November 22, 2024
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November 22, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 18 Logistics During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) moved farther and faster than any other ground offensive operation in history. Victory was accomplished through brute force logistics with a combination of tailored, mobile support packages and robust logistics release points (LRPs). However, with numerous logistical challenges throughout the operation, specifically during the operational pause at OBJ RAMs, many units operated dangerously low on ammunition, fuel, water, and other sustainment items. This chapter highlights some of the service support successes and issues associated with extended offensive operations. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Unit Basic Load/Ammunition Basic Load (UBL/ABL) Issue: Two-fold issue: 1. Though Class IV management and distribution is a logistical function, engineer experts are often called upon when it comes to construction and barrier material. 2. The theater had no plan and contributed nothing to preparing Class IV resources in anticipation of such a rapid offensive operation, predicted to be highly engineer intensive. Discussion: 1. Logistics Function: Construction and barrier material components are a class of supply. Receipt, storage, and issue of these items are clearly logistics functions. These materials are used for blocking positions or checkpoints established with wire and other materials. Because the bulk of these materials are commonly consumed in support of mobility/countermobility/survivability engineer tasks, obtaining and managing the supplies is mistakenly delegated to engineer personnel. Due to lack of theater (logistic) support assets, 3ID (M), with less than a month from the beginning of the division�s offensive operations, requisitioned and built 120 each 463L pallets of Class IV combat configured loads (CCLs). By this time, the division should have been well into unit level detailed planning and preparation, not focusing large efforts on projects such as this one. 2. Organic divisional units cannot rely on unit basic load (UBL) alone to sustain engineer barrier and force protection requirements. Early in the planning phase, the assistant division engineer identified quantities and types of Class IV materials required throughout the operation and submitted these requirements to Coalition Forces Land Component Command(CFLCC) through both engineer and logistics channels. Although the division exercised every available avenue to inquire on these resources, there were insufficient quantities of Class IV in theater when the division closed. The division�s effort to purchase both common national stock number (NSN) Class IV materials and unique engineer construction Class IV (i.e., geotextile, mobi-matting, and Hesco bastions) met with no support from high headquarters. The supply process could only make available enough supplies for UBL. Once the division crossed the line of departure, units quickly consumed Class IV UBLs in both planned and unplanned missions. Theater distribution assets were inadequate and the distribution management system could not fill the division�s requirements. Lumber and other common American construction materials were not available in a country that predominantly uses steel and clay based bricks. Recommendation: Every echelon must thoroughly analyze Class IV requirements, and coordinate complete estimates within the engineer and logistical channels. Maneuver planners and logisticians must continue to work together to ensure that identified resources are available and provided to units and appropriate stocks and transportation assets are dedicated to re-supply operations. Issue: UBL validation. Discussion: Armor units� ammo basic loads (ABLs) consisted of HEAT/MPAT heavy 120mm basic load instead of the normally recommended SABOT heavy mix. HEAT/MPAT munitions are better against trucks, buildings, and bunkers, and are still very lethal against heavy armor. The BCTs used SABOT far less often, and it is not as versatile. Recommendation: Adopt the HEAT/MPAT heavy tank ABL to increase the versatility and lethality of armor units. Issue: Engineer Class V requirements: ABL demolition materials were not sufficient to properly destroy caches of enemy weapons and munitions. Discussion: Class V demolition resources were not sufficient to effectively destroy the large amounts of enemy weapons and munitions captured during OIF. If not secured or destroyed, these munitions represent an immediate or future threat should remaining conventional, unconventional, or terrorist threat elements gain possession of them. The rapid pace of the operation did not strain the capability of both maneuver nor engineer forces to secure the munitions and continue forward progress in executing their combat mission. Frequently attempts to destroy munitions with insufficient explosives resulted in the munitions �cooking off,� hours later, creating additional hazards. Recommendation: Theater should develop CCLs heavy on basic demolition materials (C4) and initiation systems specifically designed for the destruction of enemy weapons and munitions, prepare the CCLs for multiple transportation modes, and pre-plan the lift requirement into the overall distribution management