Topic A - Deployment

Issue: Shortages of CDE at unit level were not identified until deployment or after deployment.

Discussion: Much of the data on the unit status reports (USRs) prior to deploying was incomplete or incorrect upon deployment. For example: There were shortages of 1st set boots, gloves, and mask filters. Many units were required to use the division 2nd set boots and gloves in order to equip their units with their 1st set. This necessitated the division chemical section ordering 10,000 plus boots and gloves after entry into theater, thereby putting an unexpected stress on the theater logistics system. In many cases decontamination kits and other lot numbered items (requiring tracking of expiration dates) had expired and required emergency requisitions prior to deployment.

Recommendation: Move all CDE management to installation level. Place the annual CDE dollars (approx 1.4M) under division chemical control for execution by the Directorate of Readiness (DOR) warehouse. All stocks are maintained in the DOR warehouse to include the following items. joint service lightweight integrated suit technology (JSLIST), boots, gloves, helmet covers, M291, M295, M100, and M256A1.

Issue: JSLIST fielding, distribution plan, and execution.

Discussion: The division as a whole deployed with units signing for their JSLIST suit from Fort. Stewart. In many instances the soldiers that signed for their individual suits were not sized properly by their units. There were soldiers that had not been trained on the wear, use, and specifics of the suit IAW division guidance published in multiple orders requiring the above be completed prior to 1 July 02. In addition, many later deploying soldiers did not have any suits at all when coming from Fort Stewart and Fort Benning. It was directed in the deployment order that every soldier deploying would have two sets of JSLIST suit in hand prior to deploying.

Recommendation: Retrain unit level NBC NCOs on the proper sizing of the JSLIST suit. The sizing of the suit is not based on the size of the soldiers� desert camouflage uniform (DCU). Unit level NBC NCOs should maintain a tracking system to ensure that every soldier deployed had a JSLIST suit. Unit level NBC NCOs should train their units on the proper wear of the suit (soldiers were still wearing hoods with the JSLIST). There are tapes available for the units to sign out from division chemical. All units must properly size newly arrived soldiers (within 10 days of arrival) to include proper sizing of other individual protective equipment (IPE) items (mask, boots, and gloves).

Issue: Protective mask maintenance and fitting.

Discussion: The division as a whole, not just the division tactical command post plus (DTAC[+]), had problems with proper mask maintenance and fitting. Significant numbers of soldiers had been issued masks, but not fitted and tested with the Protection Assessment Test System (PATS) IAW FS Reg 525-1. Many units did not deploy with replacement Class IX parts to repair and maintain their masks. Soldiers had no knowledge of the M41 PATS. Soldiers were allowed to deploy without proper preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) being conducted on their protective mask. All of these unit level shortcomings potentially endangered soldiers� lives. Finally, deployed commanders failed to identify and notify the leadership of significant mask problems.

Recommendation: Commanders and leaders at all level must emphasize mask maintenance. Add a check of the PATS test roster to the Marne Inspection Program (MIP). Require a 100% mask inspection of all battalion protective masks as part of the MIP similar to an operational readiness inspection (ORI). Mask sizing should also be added to the standard requirement code (SRC) as units prepare to deploy.

Issue: Units did not deploy with their required CDE as instructed to do so.

Discussion: Prior to deploying to Kuwait for possible combat operations, units were directed/ordered (via OPORDs and FRAGOs) to deploy with all of their CDE. Numerous units failed to abide by the directions and deployed without their CDE. The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) Marne Inspection Program (MIP) and the NBC defense courses taught at Fort Stewart informs personnel/units in charge of unit level NBC programs to order not only required items of issue but also a 5% overage on all items needed to sustain operations. The main items of concern were mask parts; filters, discs, valves, and head harnesses. CDE items should have been ordered while back in garrison. The end result was that many units experienced difficulties with CDE management and specifically mask maintenance due to missing end items or parts to replace non mission capable (NMC) items.

Recommendation: Commander involvement is critical. Increase the rigor of the MIP and ensure emphasis is placed on the fact that CDE requisitions are part of the logistics system and should not be treated as a separate system.

