UK Pilot flight test the Rafale F3

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Subject: UK Pilot flight test the Rafale F3
Bluewings12 11/9/2009 1:57:05 PM

By Peter Collins : Chapter 1 , the aircraft : "Most advanced Allied air forces now have operational fleets of fourth-generation fighters (defined by attributes such as being fly-by-wire, highly unstable, highly agile, net-centric, multi-weapon and multi-role assets). These Western types include the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and Saab Gripen NG. The Boeing F-15E and Lockheed Martin F-16 have an older heritage, but their latest upgrades give them similar multi-role mission capabilities. Of the above group, only the Super Hornet and Rafale M are capable of aircraft-carrier operations. As these fourth-generation fighters' weapons, sensor systems and net-centric capabilities mature, the likelihood of export orders for such an operationally proven package becomes much more realistic. On behalf of Flight International, I became the first UK test pilot to evaluate the Rafale in its current F3 production standard, applicable to aircraft for both French air force and French navy frontline squadrons. The "proof-of-concept" Rafale A first flew in 1986 as an aerodynamic study, leading to the programme's formal launch two years later. The slightly smaller single-seat Rafale C01 and two-seat B01 for the French air force and single-seat M01 and M02 prototypes for the navy flew from 1991. The first production-standard Rafale flew in 1998, and entered service with the navy's 12F squadron at Landivisiau in 2004 in the F1 (air-to-air) standard. Deliveries of the air force's B- and C-model aircraft started in 2006 in the F2 standard, dubbed "omnirole" by Dassault. Since 2008, all Rafales have been delivered in the F3 standard, which adds reconnaissance pod integration and MBDA's ASMP-A nuclear weapon capability. All aircraft delivered in earlier production standards will be brought up to the F3 configuration over the next two years. The French forces plan to purchase 294 Rafales: 234 for the air force and 60 for the navy. Their Rafales are set to replace seven legacy fighter types, and will remain as France's principal combat aircraft until at least 2040. To date, about 70 Rafales have been delivered, with a current production rate of 12 a year. Rafale components and airframe sections are built at various Dassault facilities across France and assembled near Bordeaux, but maintained in design and engineering configuration "lockstep" using the virtual reality, Dassault-patented Catia database also used on the company's Falcon 7X business jet. Rafale software upgrades are scheduled to take place every two years, a complete set of new-generation sensors is set for 2012 and a full mid-life upgrade is planned for 2020 SUPERB PERFORMANCE The Rafale was always designed as an aircraft capable of any air-to-ground, reconnaissance or nuclear strike mission, but retaining superb air-to-air performance and capabilities. Air force and navy examples have made three fully operational deployments to Afghanistan since 2005, giving the French forces unparalleled combat and logistical experience. The commitments have also proved the aircraft's net-centric capabilities within the co-ordination required by coalition air forces and the command and control environment when delivering air support services to ground forces. Six Rafale Ms recently carried out a major joint exercise with the US Navy from the deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier the USS Theodore Roosevelt. The air force's B/C fighters have 80% commonality with the navy's Rafale M model, the main differences being the latter's navalised landing gear, arrestor hook and some fuselage longitudinal strengthening. Overall, the M is about 300kg (661lb) heavier than the B, and has 13 hardpoints, against the 14 found on air force examples. Dassault describes the Rafale as omnirole rather than multirole. This is derived from the wide variety of air-to-ground and air-to-air weapons, sensor pods and fuel tank combinations it can carry; the optimisation of aircraft materials and construction; and the full authority digital FBW controlling a highly agile (very aerodynamically unstable) platform. This also gives the aircraft a massive centre of gravity range and allows for a huge combination of different mission stores to be carried, including the asymmetric loading of heavy stores, both laterally and longitudinally. Other attributes include the wide range of smart and discrete sensors developed for the aircraft, and the way that the vast array of received information is "data fused" by a powerful central computer to reduce pilot workload when presented in the head-down, head-level and head-up displays. The Rafale is designed for day or night covert low-level penetration, and can carry a maximum of 9.5t of external ordinance, equal to the much larger F-15E. With a basic empty weight of 10.3t, an internal fuel capacity of 4.7t and a maximum take-off weight of 24.5t, the Rafale can lift 140% of additional lo

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Hamilcar 11/22/2009 3:56:11 PM

warpig :

""For the record, 155E, I just wanted you to know that I knew that (although I could not have said it so clearly and succinctly) and agree with you completely. I'm trying to get BW and/or FS to respond. :-)""

I am here but for a short time as I have to drive my truck down to Nice this evening .

I also agree entirely with 155E about his last post .