system. Issue: UBL validation Discussion: DIVARTY designed and drew a UBL based on war gaming and analysis from a variety of sources. During OIF, maneuver commanders opted for higher concentrations of HE over concerns about dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM). Additionally, the new M795 HE round affords units an added 4 km range. Copperhead was very rarely used. Recommendation: Increase HE (M795) and HER in the DIVARTY UBL and decrease DPICM and BBDPICM. Revisit search and destroy armor munitions� (SADARM) role as a precision killer munitions for the artillery. And finally, decrease Copperhead allocations. Issue: DIVARTY had inadequate flexibility of Multiple Launched Rocket System (MLRS) munitions. Discussion: During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the DIVARTY MLRS battalion drew its ABL consisting of 270 M26 pods and 54 M39 Army Tactical Mission System (ATACMS) missiles. Despite initial reports to the contrary, M26A1 pods were not available in theater. The M26 rocket proved effective and accurate, but the enemy systems consistently outranged our artillery. The M26A1 might have mitigated this range disparity. Reservation of release authority at the corps level precluded 3ID (M) use of ATACMS during battle. The only ATAMCS rounds fired were in support of a V Corps deep attack before the ground war started. Recommendation: Ensure M26A1 rockets are available for future combat operations. Develop an MLRS suite of munitions that allows for greater employment on the battlefield. Issue: Inadequate resupply of artillery Class V Discussion: The division conducted extensive ammunition planning using the military decision-making process (MDMP) to identify Class V required supply rate (RSR). The required supply rate was never approved, nor was the control supply rate (CSR) ever published at any level. Ammunition re-supply, meticulously planned and synchronized at the division level, was completely uncoordinated at any level above. When ammunition did arrive in the ammunition supply point (ASP), it was usually in bulk, with incompatible quantities and types of rounds and fuses. Recommendation: Theater must supply adequate transportation assets to support pushing CSRs forward. Division must insure that ammunition resupply is coordinated based on requisitions from using units, not expenditures reports. Issue: Ammunition turn-in Discussion: Logistics units and agencies did not adequately plan ammunition turn in after the combat operations ceased or significantly subsided. The theater originally had agreed to pick up all dunnage once our units uploaded their combat ammo. As the environment developed to conditions that supported ammunition turn-in, it became clear that our units did not have appropriate dunnage available to allow for local turn-in, nor could the already strained trans assets move the dunnage from Kuwait. Recommendation: Ensure that an adequate plan is developed to facilitate a speedy turn in of ammunition at the closest ASP within a division�s sector. Issue: Ammunition accounting and management problems Discussion: Unit AHAs in the camps operated under minimal doctrinal guidelines. FSBs did not effectively outfit the AHA with enough personnel to guard and escort customer units into the AHA. Units stored ammunition in the AHA without conducting a joint inventory with AHA personnel. Personnel traversed throughout the AHA unescorted. Neither the guard force, nor the AHA personnel received a brief on the operating procedures at the AHA. Customer units drove vehicles in and around the AHA (to include a heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMMT) fueler). Many problems existed in the AHA, which may have created an environment, where ammunition could be lost or misappropriated. Recommendation: To effectively operate an AHA, the unit should position all 55B personnel (when assigned) to operate the AHA. The AHA requires a sufficient amount of personnel for security and to escort any customer units into the AHA. Units must provide the AHA with a valid access roster identifying personnel authorized access to that particular unit�s ammunition. Units storing ammunition in the AHA must conduct a joint inventory with an AHA representative prior to (or as soon as possible) storing ammunition. All unit ammunition must be clearly segregated and identified. Only vehicles carrying ammunition (or preparing to load ammunition) will enter the AHA. Issue: 24th Ordnance ammunition supply point (ASP) support Discussion: The 24th Ordnance Company supported the 3ID (M) by assisting the division ammunition officer (DAO) in palletizing and pushing the initial ABL to the units. Furthermore, the 24th Ordnance established ASPs to facilitate Class V resupply as far forward as possible. The 24th Ordnance also received all Class V ammunition in preparation for turn-in to theater. Recommendation: Recommend the supporting ordnance company arrive in the theater during the advanced cadre (ADVON) deployment. This will allow the ordnance company time to receive the supported division�s Class V ammunition from theater and begin preparations for ABL issue. Topic B - Prescribed Load List/Authorized Stockage List (PLL/ASL) Issue: Maintenance of Bradley fire support team (BFIST) specific components Discussion: Infantry and armor task forces do not have the required