November 22, 2024
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November 22, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 12 Fire Support The success of the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID[M]) in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was largely due to its ability to mass joint fires on the battlefield. From the initial destruction of the border observation posts/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission to the silencing of enemy indirect fire systems and movement to Baghdad, field artillery, close air support (CAS), and air interdiction (AI), were instrumental in allowing the freedom of maneuver for the division. With the success of joint fires integration, the fire support battlefield operating system validated its role in the combined arms team. We developed new techniques from lessons learned and implemented them to ensure success on the battlefield. The fire support battlefield operation system (BOS) also identified some shortcomings in resourcing the fight, but adapted to ensure timely and accurate fires throughout the division. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Fire Support Planning Issue: Air interdiction nomination Discussion: The AI nominations process worked well throughout this operation. Unlike the locked in rigid �Warfighter� scenario, the division level had more flexibility in the nominations to V Corps. The normal targeting process based on 24, 48, 72, 96-hour target refinement, nomination, and submission were not conducive based on movement and displacement of the DTAC and DMAIN. Using the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) Excel spreadsheets and email, and with the assistance of our fire and effects coordination cell (FECC) liaison officer ( LNO) at V Corps, we transmitted our nominations. The division scheme of maneuver and command and control movement plan and strategy did not facilitate or accommodate our normal targeting process and cycle. However, we knew and rehearsed how we would submit our target nomination to V Corps. Our basic philosophy and methodology was to submit our AI nominations to the division�s FECC LNO at the corps main (CMAIN) FECC at least four days out. The LNO provided our AI nominations to the V Corps joint warfare officer (JWO) for four ATO cycles with the understanding that both the DMAIN and DTAC would be moving at LD and for at least 36 hours would be without sustained communications connectivity and the ability to conduct its formal targeting process. The LNO, along with the field artillery intelligence officer (FAIO) working at the deployable intelligence support element (DISE), helped update and refine the division�s AI nominations. The integration of the DISE into the normal targeting process was essential, especially during the first 48-hours of combat. This process and technique was invaluable and paid major dividends in the defeat of the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division and the subsequent destruction of the Medina Division. From 19-24 March 2003, the FAIO and FECC LNO submitted the AI nominations for the division�s targeting team. The deputy fire support coordinator (DFSCOORD) and the division targeting officer provided input via single channel tactical satellite (SC TACSAT) over the fires or command nets. On 25 March 2003, the targeting team resumed its normal AI submission process with one exception - we focused only 24-hours out. This was predicated on the uncertainty of V Corps shaping operations and the dynamic battlefield. We went through a period where V Corps said 3ID (M) AI nominations maintained the same focus as theirs, and that we should not nominate time sensitive targets (TST) that were being handled at the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) level. We explained our AI focus is based on our future operations, as well as those long-range enemy systems that affect our freedom of maneuver. V Corps also wanted us to identify surge period for close air support for each ATO cycle as well. Our basic philosophy for a pre-planned CAS request was based on our previous line of departure (LD) and attack times of the day. Recommendation: Sustain the 24-hour targeting methodology and AI nomination and submission process used by the FECC LNO and FAIO working at the deployable DISE used during OIF. The division should take a hard look at the DTAC and DMAIN movement plan and strategy and the impact it has on targeting and shaping the division�s battlespace. Improve our long-range communications systems ( i.e., SC TACSAT). Issue: Target refinement while on the move Discussion: During offensive operations units must have the capability to conduct target refinement. The DFSCOORD and FAIO developed a concept and methodology to address target refinement issues and concerns while on the move. The integration of the DISE into the normal targeting process while the DMAIN was moving was essential, especially during the first 48-hours of combat. There were two methods of target refinement: 1) In the red/amber tactical operations center (TOC) configuration via ADOCS and TACSAT, ADOCS to refine and transmit received targets and TACSAT as an alternate route to transmit voice to units without digital capabilities, and 2) Physically moving (i.e., in a vehicle) pure TACSAT for all voice refinements. These methods worked well in the short term with an enemy force that could not reconstruct its command and control (C 2 ) and re-mass its resources quickly enough to be effective. Develop techniques that tie ADOCS and the Automated Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) into a system such as TACSAT for mission processing on the move in a vehicle. Communication became paramount throughout all phases of combat operations. We significantly improved our long-range communications systems by fielding the single channel tactical satellite (SC TACSAT) system at the DMAIN and DTAC on an interim basis. Without question, SC TACSAT was the lifeline of the communications architecture of the division. Recommendation: Sustain the targeting methodology, process, and procedures for target refinement while on the move. The division should take a hard look at and sustain the long-range communications capability that existed during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Submitting SC TACSAT equipment changes to future modification tables of organization and equipment (MTOE). Issue: Corps shaping versus combined air operations center (CAOC) air interdiction (AI) for deep shaping operations Discussion: Lessons learned during OIF spurred a debate concerning deep shaping operations. One of the factors fueling this argument was the placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL). Doctrinally, the FSCL is placed 30-40 km out, typically at the maximum range of the division�s organic indirect assets. The combined forces air component command (CFACC), through the CAOC, shapes the battlefield long of the FSCL. However for OIF, the FSCL was placed approximately 140 km in front of the division. This created a dead space between the area that the division could influence and the area shaped by the CFACC. One factor that contributed to this problem was the fact that rather than another Army division, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) was on our northern flank. Doctrinally, the Marines keep there FSCL long of their front line trace because they have their own air wing to conduct their deep shaping. Conversely, the Army relies on the Air Force for shaping. The debate is now who should be responsible for shaping, the CAOC or the corps. Doctrinally, the CAOC takes care of the deep shaping for the division. The division and the corps nominate AI targets and send them up to the CAOC through the battlefield coordination detachment (BCD). The CAOC, with a dynamic targeting and planning cell, takes our AI nominations and develops them into viable targets. They have a host of ISR assets to accomplish this including: U-2, Predator, satellite imagery, signal intelligence (SIGINT), and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). From target nomination to execution the process takes 72-96 hours. Once the ATO is published, fighter pilots and bomber crews, under CAOC control through the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), plan and execute the AI mission. Once the mission is complete, battle damage assessment (BDA) is analyzed and passed back down to the corps and then to the division. This process is battle proven and worked well in the past. However, CAOC kill box interdiction (KI) for OIF was unsuccessful. Contributing factors to failure were lengthy targeting processes against a mobile enemy, KI operations against a well-hidden threat, and a lack of battlefield situational awareness (SA). The CAOC�s lengthy targeting process contributed to its lack of success. By the time the analysis was done and the ATO was created, the targets had moved. There currently is no process to perform target updates to the CAOC. On one occasion, the CAOC engaged 200 empty revetments with no BDA. A well-hidden enemy was another issue that caused problems for the CAOC. The enemy used camouflage, hid in orchards, and hid in urban areas making it challenging to find. The CAOC had such a large area that they could not focus their search. Without complete situational awareness, elements with platforms that can destroy deep targets possess the capability of fratricide. The corps air support operations center (ASOC) took a different approach to the shaping short of the FSCL. Corps' process was refined to allow for dynamic retasking when a target moved or changed the degree of protection. The corps air control element (ACE) processed possible targets in a more timely way, using their internal available ISR platforms. Additionally, they observe the same ISR feeds that the CAOC sees. Through the use of Hunter unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)- Short Range, the corps used real time intelligence to find and engage targets. The ASOC�s philosophy was to kill targets with CAS as they found them with the UAV. One concern behind this philosophy is that targeting may not be done in support of the commander�s scheme of maneuver. On the other hand, we must realize that many of these CAS sorties would be going home without employing ordnance, resulting in wasted CAS sorties. One last topic worthy of discussion is movement of the FSCL based on the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. This movement is based on targeting that is done by the CFACC at the CAOC for AI missions long of the FSCL. Essentially, the CFACC plans and engages those targets as AI. If the FSCL moves according to a maneuver trigger and not ATO cycle, there is a possibility that target sets planned as AI missions suddenly appear short of the FSCL. As a result CFACC missions take off with the intent to execute AI on targets that are now located within corps and division battlespace. A solution would be to allow the CFACC to do its deliberate targeting process. Once the targets make the ATO, the aircrews will launch with the intent to do an AI mission. Upon check-in with an airborne command and control platform (either AWACS or JSTARS), the aircrews will receive an AO update. If the AI target then falls short of the FSCL, those aircraft will be pushed to the corps or division to engage those targets in the form of CAS. If aircraft check-in and their target set has already been engaged and destroyed, those aircraft will be sent back to AWACS for retasking. For this concept to work, it is essential to have an airborne command and control platform that has total SA on the battlespace. Putting Army LNOs on board with access to Force XXI battle command command brigade and below (FBCB 2 ) and