November 22, 2024
|
November 22, 2024 | |
|
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 28 Civil Affairs (CA) During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion was the battalion supporting the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]). During the attack to Baghdad each maneuver battalion, each brigade headquarters, and each tactical operations center needed civil affairs (CA) support to conduct population resource control operations. Lessons Learned
Topic A - Planning Issue: Planning for the transition to stability and support operations (SASO) and support of civil-military operations (CMO). Discussion: As combat operations progress they will arrive to the point where the unit must transition to SASO. This transition must be carefully planned and targets identified and prioritized for protection. Part of SASO is protecting infrastructure, historic sites, administrative buildings, cultural sites, financial institutions, judicial/legal sites, and religious sites. Protecting these sites must be planned for early in the planning process. All sites must be prioritized and protected based on the guidance from higher headquarters, relative impact on restoring services to the area of operations (AO), and relative importance to the nation/AO. Without prioritizing, the unit will find itself protecting unimportant sites without enough forces to protect important sites. The force occupying an area must plan for civil administration. Questions that must be answered include: Will there be a curfew and what will the hours be? Who will be the interim city leadership? Who will provide fire and police protection? Who has the lead for restoring utilities? Who will coordinate relief priorities? Who has the authority to hire/fire/appoint civil workers and leaders? When will the civilian population be allowed to begin moving about the city? Establishing a centralized information-clearing house is vital to restoring the city functions and keeping the civilian population informed. This clearinghouse may be the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) or adjacent to it. The civil information plan must get the commander�s message out to the civilian population early and often. It must publicize the location of the information-clearing house, the hours for any curfew, anti-looting messages, actions to take when approaching U.S. checkpoints, guidance about expectations for civilian behavior, and the purpose for U.S. forces being in the area of operations (AO). Recommendation: Plan for the transition to SASO as part of the overall plan. Topic B - MTOE Issue: The MTOE for civil affairs battalions is not adequate for operations in a non-permissive or hostile environment or to support offensive operations. Discussion: During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion was the battalion supporting the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) in its attack to Baghdad. The MTOE for the 422nd Civil Affairs Battalion organizes the battalion into a headquarters and headquarters detachment, a general support detachment, and a direct support detachment. The MTOE provides the battalion with M998 high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), SINCGARS radios, four M249 squad automatic weapons, and one water buffalo. The MTOE is deficient in the following areas, manning, weapons, vehicles, and communications. During the attack to Baghdad each maneuver battalion, brigade headquarters, and tactical operations center needed CA support to conduct population resource control operations. This would have required 15 CAT-A teams. The 422nd could only provide five direct support teams (DSTs) and task organized the GS detachment into six more teams. This was not adequate for supporting the division during the attack. During the attack the teams supporting the brigades came under small arms and indirect fire numerous times. The protection afforded by the M998 HMMWVs was not adequate and the teams were forced, in some cases, to withdraw without completing their missions. The cargo and seating capacity of the two-seat, M998s was also inadequate. The DSTs had six personnel, seven with a translator. This required one or more team member to ride in the back of the cargo HMMWV during convoys and operations. This reduced the capacity for the team to carry required supplies and equipment. During the attack all units were required to carry a five-day supply of meals, ready to eat (MREs) and water. This amount of supply nearly filled one of two vehicles. The other vehicle was filled with rucksacks, a-bags, sandbags, a tent, and other team gear. The CA battalion had only four crew-served weapons. All other weapons were either M16A2s or M9 pistols. This severely limited the ability of the teams to defend themselves and the ability of the battalion HHD to support the defense of the DMAIN or DREAR. The battalion deployed with assigned SINCGARS radios. There were not enough radios for each team after the battalion was task organized. The radios did not have enough range to communicate as needed and were not always compatible with the supported unit. When the battalion was mobilized, it received new communications gear. The training on this equipment was not adequate, and the gear did not come with vehicle mounts or an adequate supplies of batteries. The battalion has one water buffalo. It was not able to support battalion operations at the DMAIN and at the DREAR. Recommendation: Staff the battalion with enough DSTs to provide a DST to each maneuver battalion and each brigade headquarters, and a DST each for the DMAIN, DREAR, DTAC. The battalion must also be staffed to provide staff augmentation to the staff of each unit the DSTs are supporting and maintain battalion staff functions. For each DST, provide two M1114 up-armored HMMWVs and one cargo trailer. The vehicles must have radio mounts. The team should have one M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) and one M203 grenade launcher per team. Each team also needs a crew tent. The battalion should have two M240 machineguns with tripods and vehicle mounts. For communications each team needs appropriate FM communications equipment to communicate with the tactical unit it is supporting. Each team also needs single channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) to communicate with division headquarters. The battalion requires two water buffalos to support operations with bulk water. Return to Table of Contents |
|
| © 1998 - 2024 StrategyWorld.com. All rights Reserved. |