maintenance support to adequately fix problems inherent in the BFIST. Turret mechanics lack training in the functions and repair of items such as the inertial navigation system (INS), Tactical Communications Support Processor (TSCP), FIST distribution box, and other components. Recommendation: When task organized for combat, push BFIST specific PLL to the task forces. This will greatly reduce maintenance hours spent to get the vehicles operational. Cross train the BFIST master gunner and infantry Bradley mechanics to troubleshoot and repair the BFIST specific components to ensure the most rapid repair of equipment necessary during all combat operations. Issue: Non-availability of Class IX Discussion: Units throughout the division received few if any Class IX repair parts during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Class IX, when received, consisted of a relatively few major assemblies, starters, and generators. Planning factors for distances involved should have been used to adjust requirement for specific PLL lines. Theater distribution of Class IX was limited to Kuwait. For most of the operation, corps pushes of all classes of supply were unpredictable with little or no inventories of what was being pushed until received. Units were required to submit 2765s throughout the operation, but did not receive ordered parts until well into the battle. Additionally, the ability to send parts orders was made difficult due to lack of knowledge and practice in blasting. Due to inability to blast, ordering was conducted by driving back to the FSB/MSB. The only parts received by the unit during the operation were those already in the system at assembly area Hammer and Camp Virginia. Recommendation: Class IX requisition needs to be established using tactical website (TACWEB) to allow units to request high priority items when blasting fails. All logistical cells should have communication systems allowing units to send and receive data. Also, there is a need for more training and planning on automation systems for theater support units. These were some of the same lessons we learned in Operation DESERT SPRING/DESERT STORM specifically, TB-43-0201-1, Delayed Desert Damage and TB-43-0221-2, which listed components most likely to fail on equipment used in theater. Accurate reviews of all previous after-action reviews (AARs) would identify some problems early. Issue: Availability of critical communications parts and batteries. Discussion: The fifteen-day UBL of batteries sustained some units for approximately 20 days before certain batteries ran critically low. Battery resupplies were isolated events and barely sustained units through the transition to stability and support operations (SASO). It would not have been possible to sustain combat operations beyond transition date without significant resupply. Similar problems with basic communications equipment (antennas, hand microphones, and cables) existed as well. Units did not receive requested parts before movement to attack positions, and could not draw from the supporting FSB�s authorized stockage list (ASL). Similar to vehicle repair parts, combat losses and scrounging kept units functional for the short term. Recommendation: Ensure basic communications equipment is carried on ASL at all echelons of CSS. Carry at least a 21 day UBL of batteries and as much equipment as possible at the lowest level. Topic C - Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) Issue: Security with CSS Elements. Discussion: Security problems with CSS elements stems from three major problems; lack of mounts for machine guns, lack of commo in CSS vehicles, and lack of emphasis during training. Units experienced a lack of confidence and ability in CSS elements to properly secure themselves during convoys. This was especially true for combat trains convoys conducting LOGPAC operations. Therefore, units dedicated many assets to ensure our CSS assets were secured and that we could talk to them while moving. Recommendation: Division must integrate CSS assets into all force on force training events. It must force them to protect themselves, wear multiple integrated laser engagement simulation (MILES), and be responsible for reacting to enemy fire at all times. The division must also get more radios on the MTOE for the support platoon. Current MTOE allocations are inadequate and provide no authorization for cargo trucks or fuelers. Additional radios should be provided for the support platoons for subsequent MTOEs. Issue: Lack of logistics support for MLRS Discussion: The MLRS unit is unique because it is the only general support (GS) battalion in the division with a brigade HQ. As such, it is supported by the main support battalion (MSB) but spent most of OIF moving through BCT areas. During combat, area support was utilized and the MLSR battalion drew all classes of supply except Class IX from the FSB it was closest to. This system worked up to OBJ Lions because of planning done prior to the war. However, it lacked flexibility. If an unplanned shift in the scheme of maneuver occurred, the MLRS battalion would have been left without an FSB capable of supporting it. Additionally, almost all bulk and special supplies were pushed from division to BCTs. Since the MLSR battalion (and HHB DIVARTY) is not in a BCT, it was often left out of the distribution. MLRS units, like