155E , you said earlier :

"" ALL deceptive jamming relies on capturing the threat radar signal, modulating it in some way, and transmitting it back to the threat radar. The modulation can consist of changing the PRF, the polarization, the power level, etc, but in each case the goal is the same: the jammer emissions gradually fool the threat radar into thinking the target is at a different bearing, velocity, or range than it actually is.""

Agreed , you can also multiply the false bleeps .

In fact , this is the reason why the LPI technology has been invented to lower the risk to be detected and jammed , then LPI soon was helped by the AESA technology to counter the jamming . Being hard to detect (LPI) is not enough anymore , you need to use fast frenquency jumping with your main radar to lower the risk to get jammed on some usufull bands .

If the purpose of a signal is to feed false range vectors to an enemy threat receiver, wouldn't you want that signal to be received? Low probability of intercept means you don't want to be detected when you try to detect and TRACK a target.. So we have that basic misunderstanding in play.

Now , it the adverse jammer is also using AESA technology coupled to an excellent 3D EM databank and precise beaming to focus the energy (and be discret to other nearby radars) , your own AESA radar will have troubles to keep the lock or even the sweep because it would have to filter the "jamming noise" and "deceptive jamming" from the real echo .

No, since the multiple beam return footprint for a maltiple beam-coded pulse from an array is almost impossible to mimic without access to that transmitting array over tome to see how it codes and if it has wave form pattern to mimic. If it has a random wave form generator, then you are truly in deep manure as to countermeasures.

Again, we have signal discrimination at the receivers to help sort out the different signals OFFENSIVELY, but at least now the problem is acknowledged in print by one of the two self declared experts, that when you don't know the first thing about beam steering and you bungle the transmitter array design you produce a noisy radar that says, here I am shoot me. Same problem for ECM systems. Guess who ran into the problem first during Vietnam? Guess who now has the MOST experience with its solutions? (two western aerial combatants and as always the Russians). Guess who has the LEAST?

Your AESA radar will do that by scanning the most usefull radar bands where the most "visible" returns will occur , obviously . A good AESA suite do that very nicely , it is built for .

Well actually no. The frequencies selected depend on the target set's expected signal returns and there is a compromise for the dominant target in that target set for each sensor. Certain radars pick out bombers better than fighters for example, while certain radars are tunable to match the target sought. If a target is a bright reflector at a certain frequency (a certain crappy cruise missile comes to mind) then the defender who expects to see that cruise missile can tweak a search radar to look for it, establish a smear bearing early and exploit the increased time cushion to obtain a track solution.

Now , what your (enemy) AESA radar will do when it finds the most usuable bands (RCS spikes) filled with low white noise ?

Kill you with a solution at the launch platform receiver. Signal discrimination as described above will separate true from false most of the time. Clocks are important for this as is a libr

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Bluewings12 11/23/2009 3:17:09 PM

Hamilcar :

""If the purpose of a signal is to feed false range vectors to an enemy threat receiver, wouldn't you want that signal to be received? Low probability of intercept means you don't want to be detected when you try to detect and TRACK a target.. So we have that basic misunderstanding in play. ""

I am sorry but can 't you read english ? It is exactly what I 'm saying .

""No, since the multiple beam return footprint for a maltiple beam-coded pulse from an array is almost impossible to mimic""

Are you saying that an AESA radar can 't be jammed ? If you say so , you 're well off .

What 155E talked about is how you fool an adverse mechanical radar :

""ALL deceptive jamming relies on capturing the threat radar signal, modulating it in some way, and transmitting it back to the threat radar""

Against an AESA radar , deceptive jamming must use a different approach and a different technology .

Why ? Because capturing a signal from an AESA radar is of no use as the radar is using multiple bands and is constantly shifting . The AESA radar will simply "ignore" the deceptive jamming acting on band ... (fill the dots) .

To jam an AESA radar :

you need an AESA jammer . First rule .

don 't try to "follow" the AESA patterns of the adverse radar , it is impossible . Second rule .

What you must do is ...

I leave it like this for you (and for now) as you probably need time to dig into it . Let 's see if you can come up with decent ideas (or links) .

I act this way with you because the amount of BS you try to propagate is enormous .

Saying that the Amraam has a NEZ of 80% of its max range is quite enormous , Herald ...

You also responded to :

""Now , what your (enemy) AESA radar will do when it finds the most usuable bands (RCS spikes) filled with low white noise ?

with :

""Kill you with a solution at the launch platform receiver""

lol ! How do you do that when the returns you get are weak and mixed with white noise ? Home on Jam against an AESA ECM suite with a small mechanical missile radar , lol ?!

You said :

""Signal discrimination as described above will separate true from false most of the time.""

