November 14, 2024
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November 14, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 15 Engineer 3ID (M) engineers conducted an incredible number of missions and operated over extreme distances during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. In spite of serious communications inadequacies, engineers executed all tasks because they understood a well-rehearsed and detailed plan and in the absence of orders followed commanders� intent. Augmented with an engineer group headquarters, the engineer brigade commanded over 3,000 soldiers and controlled three divisional mechanized battalions, one corps mechanized battalion, one combat heavy battalion, four multi-role bridge companies, a combat support equipment company, a terrain detachment, and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) company. Engineers focused on accomplishing �assured mobility� missions from reducing the border obstacle to building a C-130 airstrip at the corps� main logistics base. Engineers breached obstacles, marked and cleared routes, conducted traffic control, cleared bridges of demolitions, emplaced tactical bridges, constructed and maintained main supply (MSRs), and conducted reconnaissance of every type, to include combat reconnaissance of fixed bridges under fire. They also worked in conjunction with the EOD force to clear millions of rounds of munitions, hundreds of thousands of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and thousands of UXO sites. The engineer brigade and group headquarters were responsible for division level command and control (C 2 ) missions such as a forward passage of lines (FPOL), crossing force headquarters, and restoring power, water, and sewage utilities to the city of Baghdad. Despite our successes, we faced numerous challenges in the campaign, to include inadequate communications architecture, combat vehicles that were not survivable, inadequate haul, low priority for every class of resupply, and an armor vehicle launched bridges (AVLB) fleet in crisis. Despite these challenges, and thanks in part to an enemy who was unable to sustain a coherent defense in the constricted terrain that favored him, our engineers adapted and overcame these and many other obstacles to deliver assured mobility to the Marne Division. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Terrain Analysis Issue: Engineer lead in terrain visualization throughout the campaign Discussion: Engineer delivery of terrain analysis was a huge success, enabling maneuver commanders to �see� the terrain like never before. Commanders continuously sought blow-ups of imagery, special map product operational overlays, slope tints, moisture content analysis, and terrain analysis briefings. The need to manually develop and study a modified combined obstacle overlay (MCOO) continues to be a necessary tool, since it serves as a forcing function for staff officers to understand the terrain to the necessary level of detail. Digitally produced MCOOs proved essentially useless, since the low-lying wet terrain made virtually the entire Euphrates-Tigris River Valley appear to be NO-GO. Engineers used terrain target folders during mission analysis to help commanders rapidly visualize the terrain to expedite decisions to focus the planning staff. Incorporating a terrain team task organized to the DS engineer battalion supporting the brigade combat team (BCT) proved essential to developing a detailed plan throughout the depth of the campaign that allowed common situational awareness of the terrain�s characteristics and the development of an extremely sound plan that incorporated all aspects of the terrain. This goal was only achieved because the division�s engineers worked hard in the preceding year to become terrain experts, both in the application of terrain analysis tools and software programs and in the tactical significance of terrain. At all levels the division�s engineers developed detailed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and SOPs to integrate terrain analysis into the military decision-making process (MDMP). Recommendation: Current terrain analysis doctrine should be reinforced for all engineer officers in the training base and at home station. The terrain teams should continue to be attached to DS engineer battalions to provide terrain analysis products and data. 81T Advanced Individual Training (AIT) should familiarize soldiers with all available terrain analysis software and applications and sharing capabilities. Engineers must be the staff terrain experts at all levels. Issue: Organization of terrain teams Discussion: When the division�s newly expanded terrain detachment was organized and equipped with Digital Topographic Support Systems, Light (DTSS-L) over a year ago, the division attached it and its six teams to the engineer brigade that trained and organized the teams to fight further attached to the engineer battalion�s DS to the maneuver brigades. This system worked extremely well and allowed the engineer brigade to mass terrain analysis capability to support division planners early in the planning stage, and then send the terrain teams, already equipped with intimate knowledge of the terrain as it related to the division plan, to the brigades. At the division level, the detachment supported the planners and the division tactical command post (DTAC), interfacing with first, the Coalition Force Land Component Command (CFLCC) planners for terrain products and analysis, and subsequently, with the V Corps terrain team when they arrived in theater. The assistant division engineer (ADE) and his deputy directed the terrain analysis effort, integrating intelligence sources from the G2 and the Army Corps of Engineers and prioritizing production focus. Once the brigade terrain teams began operations, they refined products and focused on detailed brigade mission sets. In many cases, the brigades produced special terrain products useful to the division, which the engineer brigade was able to disseminate across the division. Recommendation: Sustain the current method of organizing, training, and fighting the terrain teams in the division�s terrain detachment. Issue: Managing terrain visualization products Discussion: Terrain visualization products, in combination with intelligence data from multiple sources, especially the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), were critical to developing a coherent plan whose details were well understood by the entire division and allowed fairly detailed understanding of the terrain�s limitations on operations. The enormously detailed division terrain analysis conducted by the planners ensured the division developed executable plans. For example, the division cancelled branch plans to cross the Euphrates at multiple locations when imagery revealed that they were waterlogged. Additionally, a detailed analysis of roads and routes to the south of the Sulaybiyat Depression confirmed these roads were trafficable, allowing the division to attack initially along two major axes of advance. However, during the planning phase well prior to line of departure (LD), collecting, reviewing, and disseminating terrain products developed by division and EAD topographic and intelligence organizations became completely overwhelming. Because there was no central management for this information among the several planning headquarters (Central Command (CENTCOM), CFLCC, V Corps, and 3ID [M]), it was hugely challenging for planners to respond to specific request for information (RFIs) for detailed terrain analysis. TACWEB/SIPERNET was used to find products produced by CFLCC or other government agencies (OGA) sources. However, because these data files were so immense and the division had limited bandwidth, they could not download or manage these files effectively. In addition, higher headquarters� terrain products were simply hung on web pages for the division to find and use, without alerting us to new products available. We often received or found information too late to affect the commander�s decision-making process. Recommendation: All such information should be catalogued and made available by the large engineer/intelligence staffs at the corps or land component command (LCC) level. An alternate course of action (COA) would be for the Engineer School to establish a task force that assembles such information when contingency operations spin up, so that this information is available to units via the SIPRNET. Most critically, SIPRNET data capabilities must be tremendously expanded if tactical units at division and below are to be able to access terrain data from a web page. The division must install a large data pipeline at home station to allow passing and receiving the enormous data files from remote headquarter to allow adequate parallel planning. Topic B - Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Issue: Integration of EAD engineers Discussion: The engineer brigade integrated seven major and several minor EAD engineer units into the division before LD, as well as changing task organization to lose and gain other EAD assets after arrival at TF Baghdad. This nearly tripled the division�s total engineer population for the operation. Every single one of these units brought a non-organic engineer capability to the fight that was essential to the division�s success. The four multi-role bridge companies (MRBCs) brought river crossing and assault boat capabilities. The corps� combat battalion brought additional combat engineers critical to support 3-7 Cavalry�s scheme of maneuver, division C 2 capability as the crossing area engineer for the Euphrates River crossing, and the ability to weight the main effort. The 94th Engineer Battalion (Combat Heavy) and the 535th Combat Support Equipment Company brought critically needed road and airfield construction and technical capabilities. The 937th Engineer Group brought the critical C 2 means to manage the division engineer operations in the division�s rear area despite the division�s extremely extended battlespace. In order to seamlessly integrate EAD engineer units, the engineer brigade developed an RSOI SOP and checklist, with briefings for key leaders. Issues covered mission essential task list (METL) assessment, recent training calendars, strengths and weaknesses, as well as the many RSOI training requirements established by theater, division, and the brigade. In addition, the brigade held an engineer leader�s seminar early in the RSOI process to familiarize all units with the plan, the critical issues they would have to perform, the nature of the terrain, capabilities of the various units attached to the division, and a myriad of TTPs and SOPs the brigade had developed related to our primary focus on delivering �assured mobility� to the division. This seminar also helped establish the personal relationships so necessary to successful operations. Where possible, units also participated in the division command post exercise (CPX) prior to LD. In general, the integration process was successful. Contact was established with �new� units as early as possible via email or telephone. Face-to-face meetings were executed on arrival, SOPs and training requirements were exchanged, and liaison officers (LNOs) were used extensively at the brigade and battalion level. In the most successful cases, the LNOs arrived prior to the main body. Several limitations made integration a challenge. The physical separation from most EAD units and the engineer brigade (the engineer group and two battalions completed RSOI at Camp Virginia and the multi-role bridge companies at Araifjan) tremendously complicated the planning and RSOI process. SIPRNET was the primary means of communication in the pre-deployment stages, but it proved incapable of passing the large briefing files needed to assist units in planning their operation. Also, there was considerable uncertainty as to unit arrival dates in theater, further complicating planning and the RSOI process. Even after units arrived in theater and LNOs were exchanged, many EAD units were not attached to the division until very late in the preparation stage. Units assigned to RSOI these EAD engineers were often inadequate to the task (e.g., 416th ENCOM had neither the resources, time, or personnel to RSOI the MRBCs, despite valiant efforts) and lacked the necessary combat equipment and materiel required to outfit the arriving units. Though the units were a part of the division�s planning (and in some cases, execution) process, they could not officially answer to the division. Additionally, they were tasked with missions by their corps parent headquarters that in some cases conflicted with the division�s missions and requirements. The physical separation of these units from the engineer brigade made establishing support and logistics relationships particularly difficult. Recommendation: The earlier EAD units can be integrated before LD, the better � at least two full weeks on the ground and ideally a month is needed. A detailed and thorough RSOI process, with focus on the �I� of integration, is essential. Open dialogue between headquarters and commanders prior to deployment must occur. The use of LNOs is extremely helpful, particularly if the LNO can arrive prior to the main body. A function, such as a leader�s seminar, that allows all units to establish common situational awareness is critical. Early on, higher headquarters should establish clear task organization and provide all subordinate units contact names, phone numbers, and email addresses. Finally, to prevent confusion and unnecessary friction and to avoid diverting leaders� energy away from critical tasks, all headquarters must respect task organization. Issue: Multi-role bridge company (MRBC) command/support relationships Discussion: During OIF, MRBCs were task-organized across corps boundaries to several different units throughout the operation, requiring them to address many logistics and administrative issues multiple times with multiple headquarters. When the MRBCs were assigned to various units within the division, it was difficult to maintain continuity of support such as supply and maintenance. MRBCs support changed between forward support battalions (FSBs) as the task organization changed, and they were often too far from the main support battalion (MSB) to receive effective support. Task organization changes, particularly those changes that were not planned or were not executed in accordance with the plan, made this even more of a challenge. Recommendation: If MRBCs are to be fluidly moved around the battlefield, then the MRBCs need to be as self-sufficient as possible. When assigned to a division, the command/support relationship must be carefully considered and planned in advance. The �support� part of this relationship must be worked very hard. Topic C - Continuous Offensive Operations Over Extended Distances Issue: Resourcing the engineer brigade main command post (EMAIN) as separate HQ Discussion: Contrary to doctrine, the engineer brigade fought almost the entire campaign as a separate entity from the division main command post (DMAIN), and only co-located with the DTAC for the advance to the Euphrates River to conduct the division�s river crossing at OBJ Peach. This afforded additional flexibility to the division�s scheme of maneuver. While BCTs and the DTAC focused on the close fight, the EMAIN controlled numerous forward passages along the narrow divisional axis of advance, rapidly replaced the lead BCT as the crossing area commander at OBJ Peach, and quickly transitioned into Baghdad International Airport (BIA) and, later, Baghdad engineer restoration operations. This could only happen because the EMAIN trained to command and control independently. The EMAIN and its supporting 937th Group Headquarters planned and successfully controlled four divisional forward passages: the border crossing, Highway #1 near An Nasiriyah, the Karbala Gap, and the Euphrates River crossing. The EMAIN also commanded an economy of force action at OBJ Peach for three days with a mechanized task force; portions of the air defense artillery (ADA) battalion; a corps engineer battalion; and an MRBC that focused on defending the bridge, passing the division forward, traffic control, installing additional bridge crossings, and clearing OBJ Peach of enemy forces. As Baghdad was falling, the engineer brigade managed real estate operations, life support, and force protection at BIA as a forward operating base for multiple division, corps, CFLCC, and interagency organizations. Subsequently, the brigade worked to restore power, water, and sewage utilities to Baghdad as the division transitioned to stability and support operations (SASO) operations. While executing these diverse mission sets, we identified several critical shortfalls in the brigade�s MTOE, most notably, the lack of a dedicated S3, S1, and S4 (the S3 is assigned to the DTAC to support the Assistant Division Commander [Maneuver] [ADC-M] and the current fight, while the S1 and S4 are in the division rear command post (DREAR) with the Assistant Division Commander [Support] [(ADC/S]), insufficient independent logistics capabilities (to include a water buffalo), and inadequate communications architecture (no Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB 2 ) was assigned to the EMAIN, only one TACSAT, and a few unreliable Iridium satellite phones and HF radios that could not be maintained). Recommendation: Revise doctrine to use the engineer brigade as a separate controlling headquarters. To do this, the EMAIN needs additional personnel (especially its own S3, S1, and S4), weapons, communications systems (especially reliable HF radios and FBCB 2 in all engineer C 2 nodes), and logistics self-sufficiency for HHD so it can control division operations focused on mobility, forward passages, and transition to SASO with respect to real estate management, and utilities restoration. The engineer brigade should be assigned and should train with a tele-engineer kit allowing reach-back to U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Doctrine should identify specific USACE assets to be attached to the engineer brigade for transition to SASO operations, to include prime power experts, real estate managers, and infrastructure experts. The brigade also needs dedicated civil affairs support capabilities in SASO. Issue: Engineer brigade commander C 2 capability and survivability Discussion: The engineer brigade commander formed an �assault CP� with his soft-top HMMWV (which had FBCB 2 installed and thus could not be changed out for a hard vehicle), plus an excess hard top HMMWV drawn from Army prepositioned stock (APS). A battle captain was in the commander�s HMMWV to assist with C 2 on the move. The additional hard top HMMWV had an NCO and commo specialist, with a squad automatic weapon (SAW) (the hard top HMMWV�s ring mount was broken and could not be changed out with a M2 .50 cal machine gun before LD, as desired). In general, this configuration worked well, permitting C 2 of the brigade on the move. A critical communications shortfall was the lack of an additional TACSAT With two TACSATs instead of one, the commander could have better controlled the engineer fight on the move while his EMAIN monitored. The lethal nature of the continual direct and indirect contact limited the engineer brigade commander�s freedom to move around the battlespace securely. While en route to a blown bridge site, through an area declared �clear� by a Bradley platoon, the assault CP was ambushed by rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), mortars, and direct fire. All of the occupants of commander�s HMMWV were injured and only escaped more serious injury or death because the round hit the vehicle�s mobile subscriber radio telephone terminal (MSRT). Recommendation: Engineer brigade commanders must be resourced with more combat capable and survivable C 2 platforms to permit them the ability to move about the battlefield to the decisive place for engineer operations and to control the close engineer fight. This should ideally consist of a M113 or M2 Bradley and requires the addition of a TACSAT. Issue: Fighting combat engineers and survivability Discussion: Engineer combat vehicles are not survivable under the fighting conditions we encountered in OIF. One sapper was killed and three wounded when an RPG round hit a squad M113; in contrast, no RPGs penetrated any of the Bradleys or tanks in 3ID (M), and our