November 14, 2024
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November 14, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 17 Communications The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) successfully communicated over non-doctrinal distances while on the move, not only through the systems and procedures that were in place, but also by fielding new equipment, integrating available communications technology, and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to resolve issues that arose during planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. The division successfully executed their mission with several small command post (CP) configurations. Two of these smaller, more mobile CPs included M4 command and control vehicles (C 2 Vs) equipped with multiple types of single channel radios, a small-pipe on-the-move International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) data connection, and external connections for more robust data networking at the halt. For any fight in the immediate future, command posts should maximize the use of these or similar vehicles. The division�s future communications will require a more mobile, capable, modernized system to better facilitate the command and control requirement it will have for future conflicts. It must not merely become an upgraded version of what has been used in the past, but a new system that can support Army Battle Command System (ABCS) connectivity requirements and be integrated seamlessly into each of the several vehicles at a command post, either directly, or by extension from an �access node� vehicle. The purpose of this section is to address this requirement and detail other communications issues that the division signal office has faced and continues to face in order to properly support future operations. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Signal Plans/Operations Signal Planning Issue: Future communications system Discussion: The division signal battalion is equipped with MSE � and while our signal battalion is highly proficient with the equipment and developed innovative techniques to get the absolute best service out of it, it is not possible to operate MSE nodes while on the move. It cannot be upgraded or modified to be made able to operate that way. Current �digitized� division signal battalions have more modern equipment, but it is likewise limited and incapable of operation while on-the-move. Therefore a new on-the-move communication system is required. This system must be capable of providing connectivity for voice and data over extended distances and while on the move. This system must be designed to provide access to that connectivity to every unit in the division, down to company team level. At the division�s future small, mobile command posts, the vehicle(s) providing that connectivity must be just as mobile and survivable as the rest of the command post; and the communications planners, systems engineers, and operators aboard must have the same situational awareness and access to all the division�s C 2 means as the rest of the division�s elements. During OIF, the division acquired and outfitted three M4 C 2 vehicles (C 2 Vs). Each C 2 V was outfitted with a tailored communications package including FM, HF, Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), and TACSAT radios, Iridium phones, Force XXI battle command brigade and below, blue force tracking (FBCB 2 -BFT), an INMARSAT data connection, and external connections for more robust data and phone connectivity via MSE, at the halt. The single channel TACSAT, FBCB 2 , and Iridium served to provide a minimal C2 on-the-move capability, but the Inmarsat data connection was not used and the MSE capabilities were only there at the halt. To explain this further: First, the INMARSAT capability was fielded at the last minute; we got the last of the required parts installed literally on the day we crossed the border into Iraq. The system was not fully functional until after we reached attack positions north of An Najaf. Secondly, since the whole division was on the move and only the air control point (ACP) and division tactical command post (DTAC) were equipped with this capability, it could do nothing to enhance 3ID (M)�s ability to C 2 the division. It could only have facilitated the corps commander�s ability to provide information and orders to the division. In future systems, this capability will have to be fielded throughout the division enabling C 2 systems and other battlefield operating systems (BOS) access to a data communications channel while on the move. Future C 2 V-like systems should also provide more than the 64kbps bandwidth of the Inmarsat to connect interoperable C 2 systems like All Source Analysis System (ASAS), Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), and Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), not just FBCB 2 . Since the on-the-move C 2 capability hinges on access to satellites, the Army must also ensure units can gain access to satellites for training as well as operations. �Train as you fight� will mean resourcing training with satellite access. The Army has been saving money by cramming five 5 kHz channels into the bandwidth of a single 25 kHz channel and packing even more nets into that space with demand assigned multiple access (DAMA) technology, but the reality is that the quality of the 5 