This is what you hope . It doesn 't work this way Herald .

Against a good jammer (AESA or not but AESA is waaay better) , the only option is to use brute force but here is the bottleneck , the brute force must also be AESA driven . The Russians made their mechanical radars big and VERY powerfull just to burn through Western ECMs .

Read this Herald , it is about the excellent F-22 radar , the AN/APG-77 :

(from GlobalSecurity)

""The Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) capability of the radar defeats conventional RWR/ESM systems. The AN/APG-77 radar is capable of performing an active radar search on RWR/ESM equipped fighter aircraft without the target knowing he is being illuminated. Unlike conventional radars which emit high energy pulses in a narrow frequency band, the AN/APG-77 emits low energy pulses over a wide frequency band using a technique called spread spectrum transmission. When multiple echoes are returned, the radar's signal processor combines the signals. The amount of energy reflected back to the target is about the same as a conventional radar, but because each LPI pulse has considerably less amount of energy and may not fit normal modulation patterns, the target will have a difficult time detecting the F-22.""

This is very clear , the AESA high tech provides an enormous advantage in detection and stealth .

Note the ""technique called spread spectrum transmission"" Herald , which is precisely a technique also used by Spectra .

I repeat again , what Spectra does has very little do to with active cancellation . It is like an AESA radar in reverse : instead to SCAN very quickly multiple bands with precise bearing , it JAMS very quickly multiple bands with precise bearing . Since each pulses of an AESA radar are low energy pulses (fact) , the searching AESA radar will have huge trou

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warpig 11/23/2009 3:55:56 PM

lol ! How do you do that when the returns you get are weak and mixed with white noise ? Home on Jam against an AESA ECM suite with a small mechanical missile radar , lol ?!

Note the ""technique called spread spectrum transmission"" Herald , which is precisely a technique also used by Spectra .

I quoted the above part just because I wanted to have a good laugh a second time, and also just in case my prayers are answered and all BW's posts are deleted for trolling, just so we'd still have that last gem.

I really wish BW or FS would address these questions:

"In addition to 155E's excellent points (and I'm glad he has decided to join the fight), I'd love to hear BW's and FS' (and anyone else's) explanation of, [assuming for sake of argument that] if Spectra "reduces" the effective or equivalent RCS of Rafale against specific radars when they are on a bearing that is known to be an RCS spike, then why doesn't other ECM "reduce" the effective or equivalent RCS of other fighters against specific radars when they are known to be on a bearing that is known to be an RCS spike? In other words, if both ECM systems are jamming the radar, then why is the Rafale more stealthy than the other fighter if its airframe is just as LO as Rafale[, like, for example, the Eurofighter or F-18E/F--again assuming for the sake of argument that all three aircraft have similar RCS characteristics].

"Also, I'd like to remind everyone that the way an IADS works is that there is an early warning radar network that detects and tracks inbound threats, which tracks are then handed off to the C2 of shooters, like SAM brigades and fighter GCI/ACI, to actually acquire and engage. The entire kill chain must remain unbroken in order to actually be able to shoot down an attacker. However, BW and in particular FS have often trumpted the idea that the Rafale is able to penetrate undetected through an IADS, in part due to Spectra's capabilities, including jamming. Therefore my second question will focus on the way in which an IADS detects and tracks targets in the first place, and ask BW and FS what they think is the jamming frequency range of Spectra, and what is the frequency range of early warning radars used in the air surveillance network of an IADS which is what is used to form the air surveillance picture? Given the answers [and recalling those nifty videos about the omnirole Rafale, and your past claims about the Rafale penetrating to Moscow], how is it then that Spectra's jamming contributes to the Rafale being able to penetrate undetected through an IADS?"

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Hamilcar Couple of things. 11/23/2009 9:33:46 PM

Cumulative power. We seriously discuss cooking pilots and enemy receivers at range with AESA, and of course THIS:

Something else the enemy (Russia for example) throws at you.

So of course the delusion is that you can mimic when you don't know the multiple simultaneous waveforms and don't have the clocks, and actually invite a "signal" into your library (computer) to compare? How's your firewall?

Simple English. Just simple English. Can you read it?

PHYSICAL measures cannot be overwritten or deceived by enemy signals spoofs. Decoys and towed lures can be isolated stand alones that don't allow a signal exploit path into the main avionics.

Not only ineffective, but wrong choices kill.

Escort jamming is better than self protection jamming; since you can use standoff interval separation and don't shine the supported aircraft as a target? (Hint, unmanned decoys can be jammer equipped and made to physically radio resemble and heat resemble the objects they escort as well as be programmed to present a false target array so that an enemy IADS reacts and lights up; to the DEAD package that follows the decoys waiting for the IADS to light up, so they can KILL it.)