communications capability to corps and division could be one solution. Recommendation: We proved that our doctrine works when used. Defining the battlespace for all levels of command delineates where targeting is done. Corps focused on deep shaping of the battlespace in front of the division, which provided for a more timely and focused targeting process. Continue the development of corps clearance of targets through the division, as only the division truly maintains situational awareness of its subordinate units. Maintain the process that allows ISR assets to be shared with division, for inclusion in the division�s targeting process. Issue: Doctrinal versus non-doctrinal terms �A� or �G� day Discussion: No doctrinal definition clearly defines �A� or �G� day (when the 24 hour period starts or finishes) creating confusion in subordinate V Corps units. V Corps uses a GES (graphic estimate sketch) to depict timing of critical events and executable tasks using the ATO cycle as a base. With this base, a �G� day, �A� day, and �D� day starts at 0300Z and ends 24 hours later. Note: "A" and "G" are not doctrinal terms and not found in any of our joint publications. At the same time, in all other products from V Corps, a �G� day is referred to as running from 2400 hours Zulu for a 24-hour period. For example: From the draft FRAGO V, upcoming Cobra II operations order: 3.C.1.I. NET D+3/A+1/G DAY 0100Z CONDUCT GROUND RECONNAISSANCE TO RECON LOA (40 KMS). There can be two different interpretations of this: 1) According to the standard V Corps has established with the GES, 3ID (M) ground reconnaissance would be able to LD at the end of the A+1 day, G day would have been into its 22nd hour, and 2) Using the 2400 hr Zulu clock, LD would occur at the first hour of the G day, 22 hours prior to the first definition. The bottom line is that V Corps has not established a standard for �G day� and fluctuates from using the ATO cycle and the definition for a doctrinal day. This lack of clarity creates great confusion and can drastically affect the plan. There are three possible recommendations to eliminate this confusion and provide for the efficient killing of our enemies and a legitimate chance for our soldiers to survive on the battlefield: 1) Use �D� as defined in JP 1-02 as the doctrinal base only for any discussion of days or hours, 2) Adopt the ATO cycle as the standard day, or 3) Clearly define each non-doctrinal day. 1. Adopt �D� as the standard: From JP 1-02: Times- (C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the commanders of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day. a. C-day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter �C� will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning. b. D-day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence. c. F-hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. d. H-hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences. e. L-hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. f. M-day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence. g. N-day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. h. R-day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation. i. S-day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call up (not more than 200,000). From doctrine, a �D� day could be easily used to describe all actions. This is in line with the majority of Army personnel�s understanding of what a day looks like, not to mention the rest of the world. �A� and �G� would no longer be used. 2. Adopt the ATO Cycle as the standard day. The ATO cycle starts at 0300 Zulu and runs for 24 hours. The battle rhythm of the corps and division revolves around these parameters. There are two reasons 0300 Zulu is used: 1) It has always been that way, and 2) An Air Force TTP clearly delineates night and day operations. An �A� day spans the ATO cycle day. This is an Air Force TTP, which corps has adopted, but has yet to clearly define for V Corps operations. Adopting this as a standard day would not only change how we view days on the ground, but would also cause confusion in the days of the month. The 17th of March would now start at 0300 Zulu, adding to confusion. 3. Clearly define each non-doctrinal day. An �A� day runs from 0300 Zulu for 24 hours and a �G� day runs from 2400 Zulu for 24 hours. Of course, these definitions are not corps, since they view �G� as either starting at 2400 Zulu and sometimes as starting at 0300 Zulu. The draw back to accepting this recommendation is that portions of A+1 and A+2 would occur during G-day, creating confusion. Recommendation: Use joint doctrine that clearly defines a �D� day. To adopt ill defined terms, such as �A� or �G� would require these days to follow the 2400 hrs Zulu start of the day for a 24 hour period. The Army is comfortable with �G� and it mirrors our already established standard for a day (except for V Corps use in the GES). �A� day must not be used as a base, until the CFACC can move it into the parameters of joint doctrine. The ATO cycle must line up with a standard �joint day� or soldiers� lives may unnecessarily be put into danger by the added confusion. Topic B - Fire Support Coordination and Control Measures Issue: During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, V Corps employed a new concept, called corps �CAS,� using allocated CFACC fixed wing assets to strike targets within 3ID (M)�s zone, short of the FSCL. This concept created an imaginary line approximately 30 km in front of the forward line of own troops (FLOT) that was established to delineate between divisional CAS responsibility and corps use of fixed wing aviation to engage targets. Never was the definition and parameters of this concept clearly defined or written out (no deeper than a PowerPoint slide). Corps continually engaged targets short of the FSCL in 3ID (M)�s zone without requesting kill boxes be opened. Deconfliction of divisional and corps CAS was often not conducted. Battle damage assessment (BDA) from the effects desired by air surveillance radar (ASR) were never received when corps conducted the missions, nor were positive clearance of fires conducted. The placement of the FSCL was so far in front of the forward edge of the battlefield (FEBA) that neither divisional nor corps assets could effectively manage the battlespace. (On D+10 corps attempted to implement the division forward boundary (DFB) concept that was being pushed by the 3ID (M) FSE.) Link this with the limited ability of corps to conduct target development within their battlespace, and the inefficient use of CFACC assets becomes apparent. A battlespace discussion follows. Discussion: Ideally 3ID (M) would recommend placement of the FSCL close enough to the FEBA so that organic indirect fires would be able to range most targets short of the FSCL, but because the FSCL is nominated to CFLCC through V Corps, it is usually placed 100 km or more beyond the FEBA. Although 3ID (M) was able to nominate its preferred location of the FSCL, our nomination was rarely accepted by V Corps/CFLCC because the preponderance of V Corps forces (11AHR, 41st FAB, 214th FAB) have organic fire support systems (Army Tactical Missile System [ATACMS] Block 1/1A, Apache helicopters) that can easily range beyond our nominated location. 3ID (M) was generally directed to use an FSCL that could be as far as 100 km beyond the range of standard munitions from our M109A6s and M270s. The question quickly became: �How do we target enemy forces located beyond the range of our organic artillery but short of the FSCL?� Air-delivered fires were the obvious answer; but what was less clear was what type of missions they would be performing and how they would be controlled? Joint Publication 3.09-3, JTTP for Close Air Support (CAS), defines CAS as: �air action by fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces." Doctrinally, however, air interdiction (AI) missions may also be flown short of the FSCL. For example, Joint Publication JP 3-60, Joint Doctrine for Targeting, defines AI as: �air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy�s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air missions with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required." The key phrases that differentiate between CAS and AI are �close proximity� and �detailed integration.� So who decides what is CAS and what is AI? In all cases the ground commander makes the decision. The commander of the supported ground unit requests and approves all air missions within his area of responsibility. Likewise, the doctrinal requirement for coordination of AI missions short of the FSCL resides equally among the CFACC and the ground commander, but the determination of the level of coordination required rests solely with the friendly force ground commander and his fire support element. Once the ground force commander determines that the identified hostile target is not in �close proximity� to his friendly forces, and that fires or effects of those fires will not impact the fire and maneuver of his forces, he can determine that hostile target to be AI. JP 3-09 states: �Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of fratricide and waste limited resources.� This means that the CFACC or another component commander may attack targets beyond the FSCL in 3ID (M)'s zone. He is required to inform 3ID (M) prior to conducting operations. If he is unable to do so due to exceptional circumstances, he can attack targets without coordination. 3ID (M) interprets this to mean that if enemy units that fall beyond the FSCL within our zone are attacking his forces, and he is unable to contact us to deconflict, the CFACC is not precluded from attacking. This also means that if 3ID (M) units are receiving effective fires from beyond the FSCL, and they cannot communicate with higher headquarters to deconflict, they may return fire without permission. JP 3-09 goes on to say: �The establishment does not create a �free-fire area" (FFA) beyond the FSCL. When targets are attacked beyond the FSCL, supporting elements� attacks must not produce adverse effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the establishing commander�s priorities, timing, effects and deconflicted wherever possible with the supported headquarters." The division�s interpretation of the above is that the 3ID (M) commander has the right to say �no� to components that wish to strike targets in our zone beyond the FSCL, if their attacks produce adverse results or are not consistent with the V Corps or 3ID (M) commander�s priorities, timing, and desired effects. Additionally, the 3ID (M) commander must have time to coordinate these attacks with his own operations. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) kill box (KI)/CAS SOP defines kill box operations short of and beyond the FSCL: �Reference kinetic effects, the following rules apply to closed vs. open killboxes, short and long of the FSCL. (1) (U) CLOSED: Aircraft can only attack if under direct positive control (FAC.) Aircraft can fly through/over fly a closed Killbox. (2) (U) OPEN: Aircraft can attack without direct positive control within an open Killbox. (3) (U) INSIDE FSCL: Killboxes closed to air attack unless CFLCC opens it through Air Support Operations Center or Direct Air Support Center. (4) (U) OUTSIDE FSCL: Killboxes open for air attack unless CFLCC closes it through AOC Director of Combat Operations." V Corps is in violation of doctrinal use of air in terms of defining CAS, clearance of fires, and killbox interdiction operations. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, joint targeting operations in the V Corps area of responsibility were extremely restrictive. In the future, this process must become permissive to facilitate responsive, effective fires. The U.S. Army must redefine the battlespace based on our ability to influence it. Recommendation: 1) Doctrinally place the FSCL, 2) Adopt the battlefield coordination line (BCL) concept that is utilized by the Marine Corps, or 3) Establish a division forward boundary (DFB) to facilitate permissive engagement of enemy forces. 