I am going to assume you know your history, so I won't leave references in what I say. I don't really give a whole lot of credit to Grant or Sherman. From the beginng it seems Lincoln was aware that the south lacked the resources (manpower) to win the war. It seems every General he placed in command, he emphasised for them to push ahead at all cost. This is quite evident with his handling of Hooker after Chancellorville. However, Hooker didn't get along with Gen Halleck (I believe it was, recalling from memory) and he was inept to drive on after Lee spanked his hand. Lee performed superbly at Chancellorville but he failed (I say he, it was his subordinates) to do as much damage to the Army of The Potomac as he wished or could have done. He took a huge loss in manpower and then followed it up with a failure at Gettysburg, two months later, costing him another huge loss in the most vital resource the south had (ManPower). I will agree that Grant was tenacious, as was Sherman. But Grant had a major advantage over most Northern Generals of that time. No one knew who he was. He was an enigma, and this was the piece that Lincoln had been missing all along. Vapid

Well, I disagree with what you are saying, for the most part. I'm unclear about your view of Hooker at Chancelorville. Hooker, like all of Lee's opponents, had lee outnumbered 2 to 1. In addition, he managed via adroit manouver and by keeping his plans secure (i.e., telling no one his plans, even his corps commanders) to place 1/3 of hsi force in front of Lee's army and 2/3 of his force behind Lee's army. At this point, Lee was dead and the Civil War, in 1862, was over. However, Hooker proceeded to execute the greatest "choke" in military history. Instead of attacking to certain victory, her ordered his troops to dig in. This sent his corps commanders into such a frenzy they considered mutiny, but they decided to obey orders in the end. Thus Hooker's chance to destroy Lee's army slipped away. It was at that point, once the cornered Lee realized that Hooker was not going to attack, that Lee performed his possibly mist brilliant manouver, splitting his outnumbered, surrounded army into two parts, and attacking! I don't know about Hooker's relations with Halleck, but Grant had trouble with him. Grant mattered because he attacked continuously. No Union general before him did so. Because his attacks were sound, and his resources superior, he won. In the battle of Vicksburg (the key part fought in the area west of Vicksburg, Grant showed brilliance, executing his own form of "lightning war", with 7 battles in maybe a few weeks or less. When you look at Grant's duel with Lee in the East, you must remember that Grant never effectively controlled the officer corps of the Army of the Potomac. This is his fault of course, he had Lincoln's complete backing and he should have taken decisive control. But he was a diffident man in interpersonal relations, and he did not. If you observe the first Grant/Lee encounter, in the battle of the wilderness. With 0 visibility, no one knew waht was going on. Lee sent in 1 corps to "feel the situation out". Grant, as soon as contact was made, ordered an all out attack by all corps. The order was never carried out, essentially because the army of the Potomac couldn't even imagine he was serious. Their response was, of course, he means begin to reconnioter immediately. However, I believe if you look at the dispositions, that if Grant's core commanders had followed his orders, Lee's corp would probably have been destroyed. After this, Grant noticably lost confidence and became more the "plodder" that he is so famous for being. Meanwhile, he left Sherman withe the best officers in the West because he believed the west was the key to victory. Evn when Sherman did not follow his orders, as in letting the Southern Army escape from the Atlanta area and taking Atlanta instead, Grant never wavered in his support of Sherman. History seems to bear hsi strategy out reasonably well.

Grant was not an alcoholic and did not leave the Army in disgrace. His abilities were recognized during the Mexican War and at the outbreak of the Civil War Confederate General Richard Ewell, said "There is one person,I think from Missouri that I hope the Yankees don't find. Sam Grant". If you have an army of only 15,000 with no future for any promising officer to reach high rank,you will have military geniuses like Grant quitting (not in disgrace) but in frustration.Grant was not a misfit.He was trained and had a genius for leading troops in battle . He did get the opportunity because of the very weird anti military thinking since the end of the revolutionary war. Any country with 32 million people in 1861 would have had a much larger army and men like Grant and Sherman may have quit in frustration.Also you had West Point graduating many more second lieutantants than could ever be acommodated by the tiny pre Civil War US Army.

To make my point short. I don't necessarily give credit to Grant and Sherman. I believe Lincoln had the initial menatlity that allowed Generals such as Grant and Sherman to flourish and win the War. My point with Hooker, was that even after his dismal failure at Chancellorville, Lincoln still retained him as the Commanding General of The Army of The Potomac. Communications between Lincoln and Hooker, is quite clear that Lincoln wanted Hooker to press, even after the Chancellorville defeat. Hooker however was indecisive and allowed his relationship with General Halleck (Commander of All Armies; The position that Grant would eventually hold) to interfere with his decision making process. Lincoln eventually replaced him (with a worse officer IMHO but that is a different discussion). Had Lincoln ever faltered, Grant and Sherman would have never been. Vapid

