November 22, 2024
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November 22, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 25 Army Airspace Command and Control (A 2 C 2 ) During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, a large numbers of airspace users needed access to the division�s battlespace. Whether it was fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or cruise missiles, artillery, rocket, or mortar fires, divisional or non-divisional assets, all had to work with the division to gain access to and engage the enemy. Considering the large number of users, this was a noteworthy task, but it did not start with the outbreak of hostilities. The division began managing its airspace as units arrived in Kuwait and conducted training in preparation for the attack. This train-up period proved instrumental in the division�s success in deconflicting its airspace as numerous tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were practiced and internalized. The initial plan for implementing the Army airspace command and control (A 2 C 2 ) measures was for the division main command post (DMAIN) A 2 C 2 cell to layout formal airspace control measures (ACMs) at least 48 hours in advance and the division tactical operations center (DTAC) A 2 C 2 cell to finalize the synchronization and deconfliction roughly 24 hours in advance by using informal ACMs. The division�s A 2 C 2 efforts were successful overall. There was only one moment where non-divisional aviation assets were in conflict within the division�s airspace and may have led to a fratricide. The DTAC monitored the situation and performed last-minute deconfliction before fratricide occurred. Communications between different A2C2 cells was difficult due to the speed the division moved and distance at which the division conducted operations. The 4th Brigade tactical operations (TACOPS) often made direct coordination with V Corps G3 Air and A 2 C 2 element to resolve airspace conflicts when the division A 2 C 2 element lacked communications. Lessons Learned During continuous offensive operations when communications are difficult, the G3 Air needs to deconflict the airspace in the DTAC where he can communicate directly with the division�s airspace users The implementation of key TTPs during the training and planning cycle are instrumental for successful A 2 C 2 during the actual fight Monitoring the use of the division�s airspace is essential for success and Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS) can assist with this effort when needed Though a valuable tool, the Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS) still has a number of issues and must be re-engineered and re-tested in order to be completely successful. Topic A - Deconfliction of the Division�s Airspace Issue: Army airspace command and control (A 2 C 2 ) for the close fight Discussion: Every type of element that could use the division�s airspace did including: air interdiction (AI), close air support (CAS), Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM), UAV, attack aviation in deep attack and close combat attack (CCA), Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), rockets, cannon artillery, and mortars. The technique we used to deconflict the airspace was a solid set of TTPs that were developed prior to crossing the line of departure, nightly A 2 C 2 meetings in the DTAC, and stringent execution of what we agreed upon. TTPs that we developed included using a hard deck for CAS of 10,000 ft above ground level (AGL) and requiring the brigades to clear the airspace if they were to fire indirect above 10,000 ft AGL. We also standardized the ingress/egress routes for CAS that allowed for simultaneous execution of targets with CAS and artillery using ordnance (ORD) X. When attack aviation was used in a CCA role, it was controlled by the brigade fire support officer (FSO). This technique prevented aircraft from entering his zone without his knowledge while he was firing artillery or mortars. When one of the TTPs could not be deconflicted, one of the systems competing for the airspace was stopped until it was clear to reengage with that system. One of the critical points we made was that BCTs own the airspace above their boundaries and that aircraft had to often travel across other BCT�s airspace to get to their intended targets. Placing a huge restricted operations zone (ROZ), airspace coordination area (ACA), or other form of restrictive fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) over the division battlespace would only restrict fires and proved undesirable. We had to limit the amount of space the aircraft would take up. We also had to be careful of airspace coordination areas (ACAs) that uses an �easting� or �northing� gridline to restrict the firing of surface-to-surface fires. At times we could actually be shutting down another BCTs fires because of a huge informal ACA. By building routes and CAS stacks, we limited the airspace the aircraft used and still utilized all forms of surface-to-surface fires. Nightly in the DTAC, we held a 5-10 minute meeting with the air defense officer, artillery officer, air liaison officer (ALO), aviation brigade liaison officer (LNO), and the TAIS noncommissioned officer (NCO). This meeting deconflicted assets that were to enter/exit the division�s airspace during the next 24-48 hours. It brought all players together to synchronize the current and short-term battles and proved to be very effective. Recommendation: Maintain the systems that we developed for deconflicting airspace. While each theater will direct different TTPs, develop, publish, and ruthlessly enforce what has been agreed upon. Develop multiple ways to facilitate communications within the DTAC to allow all on the DTAC A 2 C 2 team to influence the division�s airspace. Issue: Airspace and position area hazard (PAH)/position area assessment (PAA) deconfliction Discussion: Deconfliction of PAHs/PAAs with V Corps artillery/division artillery (DIVARTY)/A 2 C 2 /fire support element (FSE) was a constant struggle at 4th Brigade tactical operations center (TACOPS) and FSE. Last minute changes, primarily by V Corps artillery, of PAH/PAA locations significantly affected all airspace and fire support coordination measures, leaving no time for proper analysis of impacts. While these changes were quickly adjusted and published out via Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)/Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS)/TAIS, it still increased the chance of �big sky, little bullet� theory being proven untrue. Additionally, the status of PAH/PAAs (active or inactive or no longer used) needed to be published/radio call by Corps Artillery/DIVARTY, which would increase the flexibility of rotary wing (RW) and fixed wing (FW) operations. A standard PAH size would be a big step in the right direction, as it changed from 16 x 16, to 7 x 7, to 3 x 3. The division A 2 C 2 cell added no value to this process. They acted only in a middleman capacity with no analysis or knowledge of the impact they had on 4th Brigade operations. For example, 4th Brigade would receive a new PAH 3 hrs out from an operation, located directly under a route or ROZ. 4th Brigade would have to make inquiries of DIVARTY, Corps Artillery, and