December 23, 2024
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December 23, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 3 Mechanized Operations in Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) �Adversaries will also seek to shape conditions to their advantage. They will try to change the nature of the conflict or use capabilities that they believe difficult for U.S. forces to counter. They will use complex terrain, urban environments, and force dispersal methods to offset U.S. advantages� FM 3.0, Operations. In an attempt to create disadvantages for attacking U.S. forces, the Iraqis used urban environments extensively throughout their battlespace. Due to the threat of attack by coalition air and U.S. Army attack helicopters, the concept of open desert maneuver with heavy armored forces was practically abandoned as a form of defensive operations by the Iraqi military. To counter this concentration of heavy forces in urban terrain, U.S. forces used heavy mechanized forces to project combat power at decisive points in order to break urban defense structures. Through the introduction of U.S. mechanized forces in urban areas in the form of raids and blocking positions, Iraqi defensive efforts were isolated or neutralized to the point they became combat ineffective. These successes were contributed mostly to the shock effect created by employing heavy firepower at decisive points. Chapter 3 Mechanized Operations in Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) Topic A - Maneuver Observation Synopsis To avoid detection and targeting by coalition air power as well as Army attack aviation, Iraqi forces sought refuge in urban terrain. Furthermore, to complicate targeting, command and control (C 2 ) and key weapon systems were positioned next to or in sensitive sites on the restricted target list. Despite current mechanized doctrine, the military operations conducted in Iraq proved that a mechanized division is very effective when conducting certain tactical tasks in urban terrain. The division proved that during urban operations it has the capability to decisively conduct the following tactical tasks: fix, block, raid, seize, isolate, contain, and clear. The division successfully blocked avenues of approach in and out of multiple cities during its attack. The tasks of block and isolate were assigned to contain enemy forces, prevent reinforcement, or protect lines of communication. Several raids were also conducted in urban terrain to elicit a response from the enemy; destroy enemy forces; or to determine enemy composition, location, and disposition. The mechanized forces clearly dominated the urban terrain along large avenues of approach and on all objectives, even while facing rocket propelled grenade (RPG) nests and snipers located on roof tops. The task of seize was given to several mechanized units to gain and hold key terrain in zone. The ability of mechanized forces to conduct forced entry into the urban environment and seize key terrain allowed the commander to quickly control critical avenues of approach and lines of communications. The division cleared urban areas within its capability throughout the depth of its battlespace. Mechanized brigades proved capable of clearing large objectives such as the Baghdad International Airport while simultaneously fighting conventional forces beyond the urban area. This war was won in large measure because the enemy could not achieve effects against our armored fighting vehicles. While many contributing factors, such as air interdiction (AI), close air support (CAS), Army aviation, and artillery helped shape the division battlespace, ultimately any war demands closure with an enemy force within the minimum safe distance of supporting CAS and artillery. U.S. armored combat systems enabled the division to close with and destroy heavily armored and fanatically determined enemy forces with impunity, often within urban terrain. Further, the bold use of armor and mechanized forces striking the heart of the regime�s defenses enabled the division to maintain the initiative and capitalize on its rapid success in route to Baghdad. During MOUT, no other ground combat system currently in our arsenal could have delivered similar mission success without accepting enormous casualties. The nature of this battlefield and any future battlefields that present asymmetric threats, mandates a significant security force for soft skinned vehicles, C 2 and logistics packages (LOGPAC). To assist with the division�s economy of force efforts and preservation of combat power in the brigade combat teams (BCTs), combat service support (CSS) units must be equipped with sufficient firepower and receive training on employing these systems against ambushing forces. To assist with the challenges inherent to operating in an asymmetric environment, significant augmentation in the form of MPs, linguists, and civil affairs (CA) is required. Security of key urban areas and enemy prisoner of war (EPW) operations quickly exhaust the division�s limited organic MP company. Similarly the shortage of linguists hindered operations and stability and support operations (SASO) at the company level and below. The battlefield of the 21 st century will revolve around the populated areas of the world. Mechanized forces provide the Army a unique capability to cordon an urban area and conduct a forced entry to seize key terrain or execute a raid under the protection of armored vehicles. The lethality of a mechanized force enables the attacking force to not only destroy the enemy, but also create a shock effect that destroys his will to fight. Finally, training conditions at our Combat Training Centers (CTCs) and home station training events must force leaders at all levels to face not only a multifaceted enemy, but also multiple types of terrain. Without the introduction of complex terrain and enemy in all training events, we will fall short of preparing units for combat in the 21 st century. Lessons Learned
