November 22, 2024
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November 22, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 13 Aviation Operations Army aviation played a key role in the defeat of the Iraqi regime and bringing freedom to the Iraqi people. The speed and flexibility of Army aviation directly contributed to the success of the division and proved invaluable during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF). This chapter addresses the issues that require immediate attention to enhance our capability to support Army aviation across the operational continuum. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Liaison Officer Distribution and Equipment Requirements Issue: Aviation liaison officer distribution and equipment requirements Discussion: 4th Brigade was fortunate that the attack battalion had additional captains to augment the increased demand for aviation liaison officers (LNOs). In addition to the position of the assistant division aviation officer (ADAO), the division required LNOs for in each brigade combat team, the division tactical action center (DTAC), and as an attack planner. The general support battalion provided an LNO to the division rear. Liaison officer distribution greatly impacted the ability of the attack battalion staff to plan, execute, and battle track operations. The battalion was left with one aviation captain and a chemical officer to execute operations. No MTOE equipment was available for these LNOs. Limited resources were stripped away from other staff sections to fill the void in both mobility and communications to support liaison operations. The liaison officer concept benefited both the BCTs and the battalion and directly contributed to the success of the brigade in supporting operations. This was especially true with the air-ground integration and support to 3rd BCT. This liaison concept must be maintained as we relook the role of the attack battalion in the heavy division. The liaison officer is critical in the planning and execution of close attack operations. They provide a link to rotary wing aviation that is similar to the Air Force air liaison officer ( ALO) or the Marine Corps air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO). This function must continue to be developed to provide responsive attack and lift assets to the BCT in the heavy division. The adjustment to the MTOE is the start point for the continued success of this liaison team. Recommendation: Provide a liaison team with sufficient personnel to conduct 24-hour operations with the ability to plan, execute, and track the employment of aviation assets. The recommended number of teams is four in the attack battalion and two in the assault battalion. Each team is composed of 1 x15B, 1x 93P30, 2x 93C. Increase attack and battalion MTOE to provide up armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) for each liaison team with a similar communications suite provided to the air traffic service (ATS) company in the Tactical Terminal Control System (TTCS). An additional M998 for the other half of the team is provided for mobility. Incorporate Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB 2 ) and tactical satellite (TACSAT) into the liaison teams package. Revise doctrine through the Army Aviation Center, Director for Combat Development to expand the role and functions of the heavy division liaison officer. The Army Aviation Center develops introduction of basic liaison skills and functions to include integration into the military decision-making process (MDMP) at the Basic Course and expands on this function at the Captains� Career Course (CCC). All liaison officers should attend the Joint Firepower Controller Course after finishing the CCC. Liaison officers should be post command captains and, at a minimum, CCC graduates. Topic B � Restructure of the Aviation Support Battalion MTOE Issue: Restructure the aviation support battalion MTOE to support combat operations. Discussion: The aviation support battalion is a critical component of the 4th Brigade to sustain air and ground maintenance. This structure works well in garrison, but does not have the depth or the requisite functions to support combat operations. This is due to a shortfall in the ability to support the six TACLOG functions. This is further magnified at the maintenance support team (MST) for both air and ground, as they do not have the necessary equipment or personnel to perform these functions. As a result, the ground MST that supports the division cavalry squadron is augmented, when possible, by the division support command (DISCOM) to reinforce the ground MST capability. The ground MST lacks the missile support and the necessary test and diagnostic support to keep both M1 and M3s fixed as far forward as possible. This is also true for the air MST, but sufficient depth between aviation unit maintenance (AVUM) and aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) structure mitigate some of these shortfalls, provided the aviation support battalion (ASB) is not operating in excess of 12 hours from the division cavalry squadron to accommodate logistical resupply windows. Of the six TACLOG functions that a forward support battalion provides, the aviation support battalion lacks the capability to support �move� and �sustain� functions. It is only 50% mobile and lacks a medical company. The ASB assisted 4th Brigade by placing all of A company�s equipment on the ground and using 5T and stake and platform (S&P) trailers to move the ammunition and the Class IX and additional Class I requirement 4th Brigade needed to support fluid offensive operations. Emplacing a palletized load section (PLS) will offset this problem. Two additional TACLOG functions that demand an increase in capability to sustain combat operations are �fuel� and �arm.� The daily Class III (air) bulk demand was 30,000 gallons per day. The internal bulk capability after removing the forward arming and refueling point (FARP) augmentation requirement of the ASB is 20K, and the difference in the daily bulk fuel requirement was overcome by making multiple turns to the bulk fuel distribution point. Although this work-around enabled 4th Brigade to maintain an adequate quantity of JP8, it was not feasible to sustain over a long duration. This negligible short fall can be easily overcome by providing additional 5K tankers to the ASB. The last critical shortfall in the ASB was the lack of depth in the �arm� function of the battalion. The density of ammunition specialists and equipment available does not support the ammunition basic loads (ABLs) that are maintained by the attack helicopter battalion and, if necessary, the division cavalry squadron. This function requires an ammunition transfer point (ATP) capability based on the density of munitions maintained and distributed to the subordinate battalions. Success in these TACLOG functions is doctrinally solved by corps throughput or augmentation. At the initiation of this operation, many of the echelons above division (EAD) assets required were not in theater or still conducting reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). The outlined TACLOG enhancements are critical to meet the sustainment requirements of 4th Brigade. An MTOE review will identify by line the