kHz channels is simply inadequate and the delay experienced with DAMA makes the use of the net too slow to be of any real utility. This �savings� may have allowed us to rationalize a smaller �requirement� for the number of satellites needed aloft, but the reality is that only a satellite accessible at a look angle of over 40 degrees above the horizon will enable on-the-move operation with current radio equipment. We need more satellites in every theater to ensure access to the right satellite, at the right angle, in a wideband mode. The soldiers of 3ID (M) spent the last year, the last six months in particular, analyzing the requirements of operation in the OIF environment, developing capabilities and TTPs to overcome the anticipated challenges. We documented our requirements, acquired available equipment, integrated systems, and conducted training to develop TTPs. We were not able to acquire everything we needed, but we got a minimum on-the-move C 2 capability, and integrated what was available. Through OIF, our requirement for on-the-move long-range communications in the right vehicular packaging has been validated. The soldiers of 3ID (M) are best postured to host an Army level effort to continue development of this type of capability. Recommendation: Obtain Army support for 3ID (M) to continue efforts to develop on-the-move communications capabilities on adequate vehicular platforms. Continue in 3ID (M) with development of small mobile command posts with integrated on-the-move long-haul communications systems and interoperable automation systems for every BOS. Obtain Army support for expansion of the Army satellite communications capability, particularly for SC TACSAT and ensure satellite access availability for training, Issue: Lessons learned with MSE Discussion: While MSE cannot support the division with on-the-move capabilities, it was all we had to support the majority of the division�s requirements. We had insufficient SC TACSAT, FBCB 2, and Iridium on-the-move capabilities to equip every unit. We could not even come close to equipping them with everything they needed. Consequently, we had to use MSE to augment our sparse and under-capable on-the-move systems. Through a deliberate analysis and planning process, the division�s G6 and the 123rd Signal Battalion were able to take several steps that helped make MSE more successful for 3ID (M) in the �at the halt� communications it was designed for: Task organize company teams with multichannel TACSAT, node center and retrans teams to resource each BCT, enabling the BCT S6 and signal company commander to determine the best way to employ and protect assets in the BCT battlespace to the mutual advantage of the division network and the BCT. Task organize EPLRS net control stations (NCS) and gateway teams with the ADA batteries since the ADA units are the only active users of EPLRS needlines in the division. Augmentation from higher headquarters: We received one additional node center and three small extension nodes (SENs) from XVIII Airborne Corps; one additional SEN from V Corps; two additional TSC-93 multichannel TACSAT terminals and three high gain satellite antennas (2 x 20� dishes, 1 x 8� dish w/ �L3 Mod�) from 11th Signal Brigade (Coalition Forces Land Component Command [CFLCC]). The division collocated the battalion TOC and its system control center (SYSCON) with the division G6 section at the division main command post (DMAIN) to form a division network operations and security center (DNOSC). This eliminated redundant work effort normally performed in both sections and it improved information flow between the signal community and the division staff. A similar but smaller forward DNOSC and battalion tactical command post (TAC) was formed at the DTAC. This enabled C 2 of signal elements supporting the BCTs and other parts of the division in forward enclaves. These and other notes will be addressed in more detail in a 123rd Signal Battalion AAR, to be published separately. Units may gain some utility from these ideas, but they should continue to strive to get MSE replaced at the earliest opportunity. Recommendation: While continuing the effort to develop a replacement capability and equip all the units in the division, apply these lessons to the use of MSE under similar conditions. Issue: Remote RAU support of DIVARTY. Discussion: The division signal battalion attached a remote RAU team (RR62) to division artillery (DIVARTY) for OIF. This arrangement came about because the DIVARTY was scheduled to operate in the vicinity of the division tactical command post (DTAC) (supported by NC 62) for most of the operation and if a remote RAU traveled with DIVARTY, its RAU coverage could be extended almost immediately. The concept worked out precisely as thought, and RR62 established the first remote RAU site inside Iraq from within the DIVARTY perimeter. Finally, the addition of a remote RAU team meant that DIVARTY had dedicated personnel to troubleshoot MSRTs and ensure that they functioned. DIVARTY also provided force protection for the remote RAU, which the signal battalion would have otherwise have had to arrange through special coordination. Recommendation: Continue to identify opportunities to arrange the task organization of remote RAUs to units within LOS of a node center. This will ensure that MSRTs are still employed as a mobile form of access to the MSE voice