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Subject: Navy Magazine Special Edition - worth a look
Aussiegunneragain 11/18/2010 7:11:21 AM

It's entirely dedicated to fixed wing CAS options for the LHDs. Quite interesting.

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Aussie Diggermark 2 11/18/2010 8:51:28 AM

It's entirely dedicated to fixed wing CAS options for the LHDs. Quite interesting.

Actually I wrote them a HUGE letter, blasting that entire magazine. It was totally dedicated to the tactical benefit of fixed wing CAS operating from LHD's and ignored ALL the issues in actually achieving something like this, including but not limited to, 1. The cost, 2. The design of the ships themselves, 3. The on-flow effect on RAAF capability, 4. The strategic need for these aircraft, considering we are NOT developing an opposed landing capability and so on.

I don't think many would actually disagree that 6-10 F-35B's would provide an excellent close air support capability and some air defence capability (admittedly with sortie rate issue and significant gaps in CAP capability).

What ADF disagrees with is the cost that such would have, acquiring a fleet of F-35B's and supporting them. The fact that the ships are NOT designed for operating these aircraft for extended periods (Spain are only using them to keep pilots qualified when their REAL Carrier is being refitted) the strategic NEED for and the effects that such would have on the amhibious and helo capability of these ships.

Unfortunately the Navy League does not seem to see any need for discussion of any of these points, but ad nauseum repeating that land based fixed wing aircraft can only fly so far?

Sure....

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Aussiegunneragain 11/19/2010 11:26:50 AM

I think that if you re-read the last article by the ex RN and RAN naval aviator, you will find that it addresses the various issues like fixed-wing aircraft, their crews and the specialised facilities they require (such as magazines and workshops) competing for space on the LHD's, the extra costs associated with purchasing them, the operational challenges for the RAN to learn to use them alongside helicopters on the ships. He came across as being in favour, but was by no means unbalanced

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Volkodav 11/20/2010 7:07:02 AM

The driver is government policy, without the government driving the requirement it will never happen, with the government driving it (and funding it) a way would be found to make it happen.

Assuming the COA decided, say due to Chinas acquisition carriers and regional bases, we needed to reinforce our fleet with carrier air power. How capable would we need the carrier to be i.e. what would the nature of its airgroup be (strike, ASW, CAS)? What would we need to do the job over and above the carrier(s) and air group(s), how much would it cost (can we afford it) and how long would it take to achieve an operational capability?

What would we need in the way of escorts, support ships and force protection assets, i.e. MPA's, satellites, submarines (maybe SSNs), improved situational awareness and sea control capabilities to prevent the carrier becoming a casualty?

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THEPUSSMK2 11/20/2010 10:10:23 PM

I too was totally discussed with the pathetically one sided carrier fan boy SHXT that was the "Special" edition of THE NAVY.

It really pissed me of when they wrote off every other option for fire support so they can justify the supposed "Need" of F-35B's. According to them NGS from ANZAC's and AWD's is useless, CAS from our Tigers is useless and support from shore based artillery useless.

"THE NAVY" = a bunch of out of touch armchair admirals with hard-on's for "Pocket Carriers".

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Aussiegunneragain 11/20/2010 10:58:34 PM

I too was totally discussed with the pathetically one sided carrier fan boy SHXT that was the "Special" edition of THE NAVY.

"THE NAVY" = a bunch of out of touch armchair admirals with hard-on's for "Pocket Carriers".

The reality is that none of those options can deploy the sort of firepower that a fast jet can, nor can they traverse a battlefield as quickly. The firepower is important in the instance where Australian forces were to face a large land force and the speed is important where we are conducting dispersed operations. The latter characteristic is particularily important in the sort of special forces type operations that we might conduct in the immediate region. I think this is what they were getting at, at no stage did they say that those options for fire support were useless, they just said that they are inadequate by themselves and that the airforce couldn't provide a persistant capability at long range.

For us it would basically come down to being a trade off between the airbourne firepower we may be able to deploy on a given operation, and the amount of troops, vehicles and helicopters that on each ship. For higher intensity or dispersed operations having the F-35's would probably provide more benefit than extra troops or vehicles. On lower intensity ops where the greatest possible volume of troops are important the space their facilities take up would reduce the overall capability of our initial force, even if the F-35's weren't deployed.