Issue: CDE storage and deployment support by the installation at Fort Benning.

Discussion: The Fort Benning installation staff did not support the issuing of individual protective equipment (IPE) during the deployment of individual soldiers (late deployers) in support of 3rd Brigade 3ID (M). Several attempts were made by the division staff to get the Fort Benning staff to order JSLIST and issue it to those late to deploy to 3rd BCT. The staff at Fort Benning would not order, store, or issue the JSLIST, which resulted in soldiers deploying into a combat environment with only one suit or no suit. In many cases 3ID (M) soldiers deploying from Fort Benning were issued the older battle dress overgarment (BDO).

Recommendation: The division G4 in conjunction with the division chemical section and Fort Stewart DOR should update the current support agreement between Fort Stewart (FORSCOM) and Fort Benning (TRADOC) in order preclude a recurrence of this problem in the future.

Issue: Lack of a standard Army decontaminant for thorough terrain decontamination operations.

Discussion: When the 3ID (M) deployed starting in Aril 02, all Army stocks of decontaminating saturation number 2 (DS2) were frozen by Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM). The SBCCOM memorandum freezing the DS2 stocks directed units to use alternate decontaminants, but did not give instructions on how the alternate decontaminants were to be mixed, stored, and/or applied. Until the 3ID (M) received its M100 Sorbent Decontamination System (SDS) decontamination kits in January 03, this issue was compounded by the lack of DS2 for immediate decontamination operations. The division chemical section coordinated for the purchase of high test hypochlorite (HTH) both at home station and in country to fill the need for a decontaminant for both immediate and thorough decontamination operations.

Recommendation: Project manager (PM) for NBC defense should select a decontaminant and move forward. Until a selection is made, publish thorough interim guidance for the Army to use while we wait. This guidance, at a minimum, should cover which decontaminants to use for immediate and thorough decontamination operations, mixing instructions, storage instructions, and recommended applicator.

Issue: Shortages of MTOE NBC equipment in the theater of operation.

Discussion: Some units deployed from home station without MTOE NBC equipment. Despite numerous directives instructing units to deploy with all their MTOE NBC equipment, there were several units that failed to do so. Some of the critical items left behind were the M41 PATS, M22 automatic chemical agent alarm (ACADAs), M17 SANATORS, and Radiac meters. This directly impacted the division�s ability to ensure all soldiers were properly sized and fitted for protective masks and served to decrease the division force protection level. On several occasions unit rear detachments had to forward MTOE equipment.

Recommendation: Commanders must enforce precombat inspections (PCIs), follow directives, check load plans, and allocate space for the transportation of all MTOE equipment.

Issue: Unorganized and forced equipment draw from the Army prepositioned sock (APS).

Discussion: Prior to deploying to the Kuwait, the company painstakingly scrubbed the ABS document to identify all available equipment for draw. Because two decontamination platoons were already deployed, we were careful to subtract their requirements and focus on the remaining company assets. We applied the same concept for the M58 Smoke Tracks, M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Reconnaissance System (NBCRS) and M12A1 Decontamination Apparatus because we shipped these pacing items from home station. Prior to departing Fort Stewart, we were briefed that we would be drawing from APS-5 and that the necessary equipment had been identified and was ready for it to be drawn. Unfortunately, what we were told would be available and what we actually drew were not the same. First, we drew our equipment from APS-3 (Arifjan) instead of APS-5. Although the change in equipment draw location was unexpected, the system for drawing the equipment created a significant and lingering problem for the company that lasted throughout reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI). Secondly, there was no division, brigade, or battalion representative at the site to assist with the unpredicted draw. After receiving an in-brief from the APS personnel, the company commander briefed them on the equipment that she already had in country or currently enroute. She was only allowed to verify serial numbers for prime movers and weapons. When she questioned the uncomfortable procedure, she was informed that she would be given 10 days to report shortages. An example of a major shortage is the tank and pump unit (TPU) used in the decontamination platoon. The APS did not have any tank and pump units on hand. One of three decontamination platoons were without TPUs for more than two weeks. Because the company was forced to draw two additional heavy expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMMT) fuelers, we devised a plan to use the two 2,500 gallon tankers to transport water and actually have more water readily available to the decontamination platoon. Unfortunately, due to the shortage of JP-8 fuelers in the division, the company was forced to laterally transfer the fuelers to elements in the 3rd Brigade Combat Team. The company finally alleviated the shortage by bartering with other units to secure the TPUs. Additionally, the company had to secure seven 20� military-owned demountable containers (MILVANs) to store excess draw equipment because they were not afforded the opportunity to turn the equipment in.

