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Subject: Best All-Around Fighter of World War II
sentinel28a    10/13/2009 3:38:03 PM
Let's try a non-controversial topic, shall we? (Heh heh.) I'll submit the P-51 for consideration. BW and FS, if you come on here and say that the Rafale was the best fighter of WWII, I am going to fly over to France and personally beat you senseless with Obama's ego. (However, feel free to talk about the D.520.)
 
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Belisarius1234    What we have is Skylark...   2/12/2013 6:40:56 PM
..who knows what he discusses, and someone who............doesn't.
 
B.
 
 
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Belisarius1234    FW-190   2/12/2013 6:47:43 PM
going the other way, SL.
 
That was a German killer-bird.
 
B.
thats fair, but how does this make the F6F the better plane, it matches the spit for a few years, prior to 42 the f6f didnt exist but the spit did and was doing the job it was designed for, after 43 the spit had moved on past the MkIX and yet the F6F 5 was the pinicle of the F6F development.



as I say compairing a snapshot of the spits lifecycle against another aircraft is slightly unfair, we can do the same for the F6F and compair the f6f 5 against a F8f as both were in service together, the F6F does not come off well
My measurement of great planes is based on an overall score, and the F6F had the highest average.  If I were to pick the best fighter based on ignoring one major flaw, then I would have selected the P-51 Mustang, which is superior to the Hellcat on every level but one: the ability to absorb damage.  The Spitfire had that same flaw, PLUS, it had poor range.  The Spitfire was a brilliant plane, but it must be remembered that it was a defensive fighter.  Over Britain,  attacking mediocre German bombers and hapless German fighters low on fuel,  it did great.  When it crossed the channel and operated over Europe, it was a non-contender.  If you have some evidence that Spitfires were responsible for sweeping the Luftwaffe from the skies over Germany, I'l like to hear it, but the history I read says otherwise.  The Hellcat was capable of defending its carrier, AND taking the fight to the enemy, in the air and on the ground because (Unlike the Spitfire)  it could be tasked to carry a respectable war load of bombs and rockets.  The F6F had some flaws, like a poor roll rate and a rearward blind spot, but the Spitfires range issue could not be overcome with tactics or an airframe capable of shrugging off damage if it got in trouble.  The F6F was so good that it did not need to be constantly revised and updated, like the Spitfire, to overcome deficiencies that surfaced over the life of the plane.  The F6F was brilliant the moment it first lifted off of a carrier deck, and it was so good, it took an entirely new plane, the Bearcat, to replace it.  The Hellcat was so efficient, it was scary, and so vice-free and trouble-free that it was boring.  It was so good, the F6F made the entire Japanese air force look bad, while it racked up the highest kill tally of any single fighter concept in WWII.  There were fighters in WWII that were faster, could climb higher, fly higher, dive faster, turn tighter, had better range, had more fire power, had a better roll rate and any other statistic you may want to add, but NONE of them had fewer flaws, and function equally well on offense as well as defense.  If you want to base the discussion on the greatness of a plane, but ignore that plane's flaws, I'll offer up the P51 Mustang as my substitute best, but from a strictly analytical perspective, the Hellcat was the best overall single fighter concept of WWII. 
 
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oldbutnotwise       2/13/2013 2:54:12 AM
and Lancaster V. These two marks became the Lincoln B1 and B2 respectively.
  That is the root of the argument. The two planes LAST VERSIONS had the same MTO, about 72,000 pounds, and the same aproximate dimentions, but that is about all. The Lanc had a less efficient wing, poor fuse shape and a long bomb bay that was structually heavy and caused the fuse to be weaker and less tollerant of damage.
you claim but have NEVER supported this argument, the B17 might (and I say MIGHT) have been able to survive hits
How about the fact that Lancaster crews were very much more likely to die in them than B-17 crew?
 
let me think, a bomber with 14000lbs of HE and incendaries onboard against one with 3000lbs of HE on board and one is more survivable than the other I wonder why? oh and one is hit by heavy cannon fire at close range whilst the other is hit in  afleeting attack mmm I see a patern here (I know you dont as you cannot see anything that disagrees with your world
 
