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Subject: USS Iowa and the USS Wisconsin bite the dust
Heorot    12/29/2005 3:43:24 PM
A sad day but apparently a boost to the DD(X). http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/20/AR2005122001445.html
 
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fitz    RE:Re:Yimmy   1/3/2006 7:09:12 PM
This is the part you don't get from books, periodicals, or the internet. You've got to talk to the actual people who know about this stuff. What is almost never appreciated by the layperson is that anti-ship missiles really require remarkably accurate target position data to be effective. Get them a few degrees off to either side of the intended victim and the hit probability drops sharply. They either fall helplessly into the ocean or hit something other than the intended target. This latter effect may be advantagious (Atlantic Conveyor was certainly a more important target than Ambuscade) but it may also be very undesireble (Venus Challenger). In most circumstances suffice it to say, one will be very careful about using such weapons in a crowded shipping channel. This may explain the use of SM-1 during Praying Mantis instead of Harpoon (though I suspect not). It certainly however, explains the current USN preference for SM-2 to Harpoon. SM-2 is, in anti-ship mode, a line-of-sight weapon (for the most part) under the positive control of the firing ship. This makes blue-on-blue far less likely.
 
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Yimmy    RE:Re:Yimmy   1/3/2006 7:12:35 PM
May I ask what experiences you have which make you know more than a layman?
 
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fitz    RE:Re:Yimmy   1/3/2006 8:30:53 PM
I am, as I admitted earlier, a complete and total layman. I do however, find the intricacies of these sorts of things fairly interesting and have done my best to seek out people of far greater knowledge than my own. In the end all I can do is merely pass on what I have been told, which is never quite as satisfying as the real thing, direct from the horses mouth. This is why I gave a short list of folks for our eager friend to seek out, since clearly I was not getting the message across. It does not appear that he has taken advantage of those services, however.
 
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Galrahn    RE:Re:Yimmy   1/4/2006 1:00:41 AM
"This may explain the use of SM-1 during Praying Mantis instead of Harpoon (though I suspect not). It certainly however, explains the current USN preference for SM-2 to Harpoon. SM-2 is, in anti-ship mode, a line-of-sight weapon (for the most part) under the positive control of the firing ship. This makes blue-on-blue far less likely." Fitz, I found some new information on this. The SM-2 is not a recommended antiship missile for over the horizon ASM combat. Like was discussed, the only time a SM-2 would be used in an antiship role would be for line of sight combat, and even then, only against smaller vessels. The Navy would use the Harpoon Block II in most over the horizon antiship combat scenarios, however, Raytheon designed the Tomahawk U/RGM-109E with an antiship capable role, including popup and nose down strike capability, and included in both Block I, Block II (BLU), and Block III (bunkerbuster varient) which would add enormous lethality to the tomahawk in ASM mode. With its enhanced targeting, including a datalink for 2-way satellite capability, loiter battle assesment capability, GPS, and multi-target options, the Tomahawk U/RGM-109E is the weapon of choice today. The UGM-109E will be the only weapon deployed in submarine VLS tubes in 2006, giving submarines unpresidented dual long range land and sea attack capability, and the UGM-109E will be the only tomahawk varient deployed on the SSGN Ohio upon commissioning.
 