1. Doctrinally place the FSCL. Place the FSCL close enough to the FEBA so that organic indirect fires would be able to range most targets short of the FSCL. Targets beyond the FSCL could be engaged by the CFACC (AI) or by corps/division deep attack assets. The coordination for corps or division deep attacks would have to be coordinated regardless of the FSCL placement, so this is not an additional requirement. Placing the FSCL closer to V Corps maneuver allows the CFACC to adequately resource, conduct ISR, attack, and provide feedback based on ASRs. The argument seems to be that CFACC would not adequately address V Corps targeting requirements; 3ID (M) violently disagrees. CFACC is a component, manned and equipped to effectively manage this battlespace forward of the FSCL; V Corps is not and has demonstrated their inability to manage said battlespace. 3ID (M) believes CFACC is better prepared to engage targets to effectively shape the battlefield versus V Corps� use of corps CAS. 2. Adopt the battlefield coordination line as a corps FSCM. From 1st MEF Fire Support Coordination Playbook: �Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL) � A supplementary fire support coordination measure, established based on METT-T, which facilitates the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity between the measure (the BCL) and the fire support coordination line (FSCL). When established, the primary purpose is to allow MAGTF aviation to attack surface targets without approval of a ground combat element commander in whose area the targets may be located. To facilitate air delivered fires and deconflict air and surface fires, an airspace coordination area (ACA) will always overlie the area between the BCL and the FSCL. Additionally, ground commanders may strike any targets beyond the BCL and short of the FSCL with artillery and/or rockets without coordination as long as those fires do not violate the established BCL ACA. This includes targets in an adjacent (OPCON) ground commander�s zone which fall within the BCL-FSCL area.� (1) (U) CLOSED: Aircraft can only attack if under direct positive control (FAC.) Aircraft can fly through/over fly a closed Killbox. (2) (U) OPEN: Aircraft can attack without direct positive control within an open Killbox. (3) (U) INSIDE FSCL: Killboxes closed to air attack unless CFLCC opens it through Air Support Operations Center or Direct Air Support Center. (4) (U) OUTSIDE FSCL: Killboxes open for air attack unless CFLCC closes it through AOC Director of Combat Operations." V Corps is in violation of doctrinal use of air in terms of defining CAS, clearance of fires, and killbox interdiction operations. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, joint targeting operations in the V Corps area of responsibility were extremely restrictive. In the future, this process must become permissive to facilitate responsive, effective fires. The U.S. Army must redefine the battlespace based on our ability to influence it. Recommendation: 1) Doctrinally place the FSCL, 2) Adopt the battlefield coordination line (BCL) concept that is utilized by the Marine Corps, or 3) Establish a division forward boundary (DFB) to facilitate permissive engagement of enemy forces. 1. Doctrinally place the FSCL. Place the FSCL close enough to the FEBA so that organic indirect fires would be able to range most targets short of the FSCL. Targets beyond the FSCL could be engaged by the CFACC (AI) or by corps/division deep attack assets. The coordination for corps or division deep attacks would have to be coordinated regardless of the FSCL placement, so this is not an additional requirement. Placing the FSCL closer to V Corps maneuver allows the CFACC to adequately resource, conduct ISR, attack, and provide feedback based on ASRs. The argument seems to be that CFACC would not adequately address V Corps targeting requirements; 3ID (M) violently disagrees. CFACC is a component, manned and equipped to effectively manage this battlespace forward of the FSCL; V Corps is not and has demonstrated their inability to manage said battlespace. 3ID (M) believes CFACC is better prepared to engage targets to effectively shape the battlefield versus V Corps� use of corps CAS. 2. Adopt the battlefield coordination line as a corps FSCM. From 1st MEF Fire Support Coordination Playbook: �Battlefield Coordination Line (BCL) � A supplementary fire support coordination measure, established based on METT-T, which facilitates the expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity between the measure (the BCL) and the fire support coordination line (FSCL). When established, the primary purpose is to allow MAGTF aviation to attack surface targets without approval of a ground combat element commander in whose area the targets may be located. To facilitate air delivered fires and deconflict air and surface fires, an airspace coordination area (ACA) will always overlie the area between the BCL and the FSCL. Additionally, ground commanders may strike any targets beyond the BCL and short of the FSCL with artillery and/or rockets without coordination as long as those fires do not violate the established BCL ACA. This includes targets in an adjacent (OPCON) ground commander�s zone which fall within the BCL-FSCL area.� The BCL is the most permissive measure available allowing for engagement of targets beyond corps CAS and divisional assets without violating the airspace control authority (ACA). 3. Create a division forward boundary. From FM 101-5-1: �Forward boundary (Division Forward Boundary, DFB) - The farthest limit, in the direction of the enemy, of an organization�s responsibility. The organization is responsible for deep operations to that limit. The next higher headquarters is responsible for coordinating deep operations beyond that limit. In offensive operations, the forward boundary may move from phase line to phase line, depending on the battlefield situation.� The DFB would clearly delineate corps and divisional battlespace and responsibilities of each. Beyond the DFB, it would be corps� requirement to coordinate with CFACC and others (to include 3ID (M)). This measure would give corps the battlespace they desire for air assets at their disposal, and clearly define the limit for coordination with 3ID (M) when using air. Bottomline: The BCL is clearly the most permissive measure, but also one that requires a thorough understanding of our doctrine and its use. U.S. Army Doctrine must be changed to incorporate the BCL as an FSCM. Issue: Control of CFACC fixed kill boxes Discussion: Prior to OIF, the combined forces air component commander (CFACC) developed a plan to incorporate pre-established kill boxes. During the operation it allowed for the rapid employment of aircraft, gave the aircraft a focused location to begin operations, and allowed for timely clearance of AI. One of the challenges we faced with the fixed kill box was that it did not allow for flexibility of rapid offensive operations. The division�s need to attack targets on the high payoff target list (HPTL) or high value targets (HVT) was minimized by having the Air Force destroy targets in the order they appeared on the battlefield instead of what the maneuver commander wanted destroyed. It is also imperative that all elements on the battlefield know and track when kill boxes are opened and closed. Recommendations: Consistent with doctrine, we recommend the lowest level possible control the kill boxes. Make the approval authority for opening and closing kill boxes the ground maneuver commander who owns the battlespace. Ensure the Air Force understands the attack guidance established by the division. Issue: Establishment of PAHs. Discussion: Size, placement, and activation of position area hazards (PAHs) were a consistent issue when planning routes for air and maneuver forces. The 7x7 km area that V Corps mandated be used for planning limited the freedom of movement for other forces on the battlefield. The PAHs were always in effect, essentially making the MLRS position areas off limits for all other units. Additionally, dictating planned PAH areas diminishes a unit�s ability to respond to time sensitive targets while on the move. When the C 2 AP processes an AFOM (ATACMS family of munitions) fire mission it generates a position area hazard message. The message describes the aircraft danger area around the platoon selected to fire. Four grids on the ground and an altitude define the area. This area is used to warn all flight operations and to gain clearance to fly through the airspace. If more than one platoon is required to fire the mission, separate messages are displayed for each platoon. It is munitions specific. It is only generated for those platoons the computer has listed as having the munitions. If a UFFE (unit to fire for effect) was specified in the fire mission message, that UFFE is used. If a UFFE was not specified, the computer provides the best solution based on available information. The operator can enter the XDIST value and an effective date-time group (DTG) indicating when the position area hazard is valid. The PAH may be passed to other organizations as a restricted operations zone (ROZ). A ROZ is a volume of space that the Air Force often uses to restrict airspace. The same four points and altitude define the ROZ. According to this definition, the PAH is defined once the mission digitally goes to the unit to fire and has an effective date time group associated with it. This is in conflict with the guidance we were given for planning around PAHs. The PAH is only applicable for the platoon firing the mission, not the entire position area the battery or battalion may be in. The PAH is a control measure that is generated by the digital fire control system once an ATACMS fire mission is sent down to the launcher(s) responsible for executing the mission. It is based on the ballistic solution for the missile and the position of the launchers assigned the mission. Once the fire control system derives the solution, it sends it back up digitally to higher headquarters, where the PAH can be viewed on the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). (Note: The PAH that AFATDS generates for any given mission is significantly smaller than the 7x7 km area corps mandated.) This control measure can then be used to clear airspace for the times the missions will be fired. The purpose of the PAH is to protect aviation assets from flying through the path the ATACMS munitions may take. This is what leads to the establishment of the ROZ. While the 7x7 km with a 60,000 ft ceiling ROZ was pre-established for the supposed ease of planning, this in reality only made it more difficult at executor level. Air routes had to be planned around the MLRS position areas, including FARPs being positioned far from the PAHs. The feedback given to corps resulted in the MLRS position areas being pushed out to the periphery of the division battlespace. This made planning around them somewhat better, but led to the equally important problem of security for MLRS units in outlying positions. MLRS units have few internal security assets � two hard HMMWVs with MK-19s and a few .50 cals � so the issue of providing direct fire security assets from another source is apparent. In relation to survivability when planning ATACMS firing positions, FM 6-09.60 states: The missile [ATACMS]� has off-axis launch capability to enhance crew/launcher survivability from enemy counterfire. Although a launcher firing missiles will be a higher priority enemy target, it may be less vulnerable to counterfire than it is when firing rockets. Both shorter times from initial launch to movement away from the firing point and randomly selected off-axis firings contribute to reducing vulnerability when shooting missiles. There is no need for an operational area (OPAREA) of substantial size (doctrine calls for an average 3x3 km box), due in part to the fact that hide areas and multiple firing points for each launcher are not necessary inside that same area for ATACMS counterfire survivability. In addition, operating in bare, open terrain such as was the case in Iraq, it is difficult to find/create hide areas, and any open land may be used as a firing point. FM 6-09.60 addresses the issue of desert operations: Lack of vegetation makes camouflage difficult. In all cases, the MLRS unit is visible to the ground observer� With that said, it is feasible to plan a reasonable PAH around a small group of closely placed firing points, where only the launchers could occupy and fire from, leaving the remainder of the platoon or battery in a large, modified hide area a small distance away. The launchers to fire could move forward, occupy the firing points, shoot the ATACMS missions, and depart back to the other area. Probability of receiving counterfire is low due to the off-axis launch of the missiles to begin with, but survivability may be even further increased by an immediate move. Recommendation: There are several recommendations that would help alleviate some of the issues we had with PAHs: 1) Continue to use pre-established areas, but make them smaller and turn them on and off depending on missions. 