Recommendation: In this situation much of this could have been avoided if the deployment was treated as though we were going to the National Training Center. Prior to any rotation to NTC, personnel from NTC (specifically the draw yard) visit the upcoming unit and the unit movement officers. Here the two parties sit down in a pre-determined meeting and hash out the future draw grid for the NTC rotation. This system works very well, with little or no frustrations with respect to vehicles and equipment. I believe it would be appropriate for APS personnel to take the time to visit respective deploying units prior to the deploying unit leaving home station. This is how we do it in training and we should follow this example in wartime instead of forcing units to deal with additional pressures from their draw.

Issue: Lack of CDE for Department of the Army (DA) civilians and DA contractors.

Discussion: Up to 50 DA civilians and DA contractors deployed with 3ID (M) in support of combat operations. The contractors served both in Kuwait and traveled with the division to Baghdad. 3ID (M) was required to provide CDE for these support personnel. Equipment supplied included: protective masks, JSLIST suits, boots, gloves, decontamination kits, and medical chemical defense material. None of these requirements are accounted for on the applicable authorization documents, meaning divisional units had to provide CDE and supplies from stocks intended for use by soldiers. The shortage of protective masks in the division and theater was so acute the division was required to use all of its spare �float� masks to cover the civilian support personnel thereby leaving no extra masks in the division once combat operations began.

Recommendation: There is no authorization on the division MTOE to support this requirement, therefore, DA should direct that all DA civilians and civilian contractors process through the Continental United States Replacement Center (CRC) at Fort Benning no matter where home station is or for whatever reason they are deploying into theater. In addition, ensure that CRC has enough CDE to completely equip all civilians who process through.

Topic B - Force Modernization

Issue: Suggested JWARN upgrades/modifications.

Discussion: The JWARN system was an invaluable tool at the division level for both planning and execution. Through extensive use of JWARN, we identified the following recommended upgrades to software packages.

JWARN should be able to communicate with command and control personal computers (C 2 PC), Maneuver Control System-Light (MCS-L), and FBCB 2 . This includes, the ability to automatically import unit locations, import overlays, and export nuclear, biological, and chemical warning and reporting system (NBCWRS) reports and plots. We were forced to manually input unit locations when we had both the blue tracker (FBCB 2 ) and MCS-L available; however JWARN does communicate with either system. In addition, unit locations cannot be exported to other JWARN users, thereby necessitating each individual JWARN user to battle track the entire battlefield versus a higher headquarters feeding unit locations.

JWARN does not retain user drawn graphics. Once JWARN is shut down all user drawn graphics are lost. This has obvious short falls for planning and execution.

JWARN will not import graphics from MCS-L, FBCB 2 or C 2 PC. Coupled with the inability to retain user drawn graphics, this lack of capability severely limits the utility of JWARN as a planning and battle-tracking tool.

JWARN is tied to the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) backbone. Since it has no tie to the mobile FBCB 2 backbone, JWARN loses its utility when units are on the move or not connected to MSE.

JWARN only allows one unit overlay at a time; while there may be several types of unit overlays that one needs to track. During operations in support of IRAQI FREEDOM, we tracked enemy spot reports, friendly unit locations, decontamination points, and potential sensitive sites on JWARN. Due to the limitation of a single unit overlay, all of these were required to be tracked on the same overlay. This made the overlay needlessly crowded and difficult to read.

The chemical downwind hazard modeling functions (VLSTRAC or DTRA software) were not fully integrated into the JWARN program. There is no way to create a modeled downwind plot overlay and place it on the operational map.

