December 23, 2024
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December 23, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 22 Unit Ministry Team (UMT) During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM the division deployed minus three battalion UMTs. Department of the Army Chief of Chaplains (DACH) filled the vacancies prior to the units departing the camps in Kuwait. The replacements ranged in experience from two first term captain chaplains to one senior major chaplain. All three were sent to battalions and did an excellent job of providing religious support (RS). The commanders in each unit took assets out of hide to recourse their UMTs since they did not deploy with section equipment. The chaplains had to quickly integrate into the units and �find their space.� It worked well. There were some instances where the UMTs could have been more effective had they been given their authorized equipment. Units often saw the chaplain�s equipment as �float� and took their modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) equipment to fill other shortages or loss. This degraded the UMT's ability to move and communicate and provide RS to their units. Their success was based more on the determination of the individual UMT than on the unit finding other resources to draw from. The slice UMTs and separate battalion UMTs were task-organized to support the BCTs during their fight. Their presence in the forward area support team (FAST) and main aid station (MAS) enabled the BCTs to provide better RS when they took causalities. Memorial ceremonies took a variety of types. Some were done at company, battalion, and brigade level. Each was designed and conducted according to the needs and capabilities of the unit. In each case, the UMT supported the requests and needs of the unit. Overall the UMTs did an outstanding job of being proactive and supporting the command with RS as far forward as possible. Many came under direct and indirect fire in order to provide RS. Small arms and/or shrapnel struck a number of UMT vehicles. Incredibly no one was injured. God was providential in allowing them to be far forward without being seriously injured. Lessons Learned
Issue: Doctrinal use of slice UMTs (1-3 ADA, 103rd MI, 123rd SIG) Discussion: Army doctrine places UMTs at casualty collection points and/or aid stations during combat operations. If not integrated into BCT religious support plans, these UMTs will be underutilized, traveling apart with their trains, unable to get to the majority of their soldiers, and unavailable to provide RS to casualties. Recommendation: Recommend clarification in Army doctrine by Combat Developments Directorate, United States Army Chaplain Center and School, of the following: 1) During phased combat operations these UMTs should be task-organized by division to the BCTs for appropriate phases and weighted to the main effort, and 2) Religious support plans in the BCT should include guidance for moving these UMTs to their task-organized companies throughout the division during the time spent in assembly areas or for long halts in attack positions. Issue: UMTs need to be on FBCB 2 distribution plan for Third Infantry Division (Mechanized (3ID [M]) Discussion: The ability to communicate on the battlefield is crucial to the timely provision of RS to casualties, both killed in action (KIA) and wounded in action (WIA). UMT assessment of soldier morale, combat readiness ,and intervention in cases of battle fatigue are all improved with the situational awareness and text messaging capabilities of the FBCB 2 . UMTs already have table of organization and equipment (TOE) requirements for FBCB 2 in all digitized units and the currently fielded software for FBCB 2 has a request for RS drop-down dialogue box under �Log Call for Support.� UMTs also have requirements for communication capabilities equal to command and staff elements in all current basis of issue plans (BOIPs) and the objective force. Recommendation: Provide MTOE authorization for all UMTs in the 3ID FBCB 2 distribution plan. Issue: MTOE authorized communication equipment unavailable to some UMTs. Discussion: Some TF UMTs did not receive their MTOE authorized SINCGARS during preparation for combat in Kuwait. There is a large element of risk involved when the UMT, one of the most mobile staff sections in the command, moves about the battlefield without communication. UMT vehicle SINCGARS have both Department of the Army (DA)-level TOE requirements and major Army command (MACOM) MTOE authorizations in all combat units. Provision of RS becomes much more difficult when authorized equipment is not made available to UMTs. Army doctrine and Army training and fielding plans assume UMTs will have access to all required/authorized equipment. Recommendation: Task forces should not pull MTOE authorized communication equipment from UMTs to provide communication capabilities to other users who do not have demonstrated requirements or MACOM authorization. Issue: Automation requirements Discussion: UMTs had requirements for access to computers and other automation devices during combat operations. Often, the