2) If using large, pre-established areas on the outskirts of divisional boundaries, provide additional security assets for MLRS protection. 3. Employ the PAHs as outlined in FM 6-09.60, using the AFATDS solution along with an effective date time group, making it possible to shoot ATACMS missions from anywhere, anytime on the battlefield. 1. If higher headquarters insists on making PAHs pre-determined areas, operate them in a way similar to Air Force kill boxes that are opened and closed and, therefore, do not restrict air operations for longer than necessary. A reasonably sized PAH could be placed closer to maneuver units and be �opened� shortly before a mission is fired (since most ATACMS missions are pre-planned for objectives such as SEAD) and �closed� once the mission is complete. Additionally, this could make it easier to keep MLRS tucked in behind the maneuver units for better security. A large 7x7 km OPAREA is not necessary to increase survivability. This technique would make it possible to plan potential areas along a route MLRS is most likely to take to support TST missions. The route could be segmented into separate PAHs, and each turned on in sequence as the unit passed through, then turned off as the unit left that area, making MLRS routes something akin to air corridors, but on a smaller scale. M270A1 or IPDS launchers would be able to receive a mission, stop along a route, and fire immediately (M270�s might need to update survey depending on distance traveled since they do not have embedded Global Positioning Systems). By activating the required PAH (ROZ), the airspace will have already been cleared. This option would require detailed prior planning and continuous position updates, but would allow for entire units to rapidly move as one entity rather than �leap-frogging� from one pre-determined position to another, as is now required to support TST missions. 2. If pre-determined, continually active, large PAHs pushed to the edge of divisional boundaries is the preferred method of employment, then some security must be provided for the MLRS unit occupying that area. MLRS should, whenever possible, be positioned with, or behind, maneuver troops in a relatively secure area. FM 6-09.60 suggests security packages be attached as follows: "Depending upon the situation, a company team size force, including air defense artillery, should be requested for the MLRS battalion� A combination of roving patrols throughout the position area and reaction forces may be appropriate." To protect the firing capabilities of the MLRS unit, a habitual relationship between units with the required make-up of force protection assets should be established, or such a conglomeration should be made organic to the battalion. In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, MLRS position areas were often to the far west flanks of maneuver and direct support units, in unsecured areas, leaving them vulnerable to ambush and small unit attacks. Due to the lack of direct fire systems aside from very few crew-served weapons, MLRS is especially susceptible to these types of attacks. In addition, its identification as a high payoff target to the enemy further increases the likelihood of hostile targeting. 3. The best recommendation to increase the utility and flexibility of MLRS ATACMS fires in the battle, is to use the PAH as outlined in FM 6-09.60, according to previously established doctrine. When exercised as described, the PAH translates easily into a ROZ that temporarily restricts a small amount of airspace in order to complete an ATACMS mission. An ATACMS target is determined and sent to the unit to fire when it is identified with the method of control either �at my command� (AMC) or �time on target� (TOT). Once the AFATDS derives the solution, the PAH coordinates are sent higher with sufficient time to be cleared through the proper A 2 C 2 channels. In the case of a pre-planned mission (i.e., SEAD or prep fires) with the method of control TOT, the missions can be sent well in advance to allow for pre-coordinated PAHs. In the case of a TST when the method of control is AMC, once clearance is received, the command can be given to �fire.� Immediate, short-duration PAHs are the best answer to give MLRS units the freedom of movement needed on the battlefield to best provide responsive, accurate, safe fires, while maintaining a suitable level of force protection for themselves by being closer to maneuver units. While there may be an argument that clearing airspace for ATACMS adds more time to the overall process, in the case of pre-planned fires this is a moot point, and for TSTs the few seconds� difference would be negligible. After the fire mission is complete, the PAH no longer applies, and the airspace is once again clear for air asset movement. Topic C - 3ID(M) Area of Operations Management Issue: Defining the depth of the division�s area of operations (AO). Discussion: FM 101-5-1 defines area of operations as �A geographical area, including the airspace above, usually defined by lateral, forward, and rear boundaries assigned to a commander, by a higher commander, in which he has responsibility and the authority to conduct military operations.� When there is a noncontiguous battlefield without clearly defined boundaries, mixing of combat forces and fratricide can occur. While the battlefield in Iraq had clearly defined lateral and, in most cases, rear boundaries, we did not have a limit of advance (LOA) until after the 9th day of combat operations and that turned into a division forward boundary (DFB) two days later. The permissive nature of the fire support coordination lines (FSCL) should not serve as a hindrance to rapid ground operations. Its placement should be such that it creates battlespace in front of its subordinate units and is triggered to move based on the ground maneuver�s advancement or withdrawal. During this operation, the FSCL�s movement was based on the publishing of the current air tasking order (ATO). When the division traveled 350 km in 48 hours, the FSCL quickly appeared so close to our units that the division�s coordinated fire line (CFL) was twice beyond the FSCL. This could have easily resulted in fratricide to our forward units. The division forward boundary should serve as a limit to which the division can influence with internal assets. Generally, the DFB was requested approximately 45-50 km in front of the division�s lead element. This would allow internal ISR assets to acquire the enemy and conduct shaping operations against them prior to engagement by main body forces. Deep attack aviation, CAS, and rocket fires would provide shaping operations. The delineation of the three areas of operation would allow CFLCC/CFACC to conduct deep shaping operations in the form of AI long of the FSCL; V Corps to conduct �corps CAS� between the FSCL and DFB, as well as send targetable intelligence to the division so that it could influence the next fight; and the division to have its own AO to conduct operations without constantly trying to keep higher headquarters out of the division�s battlespace. Recommendation: Headquarters at every level need to define the area of operations for subordinate units. Our doctrine provides us coordination measures to define our battlespace, where each element is able to influence the enemy with its inherent assets. This simple use of doctrine will clearly define who destroys the enemy where and will go a long way to mitigate fratricide of friendly forces. Targetable intelligence needs to be sent to the division main for inclusion in its targeting process. There will always be some time sensitive targets (TST) that require immediate engagement. In those instances, higher can control with detailed coordination with the maneuver commander that owns the ground. Division and brigade ETACs would be on the frequency for situational awareness and terminal control. Topic D - Fire Support in Urban Environments Issue: Clearance of fires in urban areas Discussion: The enemy in this fight used areas that he knew we would not strike with certain munitions based on our desire to limit collateral damage. Often, he would set his headquarters, artillery, rockets, and mortars in or beside schools, mosques, hospitals, and housing areas. While published rules of engagement (ROE) clearly defined the procedures to use, there were techniques developed to streamline the process making counterfire more responsive. Clearance of fires for counterfire and selecting the best method of engagement was tedious at the start of the ground war. After we established the priorities for method of engagement and established triggers on when to use what system, we drastically reduced the time needed to destroy the enemy artillery systems. The process used for targeting or counterfire acquisitions sent to the DTAC was to plot both the weapons location and the impact location on the ADOCS, first against the �no strike list� and then with the 5 meter controlled image base (CIB). If the weapons� location was within 500 m of an item on the �no strike list� or in an urban area, we verified where the impact location was. If it was near or on troops, we conferred with the JAG representative in the DTAC as to the response to the acquisition. If there was a high likelihood of collateral damage, we processed the target with corps to gain approval to fire, generally with the use of precision-guided munitions. The response options we used were graduated based on availability. CAS with precision munitions was always the first option, followed by dumb bombs from the Air Force and then cannons firing HE followed by DPICM with a converged sheaf. We would fire MLRS rockets as a last resort. As the war progressed, the CFO started to clear counterfire missions through the BCT that owned the land and cut DTAC out of the loop, shaving a few minutes off engagement times. Also, the DIVARTY FCE sent all fire missions to the MLRS units in an AMC status. That way, once the clearance process was complete, the command to the units was simply �fire.