December 23, 2024
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December 23, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 14 Close Air Support (CAS) Throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), close air support (CAS) played a significant role in the success of Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M) on the battlefield. CAS successes ranged the full spectrum of combat operations and CAS was used for missions including shaping, armed recce, counterfire, and troops in contact. A total of 925 CAS sorties were flown in support of 3ID (M) resulting in 656 enemy combat systems destroyed and 89 enemy facilities destroyed. Corps shaping accounted for an additional 3324 sorties destroying an estimated 2400 enemy targets. Two contributing factors to the success of CAS were its responsiveness and lethality. The following lessons learned highlight both CAS successes and shortfalls: Lessons Learned
Issue: Success of CAS in shaping and support of maneuver. Discussion: The working relationship between the fire support element (FSE) and air liaison officer (ALO) at the division tactical command post (DTAC) was exemplary, resulting in a dynamic �fires� team. Together they labored to provide a permissive environment for massing fires. Prior to OIF, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were established allowing CAS aircraft to operate at and above10 km, while artillery fires operated below. When this TTP could not be met, the team worked together to redirect systems for deconfliction. Division ALO and FSE worked together to clear targets though the restricted target list, facilitating quick CAS response times. Brigade and division fire teams worked together to ensure clearance of fires. As a result, there was no fratricide due to CAS in support of 3ID (M). CAS had a major impact on the battlefield. It was highly successful, both in shaping, as well as in the close fight. CAS was used for a number of different missions including armed recce, when ISR assets were not available; counterfire, when artillery was out of range or when collateral damage was a factor; shaping; and troops in contact. A total of 925 CAS sorties were flown in support of 3ID (M) resulting in 656 enemy combat systems destroyed and 89 enemy facilities destroyed. Corps shaping accounted for an additional 3324 sorties destroying an estimated 2400 enemy targets. The old concept of CAS stacks and push CAS proved very effective. Division ALOs positioned CAS stacks to facilitate quick response based on the ground commander�s scheme of maneuver as well as deconfliction fromposition areas for artillery ( PAAs). As a result, CAS requests for troops in contact situations were available in 5-10 minutes. In fact, CAS was so responsive at times the air support operations center (ASOC) held CAS in waiting for division clearance. For all other requests, responsiveness ranged from 5-30 minutes. These delays were due to higher priority division requests being filled, as well as gaps within the air tasking order (ATO). There were very rare occasions when weather increased the CAS responsiveness to 45 min to an hour. Precision-guided munitions were a lethal combat multiplier. Joint direct attack munitions (JDAM) repeatedly proved its value as an all-weather, day or night, weapon. In a couple of cases, enlisted terminal air controllers (ETACs) produced outstanding results using JDAM and wind corrected munitions dispenser (WCMD) for troops in direct contact in near zero visibility. JDAM was also used to destroy enemy buildings with minimal damage to other surrounding structures. Although CAS had its challenges with the counterfire mission, JDAM was the division�s weapon of choice for counterfire in urban environments to minimize collateral damage. Recommendation: Continue to work with ALOs at both the division and brigade levels to build on what we have established during OIF. Early planning is crucial in order to influence the air tasking order to get precision munitions if required for the mission. Continue to work TTPs for CAS counterfire. Issue: Use of CAS as a counterfire asset. Discussion: CAS responsiveness, search time, and positive identification (PID) problems greatly reduced CAS effectiveness in a counterfire role. Although the consistent 5-10 minutes from CAS request to bombs on target is relatively quick for a �troops in contact� scenario, this is entirely too long for a counterfire mission. Even when we had CAS on station in the area of operations, the time it takes to talk the pilots eyes onto the target for PID is substantial. The fastest reaction time for a counterfire mission from acquisition to bombs on target was approximately 5-10 minutes. This was only due to the fact that the aircrew saw the flash from a subsequent volley of artillery fire while searching that area. Search time and PID are two issues that are interrelated. The current special instructions (SPINS) do not recognize Q-36/Q-37 acquisitions as a source for PID. This drives our ETACs to do �talk-ons� to get the pilot to see the target for PID, either with his eyes or onboard sensors, before ordnance release. Operations at night and in inclement weather further complicate the problem with PID. Q-36/Q-37 radars produce 10-digit grids that can be used to employ JDAM. If directed in the SPINS, pilots could release JDAM on target without having �eyes on.