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Arbalest    RE:Re:Yimmy   1/4/2006 2:11:29 AM
Let’s try this one more time, but with a slightly different approach. You spent 3 posts arguing that (12/30/2005 9:20:25 PM) "Missiles do it with fire from the fuel not used in the flight to the target ...." (1/1/2006 12:01:50 PM) "OK then, back to business. How can I say this again more clearly... The fuel carried by the missile IS the incendiary (helped by consumables onboard the target). " (1/1/2006 12:01:50 PM) "From "World Naval Weapon Systems 1997-98" "The large shaped-charge warhead (of Styx) is carried just abaft the fuel tank (forward of the oxidizer tank). In theory, then, the effect of a hit is to blast a hole deep into the target while filling it with burning fuel." " We now seem to agree that, indeed, the designers specify a certain type and size of warhead for a missile, and intend that it be the primary kill device. The users, then, use the missile as per doctrine and training. I, and your sources, realize the effect of fire on a ship. The fact that a fire can get out of control and severely damage a ship is self-evident (or as I put it, early on, "gravy"). It is also true that explosions can start fires on ships, and the designers seem to prefer larger explosives. Now that I think about it, the Exocet that hit the Stark, and passed through without exploding, seems to have started no fires. I’m also curious about the rocket motor on the Exocet that exploded on the Stark; 1) did it continue to burn, 2) was it ejected back out the missile entry hole, 3) was it mainly consumed as part of the explosion, 4) some of 1, 2 and 3, or 5) does anyone know? As for the Sheffield and Stark being prepared for battle, the reports indicate that neither ship was at maximum readiness. If "HMS Sheffield was at full action stations with watertight doors closed.", then why does Max Hastings (as per your quote) write that there were issues with watertight doors not closing after the hit? If they had been closed when the hit occurred, how were they opened? This is a detail. Various reports indicate Cpt. Brindel as being not particularly alarmed with the Mirage’s behavior, even though a Cypriot tanker had been attacked earlier that day. The fact that many of the crew died in the crew quarters, where the Exocet hit, suggests that the Stark was not at maximum readiness. Two more details. Then there’s "How many of the FFG-7 class were taken in, completely guttted, and fitted with new, fictional bulkheads that don't buckle ...". I seem to have made an error in assuming that your references mentioned the knot that many admirals acquired in their intestines based on the Sheffield events. I seem to recall a considerable amount of interest in putting Phalanx weapons (and competitors) on everything, as these were billed as the magic talismans that would ward off the deadly Exocets. Also, a cheap re-fit. The public outcry in Britain about the loss of the Sheffield, the various news bites of the time, military and ex-military commentators, were about as public as could be. Mundane things like ECM, decoys, etc., and even fire-fighting, were suddenly interesting. There was a fair amount of press on Prince Andrew piloting a decoy helicopter during the Falklands war. As for "Every time I post something, and back it up with hard evidence from reputable sources you come back with "I don't think so" and scant else." and "Do you have anything other than uninformed opinion about any of this or do we have to keep going around and around in circles? Frankly it's starting to get on my nerve's.", I again point out that we’ve been through this. Fortunately, we seem able to avoid ad-hominem "stuff". I decided to use your sources because you had your sources in front of you, you posted them, you seem to have ignored my sources (not just Wiki), and I didn’t want to argue sources (Internet or other). If you frequent naval sites, then my statements concerning the Seydlitz, Kirishima, etc, should be already known to you. Same with my source for naval armor penetration data; otherwise, ask about http://www.navweaps.com/. My attention to detail may annoy you, but details usually change the Broader Picture. There’s a report that indicates that the Sheffield in second-degree readiness rather than at full action-stations. Apparently it took the Sheffield 4 minutes to close all hatches, but they only had one minute before the Exocet hit. I don’t know the reliability of this report, so I only mention it. If true, or only partly true (some of the ship was still at second-degree readiness), it helps explain why the fire was not contained. As anyone familiar with accident investigation will tell you, this sort of detail can change the Broader Picture completely. "When? By whom?" Kindly check the relevant sections of my previous posts: First: http://www.strategypage.com/messageboards/messages/8-8510.asp "One RPG-7 should be able to penetrate
 
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EW3    RE:Re:Galrahn   1/4/2006 2:31:27 AM
Just time for a short post. The USN has been retiring the Harpoon for the last few years. The TACTOM is the choice of weapon at a distance even against ships. In close either the SM1 or SM2 with an illuminator from a chopper or AEW will get the job done quite nicely.
 