If the Government were to make a choice on the matter, I wold prefer them to choose the firepower option and go with the F-35's. Even with a reduced capability for low level ops the amphibs are going to vastly improve our ability to conduct amphibious operations over what we have now and I think that under such circumstances they would still be entirely able to undertake the sorts of low level ops we might expect them to, like the Solomons. At the same time having the F-35's on board would provide our troops with extra assurance for operations which have the potential to become higher intensity, like East Timor did, and would be a considerable deterrant to a potential opposing force becoming an actual one. Remember as well that we are supposed to be getting a sealift ship to move extra troops and once an airfield is secured, the C-17s have added a great deal of capability in terms of moving personal and material.

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Aussie Diggermark 2 11/21/2010 12:50:04 AM

Care to explain one single plausible scenario where we would need to deploy a significant amphibious force, capable of medium to high intensity combat operations, where the actual threat is so high as to require naval based fixed wing air power AND is out of range of Australian land based air power (whether operating from Australia or from a regionally deployed airfield such as RMAF Butterworth, Diego Garcia etc) AND for some reason we have conducted this deployment without US/UK/French naval assets and air power, in support or in the lead of the operation and we therefore require our own F-35B's operating from our own LHD's?

Remember, even Timor saw a USMC MEU sitting offshore "in reserve" with it's Harrier II's ready to support us if things went pear-shaped...

I also had another look at "The Navy". I presume you are referring to the Mark Boast attributed article? This is the most perfect example of my issues with this whole magazine. He doesn't even make any bones about it, stating explicitly, "I am going to assume that the Minister has requested the ADF to provide some initial key discussion points on the development of a fixed wing offensive air support capability to operate from the LHD ships. I leave it to others to ponder on the Minister;s request and reasons for it! The purpose of this article, therefore, is to explose some of the fundamental operational and support implications of an organic fixed wing aircraft capability."

To paraphrase, it concerns itself SOLEY with the tactical aspects of operating fixed wing air power. The broader concerns about such a capability are NOWHERE addressed and yet these ARE the most important concerns. I said before, I doubt many people seriously question whether or not an F-35B can provide better fire support than a Tiger helo. What IS in doubt are all these things and the "The Navy" doesn't even touch on them...

1. Why is it necessary given our strategic circumstances and our current Government directed level of capability and under what circumstances do we envisage ever having to use this capability?

2. Is the remainder of our force structure adequately prepared for operations of such intensity or will the inclusion of such a capability without adequate support distort our overall force structure and delude some into believing we are capable of a greater scope of operations, than in fact we actually are?

3. How much will it cost to buy, operate and maintain, ie: raise, train and sustain and what effect will this have on other Navy and ADF elements, given we see budget driven measures FORCING Navy to patrol at "half speed" in order to conserve fuel?

4. What effect will this have on the requirement for supporting elements, ie: escort vessels, landing platforms, anti-surface/anti-submarine and self-defence requirements? Again, what will all these additional capabilities COST?

5. What effect will the addition of the fixed wing aircraft have on ships that are not intended for the role by RAN? What effect will these fixed wing aircraft have on the intended platforms, helos, army kit and personnel and other RAN assets, RHIB's, LCM's etc that are currently intended for these vessels?

6. Would fix winged aircraft, actually require their OWN dedicated LHD, meaning we accept a massive reduction in overall amphibious capability (3 ships down to 1) OR do we acquire a 3rd LHD, more appropriately designed with fixed wing air power in mind as a primary capability? Where does this money come from and what makes way to achieve it?

That they didn't even attempt to address these issues, shows that they aren't the slightest bit serious in REALLY pushing for such a capability. As ThePuss said, bunch of retired Admirals wanting their toys, but unwilling or unable to TRULY push the idea as a legitimate and worthwhile concept.

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Aussiegunneragain 11/21/2010 2:40:15 AM

Firstly, the point that you are missing is that even when an AO is within range of fixed wing airpower that is often not the most efficient way to provide CAS, or for that matter air defence. The Norman Freidman article highlights how would take more than 15 or 20 land based aircraft to provide 3 or 4 patrolling over the AO at 1000nm, and how they take a long time to replace if they expend all their weapons. He also talked about how, during the Kosavo operations, weather had shut down airbases several hundred miles away while the skies were clear in the AO. It isn't hard to think about other contingencies where land based airpower might be denied. What happens if a tanker becomes inoperable, how long is it going to take to replace it? Does the airforce even want it's 5 tankers tied up providing CAS, when there are likely to be interdiction and strike missions which it wants to prioritise? To me it seems smart to have naval fixed wing aircraft available, even if it is just a small force to cover any gaps in land based airpower.