maneuver survivability to tenacious attacks is a major lesson of this campaign. On multiple occasions BCT commanders wanted to leave combat engineers behind during an attack because of our lack of survivability, but each time concluded they could not because of the need for responsive combat engineers to reduce possible obstacles forward. Combat engineers must fight forward to execute the wide variety of important combat tasks carried out in this campaign, such as removing obstacles, clearing and marking routes, emplacing a wide variety of expedient obstacles, and providing additional security forces for tasks such as manning blocking positions. In addition to conducting their fundamental sapper tasks focused on assured mobility, on repeated occasions during OIF combat engineer line companies served their task forces as fighting engineers and established enemy prisoners of war (EPW) cages, conducted presence patrols, secured and defended bridges, cleared buildings, and attacked to clear routes. Enemy dismounted forces in buildings and from fortified foxholes viciously attacked our sappers throughout the campaign. Combat engineers responded with devastating effect, firing at enemy forces with crew served weapons, Javelins (one of the most important equipment additions to the force, providing both antiarmor capability and thermal imaging), and fighting from the M113 cargo hatch with small arms. The campaign illustrated the critical requirements for sappers to be able to fight as independent units at and below company level, yet sappers� Engineer Qualification Tables (EQT) do not require them to shoot and maneuver with their main weapons systems (MK-19, M2 .50 cal MG, M249s, and M203s). For those units that had trained extensively in Kuwait before combat, their realistic training proved invaluable. Weapons ranges focused on moving and shooting as opposed to typical small arms targetry. In addition, platoons conducted extensive training on displaced civilians and EPWs. Moreover, military operation on urban terrain (MOUT) training conducted at home station prior to deployment proved crucial in familiarizing sappers with the problems of fighting as infantry in urban terrain. The Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) will need to address these issues to sustain this level of training. Recommendation: Place combat engineers in a vehicle platform of equal survivability to that of maneuver forces. Completely revamp the current EQT to replicate shoot and move Tables, incorporating mobility tasks with the need to fight while attacking. Maintain this training by introducing into the METL basic infantry training, such as fire control and dismounted infantry operations. Focus training on the quick transitions between engineer and infantry missions. Increase Javelin fielding to one per sapper squad plus one in the assault and obstacle (A&O) platoon for a total of seven per sapper company. Issue: Assured mobility operations Discussion: Ever since the division�s �Warfighter� exercise in January 2002, the engineer brigade has focused on establishing TTPs to implement the emerging engineer doctrine of assured mobility, that is designed to assure maneuver commanders freedom of maneuver by predicting, preventing, detecting or neutralizing obstacles to mobility on the battlefield. This included an extensive review of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) countermine equipment to pursue in case of deployment. The focus was on terrain analysis responsibilities, SOPs and TTPs, and changing the engineer training model and mind set from a focus on demolitions and defensive/mine operations, to a focus on mobility, in concert with our Army�s offensively, oriented doctrine. As a result we focused primarily on mobility tasks in preparation for combat, to include route marking and signing and traffic control (not enough military police [MPs] were available to handle both EPW operations, manage traffic, and conduct bridge recons and seizures). Unfortunately, most of the COTS countermine equipment we trained on did not materialize prior to LD, to include the extremely effective Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System (HSTAMIDS). Some COTS equipment included the D9 dozers (used to slice through the border obstacles, as well as for area clearance), the MineLab F1A4 mine detector, the Panther mine clearer, and two tele-engineering kits (TEKs) from USACE. But because we faced relatively few obstacles throughout the campaign, our major mobility tasks were focused on overcoming natural obstacles and difficult roads and terrain, as well as disposing of UXO and enemy weapons and ammunition caches. The notable exceptions to this were two significant minefields and some other �improvised� obstacles. One of the BCTs encountered a 400-meter deep minefield astride Highway 8 north of the junction with Highway 1. This obstacle was covertly breached by sappers in order to execute a mission and was subsequently deliberately breached after being reseeded. Another minefield along Highway 8 (just east of BIA) was 1300 meters deep and required considerable engineer effort to reduce. Additionally, the enemy used unconventional obstacles in several locations, including destroyed vehicles and other expedient roadblocks. Engineers also encountered several partially damaged or destroyed fixed bridges. Of note, even in this rapid offensive campaign, engineers performed many mobility/countermobility/survivability (M/CM/S) tasks, to include:
Recommendation: The assured mobility concept should be enshrined in doctrine now. Current training emphasis in the training base, at home station, and at CTCs on emplacing minefields should be dramatically reduced and replaced with an emphasis on assured mobility operations, to include route and bridge reconnaissance, route marking and signing, traffic control at FPOLs, river and gap-crossing, and maneuvering in constricted terrain. This time should be replaced with the �fighting engineer� model discussed separately above. Defensive training should focus on situational obstacles, point minefields, and the kinds of tasks listed above, with a heavy emphasis on road craters (used fairly extensively to contain certain cities during the attack), wire obstacles, and field expedient obstacles and berms to control traffic. Issue: Bridge seizures and doctrine Discussion: Because of the constrictive nature of the terrain at the river crossing sites, the division was forced to plan its two potential river crossing operations as brigade-level tasks, rather than true doctrinally deliberate river crossings. Difficult approaches at crossing sites made it was essential we cross close to the fixed bridges to facilitate the momentum of the attack. While the preferred river crossing technique was bridge seizure, we found little doctrinal references to bridge seizure TTPs, even a METL task for an airborne unit seizing a bridge presumes the bridge is not prepared for demolition. All the training elements required for this operation exist, but there is no doctrinal framework. In planning seizure of bridges presumed rigged for demolition (all bridges over the Euphrates en route to Baghdad except the Highway 1 bridge near An Nasiriyah were rigged for demolitions, and four of them were blown/partially damaged), we decided an under-side bridge reconnaissance was required to clear bridges prior to passing heavy forces, but our organic ribbon bridge (RB)-3s were inadequate. As a result, at OBJ Peach the engineer company used RB-15s (the only RB in the Army able to mount an outboard motor to allow rapid river crossing under fire) from the MRBC, in conjunction with TF scouts equipped with Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS) devices and an EOD team to help determine safe ways to clear any demolitions/booby traps under the bridges, to execute the assault river crossing. Bridge classification training aided planning for bridge seizures and enabled execution. The tele-engineering kit (TEK) proved essential to complete technical evaluation of multiple damaged bridges after partial damage to explosives. The TEK�s video teleconference (VTC) capability to instantly transmit digital photographs of the damage allowed us to obtain a field fix to the failing span support, but the scope of work was beyond the resources and mission focus at the time. Recommendation: Develop engineer doctrine to support seizing a bridge rigged for destruction by the enemy and incorporate this into the division�s METL. Include counter demolition training to support bridge seizure as a focus of EQT and engineer tactical education system. Continue bridge classification training at the current level of emphasis. Replace current MTOE authorization of RB-3s with three RB-15s per engineer battalion, include haul asset for RB-15s in MTOE change. Augment engineer battalions with one TEK per battalion in order to train on its multiple capabilities for advanced technical reconnaissance. Augment engineers with LRAS devices for independent standoff reconnaissance capability. Issue: River crossings, forward passage of lines (FPOLs), and doctrine Discussion: During planning, the division applied Army doctrinal river crossing/combined arms breaching control measures as a framework not only for the two river crossings, but also for our several FPOLs. However, FPOL planning took a back seat to other planning efforts, and the FRAGO publishing FPOL control measures, to include a common crossing area frequency, was too late to allow rehearsals and, in general, lacked the necessary detail to adequately control the units moving through the FPOLs. As a result, the division suffered delays and confusion at its several FPOL operations, largely because units ignored or were unaware of control measures, while engineers and MPs sorted out traffic jams and congestion on the ground. In addition, the river crossing operations were conceived of as �movements� over the bridge site, rather than true combat operations requiring tactical pauses to maintain the traffic flow and ultimately mission success, resulting in significant delays at the crossing area. During the crossing of OBJ Peach, engineers templated engineer equipment parks and engineer regulating points, but despite this