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fitz    RE:Re:Galrahn   1/5/2006 1:50:55 AM
Galrahn: It is actually possible to use SM-2 for over the horizon surface-to-surface engagements, but the way this works as it was described to me sounds like accuracy could be a problem. The USN has not procured Harpoon Block II BTW - the only customer I can think of offhand so far is Denmark. Harpoon is of course capable of shooting beyond the electronic horizon, but it is not even fitted to DDG-51 Flight IIA's and it does not appear it will be carried by LCS either. Given the likely operating areas for the USN for the forseable future and expected ROE, this is no great loss. Block IV returns some residual anti-ship capability to Tomahawk, using an imaging seeker instead of active radar. This anti-ship facility has been lacking since the demise of the role-specific TASM in 1995, but it is not a primary function in the new version. I'm not aware if it has even been tested against sea targets yet. SH-60's and E-2C can not, BTW, provide CWI for terminal-phase target illumination. Arbalest: OK buddy, let's deal with some of your issues. "Now that I think about it, the Exocet that hit the Stark, and passed through without exploding, seems to have started no fires. I’m also curious about the rocket motor on the Exocet that exploded on the Stark; 1) did it continue to burn, 2) was it ejected back out the missile entry hole, 3) was it mainly consumed as part of the explosion, 4) some of 1, 2 and 3, or 5) does anyone know?" Here you go assuming things to be true when you have no evidence to support those assumptions. How about let's ask the U.S. Navy, specifically NAVSEA. This should actually address a bunch of your points... "Description: Impact of two Exocet missiles. The warhead of the first of two Exocet missiles fired at Stark failed to detonate. However, the burning solid propellant from the sustainer motor burned along several frames of the ship, causing a major conflagration and extensive damage to the ship. A second missile penetrated the hull within a few feet of the first hit and detonated just inside the ship, causing the fire to spread throughout the ship." "At 2109 on the night of May 17, the port bridge wing lookout sighted a glow that appeared inbound from the horizon. The seaman called, "Missile inbound, missile inbound," on the sound powered circuit. This information was passed into the bridge and the JL phone talker in CIC, but not to the tactical action officer (TAO) in CIC. The junior officer of the deck (JOOD) also sighted the missile just before it struck the portside of Stark below the bridge at frame 110. General quarters was sounded almost simultaneously with the first hit. The JOOD then observed a second missile inbound, grabbed the 1MC and announced, "Inbound missile, port side." At 2110, the second Exocet missile hit Stark in the same location as the first. The first missile which did not detonate, instead disintegrated, parts of which passed through the starboard side of the ship at frame 172. The warhead was found later on the second deck at frame 171. The second missile exploded about three feet inside the skin of the ship. Smoke quickly filled the spaces from the bow aft to frame 212 and flames reached the port bridge wing. The ammunition topside at the bridge was jettisoned to prevent cook-off in the intense heat. All communications were lost; radios from aircrew survival vests were used to establish communications with USS Waddell (DDG 24), the onstation airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and the AWACS controller on military air distress (MAD). The CO positioned on the bridge, made the decision to treat the missile hit as a major conflagration." This next bit is my favorite part... "Each missile injected approximately 300 pounds of propellant into the berthing complex. The combustion of the burning propellant resulted in a near instantaneous heat release of 12 million BTUs, which caused a rapid thermal pulse seldom seen in normal fires. The fire reached "flashover" in less than one minute. (Flashover is a condition whereby overhead temperatures reach 1400-1500º F. When heat is this intense, all combustible materials burst into flames and fire engulfs the space.)" "the CO became concerned when the angle of list reached 16 degrees. The executive officer (XO) organized a dewatering party, directing one group to enter the berthing area and secure the firemain piping. A second group was sent to cut holes in the bulkhead above the main deck to dewater spaces and recover the angle of list." "As morning dawned, it became very clear that Stark's exhausted crew, having mounted a determined and persistent fight, was now too worn out and depleted to continue without assistance. Teams from Waddell and Conyngham moved aboard. Firefighting and dewatering efforts were continued until late morning, when the fire was considered out and reflash watches set." "Survivability information ascertained from Stark included: 1. Need for a t
 
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fitz    RE:Re:Arbalest - I forgot one thing   1/5/2006 1:53:59 AM
Here's a quote from the redacted (declasssified and released) version of the initial Stark Board of Inquiry report that I picked up from Usenet: "2.8 (U) The first missile (dud) was more damaging than the second missile (detonation) because it injected burning fuel further inside the ship. The second missile's warhead detonated just inside the ship and vented some of its thermal energy back out through the exterior of the ship."
 