 
Given the number lost and the numbers claimed by the German Night Fighter Corpse, the main killer of Lancasters had to be Flack! is that Roberta Flack? I dont like her songs but doubt they could bring a bomber down
wrong according to the Luftwaffe the main cause of BC loses was Night fighters accounting for approx 81% of all combat losses            A source for this claim?
Given well over 3,000 Lancs lost and much less than 1,000 claimed by night fighters, I bet we would all like to see a source on this W.A.G!
<="" target="_blank" href=" />http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_German_World_War_II_night_fighter_aces 
I would like to a source on ALL of your claims but doubt it will ever happen like the above statement where is a source for that? oh nowhere as usual

 
 
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Belisarius1234    Data   2/13/2013 10:35:14 AM

APPENDIX 4
Eighth Air Force, Percentage Sortie
Loss Rate (Heavy Bombers)'
Based on tables in"Statistical Summary of Eighth Air Force Operations, European Theater, 17 Aug 1942-8 May 1945 .-
Loss Rate as Percent of
Credit Sorties
Year -Bombers-Fighters
Aug 1942 0% 0.9%
Sep 1942 1.9% 0%
Oct 1942 4.5% 0.5%
Nov 1942 2.9% 0.5%
Dec 1942 5.8% 0%
Average, 1942 3.5% 0.5%
Jan 1943 7.5% 1.7%
Feb 1943 8.1% 1.1 %
Mar 1943 3.2% 0.8%
Apr 1943 7.8% 1.2%
May 1943 5.4% 0.6%
Jun 1943 6.4% 0.5%
Jul 1943 5.5% 0.6%
Aug 1943 6.0% 0.5%
Sep 1943 3.9% 0.5%
Oct 1943 9.2% 0.5%
Nov 1943 3.9% 1.6%
Dec 1943 3.6% 0.8%
Average, 1943 5.1% 0.8%
Jan 1944 3.8% 1.1%
Feb 1944 3.5% 1.1%
Mar 1944 3.3% 1.6%
Apr 1944 3.6% 1.3%
May 1944 2.2% 1.4%
Jun 1944 1.1% 1.0%
Jul 1944 1.5% 0.9%
Aug 1944 1.5% 1.5%
Sep 1944 2.2% 1.9%
Oct 1944 1.1% 1.0%
Nov 1944 2.2% 1.8%
Dec 1944 1.2% 1.2%
Average, 1944 1.9% 1.3%
 
 
Fighters operations. Some of that will be applicable to P-38 discussions 1943-44  
 
 
From Defense Ministry
 
Lancaster bailout survival chances.
 
Pilot: 9.6%
Navigator: 13.8%
Wireless operator: 11.9%
Flight engineer: 12.4%
Bomber-aimer: 13.2%
Mid-upper gunner: 8.5%
Rear gunner: 8.0%
Overall: 10.9%

For the Halifax:

Pilot: 20.8%
Navigator: 36.2%
Wireless operator: 32.5%
Flight engineer: 34.0%
Bomber-aimer: 31.4%
Mid-upper gunner: 27.3%
Rear gunner: 23.4%
Overall: 29.0%
 
Appalling!
 
I think you can take it from there?
 
MOST bomber losses for both forces cannot be determined with absolute accuracy. Reasoned opinion and POW testimony from survivors show that FLAK is reported as a secondary factor for both forces?  Bombers hit by Schrage Musik tended to go BOOM, so the survivor testimony ratios for loss determined in the RAF BC is somewhat skewed, but the BC crews were terrified of night fighters..  US rates after number crunching are 33-38% of personal participating in raids over time. Bomber Command (a smaller force) had 42-44% personnel losses.   
 
Approximate totals for both forces 
 
 
That is 45% @ 55,000 DEAD.
 
Operational training losses...
 
AAF Statistical Digest
 
US Army Air Forces Training Command : 
14,903 pilots, aircrew and assorted personnel killed in US training accidents
13,873 airplanes written off
52,651 aircraft accidents (6,039 involving fatalities) in 45 months.
That is 40 aircraft a day during the war.
 
Some other numbers from that digest..
1000 aircraft disappeared over ocean. cause unknown.
43,581 were lost on operational combat sorties (all theaters, no breakdown but I presume 2/3 was Europe) 
22,948 lost to operations over enemy territory.
18,418 in Europe lost to operations over enemy territory.
20,570 were lost to mechanical casualty or pilot failure. (all theaters no breakdown, but I presume 2/3 was Europe.)
 