network. Ensure that enough MSE frequency pairs are available to support the extension link to the RAU. CP Communication Support Issue: DMAIN did not have an established phone-wiring standard, and the D/G6 had to create a phone wiring plan each time the DMAIN changed its configuration. Division must establish a standard. Discussion: The DMAIN did not have an established phone-wiring standard, and the D/G6 had to create a phone wiring plan each time the DMAIN changed its configuration. The standard should include habitual SEN and wire placement. A different network plan should be created for each possible variation of the DMAIN to include red and amber TOC and different deployable rapid assembly shelter (DRASH) configurations. Subordinate units must affiliate phones and must notify the division which phones will be affiliated based on which TOC is being established. We must update the baseline divisional phone book to include numbers for which we have habitually used spares. Recommendation: Division should publish updated layouts for each configuration for the DMAIN, DREAR, DTAC, and ACP. G6 should then use these layouts to annotate where each phone will go and how it will be wired. Be prepared for both less and more subscribers than originally planned. G6 must also work to create a phone book in which red, amber, and green TOC configuration phone numbers are represented. Units must continue to inform the division of the phone numbers they are using when operational. This may imply an addition to a standard divisional reporting requirement. Topic B - Frequency Management Issue: Limited frequency supportability for SC TACSAT radios. Discussion: Due to the vast number of requests for SC TACSAT nets, Central Command (CENTCOM) provided the Coalition Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) with limited satellite bandwidth. V Corps only received two 25 kHz frequencies initially and did not provide 3ID (M) with a 25 kHz net at first. 3ID (M) used a 5 kHz net initially shared with CFLCC, and then gained sole usage of a 5 kHz channel. In both instances, the quality of communications was sub par, with about half of voice communications being unintelligible. The division did not receive a 25 kHz channel until just after it had initiated combat operations. This greatly improved the capability of division communications, as well as the ability to command and control the division. When the corps first received its own 25 kHz channel, it did not seem to operate with improved quality. We discovered that the corps was operating on a wideband channel, but it was still using the advanced narrow band digital voice terminal (ANDVT) mode of operation (designed for narrowband � 5 kHz channels). We asked them to switch to Vinson mode (designed for wideband) and this resulted in much clearer comms. The division was also allocated a 5 kHz division fires net and, just prior to crossing the line of departure (LD), received a 5 kHz operations and intelligence (O&I) channel. Recommendation: The division should continue to expect a necessity for green-tab emphasis on the acquisition of SC TACSAT bandwidth due to the limited availability of frequencies and the fierce competition for capabilities. As the division is required to travel over greater distances and fight on a non-linear, non-contiguous battlefield, the requirement for long-range communications will grow proportionally. Brigades must be provided either greater density of SC TACSAT radios (and therefore more TACSAT channels) or an alternate long-range communications system in greater density to satisfy their requirements. Issue: MSE frequency planning Discussion. During the planning phase of the operation, the division requested a block of MSE frequencies to deconflict and assign internal to the division using the expertise of assigned frequency management specialists in each battalion command post. Division�s requests conflicted with V Corps desire to centrally control and assign every MSE frequency in the MSE network throughout the theater. The corps� approach had the definite advantage of preventing more interference between systems, but even when the division and corps network controllers were located close to one another in Kuwait, the 22nd Signal Brigade frequency manager could not provide timely support to frequency management requests from the division. Certainly, that relationship would not work to support the division in the attack. The division even proposed the establishment of local frequency management zones around Tallil Airbase (An Nasiriyah), Objective RAMS (An Najaf), and the Karbala Gap to Objective Peach near the river-crossing site. Since the 3ID (M) would be the first combat formation to arrive in the area, our forward network control element would cover frequency deconfliction for all units in the area until the 22nd Signal Brigade frequency manager could do it. 123rd Signal Battalion held the position that a frequency manager had to physically be located in an area in order to be effective and be able to manage frequencies while on the move or when supported only by FM radio, for example. Corps did not formally support this idea although the 123rd Signal Battalion was forced to execute it by default. At Baghdad International Airport, we experienced three incidents of interference between the band I MSE frequencies given to us by V Corps in Kuwait and SC TACSAT