Recommendations: Accept that JWARN will not be of operational utility for units on the move or integrate JWARN into the FBCB 2 system or some other wireless backbone. In addition, make the following upgrades:

• Add an import/export/save overlays function.
• Add an import unit locations and export to other JWARN users function.
• Add a multiple unit overlays versus a single combined unit overlay capability.
• Add a function to save user drawn graphics and import/export from standard Army platforms.
• Complete the integration of modeling software.

  Issue: FBCB 2 NBC tools were not easy to use nor were they intuitive.

  Discussion: Chemical downwind message (CDM) data was difficult to load and read since it was not in the standard 3 line format (W,X,Y) IAW ATP-45. In addition, loading NBC Reports1,2, and 3 data was cumbersome. The division tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP) was to use the free text message format and follow the GTA 3-6-8 format. This eliminated some of the data input problems, but also bypasses some of the automated features in the FBCB 2, such as automatic warnings for vehicles approaching a hazard area. Finally, all wind data in FBCB 2 is in knots versus the Army standard of miles per hour (mph).

  Recommendation: Modify the FBCB 2 NBCWRS interface to make it more intuitively obvious and more closely mimicking the current GTA 3-6-8 card. Look at building a direct tie to FBCB 2 and/or C 2 PC. Also, increase the bandwidth of FBCB 2 to allow the transfer of larger files.

  Issue: JSLIST protective suit was a significant upgrade from the BDO.

  Discussion: The 3ID (M) Infantry�s experience with the JSLIST was very positive. The lighter nature of the suit allowed the soldiers to operate in temperatures approaching 100 F with only minimal degradation. This is a significant improvement over the BDO. There were several issues associated with the JSLIST suit within the division.

  The suit proved to be not as durable as the BDO under the strenuous conditions of the battlefield. Infantry soldiers easily tore many suits as they went about their day-to-day activities. When soldiers were conducting fueling and maintenance operations the suit also appeared to absorb petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) products through to the inner lining more readily than the BDO.

  Recommendation: Both of the above deficiencies were addressed by changes to division standing operating procedures (SOP). Units were directed to selectively downgrade mission oriented protection posture (MOPP) levels while conducting fuel or maintenance operations or wear wet weather gear over the suit.

  Topic C - Maintenance

  Issue: M93 and M93A1 FOX contract maintenance support was non-existent.

  Discussion: We were unable to conduct maintenance operations on the FOX vehicles and systems in the division until after combat operations were over due to the inability to get the contract maintenance personnel forward. If combat operations had been extended, this would have been a serious issue, given that 2 of 12 M21s, 2 of 12 MM1s were not serviceable at the end of combat operations and numerous vehicles developed Class III oil leaks. Bottom line, General Dynamics maintenance did not provide any support until after units had been in Baghdad for over a week and after nearly all hostilities had ended.

  Recommendation: Long term solution: Accelerate getting the capability offered by the FOX onto a common Army vehicle chassis. Short term solution: Modify the current FOX maintenance contract to allow the contract maintenance to go forward on the battlefield at least as far forward as the brigade support areas (BSAs).

  Issue: Authorized stockage list (ASL) for FOX M93 and M93A1

  Discussion: The CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) and Kuwait/Iraq theater of operations were logistically immature for the M93A1 NBC reconnaissance vehicle. One point not identified by NTC/JRTC/CMTC rotations is that mortar and high caliber munitions create easy mobility kills of the M93. Tires were a huge issue and, as in the case of 2/6/92, the unit was not sent with any spares. The depth of the battlespace created difficulties in pushing spares from the rear. Additionally, those spares, which should have been carried by the vehicles upon crossing the line of departure (LD), were pushed forward from Camp Udari. This was not the only �minor� maintenance challenge that presented itself. A problem arose when for each small matter the unit was forced to send the M93 back to 92nd Chemical Company or contractors.

  Recommendation: Each M93A1 squad should have a mechanic organic to the element. This procedure would alleviate the need for 92nd Chemical Company to manage the maintenance slice while having little to no involvement with the supported units and many times being positioned well behind the supported unit in the division battlespace. Also, a prescribed load list (PLL) should be established not at the company or platoon level but at the squad level, accompanying the maintenance asset to the supported unit.