"The emergence of Grant in the West is striking. He just kept attacking and kept winning. He was somwhat versatile, especially at Vicksburg, but above all tenacious and constant on the attack. Interestingly, this is a long way toward being enough to make a great general. It describes a lot of what Rommel had. And of course, the North had more resources, which fits that strategy. Still, it is striking. Grant, the alcoholic who left the army in disgrace and could not get a regular commission at the beginning of the war. (Illinois gave him a "volunteer" commission.) Sherman who had been declared to have had a nervous breakdown in the national press for his overestimates of the requirements to achieve pacification in his area of the West. Historians seem to have different opinions on wether Sherman did or did not have an nervous breakdown. Why did two such men end up combining to win? Part of it seems to be a very deficient American officer corps, a not uncommon historical occurance. Any comments?" Observations: Grant: (My sentimental favorites are Jackson, Lee and Forest) I have heard about how during the worst days of the Battle of the Bulge enlisted men who had never distinguished themselves in any way before stepped forward and provided effective leadership when their officers and NCOs lost their nerve due to the rapid change in circumstances. I remember a comment in that PBS Civil War Ken Burns show that described Grant as having 4 o’clock in the morning courage. I guess that meant he could be asleep in the wee hours one minute and be coolly dealing with a dangerous situation the next. The point is, maybe some people can only keep their stuff wired together effectively in situations involving significant lethality but in normal situations are a complete mess. Sherman: I believe Grant and Sherman shared a certain disdain for their critics, the politicians and the press. Anything stated about someone in the press then was automatically suspect as it would be today. Sherman’s generalship was the only positive civil war example B.H. Liddell Hart gave in his “Strategy, The Indirect Approach” book. He did so because he identified in Sherman’s march to the sea Sherman’s keeping his opponent at every point on “the horns of a dilemma”. That is, Sherman moved in such a way as to leave two or more possibilities as to what he was doing next thereby keeping the opposition indecisive as how to block him. Deficient American officer corps: I am no authority on this of course but I did read Herbert W. McBride’s “A Rifleman Went To War”. Erstwhile Ohio National Guard Captain McBride spent from 1915 to 1917 at the front in WWI fighting with the British Army in the Second Canadian Division. He wrote that although Americans made the best soldiers, the Brits made the best officers. He returned stateside in 1917 to help train American troops where he had problems with American Army officers not wanting to accept the recommendations he made to them based on his long experience in the trenches in Europe. I hope Americans make the best officers now.

Grant's tactics in the East were different from what he'd done in the West because his army was different. The Army of the Patomac had largely been created my McClellan. There had never been any emphasis on moving fast. It just didn't have the reflexes of the wester armies Grant was used to. He was given a club, so he clubbed. In the west he'd outmaneuvered his opponents. His strength was that the more desperate the situation, the better he seemed to get. The more heat, the greater the activity. Sherman once said something like: "I'm a better general than Grant, but he never seems to worry about what the enemy might do, and it scares me to death." Grant quote: "There are only four rules in war. Find the enemy. Get at him as fast as you can. Hit him as hard and as often as your can. Never stop moving!!"

Grant was not actualy commamder of the Army of the Potomac. Meade remained in that role, tho Grant usually was nearby. For his projected campaign against Richmond Grant had three armys. Meades army was to pin Lee, a smaller wing of two corps were to advance south from the Shenadoah, and a third 'army' under Beutler was susposed to advance from its enclave on the coast south of Richmond. The plan went to s..t imeadiatly. Beutler did not move out his coastal smugglers haven. Franz Sigel proved his incompetence in the Shenadoah, got the two corps shattered, and place Washington at risk. With the twof lanking groups ineffective Grant was left with Meade & a death grip on the Army of Northern Virginia. Both Sigel & Beutler had powerfull political connections. Grant had no option for removing them when he first came east. A problem he had with many otherr eastern generals, despite Lincolns backing.

"...he never seems to worry about what the enemy might do," In his autobiography Grant noted he early on learned 'the enemy was just as worried about you as you are of him'. In the west he was regularly able to exploit this idea and often morally defeated the opposing commanders before the first battle in each campaign. In the east he was up a against his intelectual equal in Lee whos nerves were as good as Grants.

There is a factor: The US army - before the civil - war was quite small. Furthermore most of the officers were confedrate, so the problem about getting officers at all was very real. American military textbooks talk about the outstanding professionalism of the Northern officers (well the won) - in fact they we anything but professionals.

1. Grant the alcoholic and his dismissal Sam Grant was not an alcoholic. He just could not handle his liquor. He only drank when he was bored or missed his family. This became an issue in San Francisco in the 18750s when his beloved Julia was in ST Louis and he was stuck in California as a captain. There also came a time when some funds came up missing that were under his control. It turned out it was a matter of Grant trusting someone who did a poor job of keeping track of expenditures. He was allowed to resign instead of court martial. He later had the amount taken from his pay during the Civil War as repayment. He was wrong and he knew it. It was the missing of his family which caused his chief of staff John Rawlins to make sure Julia was beside him during the siege at Petersburg. He had learned the lesson of Grant’s boredom at Vicksburg. 2. Grant as commander. As others have stated, Grant never took counsel of his fears. He always worked to impose his will on his enemy not react to what his enemy was doing. While in the West, the lay of the land supported his scheme of maneuver (rivers were avenues into the Confederacy). This allowed him to fight a more maneuver oriented campaign. He also had a tremendous understanding of logistics which ensured his plans incorporated this vital aspect. When he cam East, the rivers did not enhance his maneuver….they were obstacle to it since they ran across his avenues of advance. Also, he knew by 1864 he could defeat Lee…..he wanted to do it in the open and destroy him by overwhelming force. Failing that he wanted to pin Lee into earthworks, since Grant knew a siege would end in favor of the Union. 3. Sherman’s ability Sherman admittedly overreacted to the difficulties of the opening rounds of the war. And he did take same counsel of his fears. However he was fearless on the battlefield and seemed to get the most from his subordinates. Since he worked with Grant for the critical 2 years int eh West, he got to work well with him. And when Grant moved East, he made sure that Sherman had a very strong second team (McPherson, Thomas, etc.)