Topic B - Counterfire Observation Synopsis

Due to the rapid offensive operations of the 3ID (M), it was imperative that the fire support community silence enemy artillery systems to allow the division unfettered freedom of maneuver. This task was accomplished with great success. Fire support elements (FSEs) at all levels and the division artillery (DIVARTY) sustained and developed new TTPs that allowed for the rapid engagement of enemy artillery systems. Field artillery rocket and cannon fires dominated the counterfire fight.

Counterfire acquisitions were cleared through the ground maneuver commander�s battlespace as the division tactical command post (DTAC) simultaneously cleared airspace. As that was occurring, the counterfire officer confirmed both the origin and impact grid with controlled image based (CIB) imagery provided by the Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS). Once cleared, DIVARTY either serviced the target with rockets or forwarded it to direct support (DS) artillery units for execution. Maneuver brigades also sent counterfire missions down to task forces to engage with mortars or ground maneuver assets, if the other attack systems could not provide the desired effect. The division and brigades utilized CAS aircraft that were already in the area to destroy acquired systems. Utilizing every asset available to effectively, efficiently, and accurately silence the enemy�s indirect fire systems was critical to accomplishing the mission. These options worked well and proved the Army�s flexibility and ability to fight the enemy.

Although CAS was successful at times, the CAS counterfire effort was considered ineffective. Several factors including CAS responsiveness, search time, and positive identification (PID) problems contributed to CAS ineffectiveness in a counterfire role. Even when CAS was on station in the area of operations, the time it took to talk the pilots� eyes onto the target for PID was substantial.

The Army considers Q-36/Q-37 acquisitions as a PID source for counterfire. However, the current Air Force special instructions (SPINS) does not recognize Q-36/Q-37 acquisitions as a source for PID. Q-36/Q-37 radars produce 10-digit grids that can be used to employ JDAM. For the next conflict, place written guidance in the SPINS specifying Q-36/Q-37 acquisitions as PID.

Through combat operations in OIF, 3ID (M) developed many lessons learned for the counterfire fight. 1. Use artillery first for counterfire missions. Use CAS only for those acquisitions that are either outside the range of artillery or restricted due to chemical defense equipment (CDE) considerations. 2. Utilize all assets available in the counterfire fight. 3. Train on these alternate methods of counterfire as well as the primary means to kill the enemy with the best means available. 4. Look hard at placing more fire finder radar systems in divisions. In the future, battles will be fought and won by smaller, more decentralized units.

Lessons Learned

• Field artillery cannon and rockets were the timeliest response to hostile acquisitions.
• CAS was not effective in the counterfire fight due to time to target and PID.
• Timely clearance of fires is paramount in effective counterfire operations.
• Utilize all assets to provide effective counterfire and to remain flexible.
• Divisions need more target acquisition assets.

Topic C - Fire Support Planning, Coordination, and Execution Observation Synopsis

Rapid offensive operations executed by the division resulted in changes in how we planned, coordinated, and executed fires. The normal AI planning process based on 24, 48, 72, and 96-hour target refinement, nomination, and submission proved not conducive based on movements of the DTAC and division main command post (DMAIN). Division submitted AI nominations to V Corps utilizing ADOCS Excel spreadsheets. The 3ID (M) fire and effects coordination cell (FECC) liaison officer (LNO) to V Corps submitted AI nominations on behalf of the division while the DMAIN was moving.

One of the biggest hurdles the division faced was the ability to conduct target refinement during a rapid advance. Integration of the division intelligence support element (DISE) into the normal targeting process as the DTAC and DMAIN moved proved invaluable. When the targeting team resumed its normal AI submission process, it was amended to focus on the next 24-hours.

Planning fires in urban terrain is a difficult task. Targeting key intersections, parks, and open areas proved crucial in military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). The enemy also used parks and other open areas in urban terrain to emplace antitank (AT) and artillery systems.

During planning, 3ID (M) attempted to create a permissive firing environment to facilitate responsive fires. Planners raised issues such as fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) and other fire control measures. A constant issue when planning air routes for aviation units was the size, placement, and activation of position area hazards (PAH). Placement of the fire support coordination line (FSCL) facilitated shaping operations for surface-to-surface fires; however, the plan to move the FSCL was determined by the air tasking order (ATO) cycle. Twice during the operation, the lead brigade combat team (BCT) was on the verge of crossing the FSCL. To maintain the permissive nature of the FSCL, we recommend movement based on the scheme of ground maneuver while allowing for shaping operations at all levels. The distance between the forward line of own troops (FLOT) and the FSCL should also leave enough room for shaping operations supporting the ground scheme of maneuver.

The permissive firing environment required measures to safeguard friendly firing positions. Brigades established "no fire areas" (NFAs) and censors zones over friendly artillery and Task Force (TF) mortars every time these assets were emplaced.