  Topic D - Operations

  Issue: Inability of the FOX system to monitor for toxic industrial chemicals and materials. (TICs/TIMs).

  Discussion: There were several points during 3ID (M) combat operations where the ability to monitor for TIC/TIMs would have been very beneficial. For example: We detonated (using close air support [CAS]) enemy chemical tractor trailers that we suspected of containing possible phosgene or other industrial compound located generally upwind from the BCT assault positions. The decision was made to destroy the vehicles while the wind was low, atmospherics were unstable, and winds generally not towards the division. Weather forecasts had the wind shifting towards the division around end of evening nautical twilight (EENT). We were forced to mask the entire division as a precaution because we could not monitor definitively for phosgene or other industrial compounds.

  Recommendation: Reintroduce the TIC/TIM chip in the FOX and consider upgrading the chip to increase the library of chemical compounds it can identify.

  Issue: False alarms by the M22 were too common and diminished soldier�s confidence in the system.

  Discussion: The false positive rate for the M22 is too high. Multiple false alarms had the effect of diminishing soldier�s confidence in the system. They were also potentially dangerous by forcing division forces into a higher level of MOPP than necessary when in contact or conducting C 2 of units in contact. In addition to the false positives we identified several logistics issues with the M22 listed below.

  • Mounts in the offense. Given the continuous offensive nature of the fight dismounted, M22s were not useful.
  • Battery shortages. There was a theater wide shortage of batteries causing many of the M22s in the division to go unused.
  • The division is currently fielded at 10% of requirements for M22 mounts (requirement is approximately 7,000 systems).

  Recommendations: The division should purchase the remaining mounts for all M22s in the division. The next generation pf chemical detector should be more reliable (less false positives, current system designed at a false positive rate of 3% or less). A solution could be a duel sampling and monitoring system. Each system could maintain the 3% rate, but both systems have to ring off to get an alarm. If one system rings off and the other does not, the system reflects a fault versus an alarm. The combined false positive rate would be less than .09%. Halving the number of systems authorized could mitigate the cost. The division came nowhere near using the 7,000 systems authorized.

  Issue: Leaders not familiar with the characteristics of chemical agents in desert climates.

  Discussion: Chemical agents dissipate rapidly in hot weather. Hot air convection currents carry agents upward and, therefore, minimize cloud travel and the threat of vapor hazards for ground troops.

  Recommendation: Think of classic G-nerve agent persistency to be similar to that of water. It has little chemical similarity, but it does evaporate at about the same rate. Almost everyone can relate to how quickly water evaporates in most terrain and under climatic conditions. In very hot weather, like water, classic G-nerve agents last only minutes, but creates a significant, short- lived vapor hazard. G-agent effects are immediate. Think of mustard agents as being delayed-acting (effects often coming 6-12 hrs after exposure for H series) persistent chemical agents with the following rules of thumb. In the hot, daytime desert temperatures, mustard persistency will be about 6 hours or less if the mustard agent is exposed to the atmosphere (i.e., not buried). Depending on velocity, wind can reduce the persistency to around 2 hours. On the other hand, think of classic V-nerve agent persistency to be similar to that of motor oil (i.e., it hardly evaporates at all). It therefore is mainly a contact hazard with long persistency (its persistency is dependent on chemical reactions with the elements, not on evaporation.). V agents, like mustard agents, are delayed acting because they must soak through clothing and the skin to be effective. Once in the blood stream, however, they are extremely fast acting and symptoms, to include death, will occur in seconds to minutes. Entry through wounds and cuts will produce immediate effects.

  Issue: Sensitive site exploitation (SSE) facilities.

  Discussion: One of the reasons for the attack on Iraq was to expose key weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities. During the transition from combat operations to support and stability operations (SASO), we did not attempt to secure these key facilities before looting started. The looting in essence turned the facilities into crime scenes. The visible clues that may have provided a detailed analysis on WMD production, research and development �& D), or storage were either destroyed or carried away by the local populace.