� In this scenario, the pilot can copy the grid from the ETAC on his way from the CAS stack and employ weapons on a first run attack; thereby drastically reducing response time, day or night, regardless of the weather. To insure that we will have aircraft with JDAM munitions on board, we must predict and plan the counterfire fights as far out as possible in order to influence the air tasking order (ATO). Recommendation: Fire supporters should always use artillery first for counterfire. Use CAS only for those acquisitions that are either outside the range of artillery or restricted by rules of engagement (ROE) due to chemical defense equipment (CDE) considerations. CAS stacks should be placed to facilitate quick response. Place written guidance in the SPINS specifically addressing CAS counterfire, specifying Q-36/Q-37 acquisitions as PID. Plan the counterfire fight as far out as possible to get JDAM munitions added to the ATO for allocation. Issue: CAS was effectively employed in an urban environment Discussion: CAS played an important role in urban operations when collateral damage was a concern. Precision weapons were used against targets such as artillery, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and special operations forces (SOF) time sensitive targets (TSTs). Some great examples of this were in the cities of An Najaf and Karbala. CAS successfully engaged artillery and SSMs inside the cities with little damage to surrounding property and buildings. Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) were attempted in the same fashion but with heavy collateral damage. Precision weapons were also successful in destroying buildings deemed hostile by the ground commander. Delay fusing and precision �bunker busting� munitions allowed the destruction of buildings while those beside it were left standing. CAS was also effectively used in support of troops in heavy contact within urban terrain. On 25 Mar 03, 3-7 CAV found itself in a desperate situation in an urban environment. CAV was receiving persistent small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire from dismounts and tech-mounted vehicles. Surrounded from all sides, the 3-7 CAV ETAC employed CAS aircraft carrying JDAM to hit the LOCs coming into the town. Air continued until all contact ceased. Once again, CAS was successful in support of 2nd BCT�s attack into Baghdad. Aircraft used their guns and JDAM to hit enemy positions along Highway 8 with devastating results. Recommendation: Continue to refine our TTPs established for using CAS in MOUT. If precision weapons are desired, plan as far out as possible to influence the air tasking order. Use precision CAS assets when collateral damage is a factor. Issue: Tactical air control party (TACP) equipment and communication shortfalls Discussion: We broke down the DTAC into a mobile configuration (red) before or during every major operation with the exception of one. Situational awareness is dumped and communications between the ALO, fires, and G3 are challenged. Controlling CAS from a M113 is nearly impossible due to the amount of noise. It has enough room for our map board and computer but it is simply too loud inside to use our radios. Controlling from a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) is just as difficult due to the lack of workspace. TACPs are using equipment and vehicle configurations that are not designed for fighting on the move. We were able to work around these shortcomings but execution was far less effective. To fight on the move, we need another weapon system platform. The division TACP also requires two dedicated satellite communication/tactical satellite (SATCOM/TACSAT) nets; one for the joint air request net (JARN) and one for a division TACP command net. Because of the mobile nature of the fight, the speed at which we moved, and the size of the battlespace, SATCOM/TACSAT were the only reliable means of voice communication. Therefore, each TACP element also needs a minimum of two SATCOM/TACSAT radios (more if TACTR and data communications is also required). In summary, division TACP requires a vehicle that can hold 2-3 people with working space. We require the following radios: 2 SATCOM/TACSAT, 2 FM/SINGARS, 1 UHF, and 1 VHF. Fighting on the move creates a very dynamic battlefield. We must have digital communications that can support SIPRNET as well as intelligence feeds while on the move. The optimum solution is to have the fire support element (FSE) and air liaison officer ( ALO) collocated within the same armored vehicle. This would create a more dynamic mobile working environment, allowing the FSE and ALO to work together instead of over a radio net. ALO requirements would be the same with the exception of 1 