nets (division command, CFLCC command, TF-20). This highlighted the need to bring a theater frequency manager into the area to deconflict the increasing requirements in the area. Recommendation. Frequency managers must balance the need for centralized control with the reality of a decentralized execution. We do not have time (or sometimes even the means) to request and receive frequency assignments from a corps level command post back in Kuwait for elements installing links in central Iraq. Either dedicated frequency pools for each division or pre-assigned frequencies for each system are required to support MSE in the offense. Issue: There was a lack of spare FM net identifiers (IDs) based on the massive number of slice elements that were task organized to the division Discussion: The division frequency manager deploys with a rollup of what net IDs the division operates on. They then request the frequencies from those numbers. Units had been sending up requests for additional net IDs that were not available. The division operates on 699 net IDs (300-999). In garrison we have (10) spare frequencies to play with; over here we had less. During the build up and occupation of Iraq, we were authorized to use additional net IDs not normally slated for use in the division to give the G6 the flexibility to accommodate unit requests. Once we return to CONUS the division will still have its original distribution of 699 net IDs. Recommendation: Units must scrub their organizations net requirements and send a detailed list up to the G6. The same net IDs used for training should be used for fighting. Units must forecast in advance Issue: Unforecasted HF frequency requirements Discussion: The division frequency manager coordinated for a frequency pool initially upon arrival in theater. After receipt of the joint communications electronic operating instructions (JCEOI), the frequency manager received numerous requests for HF radio frequencies for use by military police (MPs), psychological operations (PSYOPS), and division cavalry. The division was unable to initially fill all requirements but was able to request for and receive additional frequencies. This may not always be the case. Recommendation: There should be a standard number of frequencies the G6 requests for each unit. For example: Each BCT knows that at a minimum they will ask for �X� frequencies for that unit. If HF frequencies are limited, there should also be an order of merit (OML) that outlines the priority for frequency support Issue: Frequency hopping Discussion: All division FM nets utilized the frequency-hopping feature of the SINCGARS SIP radio during OIF. This was done, not out of an analysis of the enemy electronic warfare (EW) capability, but rather because of SOP. Had the division opted, instead, to use the SC secure mode of the radio, then options such as channel scanning would have been available, increasing the total number of nets that a station could monitor. Recommendation: Conduct a deliberate assessment of enemy electronic warfare (EW) capability to determine if it might be an acceptable risk to operate in the single channel mode rather than frequency hopping. This would normally elevate the likelihood that the enemy could use EW against us by intercept, jamming, and direction finding, and thus the enemy�s ability to exploit our communications and target our command posts. However, if the enemy has no such capability, it is not a risk. Employ our equipment in the mode that best suits the enemy threat. Topic C � Communications Security (COMSEC) Issue. Communications security (COMSEC) changeover and the impact on operations Discussion. COMSEC keys have different effective time periods based on the type of system, the classification of information being passed over it, and the likelihood of compromise. COMSEC suppression and changeover occurs at fixed times (weekly, monthly) that are not synchronized to tactical operations. As has been done in many prior operations, the 3ID (M) requested permission to freeze applicable COMSEC at LD to prevent loss of communications. Although the request was denied, the CFLCC authorized an early change to COMSEC key on most systems prior to LD, in order to mitigate the impact of changing. The division changed all COMSEC keys just days before LD. As part of this changeover, the signal battalion executed an effective rekey of the MSE network. During combat operations, units reported possible compromises where tactical action destroyed equipment and the COMSEC fill device was not positively identified as having been zeroed or destroyed. In these cases, the COMSEC controlling authority directed an immediate emergency suppression of the COMSEC keys. The fight did not stop so we could all change the COMSEC in our radios. As the division was engaged in decisive combat against the Republican Guard, V Corps changed COMSEC as directed by higher headquarters but authorized the 3ID (M) to remain on the superseded COMSEC key until the tactical situation allowed the redistribution of the new COMSEC key. Supporting V Corps elements (artillery, aviation) also remained on the superseded key since they were engaged in direct support of the division. Due to the threat of ambush against soft skin vehicles and attacks on helicopters, there was no safe way to transfer electronic COMSEC key. The division G6 worked with the signal battalion to leverage