  Recommendation: All future SSE facilities should be secured by ground combat or special forces soldiers. This would allow for a detailed exploitation instead of a crime scene investigation.

  Topic E - Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE)

  Issue: The division chemical section is not properly equipped to fulfill all of its missions as the nuclear, biological, chemical center (NBCC).

  Discussion: The modern battlefield is a very fast, fluid, and non-linear battlefield. In order to maintain situation awareness and continuous communications in this type of environment, the division chemical section needs to have its own FBCB 2 and tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications.

  Our most important function as the NBCC for the division is the establishment and maintenance of the NBC Warning and Reporting System. Our primary NBCWRS tool was JWARN. Redundant systems in place were digital non-secure voice terminal (DVNT), E-mail, tactical local area network (TACLAN), Iridium phones, SINCGARS and FBCB 2 . While the major support commands (MSCs) were stationary all systems were effective; however, once the MSCs commenced their offensive operations and the distance between them and the division main command post (DMAIN) increased, most systems became ineffective. The JWARN, while a great tool for the NBCWRS and an NBC analysis tool, was of little value to units while on the move. For those units on the move, it became a stand alone system, not capable of forwarding messages. Units on the move quickly got out of FM/SINCGARS range. The only systems that were effective for communications were the FBCB 2 and the TACSAT communications. However, many units did not have FBCB 2 or TACSAT communications. While FBCB 2 was available in the DMAIN, primarily the G3 section uses it.

  Recommendation: The MTOE for the 92nd Chemical Company needs to change. In order to enable the division chemical section to fulfill the critical role of NBCC, primarily responsible for the NBCWRS, it needs its own FBCB 2 and TACSAT communications.

  Issue: Shortages of MTOE NBC equipment in the theater of operation

  Discussion: Some units deployed from home station without MTOE NBC equipment.

  Recommendation: Scrub MTOE for availability of prime movers to move all MTOE equipment. If need be, submit changes to the MTOE to facilitate the movement of all MTOE NBC equipment.

  Issue: Division chemical lacks the equipment to run an effective NBCC and NBC element (NBCE) in the DMAIN and the DTAC.

  Discussion: As a result of the chemical section being a part of 92nd Chemical Company and not a detachment in support of the division special staff, we are often left behind the other staff section in the area of new equipment in support of the division. This was noticeable during this deployment when other sections had all new tent age and automated equipment. The automation equipment in division chemical, needs upgrading in order to effectively manage the NBC Warning and Reporting System across the division.

  Recommendation: Turn division chemical into a chemical detachment, and allocate funds to upgrade on par with the division. Or allocate funds on a quarterly basis in order to function effectively.

  Issue: Communication

  Discussion: DMAIN NBCC was not capable of communicating on the move or once BCTs exceeded certain distances. The inability of the DMAIN NBCC to communicate causes a vacuum in situational awareness and destroys the NBC Warning and Reporting Network. During various instances, the NBCC was completely relying on Iridium phones provided by the staff weather officer (SWO) (and only at the halt) and TACSAT (only at the halt).

  Recommendation: MTOE changes must be initiated to ensure the DMAIN NBCC is provided with up-to-date communication equipment.

  Issue: M93A1 NBCRS support/authorization by MTOE

  Discussion: Persistent chemical munitions are utilized in the same way that obstacles are, to shape the battlefield. The inherent mission of a division cavalry squadron is to provide reconnaissance and security for the division�s assets. The M93A1 allows for greater situational awareness and allows for a contaminated area to be bypassed, breached (fixed site/terrain decontamination), or crossed at an appropriate MOPP level necessary to protect soldiers. The M93A1 squad attached to 3-7 CAV proved itself invaluable throughout the mission and in one instance provided detection capabilities near Karbala, where trace amounts of H-Series Blister were detected by two separate M22 ACADAs and the M21. The MM1 validated a negative M256 kit, which allowed us to avoid forcing the entire unit into an increased MOPP level, soldiers enduring the stress of MOPP4 over an extended period of time, and the loss of momentum during offensive operations.

  Recommendation: The M93A1 should be an organic asset to a division cavalry squadron.

  Return to Table of Contents