The most extreme we might independantly need F-35B's is if both Christmas and Coco's islands are out of range of us being able to reliably provide a fleet with adequate 24/7 coverage by land based/tanker supported air power. What happens if, for example, a big oil find was made there at a time when instability in neighbouring countries made the local regimes look for a fight to pick with a bunch of white people, in order to distract attention from problems back home? What if those neighbouring countries were playing such a vital role in the GWOT that the US and our other allies couldn't afford to burn them for the sake of a couple of Australian islands? It ain't that hard to imagine.

Remember, even Timor saw a USMC MEU sitting offshore "in reserve" with it's Harrier II's ready to support us if things went pear-shaped...

We shouldn't be relying on the US for capabilities that we can provide ourselves, it just means that we aren't doing our fair share in the alliance. One day they might have to prioritise the needs of our enemy over us, like they did to an extent with the Falklands and the UK. They also might just wise up to the fact that we aren't doing our fair share and tell us to eff off.

Yes, so what? It was obviously boast's brief as an ex naval aviator to talk about the tactical aspects of deploying F-35's from the LHD's and he did it very well. He wasn't pretending to argue the strategic reasoning for it, it wasn't his job to do so. As for the rest of the publication, it might have been enhanced by coming up with contingencies to justify it's arguments, but I think that there is plenty of merit in what it did present. There are heaps of examples of how Australia might have to operate aircraft 400nm to 500nm from airbases and with our current and planned f

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Volkodav 11/21/2010 3:37:06 AM

Its all or nothing, either we spend the extra cash and do it right or we don't do it at all. I would like to see two or more carrier groups in the RAN as an addition to the current force, not inplace of any of it. If we can't achieve that then we had probably better not waste resources trying.

We could get half way there by considering the need to support a carrier into future acquisitions, such as the tanker replacement and the new frigates. Maybe look at making the OCVs suitable to be upgraded into open ocean escorts.

I would not look at the F-35B as it is extremely expensive, besides the LHDs have other tasks that they likely could not be spared from. In reality a CTOL carrier could more easiliy swing to support the LHDs as a helicopter and logistics platform than a LHD could swing to be a back up carrier. Its airgroup could be supported in small numbers by slotting into the USN / RN support systems.

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Aussiegunneragain 11/21/2010 5:44:52 AM

I would not look at the F-35B as it is extremely expensive, besides the LHDs have other tasks that they likely could not be spared from.

I fail to see how buying 12 F-35Bs instead of 16 F-35As that we were going to buy anyway constitutes an extreme expense, especially when the F-35B's proximity to the battle would more than compensate for the reduced number of airframes.

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Aussie Diggermark 2 11/21/2010 9:15:56 AM

I would not look at the F-35B as it is extremely expensive, besides the LHDs have other tasks that they likely could not be spared from.

What battle? Where? 500nm away from Australia? In which direction and from which part? You can't show anyone a threat that justifies such a capability and the best you can come up with is fighting some undefined threat to Christmas or Cocos Island?

In this aspect, this sort of argument is as bad as the nonsense spouted by APA. We need F-35B's operating from our LHD's to provide CAS to land forces who are to conduct amphibious invasions against an undefined land mass (whether continental or Island is unstated, except for our own territory of Christmas Island) for undefined reasons against an undefined enemy, yet one who has the capability to conduct intercontinental ranged invasions in the face of the full range of military power available to a Middle Power Country and yet the presence of a mere handful of F-35B's which severely distort the ACTUAL point of getting the LHD's in the first place, is somehow going to get us out of this "strategic hole" we face?

On top of which the addition of a land attack cruise missile capability (which ironically would provide a significant capability in the scenarios you have suggested, airfield denial and counter-C4ISR operations spring to mind...) is described as "mission creep" with the inference being that it should be avoided, but the addition of a light carrier capability is a normal, logical progression?

Sorry. If Christmas/Cocos Islands were invaded and seized, the best thing our Navy could do, would be to engage and destroy the vessels supplying the island, blockade the whole place and then rain down missiles, NGS and support special forces raids onto the invaders until they gave up.

Anybody who could seized and hold the place in the face of projected ADF combat capabilities, wouldn't be too concerned about us showing up with 6x F-35B's nor the less than a battalion strength of infantry we actually carry on our LHD's if modified to carry F-35B's...

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