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Subject: First critical element of WW-II fighter plane effectivness?
45-Shooter    1/18/2013 9:22:46 PM
Given that the "typical" WW-II Single engine fighter could be spotted at 1-2 miles, depending on aspect, about half the time, I propose that the smaller the plane, the more effective it will be! Sort of a semi-stealth solution to the "Spotting" problem?
 
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ambush       7/16/2013 4:18:38 PM


Ambush, I think you are correct, to a point about Strategic Bombing and over-stated claims or beliefs.  Neither US Army Air Force nor the RAF Bomber Command achieved what they BELIEVED they could, pre-war.  And so its claims and its demands were over-stated.

 

BUT, it did have an effect on Germany, even before Oil.  It:

1) Destroyed weapons, on the Production Line;

2) Delayed Weapons from production, due to damage and repair times;

3) Diverted resources from the combat fronts.

 
 
Given the amount of resources  Strategic Bombing consumed I think, at least  early the war, t was not a good return on investment:..  sure they destroyed a lot weapons an material but at what cost?  If you listen to the then proponents of strategic bombing it was the cure all.  Submarine problem ?  Attack German Sub production  and sub pens, German Airpower, bomb factories and airfields,  Normandy defenses, bomb Germany etc, etc.  Everybody else should have just sat on the sidelines and wait for Germany and Japan to surrender.  In fact after the war  the Strategic bomber types  stated the belief that part of  the lack of effectiveness of Strategic bombing was the diversion of resources to  things like supporting the Normandy landings.
 
 "The amount of resources dedicated to the [European] combined bomber offensive was immense.  As much as 40 to 50 per cent of the British war effort went into the RAF and the USAAF consumed as much as 25-35 per cent of US industrial output.     The USAAF grew to 2.4 million men in June 1944, or over a third the size of the US Army.  The operational costs were steep.  RAF Bomber Command lost 8,325 bombers and 64,000 casualties among their aircrew.  The USAAF lost 8,237 bombers and 73,000 crew members which exceeded total USN and USMC casualties in the Pacific."
 
"The United States commissioned a study titled “The United States Strategic Bombing Survey Report” (USSBS) after the war.  The USSBS report looked at both sides of the combined bomber offensive and came to the conclusion that strategic bombing was a failure.  Among the many factors contributing to the conclusion was the fact that Germany had a great deal of slack industrial capacity so that even at the height of the bomber offensive in 1944, armaments production actually increased."
 
   "The Combined Bomber Offensive did have successes however.  The most important accomplishments were the destruction of the Luftwaffe in aerial combat by the introduction of long range fighters such as the P-51 that could escort bombers on deep penetration missions into Germany.  Secondly, the strategic bombing campaign diverted resources from the German army to home defense.  The draining of one million men to operate the air defense network of the Reich was the equivalent of opening another front.  The bombing also absorbed not only manpower but industrial production to include scarce petroleum that could have been used elsewhere.  The bombing’s impact on morale was the least understood and definable aspect of the campaign.  Certainly, there was widespread hardship and misery inflicted by the bombing but German worker morale did not collapse as Douhet, Trenchard and Mitchell had predicted.  German workers continued to produce weapons and German soldiers continued to fight almost to the very last.  Did strategic bombing win the war?  By itself, no but it was certainly a factor in Germany’s defeat. "
 
 
 
 
 
 


 
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45-Shooter       7/16/2013 6:04:32 PM

Wehrmacht divisions and their supporting troops, and about 3 Panzer/Panzergrenadier Divisions.  Plug in an extra German Army/Army Group and an extra Panzer Korps into any campaign from 1943 on and think about the difference it would have made, at Kursk, during Bagration, in Italy, or in France 1944.
One small mistake? 600,000 troops is a bit over 52 Division sized Wehrmacht units.
  
Think about the depleted state of Wehrmacht formations from 1943 on and then think, what if they had another 10-15% of their strength; units destroyed or delayed in production due to bombing.
 
So bombing really did help win the war, well before attacks on oil production.  What it did NOT do is defeat the Germans without recourse to major ground combat, which was the hope/claim of folks like Harris, Eaker, Spaatz and the like.
As to Japan, yes the Submarine Campaign really defeated Japan, because the real bombing didn't begin until 1945. But, again, they understates an effect.  By August 1945 Japan couldn't produce weapons or food, one because of the loss of materials due to submarine attrition, but ALSO because the facilities for their production were reduced to ash.  I wouldn't discount the effect of the massive fire bombing raids on Japan's ability to continue the war.



 
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JFKY    NO Shooter   7/17/2013 2:47:40 PM
it's about 24 divisions, when you count the DIVISION SLICE...I am fielding 24 complete-ish divisions, their artillery support and logistics and flak and feld polizei...in short the whole shmeer.  So the diversion of Wehrmacht troops is even more important, because this adds a COMPLETE Germany Army/Army Group to the OoB.
 
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JFKY    Debatable   7/17/2013 2:51:03 PM
Given the amount of resources  Strategic Bombing consumed I think, at least  early the war, t was not a good return on investment:.. 
 
How else would we ahve destroyed the U-boats or panzers?  In direct combat?  You assume that it would have been CHEAPER, in lives and dollars to destroy an U-boat at seaor a Panther in the field, rather than in the factory?
 
I'm not sure you are correct in that.  You are mrely TRANSFERRING the cost and payee...from the USAAF and the RAF to the US Army/Navy/British Army/Royal Navy.....
 
 
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45-Shooter       7/17/2013 5:53:15 PM

feld polizei...in short the whole shmeer.  So the diversion of Wehrmacht troops is even more important, because this adds a COMPLETE Germany Army/Army Group to the OoB.

I have an Osprey book on Wehrmacht Division TO&Es. It states they have all of those sub units in it. One of the division's defining attributes is that it is a complete stand alone unit. Depending on the time period, they have between ~10,500 and 13,000 troops and various levels of equipment issue. I kind of figured that all those thousands of guns trucks etc would fill out those units to a higher standard than before. by your calcs, each would have 25,000 soldiers.

 
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ambush       7/17/2013 7:24:49 PM


 


I don't know about transferring cost but what if instead of single mindedly pushing through with the strategic bombing of Germany to almost  the exclusion of all else in 1941-1943 Bomber Command and  the USAAF put more resources into things like the Battle of the Atlantic, which was probably the  key Battle of WWII for the Western Allies?  More long range aircraft available for escort and patrol of just  US Eastern seaboard would have made a heck of a difference early on   and except for the air gap also made a difference in the cross Atlantic convoys which were hurting for enough of any type of escort air or surface.
 
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45-Shooter    I think you are right!   7/18/2013 6:25:04 PM

I also think the Battle of the Atlantic was more important than the strategic bombing of Germany, or at least they could have chosen different targets with in fighter cover range? More LR AC in England could have been the first step in reducing all subs in the Atlantic!

 
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marat,jean       7/18/2013 11:25:21 PM
Cannot read a map, Stewie? The great circle convoy routes would require medium ranged  ASW aircraft in Britain and VLR aircraft in Iceland. Bermuda and the Azores/Canary Islands or what was actually done. 
 
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45-Shooter       7/26/2013 2:34:28 AM

Cannot read a map, Stewie? The great circle convoy routes would require medium ranged  ASW aircraft in Britain and VLR aircraft in Iceland. Bermuda and the Azores/Canary Islands or what was actually done. 
This disputes what I wrote how? Did you even read it, or did you fail to understand what I wrote because English is your second, third, or last language?

 
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