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Subject: Rafale Proves Itself
SYSOP    8/7/2011 7:59:23 AM
 
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Aussiegunneragain       9/15/2011 10:26:31 PM


No it doesn't. track and data management at the system level is the enabler - the plane acts at the direction of every other enabler in the system until cleared to release in finals. The pilot ultimately gets cleared by the JTAC (or equiv) or by the mission planner with the 5000km screwdriver. Only at prosection to they dictate whether to release - and thats after considering that they aren't going to get into the crap with Berne/Hague conventions as what happened with the chinese embassy, and what has happened a few times in Afgh and Iraq

In case you haven't worked it out thye air chain is part of the purple chain - its not in isolation, and hasn't been for close to 20+ years


My understanding is that rules of engagement differ depending on circumstances and that there are some instances where pilots are able to fire without approval. The examples that spring to mind are the F-15's on air superiority missions during GW1, they were able to fire without approval from AWAC or ground controllers. No other aircraft were and that was linked to the Mig-25 kill on the USN F-18, the AWAC controllers stuffed around for too long and gave the Mig time to belt the Hornet.
 
If what they say about the imaging capabilities of the new AESA sets are true, i.e. they give enough detail for visual identification of aircraft at BVR or in zero visibility, I'd suggest that in the future there is even more scope for BVR engagements conducted independently by pilots than they are now. IRST is undoubtedly facilitating similar benefits.
 
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Reactive       9/15/2011 11:03:56 PM
No I disagree entirely there, re: very first point those assets are actually in many instances the best protected with good reason, you can't say that they get belted early on any more than you can say that to get to that point all your fighters are gone too. 
 
I suspect what is lacking from the picture here in the public domain is a real understanding of where sensory network capabilities actually are - the very reason that the F-teens have remained competitive for so long is that with sensory upgrades they have remained relevant to the  evolving US force construct - and that the F-35 really primarily has to be looked at as means of expanding that sensory advantage and in turn increasing the definition of that "global" picture.
 
An informed someone once told me that you could judge any army not by the sharp end (tanks in his example) but by the amount of resources dedicated to providing reconnaissance, that's been true since Leonardo Da Vinci's revolutionary cartography, through to the Battle of Britain and RADAR and so on.
 
I think what GF is saying (but using language that may not make quite so much sense to those who don't use it on a day to day basis) - that the respective differences between airframe A and airframe B are an order of magnitude less important in a tactical sense than the respective differences between how force A and force B deploys those airframes as part of a larger framework. I.e we are, perhaps as relatively informed but not professional observers underestimating the importance of the bigger sensory (and EW) picture in determining outcomes and therefore placing too much emphasis on individual capabilities of individual platforms that are far less important owing to advances in sensory capabilities and communication relays. 
 
I.e. if the F-15 pilot you are talking about is shot down by a plane or SAM that has never directly targeted him using its own onboard sensors or that he is even aware of then it would be the enemy's broader sensory, EW and relay advantages that enabled that to happen. Maybe the point is that we're past the era where formations of planes would be sent off to discover and engage each other in glorious battle - but that they are themselves directed and utilised as nodes within that broader framework - with the loser being the force whose sensory margins are reduced and depleted by a complimentary array of electronic resources of which the fighter itself may be only a small part...
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Reactive       9/15/2011 11:27:53 PM
It is important to remember that this theory on the relative importance of platform versus systems capability has been built on Western experience in the last 30 years, where we have been fighting on a one way shooting range against opponents outdated technology. It is easy to see how that could lead to complacent thinking, that we can always rely on our force multipliers to win the day. If the field shifts in the way that you say it is then we could be in for a nasty shock in 20 years time. There are heaps of instances in military history of new wars being lost or won less efficiently, because the brass are fighting yesterdays war, we could be seeing another of these instances in the making.
 
 
 
Do you honestly think the US has patted itself on the back for defeating the Iraqi air force and presumed that the same would work against the PRC in in 2025? look at the published DOD reports on evolving Chinese capabilities if you want an understanding of how seriously they (and congress) are taking them.   
 
And the response to that is surely that this is what the major exercises are for - simulating conditions that represent a realistic top-tier threat by using our own assets under a huge range of scenarios and support conditions and then using those outcomes to form policy for tomorrow's force construct?
 
I can't imagine they're just doing it for fun.
 
 
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gf0012-aust    Reactive   9/16/2011 2:22:18 AM

re your last 2 paras on post dated

Reactive 9/15/2011 11:03:56 PM

thanks for being succinct.  sometimes I'm accused of being too cryptic, but its basically due to the fact that I have stuff all time on the internet lately due to work and am economical with my time on here.  You have eloquently nailed what I was trying to state in shorthand.