fact, the bridge company arrived at OBJ Peach to find several other units occupying these sites. Also, a considerable amount of traffic blocked access to the river crossing site, precluding crossing site reconnaissance and delaying bank preparation for several hours. The addition of a corps level engineer battalion headquarters (with a combat engineer company and bridge companies) to the crossing area BCT was essential to the success of the river crossing operation. This battalion provided the necessary additional staff and personnel to conduct the detailed and complex planning and execution of a river crossing. A single engineer battalion supporting a BCT would be hard pressed to plan and execute an operation of this magnitude. Once they committed to managing crossing site(s), they would be unable to disengage from the crossing area to support a continuation of the BCT�s attack. In both cases where the division prepared to execute a river crossing, 3ID (M) forces attacked over extended distances (50 km or more) on only fair roads that rapidly deteriorated under maneuver traffic. By the time the following MRBCs passed through, they became mired in soft sand and arrived at the crossing site several hours late. If we had needed to conduct a river crossing, we would have waited a long time for the MRBCs to catch up. Further, we found that time needed (1-2 hour) for bank preparation was much greater than anticipated. Recommendation: Increase training on river crossing operations and execution of FPOLs at home station and at the CTCs. At every CTC rotation require some type of gap crossing and FPOL exercise to train on river crossing TTPs. Consider doctrinal grouping of FPOL, river crossing, and breaching in a capstone framework using river crossing area control measures as a common reference, to facilitate standardizing these similar tasks. Establish routine training relationships between MRBCs and maneuver units for annual home station training events, linked to a divisional river crossing exercise at least once a year, as well as during every �Warfighter� exercise, to hone the skills necessary for this complex but essential task. The engineer brigade�s river crossing exercise with the USMC�s 8th Engineer Support Battalion at Camp Lejeune, NC should be sustained annually. Issue: Engineer construction support �modules� for rapid, extended-distance operations Discussion: The current engineer structure assigns an engineer brigade and three combat engineer battalions to mechanized divisions, augmented in wartime by EAD engineer assets such as construction, bridging, well-drillers, and other specialized units. These additional units gave the division the capability to execute the full range of required wartime engineer tasks, but the numbers of units assigned were inadequate to complete all assigned engineer tasks. The size of the division�s battlespace, the distances covered, and the inadequate number of EAD engineers required careful prioritization of engineer assets. Because of the long distances, rapid tempo, and the inadequate LOC supporting the division�s attack, changing engineer task organization to mass engineer assets against all required tasks was not possible. The engineer brigade developed a set of engineer force �modules� for each engineer task designed to last for the campaign, with only critical task organization changes designed as part of the plan. Due to the engineer shortage, we task organized based on capabilities, not unit assignment. Hence, different combat heavy construction modules were assigned numerous tasks to accomplish sequentially along their axis of advance, with specified disengagement criteria to ensure time-sensitive tasks were completed. However, the distances quickly out-stripped communications capabilities and, combined with congestion on over-crowded LOCs and insufficient haul, many construction assets did not catch up to their elements until days later. We planned to reconsolidate engineers at OBJ Rams, the one location where the division would stop for a short period of time, ultimately allowing engineer assets to catch up and to re-task organize assets to support critical mission sets such as the Euphrates river crossing. We succeeded in accomplishing assigned tasks by adhering to a strict engineer project/task schedule, by developing engineers force modules to maximize asset allocation to tasks, and by accepting risk by not massing engineer assets on any single project. Recommendation: Engineer planners must perform a thorough engineer battlefield assessment/�troop to task� analysis of projects, task organize for durability, and develop force modules to maximize engineer asset employment. EAD engineers should be re-designed into more functionally capable modules able to execute discreet mission sets. Centralized logistics haul assets are inadequate for the assigned construction assets and must be assigned to the supported engineer unit. Issue: Division and corps engineer headquarters struggled with the task organization, command and support relationships, and mission priorities for EAD engineer units Discussion: The division�s EAD construction assets upon LD consisted of about half of the corps engineer assets in theater, due to force flow. As a result, the division was tasked with executing tasks to support corps requirements, to include clearing Tallil Air Base, and building a unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and C-130 airstrip at OBJ Rams/LSA Bushmaster. The engineer brigade planned and prepared for and executed these tasks. During the planning process, the corps engineer work line (CEWL) (typically the division rear boundary or forward) was not clearly specified for the various portions of the operation. The CEWL delineates the area where corps engineer assets execute missions so that divisional assets can focus forward. Several times during operations, the division sent personnel and pieces of equipment well behind the CEWL and the division rear boundary in order to accomplish missions. These tasks were particularly difficult, as they usually took no account of support relationships and requirements, communications ability, coordination for security in the battlespace, or feasibility of execution. During OIF, difficulties arose when engineer headquarters determined a mission requirement, but did not have the resources to execute. Often, based on �home station� command and support relationships, subordinate units were tasked to perform such missions, even though the operational command and support relationship was not the same. In all cases, these tasks pulled the units back and diverted leader energy away from the close fight and the strategic objective of seizing Baghdad. The size of the division�s battlespace and the distances involved between projects made these missions much more challenging. During OIF, it was critically important that key assets meet timelines and move to the proper location at the designated time. There were numerous tertiary impacts caused by �outside� taskings on a unit that already had a specific mission. Recommendation: Headquarters of all levels should follow established doctrine regarding engineer work lines and not assign tasks to units outside of their battlespace, especially in an engineer-resource constrained environment. This is even more critical over the extended distances faced in OIF. Furthermore, all headquarters should carefully specify the command and support relationships of subordinate units, and then respect those relationships. Missions required by the higher headquarters should be clearly established prior to the operation, or should at least be published in time for subordinate units to react and execute. Issue: Critical engineer assets lacked transportation haul to move them forward rapidly Discussion: There are numerous pieces of engineer construction equipment (graders, scrapers, dozers, etc.) that require haul assets to move from one job-site to another (916/870 or heavy equipment transport [HET]). TF 94E lacked the organic haul assets to upload all of their equipment, and was not able to move all of their equipment at one time, requiring them to either leave equipment behind or to be resourced with additional haul. Because of the size of the division�s battlespace and the tendency towards decentralized execution, it was not feasible to make several turns back to the border with the organic trucks. That process would have taken assets out of the fight for several days as trucks went back and forth on congested routes over 200 km long. The division also received four D9 dozers, an exceptional asset that could only be moved about the battlefield on HETS, however the HETs and crews initially assigned to the D9s were pulled in the first week of the operation. In theory, logistics doctrine fulfills this shortfall with EAD haul, but this never materialized. HETs and other haul assets were allocated to other priorities, leaving over twenty pieces of engineer construction equipment back behind the border, never to get into the fight. Recommendation: The feasibility of our centralized logistics doctrine needs a careful review, as the critical path in almost all supporting operations throughout this fight was haul capability. All engineer units should be resourced to move themselves in one lift. Assets must be resourced at the level from which they come. Topic D - Transition to SASO Issue: EOD assets and UXO removal and destruction become particularly important as combat operations ceased. Discussion: 3ID (M) was assigned one EOD company for this operation in a DS relationship. Though this company was tasked almost to its maximum capability during offensive operations, it was able to sufficiently accomplish its mission when augmented by combat engineers. Once 3ID (M) moved into Baghdad, it became apparent that one EOD company was grossly inadequate to support the division. Ammunition management and removal, as opposed to demolition, was of great concern. Countless weapons caches, combined with densely populated urban areas heavily laden with UXO where explosive disposal was difficult, exacerbated the danger to innocent civilians and proved a heavy burden. Though not specifically trained in UXO destruction procedures, combat engineers