Electronic lures and physical decoys off platform can be made expendable and replaceable. Even self-defense onboard aircraft systems can be made that way. A plane that carries a failed compromised self protection system internally makes itself a missile attractor and DIES. Add a noisy radar and its no sale.

There are lots of twists and turns to this, but most of us understand.

One trick pony with 1970s tricks doesn't do too well does it?.

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One Five Five Echo ECM 101 11/24/2009 7:00:18 AM

Your AESA radar will do that by scanning the most usefull radar bands where the most "visible" returns will occur , obviously . A good AESA suite do that very nicely , it is built for .

Now , what your AESA radar will do when it finds the most usuable bands (RCS spikes) filled with low white noise ?

To start with , because of the precise bearing from the adverse ECM , it will be the ony one to hear it , then it will also try not to use these bands .

From the adverse ECM suite PoV , the deal is done . Its pilot just gained "x" minutes and "x" nm to act freely .

Um... Wow, so many misconceptions in your post it's hard to know where to begin.

-- First, "RCS Spikes". When we talk about RCS Spikes we're not talking about specific frequencies¹. The term "RCS Spike" refers to the "spikes" that occur in a plot of an airplane's RCS versus the incident angle of radar energy at a particular wavelength and polarization. Like this:

http://www.aerospaceweb.org/question/electronics/radar/cylinder-rcs.jpg" width="550" height="362" />

The above is a 180 degree plot of the RCS of a cylinder lying on its side. The big spikes at each end of the graph occur when the radar hits perpendicular to the round faces of the cylinder, and the smaller spike in the center represents the RCS when the radar hits perpendicular to the side of the cylinder. Of course airplanes, having much more complex shapes, have much more varied RCS plots, and it is then useful to show them in a polar format like this:

http://cp.home.agilent.com/upload/cmc_upload/amds_radar_cross_section.jpg" />

The reason your "useful bands" theory does not work, is that RCS at a particular angle does not change significantly between frequencies in the same radar band. An airplane will look essentially the same to a radar at 8ghz as it does at 12ghz. And I'm talking about a completely static airplane in a chamber, when you're talking about an airplane in flight it's far more so because the aspect is changing all the time, dings and dents and stuff hanging off the airplane, etc.

-- Second, AESA "useful bands". Fighter AESA radars, and most air intercept and tracking radars, operate in X-Band. I think when you say "band" you really mean "frequency". AESA fighter radars frequency-hop within X-band, that is between 8 and 12 GHz. So if you want to noise jam an AESA radar, you have to jam every frequency it can operate in. There is no "more useful" or "less useful" frequency for an AESA radar, either in general or against a specific target.

-- Third, "low noise" jamming of an AESA. Others have addressed this, but suffice to say it won't work. Unless you output enough power to overwhelm the return signal at the emitter/receiver, your "low noise" will just get filtered out, same with deceptive signals.

In short, to do what you claim, your jammer would have to be able to achieve 10dB of jamming to signal on every single frequency the threat AESA set can send on. And when your jammer has a handful of little power-limited, frequency-limited, angle-limited MMIC elements and facing a 1,000+ element AESA, sorry, no contest.

All of this is goofy anyway. There's no way the Rafale's ECM is designed to counter AESA threats, because there are no threat AESA systems out there that Rafale operators have any chance of facing. And, setting aside the inconvenient truth that they are physically impossible, the measures you suggest would make your airplane far more vulnerable to conventional radars than if it did nothing at all.

----

1 - It is true that RCS will vary with wavelength due to the relationship between wavelength and feature size - an RCS plot of the same aircraft will look different when hit with L band vice X band. But the difference is only significant between widely different wavelengths, like between L and X bands, not within the same band.

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warpig 11/24/2009 9:02:45 AM

OMG! 155E, you are spoiling everything! How can we all continue to have such good jokes presented to us like the last one about how Spectra will supposedly function to jam AESA radars, if you go and start teaching him about how electronic warfare really works? Still, the odds that he will learn and change his tune are low, so all the entertainment is not even close to lost yet. But let this be a warning to you, 155E: Stop making sense! ;-)

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warpig 11/24/2009 9:07:21 AM

...and as you can guess, the really short version of the answers to my questions are:
1. There's no difference.

2. It doesn't.

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One Five Five Echo 11/24/2009 1:08:43 PM

Sorry :) I rarely get accused of making sense!

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mabie 11/25/2009 10:58:19 AM

Sorry if the following was posted previously..

-------------------------

RAFALE, AS GOOD AS ITS PRESS?