� If the mission was denied, the FCE could end the mission with no harm done. This process saved at least 5 minutes per engagement. Recommendation: Establish attack option criteria prior to hostilities and rehearse them. Improve the CIB imagery with the latest photomaps of the area of operations and continue to have a JAG representative in the DTAC. This process allowed us to mitigate some of the gray area when deciding whether to contact corps and when facing targeting from some intelligence assets. Sustain the fact that the CFO can contact a BCT and clear fires that are in that BCT�s AO. Issue: Indirect fires in MOUT Discussion: During this operation, indirect fires helped to reduce enemy strong points in buildings that could not be taken out by direct fires alone. Even though direct fires were killing the enemy troops in the buildings, the enemy would often reseed those buildings. Therefore, indirect fires and the destruction of those buildings was the only way to eliminate the threat. Without the use of indirect fires to destroy enemy occupied buildings, task forces would not have been able to secure their objectives without a much higher casualty rate. The tight confines of miliary operations on urban terrain (MOUT) make the converged sheaf more effective by concentrating all of the rounds on the desired troop concentration between buildings or on the target building, if that is the target. Mortars were especially excellent in MOUT because of their high angle fire, which enabled them to get rounds between and on top of buildings very effectively. Danger close fires were also highly effective and necessary in MOUT. Because of the tight area in MOUT and low visibility, observers often could not see any farther than 1000 meters. Because other buildings in close proximity to the target area would absorb a lot of shrapnel and debris, it was safer to walk rounds in extremely close to troops. During the battles the observers often started their danger close missions at 400-600 meters in front of friendly troops and walked the rounds in to within 200 meters of friendly troops in order to totally destroy some of the sprawling building complexes occupied by hostile forces. This was executed safely by keeping troops buttoned up, situationally aware of �shot� on the mission, and by the nearby buildings absorbing the effects of the blast. The night prior to the battle, the maneuver company commanders were briefed on the procedures for danger close missions during the battalion FRAGO. This briefing paid dividends the next day. At home station, the construction of bunkers or firing buttoned up at the OP, can train teams on danger close missions. This training would help to instill the confidence in the guns that forward observers must have to execute danger close missions in support of their maneuver task force. The mortars high angle fires were extremely effective in MOUT, although low angle fires were used for artillery missions. Low angle fires were effective because the buildings in Baghdad are generally not that high. If high angle fire for artillery had been used as the standard, it may have made some of the artillery missions more effective; however, responsiveness would have decreased. The tradeoff was acceptable as many missions were danger close where speed in delivery was more beneficial to friendly forces. The standard sheaf for artillery is the BCS special. Early in the fight the special instruction �converged sheaf� was not included in the call for fire. As a result, in some cases the mission would have to be repeated to achieve the desired effects. Halfway through the battle, procedures were modified to include �converged sheaf� as a special instruction. This greatly reduced the number of missions that needed to be repeated. Recommendation: Converged sheaf should become the standard in MOUT or always requested by the observer. Refresh all FSOs and commanders on the procedures for danger close missions prior to going into MOUT. The FSE should develop a close relationship with their task force mortars. During training in Kuwait prior to the war, task force FSOs assisted in all mortar dry training and helped develop new TTPs. One effective TTP in MOUT, developed through training with the mortars, was how to fire while lined up �ducks in a row� on a street. Firing in that configuration is not a way the mortars normally fire and it required them to figure out ways of placing their aiming poles and �slipping the scales� on their sights. All mechanized mortar sections for MOUT should practice these methods because this can easily become the way a mortar platoon needs to fire while operating along narrow city streets. Finally, danger close training in some form should be conducted at home station to better replicate the concept of "train as you fight." Issue: Non use of Copperhead, the cannon launched guided projectile (CLGP) Discussion: During this operation the enemy occupied areas and structures that they believed would give them sanctuary because of our commitment to minimize collateral damage. The use of precision munitions by the Air Force (joint direct attack munition (JDAM), laser guided bomb (LGB) allowed us to engage the enemy who used this tactic. However, the use of Air Force precision munitions was not always available or timely. Copperhead could have been used as a �100 lb LGB� against buildings and structures that the enemy used. The challenges of the Copperhead (placement of firing units to minimize angle T, cloud height, visibility requirements, laser engagement probabilities, and prepping the round) are all planning considerations that are similar to employment of all laser-guided munitions. These employment considerations are manageable. The common misperception is that Copperhead is only employed against tanks. Recommendation: Employ Copperhead as a laser-guided munition and not always as an antitank munition. Plan for the use of Copperhead against all hardened high payoff targets. Topic E - Transition to SASO Issue: 3ID (M) DIVARTY�s transition from high intensity conflict to SASO Discussion: As the division occupied Baghdad and the counterfire threat diminished, DIVARTY found itself quickly transitioning to stability and support operations. The rapid transition proved challenging for both DIVARTY and division, as units shifted focus to rebuilding Iraq�s infrastructure and stability. Division tasked DIVARTY to become the force protection headquarters for Baghdad International Airport (BIA). The DIVARTY�s task organization included 1-39 FA (MLRS), 1-3 ADA, and 59th CHEM CO(-). DIVARTY immediately identified resources needed and manpower requirements against specified tasks. DIVARTY also began to take on other non-standard missions such as securing sensitive site exploitation (SSE) locations. DIVARTY immediately positioned forces utilizing a strong point perimeter defense. Due to a large and somewhat porous perimeter, DIVARTY decided to focus on major avenues of approach and terrain that would afford the enemy the best cover and concealment. 1-39 FA with its limited night vision capability was assigned the more static points, to include the main gate entrance. 1-3 ADA, with its M6 Linebackers, M2 Bradleys, and M1068 Avengers was assigned to defend the more compartmentalized terrain on the west side of the airfield to best utilize their armor and thermal sight capability. As time and assets were made available, DIVARTY began position improvement. Class IV pushes were conducted in coordination with the G4. Additional tasks included the mending of holes in the fences surrounding the runways. With assistance from the engineers, units also began to dig slit trenches, clear fields of fire and provide lighting to BIA CPs. Division also tasked DIVARTY to provide traffic control points to keep vehicles from driving across the active runway � a task normally handled by USAF security police. DIVARTY identified an overarching need to reorganize their TOC to provide the best C 2 possible for the operation. Cells such as the FCE and TPS were of less importance and their personnel reassigned to other duties. The DIVARTY created a force protection cell and a S5/CMO cell to fulfill mission requirements. Despite being unprepared for SASO operations initially, the DIVARTY transition from high intensity conflict to support and stability operations went smoothly. Recommendations: Units should conduct SASO training at least twice a year. DIVARTY should create an �off the shelf� SASO SOP. From the outset, the main objective for 3ID (M) was seizure of Baghdad International Airport. The Air Force arrived undermanned for its mission of airfield security, which depleted our combat power to complete that mission. There should be joint planning dealing with security issues when services co-utilize terrain. This would clearly delineate security responsibilities between agencies tasked with this mission. Force protection supplies such as metal detectors, HESCO bastions, floodlights, etc., should be prepositioned in theater and flown in as soon as possible in order to assist units� security preparation of the aerial ports of debarkation (APOD). Also, recommend identifying a S5 at DIVARTY level prior to departure. This would allow the S5 to prepare SOPs, confirm tasks, and organize all security apparatus prior to deployment. Issue: The �no strike list� assisted in transitioning the brigade fire support element into an information operations element. Discussion: The FSE began to anticipate the change of mission at the cessation of hostilities. The NSL became an asset in stability operations where it was a limitation in combat operations. We utilized the NSL to identify the high payoff targets in the brigade sector. It allowed the S2 to start the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, helped the S3 with terrain management, and allowed the FS/IO element to shape what type of information themes to disseminate. Recommendation: Continue to develop new ADOCS focused TTPs. Topic F - Training and Resourcing Fire Support Issue: The lack of reinforcing cannon artillery assets available forced the division to accept unnecessary risk by using direct support (DS) battalions in a reinforcing role, often leaving a BCT with no dedicated artillery support. Discussion: 3ID (M) artillery deployed to theater with its habitual MTOE artillery assets (three DS Paladin battalions, one divisional MLRS battalion with five associated radars, and the DIVARTY headquarters). On the seventh day of the war, DIVARTY received one field artillery brigade (minus), consisting of a �lightened� brigade TOC, one M270A1 MLRS battalion, and one field artillery detachment with two Q37 radars, with the tactical mission of general support reinforcing and eventually, reinforcing. Additional V Corps requirements for time sensitive targets and ATACMS firing capability further limited 3ID (M)'s ability to use reinforcing assets because 2-4 FA had to maintain six of its 18 launchers as ATACMS TST shooters. The lack of reinforcing assets, coupled with the noncontiguous nature and depth of the battlefield, caused 3ID (M) to assume risk by leaving a BCT without battalion level DS fires. These non-standard roles included assigning one Paladin battery DS to the division cavalry squadron and assigning one DS Paladin battalion (minus) as reinforcing to other DS battalions for a majority of the war. As a result, two battalions (1-9 FA, 1-10 FA) fought most of the fight with only two firing batteries. The lack of an additional 155mm Paladin battalion limited our ability to weight the main effort with cannon fires. The ROE led maneuver commanders to opt for 155mm HE as the munition of choice. This limited the reinforcing options since the only available unit to provide fires was MLRS, which only fires dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM). Specifically, 3d Brigade fought on a 100 km front with only one battery DS for most of the battle and 2nd Brigade (the division main effort in Baghdad) fought the entire war with only two firing batteries. Another challenge was the late arrival of the reinforcing brigade. 