Corps A 2 C2 to find out the ground truth. Recommendation: Early planning and direct coordination should occur among DIVARTY, FSE, and A 2 C 2 elements to ensure airspace and PAH/PAA locations are deconflicted and support the scheme of maneuver and fires. Early identification of land and terrain suitable for FA units and the size of the PAH/PAA is critical so ACMs and FSCMs can be developed around those areas. Topic B - Monitoring Use of the Division�s Airspace Issue: Use of AMDWS to assist with monitoring the division�s A 2 C 2 effort Discussion: Since the TAIS system was never operational, the AMDWS with input from the division�s SENTINELs and the tactical digital information link (TADIL)-J feed served as the only way the division leadership could monitor the use of airspace within our battlespace. The division leadership was able to monitor the passage of friendly aircraft through our airspace as well as track our own aviation brigade assets as they targeted the enemy within range of our radar systems. Recommendation: In order to manage the division�s airspace, there must be a system in place that provides a real-time picture of where air assets are located. The first choice would be a dedicated A 2 C 2 vehicle such as TAIS, but AMDWS can serve as a workable backup system if it does not compromise the SENTINELs primary mission of identifying the enemy air threat forward of the division�s immediate battlespace. Issue: The unavailability of a TADIL-A feed to support TAIS Discussion: The TADIL-A feed for air track data from airborne platforms was impossible to receive due to three issues. First the communications security (COMSEC) for the KG-40 HF Crypto Device was not readily available in the division; it had to be obtained from the COMSEC custodian at combined forces land component command (CFLCC) HQ at Camp Doha. The second issue was the HF receiver antenna array and the problem of erecting it in a timely manner with only two personnel. The third issue was getting on the operation task link (OPTASKLINK) in order to receive the correct settings and frequencies required to program the air defense systems integrator (ADSI) computers. Even after all these problems were resolved, there were additional issues the section didn�t know about until the field engineers and Project Managers Office representative brought them up. The major one was the correct data terminal set (DTS) cable had to be installed in the TAIS. The next issue was the settings on the ADSI and 95-S had to be readjusted for proper reception. Recommendation: The current TADIL-A process needs to be streamlined in order to facilitate rapid employment and ease of use. The satellite communication (SATCOM) radio should be used to monitor the fight instead of listening to the joint interface control officer (JICO) net for changes in HF frequencies. A simpler antenna that is attached to and can be erected from the shelter such as the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) used by the AMDWS needs to be employed. Issue: Failure of TAIS technical support to respond in a timely manner to equipment outages. Discussion: Hardware and software engineers arrived in Kuwait prior to the initiation of hostilities and provided significant hardware/software support to the TAIS. Their on-site training of personnel with dealing with hardware/software issues previously not covered during new equipment training was crucial in preparing the air traffic service (ATS) LNO section for combat employment of the TAIS. The main issue with the engineering team was that it was over tasked trying to help all the other TAIS systems and could not react quickly enough when immediate problems arose. This was due to the distances between sites and their base of operations as well as difficulty in contacting them. The 3ID (M) TAIS shelter was assigned to the DTAC that controlled the close fight of the main effort. This shelter should have been given priority in maintenance and technical support due to the important role it played during the fight. Many of the equipment/software problems encountered were easily corrected. An additional week of NET training in the Unix software language and operator trouble-shooting especially under unusual conditions would help immensely. Where the contractors are positioned is an important factor in their ability to respond in a timely manner. Other systems had enough contractors in theater, which allowed them to live and travel with the user unit the entire time. Recommendation: Technical support for the TAIS system, from new equipment training to contractor support, must be re-looked. Issue: TAIS did not work as advertised. Discussion: TAIS is an airspace coordination system, supposedly capable of tracking aircraft over the Division�s battlespace. Additionally, it allows for ACM input and dissemination throughout the theater. The ACM process worked sufficiently, however, the air track system did not work for the duration of the campaign. Additionally, the system requires extensive maintenance and contractor support, which was not available during the campaign. Recommendation: Either correct the system to provide flexibility and capability to operate in different networks or develop a system that provides the service required. A viable alternative is upgrade global command and control (GCCS) command and control personal computers (C 2 PC) to incorporate the air combat maneuvering range (ACMR) and fires processes, thereby eliminating unnecessary automatic data processing (ADP) systems. Issue: Mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) phones and the SIPRNET were not always reliable, especially during movement. Discussion: Tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios were the primary means of communications used to control the fight and relay information at the DTAC. Recommendation: Assign a dedicated A 2 C 2 TACSAT frequency for immediate ACMR requests and secondary communications. Wireless SIPRNET connectivity might also be considered as an alternative. Issue: Only one FM radio can be remoted to the vehicle cab during movement. Discussion: The ability to maintain communications on the move was critical during the fight. Secure FM is the primary means of communications, however the distances traveled required long-range radios. All the radios in the TAIS should be remoted to the cab for on the move communications and situational awareness. This would also require using a whip antenna for the HF radio since it is the only radio that doesn�t have an antenna mounted on the shelter. Recommendation: All the radios in the TAIS should be remoted to the cab for on the move communications and situational awareness. Issue: TAIS electronic component failures and lack of durability in a desert environment degraded overall system performance. Discussion: The following equipment failed or didn�t perform to standard due to component failure or contamination from sand:
Recommendation: A better stock of replacement parts needs to be included in the current prescribed load list (PLL). Components that are not sealed need better filters and an air compressor should be included with the system for cleaning electronic circuit boards. Return to Table of Contents |
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