were critical to the removal and destruction of UXO and weapons caches. Units could not bypass the caches for fear of allowing enemy forces to go back and police up the weapons to use against us. Nor could they afford to put guards on the caches until an EOD team could make it to the site. Although combat engineers supplementing and augmenting EOD was an essential expedient, this tactic presented considerable safety concerns. More than once, engineers trying to destroy weapons and ammunition ended up not using enough demolitions or placing it improperly. Recommendation: Depending on the division�s battlespace and number of populated areas, a division must have at least one EOD company for combat operations. As hostilities end and units transition to SASO, they must be augmented with additional EOD support (another company per division), particularly if the division is operating in urban areas. If the Army does not increase the EOD support to divisions, then the EOD and combat engineer communities must develop training doctrine to allow combat engineers to dispose of unexploded ordnance and weapons caches in order to augment inadequate EOD assets. An important component of gaining local populace trust and confidence is to quickly remove the UXO and Class V threat. Issue: Facilities engineer support critical during transition to SASO Discussion: Though not formally announced by a cease-fire, once we occupied Baghdad, units began the transition to SASO. Over the course of the war, many components of the national infrastructure especially electricity, water, and sewage utilities were damaged or destroyed. Much of the damage was as a result of looters and vandals in the immediate aftermath of regime fall and all would have to be rebuilt. This was most immediately apparent at BIA). Although this airport and numerous other objectives around Baghdad were specified, the division had been given no plan to occupy the city and transition to SASO. Multiple military and interagency organizations vied to set up operations at BIA, but the BCT controlling BIA was too engaged in continuing combat operations to coordinate this adequately. The division directed the EMAIN to conduct a relief in place (RIP) of its crossing area commander functions at OBJ Peach with the 937th Engineer Group, and the EMAIN took control of BIA operations. After occupation by several thousand soldiers for several days, BIA was on the verge of a sanitation crisis. There was limited space to conduct �normal� field sanitation procedures such as slit trenches and transportation constraints prevented lumber for burn-out latrines to be moved forward. Upon arrival at BIA, the engineer brigade set up a Joint Facilities Utilization Board to manage the real estate and utility needs of each of the multiple tenants, and this forum became the center for all coordinated activity on BIA well after responsibility for BIA transferred to the 937th Engineer Group. As BIA began to function independently, the security situation in the city calmed and restoring utilities to the over five million residents of Baghdad became an urgent priority. The EMAIN conducted another RIP with the 937th of BIA operations and began to work with local Iraqis to restore city power, water, and sewage utilities. Infrastructure reconstruction was vital to gain the trust and confidence of the locals as a demonstration of our willingness and ability to help restore a safe, secure, and functional urban environment. The brigade directed DS engineer battalions to begin engineer reconnaissance in zone to identify, assess, and repair, if able, Baghdad�s utilities. These critical infrastructure nodes were assessed by various elements from the battalions, then at the engineer brigade this information was exchanged at daily engineer fusion cell meetings, where the brigade decided on allocation of priorities and resources. The engineer brigade also coordinated and tracked UXO disposal and Class V removal, as well as force protection, route clearance, and forward operating base living standards for the BCTs. In coordination with CFLCC's, TF Faijr, which was charged with restoring the power, water, and sewage utilities nationwide, the engineer brigade organized and energized local Iraqi electrical, water, and sewage authorities to slowly repair and restore damaged utilities. Close cooperation between TF Fajir, a 35 man headquarters, and the engineer brigade was essential as neither unit had adequate resources for their common task of restoring utilities. The two established a combined engineer operations center at Baghdad South, a key city power plant, using the enlisted terminal attack controller (ETAC) and TF Fajir personnel. The engineer brigade provided transportation, communications, topographic analytics, and focused on the details of utilities� status and security. TF Fajir tied in intelligence on the national grid, coordination with the interagency countrywide, worked U.S. government approval issues, funding, and coordination with the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). Close cooperation was especially critical since multiple security issues, such as thieves, vandals, and UXO, prevented access to many of the facilities and transmission lines, and required constant coordination with 3ID (M) and the BCTs to correct. However, starting this process was prolonged and complicated because three major elements (3ID [M], 1st MEF, and 101st ABN Div [-]) occupied different parts of the city, each dealing with separate groups of Iraqis trying to fix the infrastructure. As 3ID (M) consolidated control over the entire city, a vetting process was conducted to bring the various groups together. In addition to TF Fajir, which provided the most significant capability to energize restoration of utilities, the engineer brigade was aided in this effort by several unique U.S. Army Corps of Engineers elements and capabilities. V Corps sent some prime power experts to help restore power to BIA and a facilities engineer detachment to assist with technical assessment, repair, and coordination in Baghdad. The TEK was used extensively by the 94th Engineer Battalion to get technical �reach back� assistance via VTC from USACE laboratories to repair BIA�s back-up generators, conduct bridge damage assessments, and obtain other technical advice. All of this came together less as part of a plan, than as the result of emergency coordination and requests once 3ID (M) was in Baghdad and the critical nature of the requirements was recognized. Of major concern was the designation of authorities to operate Baghdad�s system. In the first weeks of the occupation, there was a behind-the-scenes struggle for power among Iraqis at multiple echelons across the city�s organizational hierarchy, and 3ID (M) lacked guidance on how and who to recognize. Ongoing struggles for power, establishing security without the benefit of a functioning police system, and re-establishing a pay system for government workers all continue to plague the restoration of �normalcy� to Baghdad. Recommendation: If the final objective of an operation includes restoring utilities operations to an existing infrastructure, the tactical unit occupying the ground needs to understand the plan and organization that will execute the restoration of utilities within the goal of a safe and secure environment. Technical engineer experts from specialized units such as prime power and facilities teams should be echeloned well forward to begin work as soon as possible. Additionally, higher-level plans and teams designated to rebuild civilian infrastructure need to be clearly established, made known to all units involved, and must be on the ground immediately. This is particularly important for non-military agencies charged with the political authority to make decisions with potentially long-ranging impact, such as designating which personnel we will recognize and work with. Topic E - Engineer Specific Issues Issue: Implementing the �fighting 2IC� concept in combat operations Discussion: In order to facilitate the flow of information on the battlefield between engineer companies and their parent battalion, all of our battalions and companies were encouraged to designate a �fighting 2IC� to assist company and battalion commanders with controlling the fight. Some companies used the A&O platoon leader in this role in addition to the company commander and TOC. Various battalions used different techniques to apply this concept. Some configured the engineer battalion commander�s HMMWV to accommodate the A&O platoon leader who could then monitor both the company and battalion nets. Some battalion commanders placed an officer in their command track to assist with battle tracking, and some had the A&O platoon leader fighting out of a separate track and managing specific nets for the company commander, This technique gave the company commander the same freedom to command and control his elements on the battlefield that maneuver commanders enjoy, while also monitoring commands from the task force commander. The system worked extremely well because the forward-edge battalion command posts (CPs), namely the ACP and TAC, could always contact the 2IC. The 2IC also proved to be a much more reliable source of information than the company TOCs because he was forward with the maneuver forces monitoring actions on the ground. Recommendation: Continue to develop and utilize this valuable asset while in the offense. Recommend that an additional armored HMMWV or M113 be added to the MTOE for use by the �fighting 2IC� forward on the battlefield. Issue: Employing and integrating engineer reconnaissance teams (ERT) with task forces Discussion: An ERT provides enormous advantages by placing engineer expertise well forward of the main body. The ERT can give the commander mobility intelligence of the battlefield so he can make better decisions to maintain offensive momentum. During offensive operations, most ERTs operated almost exclusively with the task forces� scout platoons to recon routes for possible enemy obstacles. Because we could draw some excess APS HMMWVs, our ERTs contributed greatly to scout effectiveness by allowing for more haul capacity. However, they provided limited engineer intelligence, as the