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Arbalest    RE:Re:Arbalest - I forgot one thing   1/5/2006 7:57:05 PM
It seems that I must write a book in order to clarify the various points and settle some of your issues for you. First, memory development and comprehension. If the "1943-vintage weapon" you are referring to is the Fritz-X, then you recall, as per our earlier discussions, my sources (kindly reread MY posts) indicate that the second hit penetrated the deck armor, and detonated a magazine. It was the magazine detonation that moved the turret and broke the Roma in half, not the Fritz-X. That a magazine explosion will do this, and that magazines are not terribly difficult to detonate, has been known at least since the USS Maine. Next, analysis of information. Read your salient points about the Stark: "At 2109 on the night of May 17, the port bridge wing lookout sighted a glow . . . . . . General quarters was sounded almost simultaneously with the first hit. . . . . . . . . At 2110, the second Exocet missile hit Stark in the same location as the first." While the Stark may have been at some state that . . . etc., the fact was that the Stark was not at "General quarters", hence not fully prepared for the hit, and in fact did nothing. You then mention later that neither ship "believed she was under attack at the time." Is your "major point" of "Condition Three" really relevant? Maybe it is; it shows that the Stark was not fully prepared, and that you know this. You are inventing the "structural changes" strawman. My written words were "was likely much better prepared", and I was thinking more along the lines of system redundancy (so systems are less likely to go down), tactics, and fire control (procedures, halon suppression systems, things to force doors closed/plug gaps), although I admit to having assumed that some work was done on ensuring watertight door close, and minor things of this nature. Since you insist upon discussing structural issues, recall that the WW1 British battleships responded to torpedo attacks by turning away from the point of launch (and using their medium guns to try to destroy the torpedo boats), and when faced by torpedo boat attack, this tactic was successful. The British chose not to bring all of their battleships for a refit (a structural fix), and relied on tactics instead. Personally, I think that they got very lucky, but this is not relevant to WW1, as their tactics seem to have worked. My "Now that I think about it, . . . , or 5) does anyone know?" paragraph is indeed poorly worded. It ends with a question, which I assumed would be applied to the entire paragraph. I did not have the detailed information. Therefore, this one is on me. But to get back to the issue of burning rocket fuel, note that while 1 burning rocket motor started a fire on the Sheffield, that got out of control and over a period of 3 days essentially destroyed the ship (the first combat strike of an AshM). 5 years later, 2 of the same missiles struck a ship not at General Quarters. One missile exploded, 2 motors burned (should be twice as destructive, right?), yet the Stark was saved. What, in the intervening 5 years, changed? Could it be that the admirals and captains determined that doctrine, tactics, damage control, and asymmetrical weapons (chaff, etc.) would be sufficient, or perhaps the only economic answer? This seems to be their answer for torpedoes as well, as modern ships seem to be much less resistant to torpedoes than the WW1 British battleships. The subsequent investigation of the Stark (why were the missiles not detected, what was the CIWS doing, etc.) suggest that the US Navy did some serious examination of their doctrine, tactics and the equipment upon which it was based. You might detect that HMS Antelope, Coventry, Ardent and RFA Sir Galahad, were sunk by one or more dumb bombs. My recollection is that, unlike the Sheffield, there was little, if any, chance of saving these ships. Some of these explosions were theoretically preventable, as they happened during disarming efforts, but had they exploded immediately, would the casualty count or damage have been less? For completeness, HMS Antrim, Argonaut, Broadsword and Glasgow were damaged by dumb bombs as well, but none of these bombs exploded. HMS Galmorgan was hit on 12 June by an Exocet, causing a fire and serious flooding. However, about three and a half hours later, all fires were extinguished and the Galmorgan was making 20kts. What happened differently, or more specifically, what did the British do differently? Could actually being ready for combat, and learning (fire fighting techniques, etc.) from the Sheffield, indeed be the answer? Fortunately, your sources are sitting in front of you, and may be reread at your leisure. You merely evade the Sheffield issues. There is evidence that the Sheffield was also not prepared for the missile strike, etc., etc. The counterexample of the Glamorgan may make the Sheffield question
 
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gf0012-aust    RE:Re:Arbalest - I forgot one thing - Arbalest   1/5/2006 8:11:30 PM
"(the first combat strike of an AshM)." minor query re Sheffield. I thought that honour was picked up by the Egyptians against Eilat? - some 15 years earlier?
 
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