~26,000 USAAF  bomber crew killed in action against Germany, 24,000 taken prisoner. Chances of surviving a parachute bail-out from a US bomber was about 69%  Chances of being killed on landing in enemy territory (Germany) 37%
 
Accident rate per 100,000 air hours accident rate by TYPE
 
Fighters.
A-36 (P-51 Apache variant)  247
P-39 (all marks) 245
P-40 (all marks) 188
P-38 (all marks) 130 (BEST of the Allison engined fighters)
 
Bombers 
B-17 (all marks) ~30
B-24 (all marks) ~35
B-29 (all marks) ~40
 
I'm trying to nail it down with a friend who has the books, but he says the RAF's numbers were similar per equivalent type aircraft.
 
I'm not going to say one way or the other until I see those numbers. 
 
B.
 
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oldbutnotwise       2/13/2013 3:34:35 PM
i from I have read the Halifax whilst having a better survival rate also had a higher loss rate so actually you had a less chance in a halifax than a Lancaster, one of the reasons Harris wanted the Lanc, has anyone seen similar figures for the Stirling?
 
its like the myth about the escape hatch (actual interviews with Lancaster survivors show that they had now problem wiyth the hatch it was getting to it in the first place), it had little to do with the ability to escape, the problem was that it hadnt enough alternatives and with the main spar blocking the fuselarge meant that getting out even on the ground was an issue.
the  rear gunner had to climb back into the plane to put on his parachute, something Harris was appalled at and had tried to get the rear turret changed to allow the gunner to carry a chute but it was only with the .5 turret that this occured
(bizzarely the B17 had the same issue with the sperry ball turret but this was fixed by the RAF at Bovnington and the changes adopted by boeing)
 
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Belisarius1234    RCAF data.   2/14/2013 12:04:14 AM
 
I'm not sure if it's reliable, but the Wellington was more bailout friendly and a bigger sitting duck than the Lancaster according to the Canadians.
 
 
Remember what I said about paying attention to your civilian whack-jobs?
 
The short of it...
 
-Emitters are bullseyes you paint on yourselves.
-Kammhuber was BRILLIANT. Harris and company, not so much.
-The Lancaster should have been streamlined at nose and dorsal with the removal of the gun turrets, with less drag, and reduction of crew-size and unneeded payload burden. If that extra fifty mph gained was possible, then the Lancaster could outrun MOST German night fighters. Cut losses in HALF.
-Not knowing about Schrage Musik was just about the DUMBEST and most shocking piece of STUPIDITY I've read concerning the RAF high command. The USAAF KNEW. They saw it used on THEM and countered, immediately. What happened?
-As expected the Lancaster was not designed by idiots. It did have more than one bailout hatch, but the hatches were all TOO SMALL. When OR indicated larger hatches were necessary, those were not made for the same reason a larger gun and redesigned turret was not fitted to the Sherman tank, mustn't interrupt production.
 
The RAF high command does not come off too well, I'm afraid.
 
B.
 

i from I have read the Halifax whilst having a better survival rate also had a higher loss rate so actually you had a less chance in a halifax than a Lancaster, one of the reasons Harris wanted the Lanc, has anyone seen similar figures for the Stirling?

 

its like the myth about the escape hatch (actual interviews with Lancaster survivors show that they had now problem wiyth the hatch it was getting to it in the first place), it had little to do with the ability to escape, the problem was that it hadnt enough alternatives and with the main spar blocking the fuselarge meant that getting out even on the ground was an issue.

the  rear gunner had to climb back into the plane to put on his parachute, something Harris was appalled at and had tried to get the rear turret changed to allow the gunner to carry a chute but it was only with the .5 turret that this occured

(bizzarely the B17 had the same issue with the sperry ball turret but this was fixed by the RAF at Bovnington and the changes adopted by boeing)
 
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oldbutnotwise       2/14/2013 3:16:01 AM
Remember what I said about paying attention to your civilian whack-jobs?
The whole of the RAF was prone to this, a lot of the changes Harris wanted was quashed by civilians "experts"
 
The short of it...
-Emitters are bullseyes you paint on yourselves.
 
that was stupid
 
-Kammhuber was BRILLIANT. Harris and company, not so much.
-The Lancaster should have been streamlined at nose and dorsal with the removal of the gun turrets, with less drag, and reduction of crew-size and unneeded payload burden. If that extra fifty mph gained was possible, then the Lancaster could outrun MOST German night fighters. Cut losses in HALF.
 