enemy did not significantly obstacle our approaches. In Baghdad, they were consolidated under battalion control to recon utilities in the city. ERTs tremendously aided infrastructure intelligence as the unit focused on restoring utilities to pre-war levels. Recommendation: The ERT should be added to the MTOE, but needs specific training to be more effective, to include obstacle reporting, bridge reconnaissance, use of the laser range finder, TF scout integration, bridge reconnaissance and assessment, obstacle marking, and route reconnaissance. The ERT should integrate into the TF scout and/or the brigade reconnaissance team (BRT) by spending at least 25% of garrison training time with scouts and conducting FTXs with them. Team stabilization is critical to maximize habitual relationships with TF and BRT and to maintain training level. Also outfit ERT with the LRAS. Issue: Task organizing Volcano systems in mechanized engineer battalions Discussion: Two of the three engineer battalions consolidated Volcanos under a platoon leader assigned to the HHC commander because situational Volcano obstacles are typically brigade level or higher targets. Although no Volcano minefields were emplaced during this operation, the Volcano platoon gave the engineer battalion commander a highly flexible asset. Two thirds of our M548s downloaded their Volcanos to make room for extra haul of engineer supplies and equipment, given the unlikely need for a family of scatterable mines (FASCAM) minefield. They also escorted numerous convoys with their crew served weapons, provided command and control and security for discreet dozer missions in zone, and became the nucleus for some units� Baghdad city infrastructure and route reconnaissance operations during transition to SASO. We were fortunate in this campaign to fight an enemy incapable of organizing a coherent attack against us, thanks in large measure to our dominant air power, overwhelming fire superiority, and armored vehicles protecting us from enemy fires. This does not mean we should cast aside our situational obstacle capability, but perhaps make it more flexible and supportable by changing the organization as suggested here, as well as changing the platform. M548s are old, limited in haul capacity, and lightly armored, while HEMTT cargo trucks can complete the Volcano mission with far greater flexibility for the force with greater haul capacity and higher maintenance reliability. Recommendation: Keep the Volcanos consolidated in platoons at battalion level, and change the MTOE to resource and reflect this, exchanging the unsustainable M548 for HEMTTs. Depending on future combat operation against better-equipped and more capable enemies, we could one day have to fight defensively, and the engineer commander�s ability to quickly employ these systems would prove invaluable. Issue: Maintain field craft and assembly area (AA) operations skills developed during OIF Discussion: In training on set engineer qualification tables, we have lost valuable training in basic soldier tasks. Field problems focus on the major engineer tasks. Valuable field craft gained in platoon bivouacs and field training exercises have been lost. Platoon sergeants have to train platoon leaders on the fly. We train for NTC, but 90% of our missions whether in combat or peace revolve around assembly area operations, convoys, and field craft. We have now trained ourselves in these areas, and we need to ensure that they remain a training objective when we execute field training. Recommendation: Once a quarter platoons should complete a 3 to 4 day field training exercise. Assembly area procedures, convoys, and field craft will all remain important training objectives of these events. Platoon sergeants need to serve as the primary platoon trainer for these areas. Issue: Panther tactics Discussion: The use of the Panther to clear small areas of mines and UXO, such as at the forward arming and refueling point (FARP) at Jalibah Air Base, was a huge success. The Panther was effectively used for �shock� effect against enemy forces, especially when used at vehicle checkpoints. We used the Panther as an additional armored security vehicle to great success. Even without the main gun turret, the local population respected the Panther. Recommendation: Continue to use the Panther as an additional armored platform. Adding an armored vehicle-launched MICLIC (AVLM) kit to this vehicle would make it considerably more useful. Topic F � Command, Control, & Communications Issue: Engineer long-range communications Discussion: Engineers were spread across the division�s entire battlespace and occasionally behind the division�s rear boundary. In some cases this meant that engineer CPs, brigade, group, battalion, and separate company, operated over 300 km apart. Despite a major effort to improve the brigade�s long-range communications architecture starting last fall during planning, we received only limited additional assets, to include one Harris radio delivered about three weeks before LD that went non mission capable (NMC) for an antenna coupler twice in the last days before LD. The brigade struggled mightily to get HF radios to work, and while we were able to get over half operational, we were never able to talk over extended range in the green, although we could occasionally talk in the clear. We obtained several Iridium phones useful for commander-to-commander discussions, but they proved largely unreliable. The brigade�s one FBCB 2 was in the commander�s HMMWV, and while extremely useful for situational awareness, its messaging capability was intermittent at best. Distances made reporting and battle tracking extremely difficult for the engineer brigade, which often learned of forward engineer actions from BCT commanders� tactical updates. Reporting through engineer channels is critical, as these reports contain more specific and detailed information, allowing the engineer brigade to assemble and track a mobility common operating picture (MCOP) for the division. These reports allow the engineer brigade and division engineer to assess the information, balance it with division requirements, and make informed recommendations and decisions. Additionally, this engineer specific information must be passed to the corps engineer. By MTOE, the units in engineer brigade have limited long-range communications capabilities. SINCGARS FM radios were used extensively for battalion and below communications, but very rarely could the engineer brigade talk to all of its subordinate units via FM. FM relay extends the range of the FM net, but it only does so in one general direction. Retrans was not a viable option due to the security situation. The MSE network works well when units are stationary, but OPTEMPO precluded mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) for major portions of the operation. The engineer brigade had a single TACSAT radio, enabling the brigade to listen to the division command net. The division engineer could talk to the CG, but he could not always accurately portray the engineer picture and make recommendations because he could not routinely receive reports from and talk to his subordinate commanders. Battlefield circulation proved hazardous as well. FBCB 2 was another long-range communication system that provided leaders with excellent situational awareness. Unfortunately, there was only one system fielded to the engineer brigade, and most engineers had to rely on borrowing time on their supported maneuver units� systems. Recommendation: The engineer community needs to be resourced with a more robust communications package designed to allow it to communicate across the division�s battlespace. Division engineers need the same capability to talk to engineer battalion commanders as the division commander has to talk to his major subordinate commanders. If TACSAT is not feasible to use on a larger scale due to bandwidth restrictions, then the Army should aggressively pursue more reliable HF radios that units should train on routinely. Additionally, engineer units need FBCB 2 fielded to the company commander and XO level. Issue: FM communication across engineer units Discussion: During this operation, units were required to conduct numerous convoys over hundreds of kilometers in varying types of terrain and weather. The soldiers and leaders in vehicles during these convoys need to be able to talk to each other to share information on everything from the overall operational situation to the actual conduct of the convoy. In many units, particularly HHCs in the mechanized battalions, and in most other cases in the combat heavy units and MRBCs, FM radios are only authorized in selected leaders� vehicles. All vehicles need the ability to at least communicate within a convoy. Additionally, based on the area covered by this operation and the overall lack of engineer assets, small �packages� of engineer equipment were given missions requiring communications ability � for example, a dozer team tasked to dig in a Patriot battery several dozen kilometers from its headquarters. Recommendation: FM radio allocation needs to be increased. All combat systems, HMMWVs, and LMTV/5-tons/2 � tons need to have a radio. Issue: Lack of dedicated small extension node (SEN) teams for EAD engineers Discussion: Because engineer battalions set up their TOCs with habitually associated brigade TOCs, they do not have a need for a dedicated SEN team. However, the division receives EAD engineer assets that are not self sufficient in terms of communication. Several times, the corps mechanized battalion was poised to accomplish a �separate� mission (for example, a crossing site headquarters set up independent of any other C2 node), but was hampered by its inability to connect to the MSE network. Although that unit maximized FM communication throughout much of the fight, the lack of a SEN meant that the battalion was oftentimes unable to get critical information from the MSE network � specifically SIPRNET. Recommendation: Provide separate corps battalions a SEN whenever possible. Attempt to get this asset as a part of the unit prior to reception at the division level. Issue: Engineer group attached to the division engineer brigade Discussion: The 937th Engineer Group was a great