cavalry, are responsible for ranging the entire division zone. Therefore, like the cavalry unit, the MLRS unit should have a dedicated forward logistics element (FLE) during all operations. Recommendation: Resource a FLE for MLRS support. Issue: Lack of general transportation assets. Discussion: The lack of general transportation assets (light/medium and medium truck companies) and the failure of host nation assets to perform as planned, had a negative impact on the quantity and consistency of support to the division. The assets were not sufficient to support corps and divisional requirements. During planning, an assumption was made that host nation assets would offset this shortage of assets. Host nation trucks never performed as efficiently as assumed. The shortfall in general transportation assets created shortages when carrying capacity could not meet divisional requirements. A shortage in a given class of supply required that a disproportionate number of trucks move the shortage class of supply forward inundating our capability in that supply and creating a shortfall in another class of supply. This newly created shortfall later required a disproportionate number of trucks to correct. This phenomenon came to be known as �resupply by inundation�(RBI). This RBI cycle could not be broken until the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) slowed sufficiently to reduce requirements. Recommendation: Two potential corrective measures for this situation are additional general transportation assets or conducting the operation at a slower OPTEMPO that generates smaller requirements in a given day. Slower OPTEMPO as a corrective measure would have been a significant deviation from the operational plan and would cause logistics to drive the operation, not a doctrinally prescribed solution. Issue: Inadequate transportation assets for direct support maintenance. Discussion: Throughout the operation the transportation of major assemblies to the maintenance support team (MSTs) has been an issue. There are not enough transportation assets to move parts around the battlefield. Recommendation: The MTOE for FSB Bravo Company should be changed so that each MST and shop office has a HEMTT with a material handling equipment (MHE) crane. This would allow for easier movement of Class IX from the brigade support area (BSA) area to the TF unit maintenance collection points (UMCPs), as well as the retrograde of unserviceable Class IX back to the BSA. Issue: Cargo carrying capacity Discussion: Units do not have the appropriate cargo carrying capacity to support requirements. Units were directed to carry five days of supply (DOS) of Class I and water, 15 DOS Class III (P), .5 UBL/ABL/ turret load, 30 DOS Class II (toilet paper, acetate, etc.) and chemical defense equipment (CDE). Recommendation: Amend MTOE/APS to authorize units additional cargo HEMTTs and palletized load systems (PLSs). The 5 ton and 2 � ton do not have the mobility necessary in rough terrain and they lack the bulk supply carrying capacity. Obviously, the PLS with trailer is preferred. Issue: Haul assets for TF rollers Discussion: The M916 5T tractor with a low bed trailer lack off-road capability. Consistently, the low bed truck would get mired in sand even without a roller on the trailer. It also significantly slowed movement whenever the field trains had to move cross-country due to the continuous recovery requirement. Because of its terrible mobility when uploaded with a roller, some units had to abandon the TF roller within 24 hours of attacking into Iraq. Recommendation: Replace the low bed trailer (LIN S70517) with a cross-country capable trailer or eliminate rollers from the MTOE because support units lack resources to haul them. Issue: Attachment of a treatment team (TMT) and two evacuation vehicles to the ECH I facilities. Discussion: The attachment of the TMT team and the two M113 evacuation vehicles really increased the ability to effectively position the health care providers in the proper tactical place to aid in collection and treatment in combat operations. The TF�s wide area of responsibility needed more than what was normally organic to the ECH I facility. This additional TMT team allowed for effective treatment of casualties. Recommendation: Continue to attach the TMT team and two M113 evacuation vehicles to the ECH I facilities during all combat operations. Consider a MTOE change for the medical platoon at the TF level. Issue: Command and control of medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets. Discussion: Prior to deployment, the aviation brigade coordinated with the division support command (DISCOM) commander and the division medical operations center (DMOC) on the best command and control relationship to sustain medical companies (air ambulance) during combat operations. The issues addressed focused on situational awareness, maintenance, sustainment, and aviation plan staffing at the FSB and BCT level. The recommendation approved by the division was the centralized command and control (C 2 ) and sustainment of these aircraft under the 4th Brigade with decentralized execution in support of the BCTs. This relationship was especially critical because the primary means of evacuation to higher echelons of care was by air assets. This relationship worked extremely well and provided responsive