the MSE node center�s ability to transfer key to another node center to pass the single-channel voice key forward from the DMAIN to DTAC to allow the DTAC to change its SC TACSAT on the V Corps command TACSAT net. Recommendation. Limit the lowest level to which current and future COMSEC key gets positioned, especially in the front-line combat formations, in order to minimize the possibility of compromise. Controlling authorities for each COMSEC key must evaluate the impact on current tactical operations when directing emergency suppression. Based on evaluated threat, certain COMSEC keys could be extended to coincide with operational maneuver and the changeover could occur during a period of consolidation and preparation for future actions. Flexible plans to pass key using courier should be supplemented when necessary with node center to node center transfers. Issue: Lack of COMSEC compromise plan. Discussion: G6 needs to document a COMSEC compromise plan for the division. The OIF compromise plan pre-supposed the limited distribution of electronic COMSEC keys. Ninety days of keying material (KEYMAT) was distributed to the division, and the division distributed 30 days worth of key to brigades. The plan was that in the event of a compromise, the lowest possible level would distribute the new key to its users. However, there was no plan for exactly HOW the key would be distributed in the event of a compromise involving all of the key previously distributed by the division. The plan must include details on how to bring new COMSEC forward from the rear to the forward units in case of a compromise. The plan should also include details on proper reporting procedures through the chain of command to division to higher. The plan must then be practiced in a field environment in order that personnel involved understand the steps. Recommendation: Develop division, brigade, and battalion-level COMSEC SOPs to reflect compromise procedures. It is also recommended that the compromise procedures be used during future training missions in order to incorporate them into brigade and battalion standards. If COMSEC custodians are supposed to have 90 days� COMSEC, they should have 90 days� worth of all KEYMAT. Instruct units to only give COMSEC that subordinate units need, don�t give out all keys, as this risks compromising all KEYMAT. Issue: Location of the division COMSEC management office (DCMO) Discussion: Normally the division COMSEC management office operates out of the division rear command post (DREAR) and there should be a set process by which division COMSEC custodians draw COMSEC, return to their division CP, and distribute KEYMAT to the subordinate units. There was no such process during combat operations. This was not the preferred method, nor was it the correct method, but it was successful. New COMSEC KEYMAT being flown in from CONUS was delivered to Camp Doha, where there was no division COMSEC representative. The G6 had discussed this with the theater COMSEC management office (TCMO) and CFLCC COMSEC managers, and CFLCC had indicated that COMSEC would be brought forward to the division as needed. However, the TCMO did not in fact courier any COMSEC forward. Division relied on V Corps to provide the required KEYMAT for the monthly changeover. Recommendation: Under similar circumstances, the DCMO must determine where their COMSEC inject point is and maintain an individual there to both retrieve the KEYMAT and possibly coordinate transportation of the KEYMAT to the DREAR. All DCMO personnel involved in distribution of COMSEC must have access to a vehicle in order to facilitate pickup. Issue: Distribution of COMSEC via MSE Discussion: When confronted with the issue that 3ID (M) was unable to distribute COMSEC due to long distances between the DMAIN and the DTAC and subordinate units; G6 utilized the bulk transfer method that the signal battalion uses to distribute MSE KEYMAT from one node center to another. The DTAC COMSEC custodian traveled to the nearest node center to pick up the COMSEC and then distributed to the subordinate COMSEC hand receipt holders. Recommendation: Bulk transfer is an effective alternative to electronic DTD-to-DTD distribution. It will only work if the link between the two node centers is clean, otherwise, there is risk for the receiving unit to get corrupted KEYMAT. It also does not guarantee secure distribution to a single recipient, like electronic distribution from DTD to DTD. Topic D - Electronic Enablers INMARSAT voice and data systems Issue: 3ID (M) received the M4 systems too late to be able to provide adequate training and installation. 