asset to have on the engineer battlefield. The Group allowed the DIVENG commander to focus on the close tactical fight while the engineer group commander focused on the rear area. Since we fought over extremely extended distances, sometimes stretching beyond the division rear boundary, the group headquarters� complementary C 2 capability proved essential. This additional C 2 node allowed the division to have a senior engineer in the rear area focused on main supply route (MSR) maintenance, division support area (DSA) construction, and other general engineering operations. Recommendation: Keep engineer groups attached to DIVENG during high intensity conflicts. Topic G - Engineer Equipment Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Issue: Engineer pacer equipment is old and inadequate for modern combat conditions Discussion: Pacer equipment for a mechanized engineer battalion consists of the M113A3 squad track, the M60 AVLB, and the M9 ACE. M113A3. A workhorse vehicle as the combat engineer squad carrier/fighting platform and C 2 vehicle for all combat engineers, the M113A3 performed well, beginning the campaign at 94% OR and ending the campaign in Baghdad at 83% OR, despite a pathetically low Class IX delivery rate. From a maintenance and functional perspective, it was successful. However, sappers, who must fight alongside or in the immediate vicinity of their maneuver comrades came under heavy fire, yet the M113A3 is the least survivable armored vehicle in the inventory. The M113s offer minimal armor protection from small arms fires and none from RPGs; during this operation Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) took numerous hits from RPGs without any injuries to occupants, but an RPG strike caused a fatality and three wounded soldiers in an engineer M113. Placing combat engineers in a lesser-armored vehicle is just plain immoral and unconscionable. Engineers executed a wide variety of important combat tasks such as security and manning blocking positions and normally operated in the attack under the same combat conditions as maneuver forces, taking severe direct fire contact from small arms and numerous RPGs. To support front-line combat units, engineers must have a more survivable combat platform. Additionally, the M113s do not have thermal sight capability that forces engineers to scan exposed using the naked eye, binoculars, or night vision goggles (NVGs). AVLB. The AVLB was a critical component of campaign planning, and drew great interest from division leaders, since it would allow the rapid spanning of small gaps in the numerous canals, streams, wadis, and roads along the narrowly defined attack corridor the division used. Thanks to the incoherence of Iraqi defenses, we only had to place 13 AVLB bridges to pass forces during the campaign, but that number turned out to be nearly all of our final available AVLB chassis when we arrived in Baghdad. The AVLB fleet started the campaign at 94% operational readiness (OR), but that rate dropped precipitously and immediately upon LD and has stabilized at 28% (14/51) in Baghdad. The low OR rate caused numerous problems for the engineer line companies, specifically speed of movement, recoverability, and maintenance reliability. During convoys, the AVLBs could not keep pace with maneuver units and were often left behind or abandoned when they broke down and could not be recovered. Across the division, engineers had to leave behind twenty one AVLBs during the movement from the border to Baghdad, all due to mechanical failures, and none to enemy fire or as a result of extreme environmental temperatures or conditions. Lastly, the M88 is not capable of recovering the AVLB and bridge by itself, requiring an empty AVLB chassis or prime mover/lowboy and M88 to recover the entire system. ACE. The ACE proved to be very versatile. The APS fleet delivered well maintained equipment and we had general success keeping it operational despite an almost complete lack of Class IX. The mission set focused on mobility and we used the ACE in countless berm reductions, debris removal operations, to fill a gap in a major highway bridge line of communication (LOC), to recover tanks from canals, to fill in enemy fighting positions, to breach enemy berms and tank ditches, and to push up a variety of expedient obstacles in urban combat to guard lateral routes into areas of operations. As the operation reached its conclusion, the lack of Class IX began to take a toll on the OR rate. However, the demand for the equipment in mobility and SASO is high. There is a need for an armored, mobile earthmover. The one-man crew was problematic in this operation due to the distances traveled. Designating, training, and using alternate operators, mainly for movement, mitigated this problem. However, the ACE was not capable of the significant earthmoving operations such as were required at the international border. EAD dozer assets reduced this problem, but the great demand for dozers meant receiving dozer support was problematic in this rapid offensive operation. Survivability work was easily completed by D7s (and D9s) more efficiently and effectively than ACEs, especially in regions of Iraq where the soil did not consist primarily of sand. Dozers are difficult to move due to their haul requirements, but a mixture of dozers and ACEs worked best during OIF. Dozers concentrated on survivability while the ACEs executed mobility tasks. Mine Clearing Line Charge (MICLIC). During a mine obstacle reduction on Highway 8 near the Baghdad Airport, the 11th Engineer Battalion successfully fired a MICLIC rocket and charge, but the MICLIC had no significant effect on the high-density, surface laid, blast resistant minefield of VS 1.6 Italian antitank mines that had to be cleared using ACEs, dozers, and manually. The worldwide proliferation of blast resistant mines and the �skip zone� make the MICLIC irrelevant against modern mine systems. Recommendation: M113A3s should be replaced with Bradleys immediately. The AVLB recapitalization program should be fully funded now or replaced with the Wolverine or other system. ACEs should be retained, perhaps increased to 10 per company, and their improvement programs should be fully funded. Dozers should be included with every combat engineer battalion for combat operations and the MICLIC should be replaced with a system capable of reducing blast-resistant mines. Issue: Organic maintenance recovery capabilities Discussion: The divisional engineer battalion is not resourced and organized to provide forward maintenance and recovery support to task organized companies during rapid offensive operations over extended distances. The current heavy divisional engineer battalion TOE centralizes organizational maintenance at the battalion level, augmented with a direct support maintenance support team (MST) from the supported maneuver BCT. Engineer companies frequently operated in support of maneuver task forces across distances that did not allow the engineer battalion�s maintenance organization to provide effective support from a single consolidated location. Maintenance contact teams, consisting of a sergeant with 5-7 mechanics and a contact truck were task organized with companies. However, critical resources like recovery, more senior (SSG and above) supervision, and other capabilities were not authorized in sufficient quantities to provide them independently for each company in the battalion. The engineer direct support MST from the FSB is also not resourced to support forward under this scenario. In essence, the operational design, speed, and tempo of this campaign forced us to decentralize a maintenance organization that is not resourced to operate effectively decentralized. When battalions were forced to move decentralized during an attack of over 3 days and 500 km, AVLBs and ACEs suffered a maintenance attrition rate up to 50%. In most cases, this equipment had to be left in unsecured territory because the resources to rapidly recover and repair it on the move were insufficient and separated by too much distance. Maneuver task forces lack the expertise and resources to adequately support engineer maintenance. Recommendation: If this campaign is a harbinger of future war, heavy divisional engineer battalion tables of organization and equipment (TOEs) should be resourced to provide an independent organizational maintenance capability for each line company and the HHC. Additionally, the HHC should have some capability to augment this more robust organizational maintenance with recovery in order to assist in evacuating engineer equipment to a central location for DS maintenance support. Some of the key components of that organization are listed below. Additionally, a separate battalion level staff officer, maintenance technician, and motor sergeant to provide oversight and staff level maintenance management should be authorized under the engineer battalion administrative/logistics operations center (ALOC). Battalion Staff HHC Engineer Company x 3 Battalion Maintenance Officer Company Motor Sergeant (SFC) Company Motor Sergeant (SFC) Battalion Maintenance Technician ULLS-G w/92A20 ULLS-G w/92A20 Battalion Motor Sergeant Vehicle w/storage for PLL Vehicle w/storage for PLL 2xHMMWVs and Operators Contact truck Contact truck HEMTT recovery vehicle Tracked recovery vehicle Tracked recovery vehicle Issue: Tele-engineering kit (TEK) Discussion: The corps mechanized engineer battalion that supported the division brought with it a tele-engineering kit. This kit enabled engineers to take pictures and video of �engineer problems� such as damaged bridge and broken generators and send those back to the Corps of Engineers. Engineers could receive suggestions on how to fix problems and could even teleconference with engineer experts to discuss the problems or issues. This kit proved invaluable, particularly in restoring the power, water, and other infrastructure problems when the division occupied Baghdad Airport. Recommendation: An absolute bare minimum of two of these kits should be fielded to each divisional engineer brigade, preferably one per combat engineer battalion. The additional capability to leverage the entire 35,000 man U.S. Army Corps of Engineers via reach-back technology brings