yes removal of the nose turret a la Halifax would have made it faster, reductionin crew size might have made a difference  (although chances were that would have just meant more bombs carried - and a reductionin moral, thos pop guns they carried were ineffective but they did give some sense of security, there were nearly mutany in some Halifax squadrons when they lost the nose turret)
 
-Not knowing about Schrage Musik was just about the DUMBEST and most shocking piece of STUPIDITY I've read concerning the RAF high command. The USAAF KNEW. They saw it used on THEM and countered, immediately. What happened?
Did they? when was that?
The big problem with schrage musik was that thier was no defense, belly turrets were useless at night and a nigt fighter against the ground was allbut invisible, hell there are many stories about Heavy bombers missing each other by feet and if you cant see a 4 engine eavy what chace a 2 engine night fighter. the only defense was in radar directed guns, but you hit your point about emitters
 
 
-As expected the Lancaster was not designed by idiots. It did have more than one bailout hatch, but the hatches were all TOO SMALL. When OR indicated larger hatches were necessary, those were not made for the same reason a larger gun and redesigned turret was not fitted to the Sherman tank, mustn't interrupt production.
 
I find this actual hard to believe for a few reasons, firstly we had a talk by Lanc vets (our local airport was built for Lancs as the factory was next door) and they all said getting to the hatches was the problem not getting out once you were there, the point about the change effecting production was dissmist by one of the plant managers who said it could have easly been done as the structure round both the nose and rear hatch was quite lowly stressed , so if it was quashed as causing production delays then it was by someone not qualified to make that descision
The RAF high command does not come off too well, I'm afraid.
 
bad descisions are made during war escpecially when you have to make it up as you go along, Harris was too wedded to the doctrine he was trained in "the bomber will win the next war" (strangely how this is STILL thought of as valid) , dont forget the RAF considered high altitude fast daylight raids but after trying it with the only suitable aicraft (the B17) came to the conclusion that it was suicide
I was reading up on the B17 afters shooters complete bull and found that the orginial USAAF tactics called for altitudes of about 20000ft as beyond that the bomb sights were useless, the RAF tried them at 30-35000 feet trying to get above the flak and fighters, they failed, they also found that the B17 was seriuosly under protected even by RAF standards, this feed back mean that by the time the USAAF entered the war vast improvements on the B17 defensive front had been made
 
 
 
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Belisarius1234       2/14/2013 10:17:26 AM

Remember what I said about paying attention to your civilian whack-jobs?

OBNW wrote:
The whole of the RAF was prone to this, a lot of the changes Harris wanted was quashed by civilians "experts"

The short of it...

-Emitters are bullseyes you paint on yourselves.

OBNW wrote:
That was stupid.

That depends. Monica in theory makes sense. You have to be able to know you are being painted and chased, and you have to be able to track what chases you to defend yourself. A heat sensor would have been somewhat effective if the research had been done. Those were quick to develop to gun range certainty to detect hot engines as far away as five hundred meters by 1940. The Germans HAD them.

-Kammhuber was BRILLIANT. Harris and company, not so much.

Self-evident from the way he reacted to WINDOW.

-The Lancaster should have been streamlined at nose and dorsal with the removal of the gun turrets, with less drag, and reduction of crew-size and unneeded payload burden. If that extra fifty mph gained was possible, then the Lancaster could outrun MOST German night fighters. Cut losses in HALF.

OBNW wrote:
Yes, removal of the nose turret a la Halifax would have made it faster, reductionin crew size might have made a difference  (although chances were that would have just meant more bombs carried - and a reduction in moral, those pop guns they carried were ineffective but they did give some sense of security, there were nearly mutiny in some Halifax squadrons when they lost the nose turret)

The Halifax squadrons laid on more day missions (The RAF still flew a LOT of those). It's possible the Halifax crews were assigned to those suicide mining missions, so they would scream about the nose turrets, I'm simply not sure if that could be the reason. A slow day bomber needs a nose turret. Night bombers don't.

-Not knowing about Schrage Musik was just about the DUMBEST and most shocking piece of STUPIDITY I've read concerning the RAF high command. The USAAF KNEW. They saw it used on THEM and countered, immediately. What happened?

The military man is supposed to be smart enough to think for himself. Harris was inflexible and small-minded. You pointed out that he was the one who wanted to find a way to fit parachuted to the rear Lancaster rear gunners. Yet when ORS suggested solutions he did not push them (See below.)
 