shortfall of personnel and equipment required to fulfill the same functions of the FSB in support of the BCT Recommendation: Review the MTOE and make corrections to reflect the necessary requirements to sustain all TACLOG functions in support of the brigade. Procure required equipment to support medical, fuel, ammunition, and move functions of the aviation support battalion. Topic C � Army Transformation Initiative (ATI) Degradation of General Support Aviation Battalion (GSAB) Support to Heavy Divisions Issue: Army Transformation Initiative degradation of general support aviation battalion (GSAB) support to heavy divisions. Discussion: 4th Brigade underwent the restructuring of the general support aviation battalion as a component of the Aviation Transformation Initiative (ATI). This reduced the number of UH-60 airframes from 24 to 16. This reduction of aircraft degraded the ability to conduct internal support to the brigade and external support to the division during combat operations. The number of available aircraft based on maintenance was 12 of the 14 on hand. Of these aircraft and crews available, five were available to support both internal and external general support missions. We maintained two command and control aircraft to support 4th Brigade and division command group, two immediate personnel recovery aircraft for downed aircrew extraction, two casualty evacuation aircraft to augment medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), and one downed aircraft recovery team (DART) aircraft. This is extremely inadequate when looking at the battlespace the division covered and the length of our ground lines of communication (LOCs) to support combat service support (CSS) functions. The battalion did conduct high priority parts runs back to Kuwait, but the frequency was not sufficient to meet demands. Additional Chinooks from the corps were provided on one occasion to support emergency Class V operations. The augmentation of a minimum of one heavy lift platoon to conduct routine GS mission sets to support CSS operations would have alleviated some of our shortfall. Changing the MTOE back to the 24 aircraft structure prior to ATI would enable the battalion to support these critical general support mission sets. This would provide the division greater capability to conduct airborne command and control, airborne retrans, augment MEDEVAC, provide limited infiltration/exfiltration of small dismounted units, and most importantly reinforce the move TACLOG function to support sustainment operations. Recommendation: Change the MTOE back to provide the general support aviation battalion 24 aircraft in the heavy division. This will provide the airframes to support the troop to task required to sustain heavy division operations and provide the depth in airframes necessary to support CSS operations. Topic D � Enhanced Optics Requirements Issue: Generation I forward looking infrared (GEN IFLIR) is a serious deficiency in the Apache and has shown little improvement in 20 years. Discussion: The enemy in OIF hid much of its combat power, to include deadly ADA systems, in and around urban areas and under groves of palm trees. This became more evident as 4th Brigade closed on Baghdad. Aircraft operating in and around the Euphrates River basin identified numerous air defense artillery (ADA) and armor family of vehicles (AFVs) dispersed in the farms and palm groves east of the river. GEN I FLIR was unable to assist the pilot with early identification of systems hidden in this manner. The lack of fidelity to identify threats in the close fight denied the aircraft the ability to make maximum use of its weapons stand off. The 1-3 ATKHB commander required visual identification in order to prevent fratricide. At distances exceeding 3 km at night, positive identification was impossible. Although it greatly improved our ability to fly in the 0 % illumination conditions that existed for the majority of operations flown, its ability to see large wires and towers around urban terrain is also questionable and places undue risk on the pilot and mission. Furthermore, even in close distances, the GEN I FLIR is incapable of differentiating between soldiers and civilians, further complicating air-to-ground integration in close combat attack missions on the urban periphery. Recommendation: Purchase and install GEN II FLIR as soon as possible for the AH-64 fleet. Prioritization should be given to division attack helicopter battalions in the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL) sequencing. Topic E � Close Combat Attack Training Issue: Static hover fire techniques in attack by fire (ABF) and battle positions (BPs) Discussion: Enemy ADA units had improved since Operation DESERT STORM in their ability to target attack helicopters. ADA systems were placed in the tree lines and in urban areas to exploit Apache vulnerabilities. On one occasion, the enemy employed an obviously lucrative target, a T72 tank, in the open with the expectation of drawing Apache helicopters into an ADA ambush. Fire to the exposed flanks and rear of the aircraft was constant in many attacks. Intelligence confirmed the use of ADA ambush experts in the Iraqi military. Recommendation: Incorporated moving fire and dynamic engagements during peacetime training, especially in the Longbow cockpit training (LCT) and during Table V-VIII aerial gunnery densities where we can practice actual engagements on stationary and moving targets. Change the MTOE to provide 21 aircraft to perform security tasks during actions in the ABF. Issue: Lack of doctrinal, standardized maneuvers to break contact and/or suppress enemy enroute. Discussion: The current FM 1-112, Appendix F is titled "Air Combat." Some of this appendix discusses �air to air combat� but also discusses �air to ground combat� and some team and company TTPs. This confusing appendix represents the only �current� attempt to address this subject in doctrine. Enroute combat maneuvers (ECM) were re-created by 1-3 ATKHB from previous air combat maneuver doctrine. This TTP is a method to react to enemy fire enroute, suppress and, reorganize to continue the mission. Having a common, trained TTP throughout the battalion proved invaluable. Recommendation: Forward ECM as a TTP to Army Aviation Branch to be incorporated into training and doctrine. Issue: Lack of doctrinal, standardized maneuvers for running fire engagements. Discussion: The aircrew training manual (ATM) and gunnery manuals discuss running fire engagements. It does not, however, discuss implementation of these tactics, supported training/gunnery, or control at the team, platoon, or company level. Close combat maneuvers (CCM) was re-created and refined by 1-3 ATKHB from tactics used in Vietnam and over water engagements in Korea. These running fire tactics were organized into circuits based on the enemy, using two methods of attack. Running fire provided enhanced accuracy during rocket engagements and added security during 30mm engagements. Team members and command and control shared a common picture of the situation. Recommendation: Forward CCM as a TTP to Army Aviation Branch to be incorporated into training, Table VII/VIII gunnery tables and doctrine. Return to Table of Contents |
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