Prior to OIF, the combined forces air component commander (CFACC) developed a plan to incorporate pre-established kill boxes. During the operation, this allowed for the rapid placement of aircraft, allowed for quick clearance of AI and gave aircraft a reference point to start hunting. One of the challenges with the fixed kill box concept is that it does not allow for flexibility once friendly forces approach an open kill box. The division�s desire to attack targets on the high payoff target list (HPTL) or high value targets (HVT) was nullified. Conflicts arose when the Air Force destroyed targets as they were acquired instead of what the maneuver commander wanted destroyed. Recommend the lowest level possible control in opening and closing kill boxes.

Once OIF commenced, 3ID (M) fire supporters cleared fires inside and outside of the division boundary with coalition and special operation forces (SOF). Frequently, the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) backbone or tactical satellite (TACSAT) radio were the only assets available to clear artillery and CAS. This proved to be quite challenging while on the move. Clearance of fires within the Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs) and the 101st Airborne areas of operation were handled through the MEF LNO in the DTAC and the 101st LNO at corps by use of the Iridium phone. This made the clearance of cross-boundary fires extremely slow. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) was used to clear fires with the MEF when the DTAC had access to the local area network (LAN).

The division encountered many delays when it sent a request to higher to engage a target on the "no strike" list (NSL). The clearance of targets on the NSL must be done rapidly. Delays in approval allow the enemy targets to reposition or seek cover prior to engagement.

During OIF, higher headquarters utilized ISR assets in the 3ID(M) area of operations (AO). ISR assets at all levels can collect enemy targets. However, ground maneuver commanders must clear execution of fires on ISR identified targets.

3ID (M) developed new and revalidated fire execution techniques. A successful method of destroying mounted or dug-in infantry troops was by firing high explosive (HE) rounds with sectioned fuse settings. Although collateral damage was a concern, white phosphorous (WP) was a valuable asset for destroying equipment in tree lines, due to its ability to burn. Dual purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM)/multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) did not produce duds on the roads themselves, but duds were visible on the softer ground just off the roads. High explosive/variable fuse (HE/VT) and high explosive/time fuse (HE/TI) mixes are the preferred munitions for urban missions. Consider increasing the amount of HE projectiles and time fuse/variable fuse (TI/VT) fuses in the unit basic load (UBL) for urban conflicts.

Lessons Learned

• The fire planning process is continual, even during rapid offensive operations and when communications are not up to task.
• Adhere to the doctrinal application of FSCMs and other restrictive fire control measures to ensure a permissive but safe environment for friendly forces and to facilitate clearance of fires.
• Fire support coordination and clearance of fires is the responsibility of the ground maneuver commander.
• Higher headquarters must coordinate placement of assets under its control with the maneuver commander that owns the ground.
• Proper selection of ammunition types enables the artillery to kill the enemy during rapid offensive operations.

Topic D - Training and Resourcing the Fire Support System Observation Synopsis

3ID (M) artillery deployed to theater with its habitual modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) artillery assets and received one field artillery brigade (minus) with the tactical mission of general support reinforcing (GSR) and eventually reinforcing �). The GSR brigade had only one multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) battalion and no cannon battalion. V Corps requirements for time sensitive targets and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) firing capability limited the use of the GSR asset. The lack of reinforcing assets, coupled with the noncontiguous nature and depth of the battlefield, caused 3ID (M) to assume risk by leaving a brigade combat team (BCT) without a direct support battalion. The lack of an additional 155mm Paladin battalion limited the ability to weight the main effort with cannon fires. The ROE led maneuver commanders to opt for 155mm HE as the munition of choice. This limited the commanders� options, as MLRS was the only available reinforcing unit to provide fires.

Bradley fire support teams (BFISTS) and combat observation and laser teams (COLTS) did an excellent job at locating targets and reporting battlefield intelligence. Observers clearly identified a need for optics with increased range during the war. Presently the optics and imagery devices used by fire supporters is only accurate out to the maximum effective range of direct fire weapons.

BFISTS and COLTS must be proficient in employing all means of fire support. Given the amount of air power available for OIF, we identified positive indirect (type II CAS) and ETACS as a critical training requirement before hostilities. In future operations the lack of qualified ETACS may require our FIST and COLT teams to become universal observers.

FSEs at brigade and higher validated ADOCS as a reliable, efficient, and useful system in the fire support community. ADOCS quickly passed targetable data and provided a clearer �fires� picture to the maneuver commander.

To enhance our counterfire capabilities, the test program set (TPS) MTOE and command and control (C 2 ) needs to be redesigned. New doctrine and capabilities allow fewer fighting forces to travel faster and fight over longer distances. While these capabilities initially allowed 3ID (M) DIVARTY to fight without a reinforcing field artillery brigade, it required different and more robust configurations in C 2 that are not supported by MTOE equipment or personnel.

Lessons Learned