(next post)
 
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Belisarius1234       2/14/2013 10:30:12 AM


Did they? when was that?

1943 Black Thursday

http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/AIRCHRONICLES/cc/reichert.html" target="_blank">link

 
The USAAF reaction was quite quick. Some of the changes you see from the B-17F to G were as a result of the fighter massacre. Some were faster belly turret traverse, nose guns in a powered mount, bomb fuses reworked so that they didn't go off when shells hit the bomb bay, etc,.  

OBNW wrote
The big problem with schrage musik was that thier was no defense, belly turrets were useless at night and a night fighter against the ground was all but invisible, hell there are many stories about Heavy bombers missing each other by feet and if you cant see a 4 engine heavy what chance a 2 engine night fighter. The only defense was in radar directed guns, but you hit your point about emitters

What did I say about heat sensors? This is where the MONICA comes in. Once you get a positive, the heat sensor can automatically turn on the gun radar to determine what the bearing threat is. You know that something is beneath you, that is hot enough to be a machine. Voila, the radio-echo ranging sensor comes on and a guns solution track begins. The radar directed gun shoots, automatically as soon as a positive return registers. This was a possible even with the crude tech of 1944.

Then there is always PAINT. It always struck me how insane the British aircraft paint schemes were. The Germans aloft could pick a Lancaster out by the way moonlight reflected off the beasts! Matte works as does dark GRAY.

-As expected the Lancaster was not designed by idiots. It did have more than one bailout hatch, but the hatches were all TOO SMALL. When OR indicated larger hatches were necessary, those were not made for the same reason a larger gun and redesigned turret was not fitted to the Sherman tank, mustn't interrupt production.

OBNW wrote:
I find this actual hard to believe for a few reasons, firstly we had a talk by Lanc vets (our local airport was built for Lancs as the factory was next door) and they all said getting to the hatches was the problem not getting out once you were there, the point about the change effecting production was dismissed by one of the plant managers who said it could have easily been done as the structure round both the nose and rear hatch was quite lowly stressed , so if it was quashed as causing production delays then it was by someone not qualified to make that decision

I'll accept the plant manager's word and argue the crew member was right too. Let me suggest a few things.

http://www.lancaster-archive.c...

http://www.lancaster-archive.c...

Just the way that SMALL plane is put together shows me that the travel paths were tight. I note the stringers and ribs are set too close together for anything but small entryways to interrupt the flow of structure integrity. The only possible large escape paths are out through the nose and tail and the canopy. The bomb bay (B-17 and B-24 favorite routes are impossible). Note how the main wing splits the plane in two? Then the tailplane does the same thing? How the bomb bay interrupts the cockpit escape route down?

(next post)
 
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45-Shooter       2/14/2013 10:36:32 AM

    bad descisions are made during war escpecially when you have to make it up as you go along, Harris was too wedded to the doctrine he was trained in "the bomber will win the next war" (strangely how this is STILL thought of as valid) , dont forget the RAF considered high altitude fast daylight raids but after trying it with the only suitable aicraft (the B17) came to the conclusion that it was suicide
Given that overall losses of both planes and crew were so much less with the later marks of both the Lancaster and the B-17, and that B-17 losses per sortie were about half of those of RAF Bomber Command heavies, I would say the above does not make much sence. Furthermore, losses per ton of bombs dropped on target seems to show, at least according to the two previous posts, that night time bombing was a looser.

I was reading up on the B17 afters shooters complete bull and found that the orginial USAAF tactics called for altitudes of about 20000ft as beyond that the bomb sights were useless, the RAF tried them at 30-35000 feet trying to get above the flak and fighters, they failed, they also found that the B17 was seriuosly under protected even by RAF standards, this feed back mean that by the time the USAAF entered the war vast improvements on the B17 defensive front had been made
1. The Norden bomb sight was not useless above 20,000'. In fact it was used with out modification at altitudes over twice that hight from the B-36.
2. All aircraft got better as the war continued.
3. At least in day light you could see them comming and had a chance to shoot back.
   
 


 

Given the absolute fact that the USAAF flew more sories, 762,462, dropped more bombs, 1,396,816 tons, and had fewer casualties than the RAF BC, see above, I would have to say the entire strategy was flawed at best and totaly screwed at worst.
 
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