I've spent the last 12 months on solution/platform evaluations and its starting to do my head in - so my patience is also getting challenged when I see some posts.






 
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gf0012-aust       9/16/2011 2:33:39 AM

in my need to be cryptic I might be causing a loss in translation

I'm not trivialising the need for gucci gear on individual platforms, but the shift is towards gucci that is informs and provides appreciation to the entire force construct.

even if planes are fighting "alone" they are pulling in SA from so many varied sources that whoever hoovers and sees the most can dicate the event.

SA is about dictating engagement, contempt or thereof.  The emphasis is on the system because it informs the platforms.

conversely sexy kit not part of the broader operating picture, as a contributor or as a kinetic force deliverer has a far higher chance of dying.  thats the reality.

its why the US, China, Israel, France, UK and a swag of other modern forces are restructuring rapidly. the RMA has gone to the next stage without anyone really being aware of it, so its evolution has been so rapid that a host of other nations are already a tactical generation behind.



 
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Aussiegunneragain       9/16/2011 6:22:27 AM


No I disagree entirely there, re: very first point those assets are actually in many instances the best protected with good reason, you can't say that they get belted early on any more than you can say that to get to that point all your fighters are gone too. 

 I'm not theorisiing here. The very first thing that the US has gone after in any air campaign is the C4 network, then the radars. There is no reason to think that the Chinese wouldn't do the same. I remember a GF quote from a while back to the effect that you hit the central nervous system and the arms and the legs don't work. That is what has happenned in recent years/ 

I suspect what is lacking from the picture here in the public domain is a real understanding of where sensory network capabilities actually are - the very reason that the F-teens have remained competitive for so long is that with sensory upgrades they have remained relevant to the  evolving US force construct - and that the F-35 really primarily has to be looked at as means of expanding that sensory advantage and in turn increasing the definition of that "global" picture.


An informed someone once told me that you could judge any army not by the sharp end (tanks in his example) but by the amount of resources dedicated to providing reconnaissance, that's been true since Leonardo Da Vinci's revolutionary cartography, through to the Battle of Britain and RADAR and so on.
 

I think what GF is saying (but using language that may not make quite so much sense to those who don't use it on a day to day basis) - that the respective differences between airframe A and airframe B are an order of magnitude less important in a tactical sense than the respective differences between how force A and force B deploys those airframes as part of a larger framework. I.e we are, perhaps as relatively informed but not professional observers underestimating the importance of the bigger sensory (and EW) picture in determining outcomes and therefore placing too much emphasis on individual capabilities of individual platforms that are far less important owing to advances in sensory capabilities and communication relays. 

 

I.e. if the F-15 pilot you are talking about is shot down by a plane or SAM that has never directly targeted him using its own onboard sensors or that he is even aware of then it would be the enemy's broader sensory, EW and relay advantages that enabled that to happen. Maybe the point is that we're past the era where formations of planes would be sent off to discover and engage each other in glorious battle - but that they are themselves directed and utilised as nodes within that broader framework - with the loser being the force whose sensory margins are reduced and depleted by a complimentary array of electronic resources of which the fighter itself may be only a small part...

 


 For a guy who started this entire conversation by telling us how India should by the Typhoon based on it's superior platform centric performance, I'm impressed by your ability to adopt a new point of view with gusto .. .

 



 

 

 
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Aussiegunneragain       9/16/2011 6:30:18 AM



It is important to remember that this theory on the relative importance of platform versus systems capability has been built on Western experience in the last 30 years, where we have been fighting on a one way shooting range against opponents outdated technology. It is easy to see how that could lead to complacent thinking, that we can always rely on our force multipliers to win the day. If the field shifts in the way that you say it is then we could be in for a nasty shock in 20 years time. There are heaps of instances in military history of new wars being lost or won less efficiently, because the brass are fighting yesterdays war, we could be seeing another of these instances in the making.

 

 

 


Do you honestly think the US has patted itself on the back for defeating the Iraqi air force and presumed that the same would work against the PRC in in 2025? look at the published DOD reports on evolving Chinese capabilities if you want an understanding of how seriously they (and congress) are taking them.   

 


And the response to that is surely that this is what the major exercises are for - simulating conditions that represent a realistic top-tier threat by using our own assets under a huge range of scenarios and support conditions and then using those outcomes to form policy for tomorrow's force construct?

 


I can't imagine they're just doing it for fun.