evacuation of over 400 U.S. and Iraqi casualties. The brigade was able to provide all necessary maintenance, forward arming and refueling point (FARP) support, Army airspace command and control (A 2 C 2 ) products, air tasking order (ATO) products, threat updates, routing, and, as necessary, armed escort support to ensure the success of each evacuation. This would not have been possible if these assets were placed under the control of the BCTs. During both occasions that these platforms were placed under the control of the BCT, aircraft launched without requisite knowledge of the threat and airspace control measures. Neither the FSB nor the BCT is capable of managing these operations based on their current staffing and often do not have electronic access to the air space tasking and control orders. The C 2 and maintenance relationship exercised by the division is the preferred method of C 2 and sustainment and is supported by the 36th Evacuation Battalion commander and the 30th MEDCOM commander as the most preferred method of employment of direct support (DS) air ambulance assets at the division level. The division should continue to place DS air ambulance assets under the C 2 of the 4th Brigade to best support this low-density high demand asset within the division. Recommendation: Continue to place MEDEVAC assets under the C 2 of 4th Brigade to best employ and sustain air ambulance assets on the battlefield. Issue: MEDEVAC communication Discussion: Air MEDEVAC was successful during combat operations South of Baghdad. Air MEDEVAC was called using brigade command nets due to limited retrans capability. MEDEVAC requests were forwarded from the BCT TOC/TAC to 4th Brigade via Iridium or tactical satellite (TACSAT). Enemy situation and weather prevented use of air assets in the urban environment. Ambulance exchange points (AXP) operations were critical with the distances involved from frontline units to nearest Level II (+) care. However, the need to secure AXP assets is crucial. Recommendation: Need to modify MTOE to authorize retrans capability for nets up to brigade level. Each net needs to be monitored in the BCT TOC and higher. Division needs a dedicated TACSAT net for all Air MEDEVAC/ casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) requirements. Also, modify C MED MTOE to include M1025 security vehicles so that other combat power does not have to be dedicated to protecting the AXP assets. Issue: Use of aerial resupply Discussion: Continually, it was briefed to BCTs that two CH-47s were available to conduct daily aerial resupply to BCTs. Unfortunately, little to no daily aerial resupply was conducted following the early stages of combat. Recommendation: Dedicate one CH-47 to each BCT and, based on the enemy situation, fly daily LOGPACs to the BSA or to unit trains. LOGPACs should be packaged to maximize lift and should include critical Class I and water, Class III (P), Class V, and Class IX. BCTs provide liaison officers (LNOs) and details in the division rear command post (DREAR) to build logistical resupply packages and put this inside the CH-47 to be pushed out to the BCT each day. In order for this system to work, CH-47s MUST fly daily and MUST fly as far forward as possible, at least to the FSB. Contingency plans for airdrop resupply should be considered for high priority resupply items. Issue: Potable bulk water for headquarters and headquarters company. Discussion: An HHC in an armor unit is authorized three M149A1 water trailer tanks per the FY03 MTOE. At line of departure (LD), one HHC had four water trailers, but only the authorized three could haul potable water. As the TF transitioned to consuming bulk water, consumption forward in the TF battlespace for HHC elements exceeded 400 gallons per day (the capacity of one trailer). Three trailers did not allow a sustainable bulk water cycle for the TF. Two water trailers were required forward in a 24-hour period, and distances between the field trains and the TF allowed only one LOGPAC per day. To provide sufficient bulk water without shortages, two trailers needed to be forward (being consumed) while two trailers were in the field trains being re-supplied. This MTOE deficiency forced HHC elements to draw bulk water from company teams, affecting their re-supply operations in terms of time and quantity of water available. Recommendation: Add a fourth M149A1 water trailer tank to the MTOE for a tank battalion HHC (LIN W98825). Issue: Five-gallon water can re-supply during combat operations. Discussion: In addition to damaging rations small arms, rocket propelled grenades (RPG), and indirect fires also destroyed five-gallon water cans. Some combat vehicles attacked into Baghdad with no five-gallon water cans and were sustaining themselves by refilling 1.5-liter water bottles with bulk water. Replacement of such a large quantity of water cans, like other essential items has been challenging. Few have actually been replaced at the time of operation transition. Recommendation: Add or carry at least 100 five-gallon water cans in the ASL at all echelons of support. Issue: Class I bottled and five-gallon water storage Discussion: Bottled water is clearly the answer to the resupply of drinking water. It speeds up LOGPAC times significantly and is more easily stowed in the interior of the vehicles. The greatest advantage of