incredibly increased capability to the forward engineer to quickly solve technical problems with field solutions he can have confidence are structurally sound. Issue: Divisional engineer need for Level I combat health support (CHS) (battalion aid station) Discussion: Divisional combat engineer battalions do not have a battalion aid station with Level I CHS capabilities. The engineer battalions are often task organized with additional EAD engineers and required to move and operate as an independent element. Task Force and BCT assets become overwhelmed as more units get task organized to them during operations. Divisional engineers need to have a Level I CHS capability if they are expected to provide medical support to EAD units task organized to them. Additionally, there are no organic field litter ambulances (FLAs) in an engineer battalion. In a high intensity combat (HIC) environment, with tenacious Fedayeen forces attacking us on all sides constantly, the soft-skinned PSG and 1SG HMMWVs are inappropriate casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) vehicles. Recommendation: Divisional engineer battalions should be authorized a PA, additional enlisted medical personnel, and appropriate equipment (to include an FLA) to provide Level I CHS (a battalion aid station) in order to support EAD and organic engineer units task organized under engineer battalion control. Issue: MTOE changes to support mechanized engineer battalion HHC C 2 Discussion: Engineer battalions typically become the C 2 headquarters for combat support units task organized to the BCT. Since the line companies are task organized to TFs, these platoon or smaller-sized units typically fall under the control of the HHC commander. In some instances during this operation, engineer HHCs controlled the BCT�s decon platoons, MPs, and other EAD engineer elements in addition to the support platoon, maintenance platoon, and the Volcano platoon. One engineer HHC was given the mission to secure the BCT�s forward surgical team. Given the reality that HHC will execute a variety of missions to support both the engineer battalion and the BCT, its MTOE must be adjusted to address this requirement to C 2 additional forces. These changes include positions for a company XO and operations SGT, a vehicle for the XO/company CP, additional crew served weapons, and additional radios. Recommendation: MTOE should authorize positions for the XO and a 12B30/40 for an operations NCO. The company headquarters needs either a cargo HMMWV with M101 trailer or a light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) with one long-range and one short-range radio to carry equipment needed to run the company CP. The MTOE should also include a 10kw generator to power the HHC CP. Issue: D9 dozer DISCUSSION: DURING OPERATION Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. Army employed the D9R armored dozer for the first time in combat. The D9 dozer sustained two mine strikes with only minimal damage, as well as small arms fire with no injury to the crew. The CAT-made dozer was very dependable and the air conditioning and heater made desert operations possible year round. The cab design with two seats proved to be a wise choice in terms of providing a package where 24-hour operations are sustainable for some period of time. Finally, the total power and size of the dozer proved itself to be an outstanding resource for any mobility, countermobility, or survivability mission. The HET is the only trailer in the army inventory capable of hauling the D9 because of its weight of 62 tons, but because of the high demand for HETs the D9s often could not be hauled, and were unable to provide responsive support without dedicated HETs. Due to this fact, there were a few instances where the dozer and crew were stranded without transportation. More commonly, the D9 could not be used to its full potential because we lacked transportation to haul it where required. Recommendation: Field this piece of equipment across the engineer regiment. Combat heavy battalions should receive 4 D9s and combat support equipment companies should receive 2. The D9 �system� should include the D9, a HET, a crew-served weapon, and a radio. Topic H - Logistics Issue: Vehicle recovery assets/planning inadequate Discussion: During a continuous movement of over 250 km, engineer equipment (mainly AVLBs and ACEs) became NMC at a rate far above battalion and BCT recovery capabilities. In some units this problem was compounded by the task organization of engineers and the order of march. Maneuver units could typically sustain a faster pace and stopped less frequently for maintenance. ACEs, and especially AVLBs, repeatedly overheated or broke down, and fell out of the formations in unsecured territory. Engineer battalions are not authorized sufficient recovery assets to provide an element to each company. The lack of recovery resources was further compounded by the poor performance of M88 tracked recovery vehicles. These vehicles, similar to the AVLBs, had to stop frequently or face overheating and other mechanical problems. Self-recovery by like vehicles was used to some extent, but frequently resulted in another NMC AVLB or ACE. In addition, each BCT and separate unit had different plans for dealing with broken equipment. Some units left the vehicle and drove on. Others took a grid location of the broken vehicle and left it. Others took parts from the �abandoned� equipment, rendering it further unserviceable. During the extended pause at OBJ Rams, there was no consolidated effort to police up broken equipment, partly from concern with the security situation along LOCs, partly because units were consumed with combat operations, and partly out of inertia. Recommendation: Clear recovery guidance that accounts for security and other recovery requirements must be published and rehearsed as part of a separate, coherent divisional plan prior to LD. Units must know what to do with inoperative vehicles and the decision authority for leaving them. In addition, the Army absolutely MUST fund the AVLB recap program. By the time the division attacked Baghdad, the overall AVLB OR was at 30% (compared to the next lowest OR of engineer equipment, the ACE at 70%). Issue: Class IV planning and movement Discussion: Though the ordering, packaging, and delivery of construction and barrier material, Class IV, is clearly a logistics function, engineers must estimate the initial requirements for quantities needed. Because of the link between engineers and Class IV, it is often difficult to see a shortage of Class IV as a logistics issue and not an engineer issue. In this campaign the engineers invested considerable effort to order and manage Class IV, but due to lack of theater (logistic) support assets, the division�s engineers coordinated the construction of 120 each 463L pallets of Class IV combat configured loads (CCLs) with assistance from the Division Materiel Management Center (DMMC). Engineers made a huge effort to build the Class IV CCLs and developed a synch matrix with corresponding transportation requests for theater throughput. Organic divisional units cannot rely on unit basic load (UBL) alone to sustain engineer barrier and force protection requirements. Once the division crossed LD, theater assets to transport Class IV materials proved inadequate. Units quickly consumed their Class IV UBL both in planned and un-projected missions including additional EPW holding facilities. Engineers were unable to use Class IV to exploit opportunities (barrier material around Karbala for 3rd BCT) because no Class IV was available. Additionally, the division got very little help from higher headquarters in efforts to contract and purchase both common national stock number (NSN) Class IV materials and unique engineer construction Class IV (i.e. geotextile, mobi-matting, and Hesco bastions), although the ADE identified quantities of these materials as early as 05 NOV. 03. Recommendation: All headquarters need to do a complete Class IV estimate for support of all operations. This estimate needs to be given to the S4/G4/C4 early in the planning process to ensure proper quantities of materials will be available in theater for allocation to engineer forces and using units. Planners and logisticians must continue to work together to ensure that identified needs actually get ordered and pushed to units. Engineer and logistics planners should develop a plan to resource units that are included in operations. Logistics planners need to incorporate realistic estimates for pushing forward ALL classes of supply and ensure that proper transportation resources are available to resupply subordinate units. Issue: Organizational Class IX repair parts and Class IIIP Discussion: During OIF, �just-in-time� logistics did not work. The supply system failed to provide engineer Class IX repair parts, critical Class IIIP, and Class IX batteries, in any significant quantity, both before and during operations, up to the occupation of Baghdad. Engineers must return to a robust, demand supported, Class IX prescribed load list (PLL) if we are to have any hope of maintaining what is, on average, the oldest and most maintenance intensive fleets in the Army (M113, M48, and M60 AVLB Chassis, M548, MICLIC) during rapid offensive operations over extended distances. During the first 21 days of OIF, requisitioning repair parts was a difficult process, and very few parts actually arrived. The Army�s current supply system failed before and during the operation. As bad as this problem was for the division, it was even worse for the EAD engineer units. Had some units not �cheated� the system and developed a robust unauthorized PLL prior to LD they would not have succeeded in staying combat effective. Recommendation: Engineer units should return to robust Class IX PLLs and resource heavy divisional engineer battalion MTOEs to manage, store, and transport this PLL at company level in a configuration that allows easy access and use on the move. This requires an Unit Level Logistics System � Ground (ULLS-G) with 92A10 and a cargo vehicle that allows for the storage, organization, and easy access to a robust Class IX PLL. Return to Table of Contents |
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