3ID (M) command group was not trained in the use of the INMARSAT Mini-M by the ADC (M) and commanding general. Discussion: 3ID (M) received the systems too late to be able to provide adequate training and installation. By the time G6 received the systems, the war had already begun and other systems were in place to communicate. In addition, 3ID (M) had issues coordinating with the contractor to complete installation. INMARSAT phones were initially left back at Fort Stewart and were not brought forward until March. Operators did not show proficiency. G6 was able to operate and show general officer (GO) aides how to use it, however the phones were used infrequently, if at all. The power supplies were only able to be powered using 220 volt outlets, a vehicle cigarette lighter socket, or a solar cell battery charger. One system�s antenna mount was broken. Two Mini-Ms were brought over but not used until February, when they were given to the DREAR. Recommendation: Continue to work with the INMARSAT upon redeployment in order to continue training on the systems. The 64k INMARSAT pipe is great for short halt SIPRNET or connectivity in the initial stages of a division command post setup, however, now that 3ID (M) is set and combat operations have concluded, its usefulness is now in its redundancy. Pursue alternate satellite phone communications. Cancel INMARSAT subscription. First generation INMARSAT phone can be replaced by more reliable, second-generation equipment that is manufactured within CONUS. This will facilitate easier replacement of parts than currently available. Cell Phones Issue: During the receiving, staging, onward movement ,and integration (RSOI) phase of operations, division relied heavily on non-secure commercial cell phones. Discussion: During RSOI phase of operations, division relied heavily on non-secure commercial cell phones. Cell phones were an effective and relatively efficient form of communications between sites that were often great distances apart. However, because they are non-secure, their utility is limited. The division initially had Smart-zone radios, but CFLCC reallocated them to other users. The Motorola XTS-3000 radios we have at Fort Stewart are compatible with the Smart-zone trunking system, but only our MPs have secure-chips for their radios. Recommendation: The division should purchase more Motorola XTS-3000 type radios and ensure that we get the secure chips for them. The division should also provide specifications explaining to units what they should buy, if they choose to buy additional radios. Iridium Phones Issue: There was only limited phone support for the division. Iridium phone reliability and ease of use were constraints. Discussion: The division initially distributed 13 Iridium phones to the BCTs and separates. As more slice elements came forward with additional requirements, the division requested and received an addition 30 phones, for a total of 43. This number was augmented by other task-organized units that brought their own Iridium phones. The division initially planned for 6-8 contingency phones, however these were quickly used to support users whose phones were broken or other unforeseen requirements. Like SC TACSAT, Iridium phones were excellent in providing clear voice communications regardless of distance. However, Iridium phone calls were not successful approximately 50% of the time. Many times calls would terminate mid-call. Other times, calls would not successfully connect. This is possibly a function of the short battery life of the phone system, as well as the tendency for users to leave the phone off and charge the battery. Batteries could only be charged using a cigarette lighter or a 110-volt outlet. Users did not know their PIN codes for both powering on the phone and also making a secure call. As a result, on about 30 occasions, Iridium phones were locked out. G6 kept the unlock code close hold, as well as the secure mode PIN numbers for all phones. The power-on PIN number was the same for every phone and was widely known. Recommendation: Recommend 3ID (M) purchase additional phones to reach a total of 60 fully mission capable (FMC) Iridium phones with secure sleeves. G6 should be responsible for maintaining 5-10 floats that will be used to replace damaged or destroyed equipment. The division must adhere to a more strict priority of distribution. For each phone, provide an AC/DC inverter to allow operators to charge the phone from any military vehicle. Issue: Units did not always use phones in secure mode, resulting in violations of OPSEC. Discussion: Higher headquarters reported that Iridium phones were used in the non-secure mode to pass classified information. There were several reported incidents of troop movements and locations being passed. The issue seems to have been threefold. 1) Soldiers did not understand the necessity of using the secure mode and thus did not use it, 2) Soldiers did not know how to use the secure mode and 3) Leadership did not place an emphasis on using the secure mode. Recommendation: Users must be instructed on use before operating an Iridium phone. Before an individual signs for a secure phone, he must be taught step by step how to use the phone in the secure mode. The leadership must also place an emphasis on security for the phones. The Iridium phones should be treated as a controlled cryptographic item (CCI) item just as a filled automated net control device (ANCD) is. Users signed for the phone must keep it secured from unauthorized usage. Commercial Satellite TV Issue: Commercial TV access within the division. Discussion: Prior to deployment the division had validated the requirement for commercial satellite TV requirement at division CPs only, expecting the fielding of the Global Broadcasting System (GBS) as a means to provide service in theater. The division did not receive GBS until just prior to crossing the LD and was able to coordinate with CFLCC Directorate of Information Management (DOIM) to receive KUSAT satellite decoders as an alternative. After crossing the LD, the division was able to coordinate to receive an AFRTS satellite decoder from V Corps, but this was received