bottled water was that it was easily replaced, unlike five-gallon water cans. Units had difficulty maintaining 5-gallon water cans because of shrapnel and small arms fire. Some combat vehicles attacked into Baghdad with no five-gallon water cans and were sustaining themselves by refilling 1.5-liter water bottles with bulk water. Every enemy contact would cause units to lose several water cans to shrapnel or small arms fire. In an urban environment, water cans can also be destroyed from getting hit against walls, light poles, and other obstacles. With bottled water in the system, shortages are easily replaced. One additional item that would increase units ability to protect water, bottled or five-gallon cans, would be extended bustle racks with 7.62 ballistic protection. This would increase ability to carry/stow Class I and prevent its destruction by small arms fire/shrapnel. Recommendation: Refit combat vehicles with an extended bustle rack with 7.62 ballistic protection. Plan for the use of bottle water for Class I re-supply in all future combat operations. Also, add or carry at least 100 five-gallon water cans on the ASL at all echelons of support. Topic D - Force Modernization Issue: TACSAT and MTS availability. Discussion: Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS) and Standard Army Maintenance System (SAMS) transactions cannot occur with any reliability over the extended distances that many division units covered. Recommendation: In extended offensive operations it is absolutely imperative that communication systems be available to call back O2 priority requisitions to the direct support unit and to the division Material Management Center (DMMC). Such communications capabilities would allow for units to get a constant status on requisitions and, if haul capacity exists, a consistent flow of Class IX. Issue: Situational awareness in the logistics community Discussion: Logistical nodes on the battlefield lacked situational awareness of the maneuver units on the battlefield. The brigade S4 is the only logistics entity in the BCT that has an FBCB 2 system, but is not always collocated with the FSB. Without situational awareness, it is extremely difficult for the logisticians to monitor movement of forces and maintain communication with maneuver forces. Recommendation: All logistical nodes should be outfitted with FBCB 2 and means of voice communication. This would establish the link and situational awareness needed to project requirements, track the movement of forces, and ensure that critical logistics and tactical information is available to all. This will provide logisticians with the same battlefield awareness and capabilities currently afforded to maneuver units. Issue: In transit visibility (ITV) of logistics support items. Discussion: The division has not had ITV of forward moving supplies. The lack of this visibility has had a negative impact on the DREAR and DISCOMs ability to support its division customer base. It appears that corps MCTs are not properly integrated with corps and theater supply support activities (SSAs). This has handicapped their ability to capture and forward ITV information regarding the movement of supplies to the division. The lack of consistently dependable communications systems has also played a role in this lack of ITV. Recommendation: Better integration of the MCTs and a more dependable communication system would have offset this problem. Issue: Use of the Movement Tracking System (MTS). Discussion: The Movement Tracking System has been very helpful to the division transportation office (DTO)/movement control office (MCO). MTS has been the most consistent communication system. The system has been used to communicate with units and provide unit movement and positioning information. This provided situational awareness and enabled the DTO and MCO to transmit requirements quickly and consistently even while moving. Recommendation: Increase the level of training for units/personnel given the MTS equipment. Increase the number of MTS systems resident in the division. Issue: Non-use of Orange 1 report (request for Classes I, II, III) Discussion: Division established a TACWEB format for processing Orange 1 reports for supply requisitions. This system was not used and division was forced to utilize FM communications and e-mails to request supplies. During operations it became apparent that Orange 1 reports were only used to forecast unit headcounts and not to process requests. Units never received a supply push based on Orange 1 requisitions. Recommendation: Reestablish the Orange 1 as the primary supply request form. Establish a TACWEB based Orange 1 report that can be accessed by all logistical support units to process supply requests. A common Orange 1 format throughout division would facilitate the ordering process as DIVARTY units move from one support element to another under area support. Issue: Need to update DIV/DISCOM field standing operating procedures (FSOP) Discussion: FSOP is out of date (1999) and does not fit the environment. The FSOP should have been revised prior to deployment. Orange reports and LOG battle rhythm was not adequate and confusing for new personnel. Recommendation: Update immediately upon return to Fort Stewart. Use at the next CPX, validate, and then finalize. Tie explanations to TACWEB reports. Topic E - Personal