November 13, 2024
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November 13, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 26 Command and Control (C 2 ) At the division level, the number one lesson learned over the entire Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is that units from platoon to division level must be able to command and control on the move. Systems and equipment that could not execute on the move quickly became ineffective. Twice during OIF, the division moved over 350 km in less than 80 hours. These types of offensive operations required all units to plan, command, and control while moving towards the objective. The Army must develop long-range communications and data systems that work on the move. Units from TF to division level desperately need C 2 vehicles, with updated technology and an on the move capability. Units should also work to ensure as much planning as possible is accomplished prior to line of departure (LD). This develops a common picture and focus that allows a more fluid command and control operation. This chapter will discuss communications systems, equipment, and planning that worked well or should be improved. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Communications Observation Synopsis FM communications from BCT to division level did not meet the requirement for the 3ID (M) during OIF. BCTs and divisions must have a communication system that does not rely on line-of-sight. Line-of-sight radios no longer provide adequate coverage for a mechanized brigade or division on the move. Multidirectional tactical satellite (TACSAT) provided the best voice communications for units in the offense. Crucial to its success however, was a high look angle and a broadband frequency. The high look angle allowed vehicles on the move to mount the antenna oriented straight up. This allowed the antenna to receive a signal regardless of the direction of travel. The broadband frequency was critical, as the narrowband frequencies distorted the transmissions and required several calls to relay information. Modifying the antenna mounts and gaining a broadband frequency gave the division a long-range voice communication system. However, the single wideband frequency only allowed the division to effectively operate the command net over extended distances. The division fires and operations and intelligence (O&I) nets that operated on narrowband frequencies were ineffective. Additional wideband frequencies and antenna mounting systems that provide an on the move capability are required if TACSAT is the primary voice communication system for a mechanized division. BCTs and divisions must have multiple dedicated nets that provide clear and responsive voice communications over great distances. Lack of an �on the move� capability also limited many of the division�s data systems. Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB 2 ) proved to be the only data system that truly operated on the move. Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) had �on the move� capability, however, it was limited to the line-of sight requirements of the FM radio. Other systems, such as command and control personal computer (C 2 PC), Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), All Source Analysis System � Light (ASAS-L), Maneuver Control System � Light (MCS-L), Air and Missile Defense Work Station (AMDWS), and Joint Warning and Reporting System (JWARN) all required the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) backbone to influence the fight. Due to the rapid advance of the attack the division main command post (DMAIN) and division rear command post (DREAR) both moved simultaneously during much of the operation, making MSE data communications impossible during their movement. This, coupled with the fact that many of the new digital systems do not have the capability to exchange data and are not integrated with each, other makes operations even more challenging. Maps, graphics, and icons are different on each of the electronic enablers, and this forces staffs to input the same data multiple times to gain a common picture. Additional command and control issues arise at the lowest levels of the division. When infantry soldiers dismount from a Bradley Fighting Vehicle they have no ability to talk with mechanized sections within their team. Dismounts must be able to talk to combat vehicles to effectively integrate supporting fires. The current integrated communications security (ICOM) radios and the limited manpacks make it difficult to ensure constant communications. The AN/VRC 148 (v)(2) radio from THALES (NSN 5811-01-463-5543) would meet this requirement. This radio is the size of an AN/PRC 127, but has ability to be loaded with communications security (COMSEC), and can operate in the FH mode. It has the same capabilities as the manpack but is smaller and the accessories that come with it make it easy to operate during dismounted patrols. Topic B - Equipment / Platforms Observation Synopsis During OIF, the division maintained four command posts, the assault command post (ACP), DTAC, DMAIN, DREAR. The commanding general (CG) used the ACP to conduct battlefield circulation and gain a situational understanding to make crucial decisions. The DTAC was led by the Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver) (ADC [M]) and was the primary command and control element for the close fight. The DMAIN served as the key planning command post (CP) and maintainer of the MSE network. The DREAR, controlled by the Assistant Division Commander (Support) (ADC [S]) pushed all logistics. This structure worked fairly well, however, due to the long distances required to move, the DMAIN and DREAR were often on the move. This caused the MSE network to be very limited and proved difficult at times for the DMAIN to maintain situational awareness and influence the fight. During OIF, all BCTs established smaller more mobile command posts. This allowed the BCTs to maintain situational awareness of the close fight and command and control their units in a more responsive manner. Mechanized divisions and BCTs must continue to develop smaller and more mobile command posts. As communications become more advanced, the Army must move away from the large stationary TOCs and MSE based communications. There is also a requirement for an improved command and control vehicle. Six months prior to crossing the LD, the 3ID (M) received three M4 command and control vehicles. These vehicles provided an incredible capability to command and control on the move for the division. They provide a very mobile and survivable C 2 platform. When outfitted with tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios, FM radios, and every data system the division owned, the M4 allowed the DTAC to control the division close fight. The M4�s capabilities were limited by the systems that either required the FM communications or simply could not function on the move. When the DMAIN or DREAR were stationary and providing the MSE network, the M4s could come to a short halt and potentially have all systems fully operational within 30 minutes. However, over 90% of the command and control was conducted on the move using broadband TACSAT, FBCB 2 , and AFTADS with units that were within FM range. The M4s had great features such as the ability to talk wireless between tracks, an automatic FM mast antenna, climate control, and the ability to hold five operators comfortably. While the vehicle was a welcome addition to 3ID (M), there were several key issues that must be improved. The M4 must have fully functional systems on the move. Going to a short halt many times was simply not feasible to keep pace with the lead BCT. The FM mast antenna, climate control system, and wireless track-to-track communications failed at times. These features must be made more durable if the M4 is to be the C 2 vehicle for future mechanized divisions. The ideal C 2 package for a DTAC is three M4s. This allows the maneuver, fires, and intelligence BOSs to operate and air liaison officers (ALOs), assistant division aviation officers (ADAOs), chemical officers (CHEMOs), and air defense officers (ADOs) to maintain situational awareness and contribute to the fight. BCTs can be effective with only one M4, and TFs need a small more mobile version of the M4 to command and control their close fight. The future C 2 vehicle for TFs, BCTs and divisions must be mobile, survivable, and most importantly able to operate both long range voice and data systems on the move. Return to Table of Contents |
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