Exclusive online report from Jon Lake and Marcus Messalla

For many observers, the star of the Dubai air show was Dassault&S217;s Rafale, coverage of which dominated the various air show daily newspapers. Following the June 2008 announcement that the UAE government was in discussions to buy the Rafale, many expected a contract to be signed during 2009, possibly during the show.
But while the companies that make up &S216;Team Rafale&S217; did sign a plethora of contracts with local organisations and entities that looked like part of an &S216;offset&S217; deal, strengthening French involvement and influence in the UAE education, technology and aviation sectors, and though Dassault&S217;s delegation at Dubai included Serge Dassault himself, and Charles Edelstenne (Dassault President), no Rafale deal was inked.
And some have speculated that the Rafale deal may have already started to slip out of Dassault&S217;s grasp. Brigadier General Ibrahim Naser Alalawi, deputy commander of the UAE Air Force and Air Defence, expressed his hope that the UAE would have a fifth-generation fighter within a couple of years, leading some to expect that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter might win an order in place of the Rafale.
Retired Gen Khalid al Buainnain, the former chief of the UAE Armed Forces, emphasized the need for &S220;interoperability&S221; with other systems and weapons platforms &S211; and especially the US-supplied Block 60 F-16E/F, and emphasized that there was no need to rush to sign a deal &S220;because the capability of the Mirage 2000 and the F-16 is very strong&S221;, while Riad Kahwaji, the chief executive of INEGMA, insisted that &S220;The French government needs to find a solution for (finding a customer for the UAE&S217;s existing) Mirage 2000s in order for the UAE to be able to purchase the Rafale.&S221;
Others pointed to the sudden decision by Lockheed and Eurofighter to send their fighters to Dubai as perhaps indicating that the deal had not been finally sealed.
Rampant Rafale or Arrant Nonsense?
But despite all this, Dassault seemed to be winning the media battle, with the aircraft gaining a great deal of positive coverage in the local and specialist press &S211; most notably in the UK trade magazine &S216;Flight International&S217;, which published an extended flight test in the week leading up to Dubai. This flight test (titled &S216;Rampant Rafale&S217;) was then re-printed in full in &S216;Flight Daily News&S217; at the show, and is presented on Flightglobal at:
http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/2009/11/09/334383/flight-test-dassault-rafale-rampant-rafale.html
Flight printed the cover line &S216;Rafale Rules!&S217; on it&S217;s front cover &S211; together with the taster &S220;Why we think favourite for UAE fighter contest is most complete combat aircraft we have flown.&S221;
Flight&S217;s test pilot (Pete Collins, a retired RAF Wing Commander, former RAF test pilot and Red Arrow) concluded that: &S220;If I had to go into combat, on any mission, against anyone, I would, without question, choose the Rafale.&S221;
From such a pilot, this ringing endorsement seemed, on the face of it, to be unarguable.
But RAF Typhoon pilots in the UAE reacted with puzzled amusement and barely disguised scorn.
&S220;If he thought that, he can&S217;t have flown Typhoon&S221; one told me, bluntly, while another (who had actually flown Rafale) explained that &S220;the Rafale is underpowered by comparison with Typhoon, and needs reheat where we would use dry. We can get through the Mach and supercruise in dry power at typical operating altitudes, and you simply can&S217;t do that in Rafale.&S221;
Pilots who had experienced Rafale&S217;s much vaunted MMI were less than fulsome, concluding that it was &S220;probably great if you&S217;re a Mirage 2000 pilot, but the test will be how a rookie adapts to it.&S221; Even the Armée de l&S217;Air acknowledge that it takes more than 100 flying hours to get used to the collimated cockpit display, they told Combat Aircraft.
And looking into the Flight flight test more carefully, it became clear that the glowing praise was based on flimsy foundations, as an RAF test flying insider (who has flown Typhoon, all of the US Teen Series fighters and the MiG-29) explained to us.
The Flight pilot

&S220;Though Flight&S217;s test pilot is a distinguished former RAF fighter and test pilot, he has little recent, relevant experience that would provide him with any real basis for comparison with the Rafale.
&S220;Collins&S217; operational RAF flying was in the old &S216;steam driven&S217; Harrier GR.Mk 3, and he also flew in the Falklands in the Sea Harrier FRS.Mk 1. As a Squadron L

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MK 11/25/2009 12:01:17 PM

Here is the http://www.combataircraft.net/reports/rafale.php

Yet JL lacks to mention any names, who were those RAF pilots etc. and who is Marcus Mesalla? A few names couldn't hurt that's what is seriously lacking and will certainly be judged as biased Rafale bashing besides the community.

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