Baggage and Flight Manifest Issue: The practice of building flight manifest by the number of seats available for personnel deploying from Hunter Army Airfield to Kuwait resulted in soldiers being separated from personal baggage. Discussion: During the initial stages of the division�s main body deployment, personnel departing Hunter Army Airfield (AAF) were flown on contract flights to Kuwait International Airport. Aircraft were filled to maximum seating capacity in order to expedite the deployment timeline. However, problems arose with the shipping of baggage. Most soldiers deployed with a minimum of two bags and in many cases shipped footlockers with unit equipment as well as communications equipment for vehicles to be drawn from Army prepositioned stock (APS). Normal weight allowances for airline passengers were exceeded by deploying personnel. Additionally, cargo space within the transport aircraft was insufficient to handle the increased baggage. An initial attempt to resolve this problem was to fill every seat on the aircraft and transport as much cargo as possible. Excess baggage was palletized and shipped on a subsequent cargo flight. There was no selection process to identify which bags would be shipped with deploying personnel and which bags were to be held for a follow on shipment. Therefore, when soldiers arrived in Kuwait, they may have all, part, or none of their baggage. Soldiers were not held at the airfield in Kuwait to await follow-on baggage shipments. They were pushed out to various units throughout the area of operations (AO). As follow-on baggage arrived, it was sorted and push forward to those soldiers. This process proved very ineffective and caused many soldiers to spend days and sometimes weeks in forward deployed positions without their field equipment. This also created a huge work requirement for movement personnel to sort and push baggage. As a final solution to this problem, the division stopped deploying soldiers unless their baggage was accompanying them on the flight. During boarding procedures at Hunter AAF, if the cargo capacity of an aircraft was exceeded, passengers were removed from the manifest and scheduled to fly on a later flight. Recommendation: Flight manifest must consider the cargo capacity as well as the seating capacity of aircraft to determine the maximum number of personnel that can by deployed in a single flight. Soldiers should not be separated from baggage when deploying to field conditions. Continue the technique of building flight manifest for transport flights based on cargo capacity as well as seats available to ensure soldiers are not separated from personal baggage when deploying to field conditions. Topic F - Unit Movement and Procedures Issue: Movement capability from LD to current operating locations. Discussion: Unit movement from Kuwait to current locations has been extremely variable. Difficulty of movement on routes and inaccessibility to routes caused unit movements to last as much as 100% longer than planned. Assumptions regarding the ease of movement and lack of contact proved to be optimistic. Despite detailed planning, the failure of these assumptions caused movement forward not to occur as planned. Lack of detailed knowledge of the poor condition of the route in localized areas was one factor that increased the difficulty of executing unit moves. Enemy contact also slowed movement forward and created the need to move units on other than planned routes. Most units could not attain/sustain the 30 kmph planned movement speeds in this environment. The slower movement rate caused routes to back up with traffic and become congested. Failure to keep later moving units off congested routes added to the congestion experienced by units already on the routes. Another factor contributing to the inefficient movement forward was a failure by units to comply with accepted convoy procedures. Units moved on routes without march credits, stopped on roads for rest halts, and moved on the routes without regard for other units on the route. This lack of convoy discipline caused traffic jams and created situations where units move three abreast on two lane routes. Vehicle damage and delays in movement were the result of all of this uncoordinated activity. Recommendation: Movement/highway regulations and procedures must be strictly enforced and monitored by division. Moreover, units must maintain strict convoy discipline in order to facilitate ease of traffic flow in and out of the area of operations. Issue: No executable plan in place to transition quickly from high intensity offensive operations to SASO environment. Discussion: Although V Corps had spoken and many higher-level briefings made mention of Baghdad, operational and tactical planners had not conducted detailed planning concerning the transition to SASO environment. Moreover, logistical support operations had already been difficult. The transition was difficult to anticipate for two reasons: 1) Division log managers were completely engulfed in current logistics operations and simply trying to solve numerous problems that might overwhelm lesser persons. Foresight was clouded by the continuing difficulty to sustain offensive operations, and extreme anxiety that failure might arrive at any moment. 