 



Well I wasn't necessarily talking about the US, but they as much as anybody can get tied up in the past. The US only won the last couple of air wars based on perfected Vietnam era tactics, and enemies who had better technology but a lower degree of professionalism than the Vietnamese. Has it occurred to anybody that all this effort to improve information transfer in an environment where nobody can "see" anybody else's aircraft (I'm talking J-20 and T-50) will be entirely futile?
 
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Reactive       9/16/2011 11:39:24 AM
 I'm not theorisiing here. The very first thing that the US has gone after in any air campaign is the C4 network, then the radars. There is no reason to think that the Chinese wouldn't do the same. I remember a GF quote from a while back to the effect that you hit the central nervous system and the arms and the legs don't work. That is what has happenned in recent years/ 

Right I don't think that's even in question but to penetrate through to those critical networks is the hard part, it is a layered system - which is why attempts made to develop technologies and strategies that circumvent those defenses (like the Chinese carrier-killer missile) are met with understandable alarm, and very likely efforts to jam/intercept them.
 

 For a guy who started this entire conversation by telling us how India should by the Typhoon based on it's superior platform centric performance, I'm impressed by your ability to adopt a new point of view with gusto .. http://www.strategypage.com/CuteSoft_Client/CuteEditor/Images/emwink.gif" align="absmiddle" border="0" alt="" />.
Well thank you for the sneer, what I have said is that both airframes have different optimisations, that is absolutely clear as mud and will exist no matter how they are employed at least in terms of HOW they are employed. I have also stated that the EF program has failed on several levels. I do always maintain that sensor performance is the most important indicator of future capability (relevant to both platforms) but that sensory and kinematic capabilities in the EF are at least optimised for its primary AA mission.
 
What we can absolutely see from the F-teens is that their amazing longevity is partially due to economies of scale, the ability to upgrade their sensory and networking capabilities in line with technological developments and developments in support platforms. I don't view either the Rafale or EF as particularly worthy successors to these because they will have nothing like the same top of the line service life and have very clear limitations given we are entering the dawning LO/VLO era. I also think it is fair to say that to a degree the less developed or advanced an airforce is the greater the burden is placed on platform-centric capabilities which is why we can reasonably guess at the outcome of an air war between Israel and Turkey even if both are F-16 operators. I wasn't actually making the argument for GF, I was just actually trying to put what he said in a manner that was understandable to myself and maybe at least to the French poster who may have special difficulty in translating due to the language barrier and his mild retardation. And last but not least is that fact that if I am wrong I am more than happy to stand corrected by those who know better, there are certain things that it is very hard to discern even with a keen interest which is why I like to listen rather than pointlessly argue with professionals in those industries.
 
 
Has it occurred to anybody that all this effort to improve information transfer in an environment where nobody can "see" anybody else's aircraft (I'm talking J-20 and T-50) will be entirely futile? 
 
In my humble opinion that point will never emerge, the power, size and synchronisation of airborne, sea and especially ground-based arrays will grow enormously, the fact that current airborne radars are (presumably) below the peak powers necessary to defeat the sorts of dBm figures touted in VLO platforms today at useful ranges is no indication of the rate of advance of antennae power, especially since these have enormous scalability - it is quite reasonable to theorise that these will in turn outpace advances in materials science. Maybe the future is one where air-platforms are at a fundamental disadvantage due to their relatively limited power generation capabilities. I don't ever believe in prolonged arms-race plateaus, offensive strategic nuclear weapons are, for example virtually impossible to mit
 
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Reactive    forum software is crap   9/16/2011 8:28:27 PM
I don't ever believe in prolonged arms-race plateaus, offensive strategic nuclear weapons are, for example virtually impossible to mitigate and perhaps 50 years down the line the same will be true of defensive HPM systems..
 
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gf0012-aust       9/16/2011 10:51:28 PM

technology doesn't plateau either.

LO/VLO has evolved in absolute terms since 1912 when a Taube fighter was covered in celite to make it "invisible" (it was the clear material used to make the first lightweight car windows)

in modern terms, VLO is on its 4th manned development iteration since 1957, and its well on the way to a 6th iteration of unmanned.  every iteration has used different concepts from the prev platform base.

ewarfare has evolved dramatically since the end of WW2 and systems integration over disparate applications has basically done a quantum leap on every new development.

sensing the battlespace will result in new solution sets, new constructs and more importantly, each significant development is going to result in new ways for the warfighter to do their job.  its not just about the technology advances and platform advances need to be able to capable and contribute across more than the traditional roles of see, point, dictate contempt etc....


 
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