FM/SINGARS could be omitted. The final equipment shortfall noted is the lack of the ability to self-designate targets. TACPs require the capability to mark and self designate targets to better facilitate quicker target acquisition by aircrew and more accurate target coordinates for JDAM employment. Quicker target acquisition would increase responsiveness allowing more ordnance to be employed in a shorter period of time. Recommendation: Add to our modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) a vehicle that can be used by the division TACP for command and control of air assets. Field a better communications package to support TACP long haul and digital communications while on the move. Finally, provide the TACP the capability to mark and designate targets to increase responsiveness and lethality. Issue: Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC)/Coalition Force Air Component Command (CFACC) and corps engaging targets with CAS within 3ID (M) area of operations (AO). Discussion: The division was consistently challenged by CFLCC/CFACC and corps attempting to engage targets with CAS and air interdiction (AI) inside 3ID (M) AO. Instead of passing intelligence information down to the division and allowing 3ID (M) elements to engage targets, higher headquarters insisted upon engaging the targets themselves. On several occasions no known coordination was attempted. On one occasion, the division ALO stumbled upon an operation that corps was trying to execute inside an objective that was cordoned by 3ID (M). Once again, the division did not coordinate with the brigade that owned the battlespace. On another occasion, 3ID (M) ETACs reported explosions within their battlespace 4 km from their position. Several minutes later, corps contacted division, wanting to use that area to strike, control, and reconnaissance (SCAR) for enemy artillery and surface to surface SSMs. This was another example of corps engaging targets within 3ID(M) battlespace without coordination. The danger here is obvious. Corps does not have the situational awareness (SA) to engage targets within battlespace that they do not own. There is a large possibility for fratricide. CFACC also attempted to engage targets inside the fire support coordination lines (FSCL). Much to their credit, corps was able to stop a total of 14 of these attempts. However, an F-15E under CFACC control was successful in one attempt. The F-15E misidentified an MLRS as a surface to air missile (SAM) launcher approximately 15 miles from his position. The pilot found 14 vehicles in that area and asked permission from Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to engage those targets. This incident is still under investigation but the end state was fratricide; 3 killed in action (KIA), 6 wounded in action ( WIA), and 3 vehicles destroyed. This is unacceptable. One contributing factor to confusion of battlespace ownership is the lack of a division forward boundary (DFB). Without the DFB, there is no definition of where division battlespace ends and corps battlespace begins. With the establishment of the DFB, coordination between corps and division improved. One more topic worthy of discussion is the argument of engaging targets based on who has �eyes on.� On many occasions, either with Hunter, Predator, or SOF, corps had more SA on the target than the brigade who owned that battlespace. Corps used this information as an argument that they should control the aircraft. The problem lies in the fact that corps may have more SA on the target; however, they do not have more SA on friendly forces in the area. Corps needs to either push the ISR assets down to the division or they need to coordinate with division for operations in our AO. Regardless, if corps does operate in our AO, one of our ETACs needs to be up on the control frequency with final control authority. Recommendation: Before LD, establish clear and concise boundaries between corps and division battlespace.. Corps needs to pass intelligence and ISR assets down to the division for targets found within our battlespace. If higher headquarters needs to engage targets within division AO, detailed coordination must be done through both Air Force and Army channels. For CAS engagements within our AO, we must have our own brigade ETACs on control frequency with final control authority. Summation: The working relationship between the FSE and ALO at the DTAC was exemplary, resulting in a dynamic �fires� team. Together we labored to provide a permissive environment for massing fires. CAS has proven itself as an indispensable asset to the ground commander. To insure future success, we must take from these experiences, lessons learned and then train them. We must continue to train as a joint team. Equipment and vehicle upgrades must be accomplished to guarantee that the TACP of the future has the tools to fight successfully while on the move. Army doctrine must be scrutinized to facilitate clear ownership of battlespace. Return to Table of Contents |
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