3ID (M) coordinated and conducted corps level exercises with 17th FA BDE, only to have 214th FA BDE arrive for the actual operation. The brigade did not arrive in time to train with the unit in theater, limiting training opportunities on C 2 and mutually supported unit (MSU) operations. DIVARTY quickly established a battle drill for MSU C 2 between the two units during combat operations. Because 214th FAB did not receive a mission of reinforcing 3ID (M) until day seven of the conflict, there was no opportunity to train with 3ID (M) until execution. Recommendation: Heavy division artilleries need at least one doctrinal FA brigade reinforcing them in a high intensity conflict. The minimum requirement should be one cannon battalion, one MLRS battalion, and one tactical acquisition detachment (TAD). Issue: Communications systems throughout the fight challenged the fire support system�s ability to provide responsive coordination at the division level. Discussion: The fire support community�s reliance on FM communications hampered our ability to command and control coordinated, massed fires. Throughout the operation, all four brigade combat teams, the divisional cavalry squadron, DIVARTY, or division main were never within FM communications range (20-25 km). At one point, two of the BCTs were approximately 270 km apart. This hampered the DTAC FSE's ability to provide additional resources, maintain situational awareness, pass digital graphics and updates, and approve FSCMs. In the middle of February 2003, all elements listed above received single channel tactical satellite (SC TACSAT) radios with a 5-kHz bandwidth. After initiatives by our NCOs, the antennas were mounted to allow for non-doctrinal on-the-move voice communications with all elements. This gave us the ability to slowly pass voice communications when units needed additional resources and to pass information/data. It prevented us from passing digital communications and, based on the bandwidth, required a long time to pass information and the need to repeat transmissions routinely. Recommendation: With the noncontiguous battlefield we encounter today and operational maneuver at the division level, the artillery community needs to invest in updated communications that allow for both responsive voice and data secure communications. Each division needs sufficient bandwidth allocation to allow for a division fires net (25 kHz) to control fires. The 25-kHz bandwidth will give each element the ability to talk with quick, precise communications that are required in the fire support community. Furthermore, we need to develop/purchase equipment that provides secure data communications on the move, over long distances. Without clear long-range data communications, we open ourselves to missing information and transposing coordinates for both fire missions and graphics. The recommendation is that every element in the fire support community receive updated voice and data communications. Division would only field the upgrades to those elements that would communicate on the division fires net: division and brigade level fire support elements and the division artillery. Issue: FM communications limitations Discussion: At the distances units operated during OIF, effective FM communications were limited. This affected not only FM communications with FSE/DIVARTY elements but also FM communications with rotary wing aircraft. SC TACSAT (along with Iridium phones) was many times the only means of communication. The drawbacks of this situation include: limited number of systems, expense, bandwidth of command versus fire support net, only C 2 aircraft with SC TACSAT capability, and no ATCCS systems compatible with SC TACSAT. The bandwidth alone drove a lot of FS conversations to the command net. At these distances, AFATDS on an FM backbone did not increase our capability. When on a mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) backbone, AFATDS works adequately while units are set. Once on the move or at short halts the effectiveness of the system is limited to who has FM digital communications. Reliance on stationary MSE networks is an unnecessary burden. ADOCS was a great planning tool and increased our capabilities to provide the commander quick feedback and receive updated positioning, FSCMs, and essential information (like the ATO). This system too, suffers from a reliance on a MSE backbone. Recommendation: The current communications system needs a major overhaul. A common communications network that utilizes the capability of satellites for both voice and digital traffic, integrates AF/Navy/Marine communications, and is compatible with ATCCS systems (AFATDS/ ADOCS) is required. Discussion: The M7 BFIST performed magnificently during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Every crew praised its speed, survivability, and communications ability. It allowed FIST teams to remain in the fight when only turreted armored vehicles were survivable and allowed to participate in operations due to the rocket propelled grenade (RPG) threat. The 25mm gun and M240C coax machine gun were utilized in a defensive mode, but in every case, crew proficiency (Table VIII) on these systems saved lives. Because FIST teams were able to remain side by side with maneuver elements throughout all operations, they called 697 DS missions across the division. Several limitations, namely the lack of a designation system and optics package, were the primary concerns regarding the BFIST performance. The BFIST does not have the mounted capability to laser designate. The only way for a FIST team to designate is to dismount and set up to a ground/vehicular laser locator designator (G/VLLD). This is not practical during offensive operations. The G/VLDD should be mounted on the TOW hammerhead and stabilized so FSOs can paint targets on the move, but also be removable in order to facilitate dismounted operations. BFIST sights can only see out to the maximum range of the Bradley weapon system (3 km). This hinders the ability to effectively call for fire because by the time it is acquired the company is in the direct firefight and maneuvering to destroy the enemy. Also, with newer systems such as long-range survey system (LRSS), the optics on the BFIST do not give the clarity of vision that other systems can, so even as an information gatherer, the BFIST is lacking in its ability to acquire targets at maximum range. Recommendation: The fire support world needs to purchase smaller, lightweight, designator systems with power source commonality. Also, we need a designator that is part of the integrated sight unit (ISU) on the M7. Either a 25/50X forward-looking infrared (FLIR) should be added (as on the M1A2 SEP), or more cheaply, we could equip BFISTS with the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS 3 ) that is stabilized for usage on the move. Issue: Employment of close air support (CAS) Discussion: During OIF, units from battalion to corps used CAS extensively. One of the few ways to control CAS was with the use of an enlisted terminal air controller (ETAC). The shortages of ETACs in the division enforces the idea that FIST can control CAS in both emergency and non-emergency situations while ETACs use indirect control through the FIST. The military is making the focus towards joint operations and we, as fire supporters, must present the FIST as a universal observer capable of employing all means of fire support. Recommendation: Train and certify FIST teams to ensure they are capable of employing all means of fire support. Equip the FIST with smaller, lightweight, target marking and designating instruments. Equipping FBCB 2 with the capabilities of AFATDS could remedy the lack of long-distance communication. But this does not just apply to FISTs. More members of BDE/BN staff should be trained on CAS integration to provide redundancy if ETAC/ALO go down. Issue: The need for a better laser designator system. Discussion: The ground/vehicular laser, locator, designator (G/VLLD) and related system require more than half of the interior stowage of the M7.The noncontiguous battlefield did not allow for simply dismounting the G/VLLD because of exposure to enemy small arms fire. Therefore, fire support teams did not use the G/VLLD and missed many opportunities to use a laser designator to mark targets for CAS. The fire support community also missed many opportunities to employ Copperhead. While fighting in the urban environment, fire support could have used the Copperhead as a �100 lb LGB� against buildings and bunkers when CAS was not available. The enemy�s use of high collateral damage areas in this conflict reinforces the need for precision artillery munitions. Recommendation: The fire support world needs to purchase smaller, lightweight designator systems with power source commonality. We need a designator that is part of the integrated sight unit (ISU) on the M7. Additionally, more units on the battlefield (not just FISTs and COLTs) should be equipped with lasing/target designation devices. Each mechanized/armor company should deploy to combat with several portable designators spread throughout its formation. That way, the lead platoon (or squad) could designate for CAS/Copperhead. Issue: High-technology combat observation lasing teams (COLTs) Discussion: The current COLT organic equipment includes a G/VLLD, an AN/TAS-4 Thermal FLIR night sight, a (Mini-Eyesafe Laser Infrared Observation Set [MELIO]), and a Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver (PLGR). Using the lasers in conjunction with the thermal night sight and the PLGR, the COLTs can accurately determine enemy location. However, environmental factors, human error, and the condition of the aging equipment all play an important role in accuracy. After obtaining a distance and direction from the laser devices, the COLT must still enter the data into the PLGR to obtain the target location. The process is not time consuming, but it is far from simply pulling a trigger. With the advent of the Long-Range Survey System (LRSS), target location is simplified and nearly eliminates human error. The LRSS combines a next-generation thermal site, an internal GPS self-locator, and an exceptional day-TV site into one package that only requires the operator to pull a trigger to obtain an extremely accurate grid location for anything in its cross hairs. The lack of a laser designator, as well as low-visibility environmental conditions (dust, rain, fog, etc.), limits the LRSS. The G/VLLD is aging and repair parts or replacement G/VLLDs are difficult to obtain. The TAS-4 is a first generation night sight that is outdated when compared to the LRSS. Finally, the LRSS�s �zoom� capability out-performs the G/VLLD 13X magnification. The only advantage of the G/VLLD is the ability to designate. The first day of the war perfectly illustrates how the COLT teams� inferior equipment led to a change in doctrine. Indirect artillery fires and rotary-wing attack aviation were used to destroy ISR outposts along the Kuwait-Iraq border, a forward observer�s mission by doctrine. BRT scouts (with LRSS) were chosen as the primary observers to facilitate the destruction of the ISR outposts over COLTs. Recommendation: Equip the COLTs with superior optical targeting devices with a laser designation capability. Issue: Unit basic load (UBL) validation Discussion: 3ID (M) DIVARTY designed and drew a UBL based on wargaming and analysis from a variety of sources. During the war, maneuver commanders opted for higher concentrations of HE because of concerns about DPICM. Additionally, the new M795 HE round affords units an added 4 km range. The increased range of this round would have helped during all