only means of communication with the division UMT was by tactical website (TACWEB) reporting. Automation devices are not reflected as requirements in the TOE. Recommendation: Combat Developments Directorate, United States Army Chaplain Center and School should capture lessons learned from the 3ID (M) combat experience in Iraq to provide justification for TOE requirements and/or changes to doctrine. Issue: Religious support to battle-fatigued soldiers and small units suffering WIAs and KIAs. Discussion: UMTs spent a large amount of time providing RS to small units between operations involved in close combat. This activity was not adequately planned for, trained, or rehearsed at home station or at NTC. In most cases UMTs fell back on orientation training received on battle fatigue in the Chaplain Basic Course. The UMTs did what they could to encourage and sustain the fighting morale of soldiers who experienced the effects of killing large numbers of enemy soldiers at close range. An unexpected result of this RS was the effect upon the UMTs themselves. They needed to find time to pace their ministry and ways and means to refresh their own morale and spirit. Recommendation: The United States Army Chaplain Center and School Combat Developments Directorate, in concert with the Training Directorate, should interview 3ID(M) UMTs and develop a more aggressive and intensive course of action for training UMTs. This should occur in both the Officer and Enlisted Training Divisions. Training should reflect guidance for the debriefing of UMTs and �who ministers to the ministers.� Issue: Memorial ceremonies. Discussion: Memorial ceremonies were conducted at a variety of places and times during combat operations. Some commanders decided to wait until they reached Baghdad before conducting ceremonies. Others held their ceremonies soon after the loss of a soldier. All were based on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T) and until the BCTs reached their planned limit of advance. Appropriate honors were rendered when troops were not fully engaged in combat and when a large amount of soldiers could be assembled without a high degree of risk from indirect fires. A couple of BCTs held a ceremony following hostilities in addition to the ceremonies held earlier at battalion or company levels. Recommendation: Sustain. Issue: Placement of UMTs on the battlefield. Discussion: When the units experienced the majority of KIA/WIA, no repositioning of UMT assets was necessary due to prior planning and placement of UMTs. Soldiers, both KIA and WIA and those in proximity to these events received timely RS. 1st BCT and 2nd BCT had received additional UMT assets for combat operations. Separate battalion UMTs were placed in the brigade support area (BSA) for organic support of their own unit assets with a "be prepared to" mission to support casualty care at Charlie Med and to cover the BSA when the forward support battalions (FSB) UMT moved forward with the forward logistics element (FLE). Some utilized their slice UMTs forward as needed. These task organizations were published in both division and some BCT FRAGOs when appropriate and in all cases coordinated with the commands involved. Other UMTs from supporting units were task organized for particular phases and efficiently came under control of the gaining BCT for support and reporting. The brigade chaplain to commander and brigade chaplain to brigade chaplain coordination is critical to the success and effectiveness of attached or OPCON UMTs. Recommendation: The division chaplain should sustain this kind of support of the division main effort by providing task organized UMTs to strengthen RS and shorten response time to critical incidents. Direct and general religious support are both enhanced and more effectively use the UMT assets available. Issue: UMT integration in TF and BCT home station and NTC training. Discussion: BCT UMTs were fully integrated in Marne Focus and NTC, to include the full utilization of MTOE equipment (M998 and SINCGARS). UMT participation in the BCT/TF military decision-making process (MDMP) rehearsals, and the aggressive placement of UMTs forward on the NTC battlefield is directly related to their ability to execute UMT battlefield tasks during combat operations. Recommendation: Sustain full integration in field training for UMTs, to include participation in the Leader Training Program prior to NTC deployments. Issue: Catholic coverage during combat operations Discussion: Two Catholic priests were assigned to the division. One was in 1st BCT the other in 2nd BCT leaving 3rd BCT and all attachments without dedicated Roman Catholic (RC) support. During combat operations the Catholic priests could not be moved across the battlefield in a timely manner due to the lethality of the enemy and the distances involved. Only after reaching Baghdad were RC services able to be scheduled for other units. Recommendation: Units must develop a program at home station to recruit and train EMEs to support RC soldiers during combat operations. Return to Table of Contents |
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