too late to be of significant utility. The requirement for satellite TV support at echelons below division were not stated until after conclusion of combat operations Recommendation: Upon return to home station, research solution for providing BCT CPs with satellite decoders in the field. Issue: Providing access to TV at multiple locations within a single division CP Discussion: The division automation office forecasted the requirement to provide satellite TV reception to multiple locations in the division main CP by attaching black box balun connectors to each TV. This allowed the audio and video signals to be consolidated into a single CAT V cable and piped to another location. By doing this, a single signal was chained from one TV set to the next. Recommendations. Units anticipating a requirement for satellite TV access should procure a black box balun connector and enough CAT V cable to support their requirement. This is not a G6 responsibility. Topic E - Tactical Radio Systems AN/PSC-5 Spitfire TACSAT Radio Issue: There were a limited number of radios available for distribution, resulting in reduced number of nets and a lack of spares. Discussion: The division conducted combat operations with 49 SC TACSAT radios. Not all of these radios were fielded to the division. Three were provided by CFLCC in support of the CONUS contingency response force (CCRF), and V Corps provided one. As a result, the division could only distribute among three nets: C 2 , fires, and O&I. This provided each BCT and separate battalion the ability to satisfy most division C 2 requirements. Some separate battalions did not receive radio systems for the O&I net. Some radio systems were not FMC, and as a result some units began with degraded capability. During the course of pre-combat operations, many units had radio systems become non mission capable (NMC). The radios cannot be fixed locally, they have to be returned to the factory for repair, so the radios were turned in to support battalion electronics shops, and they were not available for the war. Brigades ended up using radios slated for the O&I net in order to communicate on the C 2 net. G6 attempted to procure 18 addition TACSAT radios for the division through submission of an operational need statement to FORSCOM prior to deployment and contributed to the V Corps urgent need statement to DA prior to initiation of combat operations. These efforts were unsuccessful. Recommendation: Acquire more TACSAT radios. Future combat operations will probably employ 3ID (M) in a similar role as in recent combat operations, requiring the division to move great distances at a rapid rate of speed. The usefulness of the SC TACSAT radio has been underscored in this conflict. The division should look at purchasing more SC TACSAT radio systems to provide BCTs and separate battalions with additional replacement radios. Additionally, the division should investigate providing additional radios to units in the division with unique long-range communications requirements. These units may include, but are not limited to, division cavalry, MPs, and support battalion medical companies. AN/PSC-11 Single Channel Anti-Jam Manportable (SCAMP) terminal radio system Issue: The division ultimately was unable to employ its SCAMP radio systems due to various reasons. Discussion: The DISCOM received 10 SCAMP radios that were redistributed from other units in the division. DA initially fielded the systems to provide divisional CPs with long-range communications ability, but the division decided to provide the CSS community with long-range communications. Several individuals from division support command (DISCOM) and G6 attended school training on the radio system, but the division began its deployment before the soldiers returned, so there was a shortage of people who knew how to use the systems. During the transit process, five of the ten systems were lost when the DISCOM sensitive items MILVAN was not recovered. Five systems did arrive in theater and were successfully programmed. However, the privileged terminal that controlled the network became NMC. Because of these reasons, the division never completely integrated SCAMP into the division�s communications architecture. Recommendation: The division must look at alternate means of employing the limited number of SCAMP radios that are available due to the loss of five systems. SCAMP radio is not an on-the-move system. It requires dedicated network planning and significant setup time to be successful. Any asset that it supports must be stationary. SINCGARS FM Radio Family Issue: Field expedient long range antenna Discussion: In an attempt to gain greater FM range the DIVARTY combined two different types of antenna systems. The 9-meter (SHF) mast from one of the supporting SEN teams that was not in use was combined with two sections of an OE-254 to create the tallest antenna at the DIVARTY TOC. Not only did this antenna increase the range of digital nets, but when integrated into the setup process of a DIVARTY expando van, this telescoping antenna went up quickly at each jump. Recommendation: The lack of quick erect antenna mast system (QEAMS) antennas facilitated the establishment of an effective TTP that can be used by any BCT to extend the range of a radio system in a permissive environment. Return to Table of Contents |
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