Topic B - Fire Support Observation Synopsis The division�s successful operations in urban terrain was due to the proper use of observers, selection of munitions, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) developed or refined to hastily clear and process fires. Task force (TF) scouts should be built into the observation plan during MOUT. TF scouts equipped with the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS 3 ) can now acquire targets at a longer range and with the same accuracy as the Bradley fire support team (FIST). The observation plan becomes essential immediately after seizing an urban objective and prior to the enemy�s counterattack. There are only a few avenues of approach in MOUT where an observer can see beyond 1000 meters. Early detection out to 1000 meters is key for deciding whether to engage targets with direct or indirect fires. Planning fires in urban terrain requires special attention toward munitions choice and terrain analysis. Iraqi forces used road intersections as key terrain for ambushes because they usually provide the best fields of fire and intersecting avenues of approach. They also heavily used parks and other open areas found in urban terrain to emplace antitank (AT) systems and artillery in the direct fire mode. Dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) and multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) did not produce duds on the roads themselves, but did produce some on the softer ground just off the roads. High explosive/variable time (HE/VT) and high explosive/time fuse (HE/TI) mixes are the preferred munitions for urban missions. For all fire support missions, timely clearance of fires is essential. This is especially true for MOUT, given the time and distance enemy targets are detected forward of friendly forces. Iraqi forces habitually sought refuge in areas that would not be struck by coalition forces with munitions because of the desire to minimize collateral damage. Many times they set headquarters, artillery, rockets, and mortars in or beside schools, mosques, hospitals, and housing areas. While the coalition ROE were clear, there were TTPs used to streamline the process and make counterfires more responsive. Clearance of counterfires and selecting the best method of engagement took longer then expected at the start of combat operations. Establishing a priority for the method of engagement and triggers drastically reduced the time needed to kill enemy artillery systems. The process used by some units, when faced with targeting or counterfire acquisitions sent to the division tactical command post (DTAC), was to first plot both the weapons location and the impact location on the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS). Targets were then checked against the �no strike list� and the five-meter controlled image base (CIB) imagery. If the weapons location was within 500 meters of an item on the �no strike list� or urban area, the impact location was then verified. If it was near U.S. troops, the judge advocate general (JAG) representative in the DTAC was consulted to determine whether or how to service the acquisition. When it was determined that a high potential for collateral damage existed, the target was processed through corps to gain approval to fire. Response options were determined based on availably of assets. The first option was cannons firing high explosive (HE) followed by DPICM with a converged sheaf. Multiple launch rocket systems ( MLRS) fires were used next. CAS was used as a last resort. Finally, counterfires officers (CFOs) began clearing missions directly through the BCTs for fires within the BCT�s battlespace, thereby, reducing clearance of counterfires by several minutes. Air Force close air support (CAS) played an important role in urban operations when collateral damage was a concern. Precision weapons were used against targets such as artillery, surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and time sensitive targets (TSTs). Some great examples of this occurred in the cities of An Najaf and Karbala. Close air support (CAS) successfully engaged artillery and SSMs inside these cities with little damage to surrounding property and buildings. Both Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) and MLRS were attempted in the same fashion but with heavy collateral damage. Precision weapons were also successful in destroying buildings deemed hostile by the ground commander. Delay fusing and precision �bunker busting� munitions allowed the destruction of buildings while those beside it were left standing. Lessons Learned Topic C - Aviation Operations Observation Synopsis Army aviation proved effective during urban operations by using the cover of darkness, high-speed aircraft movement techniques, and running fire