips.  Ironically, it was a close family member, former regular soldier and Vietnam veteran, who introduced me to the analogy in reference to some of the dangerously stupid US conscripts he encountered over there.  I apologize to any veterans or their families if they were offened by my clumsy analogy and failure to provide proper context for it. 
 
Thanks for pulling me up on that one.
 
Our National Service was not universal and we were quite picky in who we selected from the ballot.  In addition according to the Australian War Memorial:
"All national servicemen were liable for military service in Australia and overseas, or 'special overseas service', while with the Army full-time. Officially, national servicemen could not be posted according to their wishes and therefore could not choose whether or not they served in Vietnam, although a national serviceman could apply to his commanding officer to remain in Australia on compassionate grounds. The general impression given by serving Army officers at the time is that more national servicemen were keen to serve in Vietnam than were needed, and that those unwilling to serve there were transferred to units serving only in Australia. Commanding officers were understandably reluctant to have any soldier who actively opposed participation in the war and who therefore might be a danger to other members of the unit. For most of the war the Government denied that this practice existed. In September 1971, with the level of Australian involvement in Vietnam decreasing markedly, the Minister for the Army, Andrew Peacock, stated that although national servicemen would continue to be sent to Vietnam, they would not be compelled to go."
 
So quite clearly no one could refer to them as substandard, they were there because they were good enough and brave enough to hold their end up, any who were not were rejected.
 
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Aussiegunneragain       1/21/2010 8:27:58 AM

Thanks for pulling me up on that one. 

No worries. Just a result of over enthusism for the debate at hand withought thinking about the way the message might be taken I think. We've all done it.

 
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Volkodav       1/22/2010 9:18:22 PM
A carrier is a versatile, multi role force multiplier, its capabilities include the capability of any aircraft type they can operate from their flight deck or any asset they can accommodate in their hull, hanger or on deck.
 
Their huge fuel bunkerage allows them to act as tankers for other ships and their stores capacity makes them effective in the logistics role in an emergency.
 
Aircraft carriers are probably the most capable and flexible ships in existence.  They are so flexible that large amphibious ships have evolved into carrier like vessels and large ASW ships are moving in the same direction (it could be argued that Invincible was the first to do so as it was designed as an ASW escort cruiser for the CVA-01's).  The irony is that such ships are so capable, due to their carrier like qualities, that in the absence of true carriers they are pressed into carrier roles.
 
Australia, due to geography has to be a maritime power, we like to see ourselves as a medium power however our inability to independently project power suggests we are, at best a small power, or maybe not a power at all if you consider that we require US support to conduct interventions in our own region.
 
Two large CTOL carriers backed by a pair of small Helo / STOVL carriers would make Australia the most capable medium power in the world by enabling us to undertake any action we needed within our extended region without US support, the need for regional basing or over flight negotiations.
 
The normal ORBAT would be one carrier in the strike role with the other acting as a Helo carrier, able to conduct ASW and/or Amphibious Assault as required.  One of the small carriers would be used in the training and logistics support role with the second available to backfill the ASW /Amphib role in place of a large carrier as required, otherwise remaining in reserve.
The RAN FAA, RAAF and Army would maintain sufficient aircraft to swing the carriers to which ever role was most critical in an emergency and the provide training in the interim.  The RAN's Destroyers and Frigates would be tailored to serve as multi-role escorts for the carriers but still capable of independent deployment as required, i.e. helo's, air defence missile systems, medium calibre gun etc.
 
 
 
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Aussiegunneragain    Volkodav   1/23/2010 10:34:59 PM
The short answer is that we wouldn't have been able to man a couple of extra medium carriers without conscription and it would have required a major increase in the defence budget, especially given the number of extra surface vessels that you are also saying that you could accompany the purchase. To do that the Australian Government and People would need a very strong strategic justification. There was none at that time.
Australia had no interest in being able to independently intervene in the sorts of conflicts that would require an aircraft carrier beyond Indonesia and New Guinea, and both of those places are within range of US based air power. Additinally if there was a major conflict it would in all likelyhood involve Russia, China, North Korea or Vietnam and a couple of squadrons of F-4's and a few Buccaneeers off a medium carrier wouldn't have made a significant contribution against the airforces of any of those nations.
 
Finally, if we seriously considered that there was a risk of the US pulling out of the region and us having to fight for ourselves, then we would also be smart to question their commitment to taking a nuclear strike on our behalf and therefore ask why we would rely on their nuclear deterrent. In that instance the extra money would be better spent on indigenous ICBM and nuclear warhead development than on conventional forces.
 
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Aussiegunneragain       1/24/2010 6:40:25 AM

Australia had no interest in being able to independently intervene in the sorts of conflicts that would require an aircraft carrier beyond Indonesia and New Guinea, and both of those places are within range of US based air power.
Should read "ground based airpower"


 
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