2) There had been no definition of end state for the previous phase and its relationship to the next phase. Indicators had not been identified, and the division was unable to state objectively those conditions that must define end state of one phase and the beginning of another. In the same respect, the division (like the HQ above) had not gleaned an understanding of Phase IV operations. As a result, the division found themselves thrust into Phase IV operations, without a well-understood, easily executable transition. A great deal of time was lost in logistics operations that might have been precluded with a well-defined plan. Recommendation: Overall the division operations section and all other staff proponents must make a concerted effort to understand the defined phases of the overall operation and the transitions between each phase. Typically, line units have had the most difficulty and found they are the most vulnerable during transitions of all kinds. Moreover, the focus of effort during transition and into the SASO environment is heavily weighted in G5 staff actions and coordination by civil affairs units with the local populous or governmental officials. These experts must take on the responsibility for assisting the division staff in recognition of key indicators. This must be completed prior to execution of previous phases in order to facilitate rapid transition when conditions are met. A technique by which to do this could be the graphic or narrative depictions similar to the division�s other decision points. Issue: No recovery plan in place to police up routes after long division maneuver. Discussion: During the course of extended offensive operations, many vehicles were lost due to battle damage, maintenance issues, or mired in off road conditions. Designated maintenance collection point s (MCPs) along prescribed routes proved insufficient for such lengthy operations. Emphasis was on forward movement, not on stopping points for periods of time in which to conduct maintenance. The division�s grueling pace quickly overwhelmed recovery and movement support assets The division had dedicated minimal heavy equipment transport (HET) support to each major subordinate command (MSC) for this purpose because there were other immediate demands on the assets. The commander�s intent was to remain flexible enough to conduct rapid exploitation should we face sudden regime collapse. Recommendation: Regardless of size, length, and pace of an offensive maneuver of this nature, the division must put together a concerted plan to police up the battlefield and routes. Topic G � Combat Service and Support (CSS) Flexibility and Learning on the Move Issue: CSS flexibility and learning on the move Discussion: We achieved successful results in a difficult situation, with limited resources, and in an immature theater structure (ARCENT, 377 Theater Support Command). The G4 and DISCOM staff, as well as DS support team and BDE S4s proved themselves to be very adaptive and learned on the move, during a fast OPTEMPO situation. Doctrinal concepts and home station garrison policies did not work in the Kuwait pre-war environment. CSS leadership and their sections were able to quickly adapt and learn how to successfully operate. Many of the fixes were to work longer, harder, and to assume more responsibility. For examples: 1) Provide combined CSS task forces direct support and organize transportation assets to support resupply; 2) Work in or augment the Doha supply support activities (SSAs), Directorate of Logistics (DOL); (3 Provide extra MHE at theater distribution center (TDC) to assist theater units in processing and moving parts; and (4 Put commodity expediters and key battle staff at Camp NY, Doha, aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), sea ports of debarkation (SPODs) to work issues. The G4 and DISCOM staff identified and consistently worked though difficult logistical obstacles such as: 1) Missing APS equipment, Department of Defense, Activity Address Code (DODAAC) problems; (2 Supply support activity (SSA) supplemental address problems; and 3) Lack of theater transport for commodity distribution. The G4 and PBO were able to react quickly to obtain missing APS equipment in theater or obtain augmentation from home station. The DISCOM materiel officer (MATO) section was able to work through many HQ layers to fix DODAAC and SSA supplemental address problems. The DISCOM ground safety officer (GSO) was able to obtain critical transport from Doha Director of Logistics (DOL) (Army Central Command [ARCENT]) through good networking connections and determination. All of the above were critical to the success of the division and were beyond the scope of normal operations. These innovations were critical to moving our parts and supplies through the system. Recommendation: Train personnel to be adaptive and flexible and foster a thinking CSS environment. CSS leadership was very results/mission-oriented. Quick identification of the problem and immediate intervention ensured success. Continuing to train key leaders to take action beyond their normal scope is a critical enabler for successful LOG C 2 and execution. Train junior leaders to do the same. Ensure future CPXs include similar support scenarios to work through immature theater, lack of transportation, and sharing of CSS resources. Return to Table of Contents |
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