procedures. Additionally, Iraqi forces collocated critical assets with protected sites such as schools, hospitals, mosques, and residential areas to avoid coalition targeting. Throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, air troops equipped with OH-58D Kiowa aircraft conducted operations in built-up areas. On several missions, they encountered heavy small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fires. Due to the restricted visibility associated with operating in urban terrain, helicopters became vulnerable to small arms, RPGs, and shoulder fired surface to air (SA) weapons. Although several aircraft received damage while conducting combat operations, none were lost due to enemy fire. This was largely due to movement techniques used by the aircrews. Prior to introducing Army aviation assets in built-up areas, a thorough mission analysis must be conducted to identify the risk to aircrews. Based on this analysis, aircrews can modify mission TTPs as required in order to mitigate as much risk as possible. OH-58D aircraft operated at or below 50 feet above ground level (AGL) while maintaining airspeed of at least 60 knots. Scout weapons teams maintained a separation of approximately 200-400 meters between scout and gun. Conducting operations at night will greatly increase aircraft survivability. Lessons Learned Topic D - Training Observation Synopsis U.S. forces fought like they trained. The division conducted integrated multiple live fire maneuver exercises, MOUT exercises, and detailed command and control exercises at task force through division level. All maneuver battalions conducted externally evaluated company through battalion force on force and live fire training events focused on offensive operations. Every rifle squad conducted combined arms training focused on entering and clearing a complex trench system and a multiple room structure. The division artillery (DIVARTY) conducted live fire training events prior to crossing the line of departure that massed every firing system in the division at a single point and ensured every firing battery was trained and ready to mass fires anywhere on the battlefield. As a result of this training, units were able to engage enemy dismounted and truck mounted forces very efficiently using all available organic weapons systems. Many battles found U.S. forces fighting an asymmetrical enemy that used dismounted infantry and trucks mounted with heavy machine guns and air defense artillery (ADA) guns. Iraqi forces used schools, mosques, and hospitals as headquarters, ammo caches, and sniper positions. Brigade combat teams (BCTs) quickly adapted their tactics to the new threat with very good results. In both open and built-up terrain, BCTs were very effective in destroying enemy armored vehicles. The ability to detect and strike Iraqi forces before they were able to engage resulted in strong target effects by U.S. forces against Iraqi targets. In return, U.S. forces took an extremely small number of direct fire hits from Iraqi armored vehicles. The urban terrain took away a lot of our standoff capability but our crews gunner skills proved faster and more accurate than the Iraqi crews. Current training methodology should be sustained with special emphasis placed on asymmetrical threats that the mounted forces may encounter. Additionally, with the success of employment of armor in urban terrain, armor units must review their mission essential task list (METL) to include MOUT. During past training exercises, the focus of MOUT training was on the infantry units, using armor primarily in a follow and support role. However, during much of the urban fighting, tanks were the primary attack forces. The deficiency in urban warfare training for the tank crews was noticeable and forced units to create �on the spot� TTPs. Home station and Combat Training Center (CTC) exercises must include realistic urban scenarios where tanks lead close proximity (less then 200 meters) attacks into built-up areas with the infantry in a follow and support role as well as bridge seizing and clearing operations. Operational success in MOUT or in open terrain could depend on the ability of heavy forces to seize bridges and bridgeheads. This was true for heavy forces in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Historically, armor units spend little time training this critical task. Combat Training Centers must provide company or larger units the opportunity to practice seizing large bridges. Lessons Learned
Topic E - Equipment Observation Synopsis United States Army heavy forces proved extremely effective for conducting MOUT. The M1 Abrams tank led the attacking columns of U.S. forces through urban areas and was successful in producing a strong shock effect against defending forces. M1s and M2s were attacked with small arms, BMP 30mm and 73mm cannons, T72 125mm rounds, numerous ADA systems, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) without suffering the catastrophic loss of a single crew member. Only one M2 was catastrophically destroyed by enemy fire. The M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) is also well suited to the urban environment. Its size allows it to be easily maneuvered in built-up areas and the elevation, deflection, and barrel length allow it to engage and suppress vehicles and buildings up close. Lessons Learned
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