stages of the war. The following chart shows 3ID (M) DIVARTY�s recommended UBL for a DS battalion involved in high intensity conflict in Southwest Asia. OLD Battalion UBL DODIC Nomenclature DS BN D061 SADARM 115 D505 ILLUM 50 D528 SMK (M825) 351 D544 HE (DEEP) 1002 D529 HE (M795) 0 D550 WP(M110) 136 D563 DPICM 1800 D579 HE(RAP) 700 D864 DPICM (BB) 1300 TOTAL 5544 D510 COPPERHEAD 90 D532 M203 1450 D533 M119A2 RED 2450 D541 M4A2 WHITE 1644 TOTAL 5514 Recommended Battalion UBL DODIC Nomenclature DS BN D061 SADARM 115 D505 ILLUM 50 D528 SMK (M825) 351 D544 HE (DEEP) 0 (-1002) D529 HE (M795) 1702 (+1702) D550 WP(M110) 136 D563 DPICM 1200 (-600) D579 HE(RAP) 1100 (+400) D864 DPICM (BB) 800 (-500) D510 COPPERHEAD 30 (-60) TOTAL 5544 D532 M203 1000 (-450) D533 M119A2 RED 2450 D541 M4A2 WHITE 2064 (+450) TOTAL 5514 Sense and destroy armor (SADARM) performed better than expected and ended up the preferred precision munition for DS battalions and their maneuver commanders. SADARM killed 48 pieces of equipment out of 121 SADARM rounds fired. Units also found they could fire substantially less than the doctrinal 24 rounds to achieve effects on target. Because of the success of SADARM, unit TTPs were four rounds in effect against a point target. BCT commanders and fire support teams, on the other hand, chose not use Copperhead during the operation. Recommendation: Based on ROE, increase HE (M795) and HE (RAP); decrease DPICM and BBDPICM on the UBL. Revisit sense and destroy munitions as a precision killer for the artillery. Decrease Copperhead allocations. Issue: DIVARTY had inadequate flexibility of MLRS munitions. Discussion: During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, 1-39 FA drew its UBL consisting of 270 M26 pods and 54 M39 ATACMS missiles. Despite initial reports to the contrary, M26A1 pods were not available in theater. This forced DIVARTY and 1-39 FA to conduct operations without conventional extended range rockets. The M26 rocket proved effective and accurate, but the enemy systems consistently outranged our artillery. The M26A1 would have proven beneficial to mitigate this range disparity. Lack of release authority precluded 3ID (M) from firing any ATACMS during the battle. As a result, the only ATAMCS rounds fired were in support of a V Corps deep attack before the ground war started (3 missions, 6 missiles). The only munitions currently available for standard MLRS rockets are the DPICM sub-munition. The ROE limited our ability to use MLRS in many cases. Fires in highly congested areas and civilian populace centers precluded the use of MLRS fires, especially within the city confines of Baghdad. Development of different types of MLRS munitions such as SADARM, brilliant antiarmor submunitions (BAT), smoke type precision munitions, and an HE conventional rocket similar to the Unitary missile would have greatly added to the flexibility in employing MLRS. Recommendation: Ensure M26A1 rockets are available for future combat operations; develop an MLRS suite of munitions that allow for greater employment on the battlefield. Issue: Inadequate resupply of artillery Class V Discussion: DIVARTY conducted extensive ammunition planning using the MDMP process to establish our Class V required supply rates (RSR). Corps never approved our RSR and published it as a controlled supply rate (CSR). Additionally, although initially approved, corps denied ammunition required for preparatory fires at the last moment. DIVARTY never received a resupply of ammunition based on our RSR, a CSR, or any other specific request. When ammunition did arrive in the ASP, it was usually �pure� as opposed to broken down into usable combat configured loads, and it usually arrived with powders and fuses that were incompatible with the rounds. Corps throughput only happened once and with only three flat racks, which DIVARTY soldiers personally escorted from the division support area (DSA) to an ammunition transfer point (ATP). Corps and theater tried to manage ammunition by calling and asking for expenditures by round and type per day so they could determine what to send us. Classes of supply are managed by expected/planned consumption, not expenditures. Artillery Class V should be no different. The only way resupply ever worked was when DIVARTY took the non-doctrinal approach of sending unit palletized load systems (PLSs) and ammunition platoon leaders to stay in the ASP and wait for useable/complete rounds to arrive from corps. Once enough complete rounds arrived, the platoon leaders would drive them all the way from the DSA to their service batteries. Recommendation: Theater must supply adequate transportation assets to support pushing CSRs forward. Division must insure it bases ammunition resupply on planned consumption figures from DIVARTY, not expenditures. Ammunition must be broken down and matched properly by echelons above battalion. Issue: Increase the ability for command and control on the move for the DIVARTY TOC, BDE FSEs, and field artillery battalions. Incorporate the ability to operate two C 2 nodes simultaneously at the BCT level. Discussion: Field artillery HQs at all levels experienced C2 problems while on the move due to the speed and distance of the operation. At the major subordinate commands (MSC) level, Operation IRAQI FREEDOM produced a necessity to operate two command and control nodes simultaneously. Neither the BDE FSEs nor the DIVARTY TOC are manned or equipped with vehicles and radios to operate two TOCs. At the BCT, doctrine calls for the FSCOORD�s HMMWV as the primary communications platform for a BDE TAC or jump TOC. This reliance is not feasible, especially if the second TOC is more permanent than doctrine implies, as was the case in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. BDE FSEs need a second crew and vehicle with communications to meet the fire support needs of the BCT on the modern battlefield. Manning and equipment in the DIVARTY only supports one operational TOC. While doctrine calls for a reinforcing BDE to pick up C2 responsibilities for short durations, the DIVARTY did not have a reinforcing BDE for the first seven days of the war. When they did, MSU operations greatly enhanced C 2 on the move. At the FA battalion level, problems resulted from outrunning FM capabilities. BDE level MSCs and above relied on AN/PSC-5 Spitfire SC TACSATs to communicate, but at BN level, FM communications were inadequate. Battalions developed TTPs using quick erect antenna mast system (QEAMS), OE-254s with multiplexors, and rolling retrans on the move, but still experienced degraded FM communications while moving great distances. Heavy division artillery MTOEs equip the DIVARTY TOC with M934A2 expando 5 tons. These vehicles are slow, cumbersome, and require the TOC to power down digital communication packages before moving. The DIVARTY TOC developed TTPs on which nets the HMMWVs would monitor, but still faced degraded FM capabilities while moving. The DIVARTY TOC also powered down AFATDS boxes before moving due to the expando vans� inability to power the boxes on the move. This resulted in delays in establishing a firing capability at the new locations. As an interim fix, DIVARTY reconfigured two M1113 RWS HMMWVs for the operations and fire control elements to jump without losing digital capability with AFATDS. The remote work station (RWS) HMMWVs, however, lack the ability to operate as an MSC platform for extended periods. Recommendation: Change the MTOE to provide DIVARTY a hardened package that communicates on the move. Incorporate M577A3s or command and control vehicles (C 2 Vs), possibly augmented by M1113 RWSs, for the DIVARTY TOC. Increase long-range communications platforms, including AN/PSC-5 Spitifire Radios, AN/PRC-150 Harris HF radios and QEAMs. Explore increased BDE FSE equipment and manning to accommodate BCT changes in doctrine. Develop anall-weather QEAM-style antenna that operates on the move and increases the ability to establish firing capability quickly. Issue: Too many/different/non-compatible information systems Discussion: The Army has too many Army Battlefield Communications Systems (ABCS) and Situational Awareness (SA) systems. Each BOS has developed an information system to suit its particular requirements but little interoperability or commonality exists. The problem lies in commonality and training between systems. This lack of communication causes frustration for MSC level commanders since they do not have the assets to effectively merge these systems into one common operating picture. As a result, 3ID (M) DIVARTY during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM monitored following information systems at one time or another: 1. Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS) 2. Command and control personal computer (C 2 PC) 3. Maneuver Control System Light (MCS-L) 4. Remote work station (RWS) 5. All Source Analysis System Light (ASAS-L) 6. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) 7. Effects management tool (EMT) 8. Joint Early Warning System (JWARN) 9. Force XXI Brigade and Below C 2 System (FBCB 2 ) 10. Terrabase/SPEED (Terrain Analysis and Profiling Systems) 11. Microsoft Internet Explorer for access to 3ID (M) TACWEB 12. Microsoft Outlook Mail to transmit FRAGOs This plethora of systems presented a tremendous challenge to the DIVARTY staff in giving the commander information in a synchronized and homogenous manner. As an example: At one point during combat operations while the DIVARTY was located in position area for artillery (PAA) WILCOX, the counterfire picture was being tracked on ADOCS, unit locations where displayed via C 2 PC, and counterfire missions were being transmitted via AFATDS. Add to this the requirement to stand up a JWARN station when M22 alarms at the DTAC were activated to plot downwind hazards and possible jump locations being analyzed for communications suitability on Terrabase. Although some of these systems do, in fact, communicate with one another, most do not and, therefore, there is no commonality between user functions, graphical displays, and optional features. Disparate operating systems compound this throughout the range of systems (Windows, UNIX, SOLARIS, etc.) Recommendation: Standardize systems in some key areas: 1. Standard operating system 2. Standard �iconology� 3. Standard networking protocols 4. Standard interfaces to various transmission media The required end state product is something similar to the Microsoft Office. Each of these applications, though designed to perform a different business function, are completely compatible with each other. The CEO of any typical business has nearly every software tool needed from accounting, to correspondence, to spreadsheets that graph product performance, to databases that can track inventory. The Army would benefit immeasurably from a one-stop compatible hardware and software package that allows a commander to synchronize all of the battlefield operating systems within the unit. Issue: Command and control vehicle (C 2 V) operations � How continuous command and control of the divisions close fight worked and how to improve on it Discussion: The division received three command and control vehicles (C 2 V) in late October 2002: One for the commanding general�s attack command post and two for the DTAC. There are fire support positions in both the ACP and the ADC (M)�s C 2 V. Of the four FM radios in the C 2 V, two were dedicated to fire support voice and digital nets. There is an AFATDS and the section moved the ADOCS into the vehicle when it moved. The AFSCOORD in the C 2 V became the center of gravity for fires in the close fight. All charts, tasks, and reporting procedures conducted out of a stationary TOC, were in the C 2 V while on the move. What the C 2 V lacked was the ability to talk on the division fires TACSAT net that was located in the M577A3. Recommendation: A quick fix would be to add an additional TACSAT to the C 2 V so that it could be completely self-sustaining. That would allow the AFSCOORD in the C 2 V to have a back up when he is down for fighter management and would provide for redundant communications if one TACSAT went down. A greater fix would be to acquire another C 2 V for use by all fires assets: artillery, Air Force, and attack aviation. One AFSCOORD would stay in the ADC (M)'s C 2 V, but there would be an AFATDS operator and the other AFSCOORD in the fires C 2 V, along with the ALO, his NCO, and the attack aviation LNO. There would be a requirement for five TACSAT nets (division fires, corps fires, joint air request net (JARN), ETAC net, and the division command), three FM nets (division fires voice and digital and Air Force), and one UHF net for the Air Force. The digital systems should include AFATDS, ADOCS, and FBCB 2 . The addition of the fires C 2 V would reduce the footprint of the DTAC by two tracked vehicles and a HMMWV and would provide for constant synchronization and deconfliction of fires on the move. The secure intercom, integral to all C 2 Vs, would provide the most updated information to the AFSCOORD in the ADC (M)�s C 2 V and would provide for more a timely response with fires. Issue: AFATDS performance during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Discussion: AFATDS proved battle worthy in technical and tactical fire direction. For most of the war, digital communications existed from CFLCC down to the shooter level, with the exception of FM range limitations between battalion and brigade level echelons. Digital interface with the AFCS worked as expected and battalion-to-battery FDC digital communications worked well. The problem with establishing digital communications was between the battalion FDC/TF FSE to BDE FSE and DIVARTY. Many of the problems at the BN and BDE level were due to distances involved on the battlefield. BDE FSEs and DIVARTY had the ability to establish connectivity via the MSE LAN. This aided in passing traffic to battalion boxes out of FM range by relaying through LAN connected boxes at BDE level. 3ID (M) DIVARTY�s training level on the use of Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) was not sufficient to warrant use during the war. EPLRS, however, proved a capable distance enhancing communication platform for the ADA�s Air Missile Defense Warning System. This platform warrants testing during future training to mitigate AFATDS FM digital communications range limitations. Recommendation: AFATDS proved a reliable system. Continue to use AFATDS as the artillery�s tactical and technical fire direction system. Test EPLRS as a possible solution to mitigate long-range digital communications limitations. Issue: DREAR FSE Discussion: An assessment was made in garrison prior to deployment that DREAR FSE personnel and equipment would be provided from internal assets. The division reviewed DREAR SOP Appendix 3 (FIRE SUPPORT) in the Fall 2002 and published it. In late January 2003, DIVARTY tasked the division FSE to provide the DREAR with a functional FSE attached to the rear operations center (ROC). One officer (O-3) and one FSNCO (E-5) were assigned to this task as well as an additional FSNCO (E-7) who came out of the ROC. Over a two-week period, DIVARTY procured the equipment from various sections within the division FSE as well as HHB DIVARTY. Once operational, the DREAR FSE had just enough equipment to function as a liaison element rather than an actual FSE that could process and control fires. Due to shortages of radios, power supplies, an AFATDS system and a laundry list of other priorities to support, the FSE was only equipped with ADOCS and a digital non-secure voice telephone (DNVT) for connectivity throughout the war. A stand-alone ADOCS server gave us the capability to monitor fire support events and plans as long as the main server was online to push out updated data. ADOCS, being a planning tool however, did not give us the capability to communicate with firing units such as a tactical combat force FSE. This had to be done via FM within the ROC. The expectation before combat operations was risk would be accepted in the division rear area. During combat operations, the DREAR FSE provided the ROC and Assistant Division Co mmander (Support) (ADC-S) situational awareness on fire support events taking place throughout the division AOR. The FSE also supported the DSA security plan by coordinating whatever assets were available, mostly TCF mortars. On several occasions, the FSE cleared fires with the 101st AAD while they attacked to secure lines of communication (LOCs) and urban areas bypassed by 3ID (M). Other clearance of fires included counterfire along the division rear battlespace (DRB) and targeting Fedayeen, paramilitary, and some Republican Guard (RG) forces attempting to disrupt our supply lines. Most of this was executed over DNVT or FM. In support of DIVARTY, the FSE served as a conduit through which the DIVARTY XO could coordinate resupply of Class IIIBand V from the division materiel management center (DMMC) and G4. Class V resupply, particularly combat configured loads (CCLs) of HE, became an issue by G+4 due to unanticipated counterfire volume around urban areas and delays of logistics convoys trying to catch up to units along congested LOCs. Recommendation: On the books, DIVARTY has no responsibility to provide a fire support element to the DREAR. However, the DREAR has come to expect one as SOP from the training relationships established during division �Warfighter� exercises. Although the DREAR FSE is not a critical node, it does have a use in liaison and coordinating fires needed in an asymmetrical battlespace. The best course of action is to provide the ROC an FSE by MTOE and to task a Georgia National Guard artillery battalion to provide the necessary personnel and equipment. An FSE provided by the Guard should have a habitual training relationship with the ROC. This would relieve the division FSE of having to strip personnel and equipment at the last minute to stand up another FSE for every �Warfighter� or deployment. Issue: Reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI): Poor fidelity of APS Grid Discussion: While at home station, visibility of what was on the Army prepositioned stock (APS) draw grid was only available through the APS Battle Book System. Therefore, the system drove decisions on what to ship. Unfortunately, what the APS battle book system said was on the draw grid and what was actually on the ground were vastly different. This caused tremendous difficulties when trying to properly equip battalion and battery sets. Further complications arose when CFLCC designated several HMMWVs for contractors out of 3ID (M)�s allocation. This resulted in a 31 HMMWV shortage for DIVARTY. Shortages were eventually filled, at the cost of several man-hours of staff work and lost training time for units. Recommendation: The exact status of the APS grid should be posted to a SIPR web site that would be available to all units (down to BN level) and continuously updated prior to and during deployment so there would be no confusion as to who had ownership of which vehicles. Additionally, having individual-vehicle fidelity on the draw grid (including maintenance status and shortages) could expedite preparation of hand receipts and other actions, before a unit ever deployed. Issue: Deploying as a task-organized unit versus a pure unit. Discussion: We deployed an artillery battery with each task force. However, the fire support element equipment was not part of the draw grid of their respective maneuver unit, rather, it was on the HHB draw grid. This precluded the FSE elements from having an initial operating capability as the task force became operational. In addition, all FSEs had to go back to Camp Doha to draw their equipment as HHB deployed in theater. Recommendation: Set draw grids task organized or deploy as a pure unit and deliver combat capable FSEs ready to perform all mission essential tasks to their respective task forces. Issue: Lack of logistics support for 1-39 FA (MLRS) Discussion: 1-39 FA is a unique unit because it is the only general support (GS) battalion in the division with a brigade HQ. As such, 703rd MSB supported it, but spent most of the war moving through BCT areas. During combat, area support was utilized and 1-39 FA drew all classes of supply except Class IX from the closest FSB. This system worked up to OBJ Lions because of planning done before the war, however, it lacked flexibility. If an unplanned shift in the scheme of maneuver occurred, 1-39 FA would have been left without an FSB capable of supporting it. Additionally, almost all bulk and special supplies were pushed from division to BCTs. Since 1-39 FA (and HHB DIVARTY) is not in a BCT, it was often left out of the distribution. 1-39 FA, like 3-7 CAV, is responsible for ranging the entire division zone. Therefore, like 3-7 CAV, 1-39 FA should have a dedicated forward logistics element (FLE) during all operations. Recommendation: Resource a FLE for 1-39 FA. Issue: Target analysis and target production section (TPS) manning at DIVARTY level for counterfire Discussion: The TPS is too small to support the changing doctrine and is assigned to the wrong MTOE. New doctrine and capabilities allow fewer fighting forces to travel faster and fight over longer distances. While these capabilities initially allowed 3ID (M) DIVARTY to fight without a reinforcing FA BDE, it required different and more robust configurations in C 2 that are not supported by MTOE equipment or personnel. The DIVARTY counterfire officer is assigned to HHB DIVARTY, while TPS personnel are assigned to A BTRY of the division MLRS BN. As a result, the counterfire officer is responsible for a section that does not fall under his supervision or within his chain of command. Six personnel proved inadequate to operate for extended periods during the war. During one instance, the DIVARTY TOC split, forcing the TPS to man two teams of three personnel. This limited both teams� ability to man their sections for 24-hour operations. The TPS MTOE for equipment, automation, and communications is also inadequate. DIVARTY tasked one of the DS battalions to provide an additional AN/VRC-92 to the TPS, enabling the section to communicate under split operations. Additionally, two HMMWVs are not enough for the section to operate and does not provide for digital communications on the move. Recommendation: Assign the target production section to DIVARTY�s MTOE. Increase manning to eight personnel and three vehicles. The 10 personnel need to include one x CW3, 1 x WO1/CW2, 1 x 13R40, 1 x 13F20/30 and 4 x 13F10. Equipment MTOE changes need to include an M113 RWS shelter, 2 x M998 HMMWVs, 4 x QEAM antennas, 4 x AN/VRC 92s, and 2 x AFATDS computers in addition to 2 ADOCS platforms. Issue: Replacement operations. Discussion: Since the onset of the war, DIVARTY received roughly 20 replacement soldiers. Most of the replacements were stranded in Kuwait for the entire combat operation, leaving some critical positions unfilled. Additionally, DIVARTY lost eight soldiers, including three key leaders, to combat operations and they were never replaced. Recommendation: The theater needs to refine its system to push replacements forward to units in theater. Replacement for leaders killed in action is imperative. Units can continue operations without them, but it is more difficult. Key leaders that are needed up front should be placed on supply convoys or flown forward with air assets. Issue: Bradley fire support team vehicle (BFIST) performance during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Return to Table of Contents |
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