November 22, 2024
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November 22, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 5 Helicopter Operations in the Offense During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), Army helicopters were an integral part of the combined arms team. They supported the division scheme of maneuver with a wide range of capabilities. Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) aircraft flew over 160 missions into contested terrain, proving itself a combat multiplier. Attack aviation successfully conducted observation post (OP)/intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) destruction with division artillery (DIVARTY), close combat attacks (CCA), shaping operations, reconnaissance, and many other roles. The 4th Brigade relied heavily on the general support aviation battalion (GSAB) for both sustainment of aviation assets and personnel recovery. The air cavalry had tremendous success working with ground cavalry and close air support (CAS) from the Air Force. During OIF, the aviation community learned many valuable lessons about the use of aviation in a heavy division. Topic A - Incorporate Close Attack Operations Observation Synopsis The integration of close attacks in support of division operations was extremely successful. The benefits of attack helicopters in the close fight for the heavy division were proven during operations in support of 3rd Brigade Combat Team (3rd BCT) at An Nasariyah and during reconnaissance operations north of Baghdad. At An Nasariyah, attack helicopters shaped the BCT�s battlespace and provided close combat attack support for operations on the objectives. The 3rd BCT incorporated triggers and fire support coordination measures (FSCMs) to allow for attack aviation to shape targets outside the effective range of direct support (DS) fires and transition to support actions on the objectives by securing flanks and providing over watch of ground forces. During operations in support of 1st BCT, attack helicopter battalions conducted shaping operations and close attack operations to enable the brigade to rapidly move through the Karbala Gap and seize follow-on objectives. The attack helicopter battalions destroyed threats in the restricted terrain that could place direct and indirect fires on 1st BCT and provided intelligence on the route and threats beyond the objective that supported the destruction of the 14th Brigade of the Iraqi Medina Division. Close attack operations are the ideal method of employment of attack aviation in support of the heavy division. The emphasis on close attack operations and the requisite skill sets to execute close combat attacks needs to be maintained by the division through continued training in conjunction with brigade force on force and gunnery exercises. Additionally, the 4th Brigade�s standing operating procedures (SOP) must be incorporated into the division field standing operating procedures (FSOP) to ensure standardization across the three ground maneuver brigades. Lessons Learned
Topic B - Shaping Operations in the Heavy Division Observation Synopsis The current attack helicopter doctrine is still oriented on deep attack operations and although this is still a realistic mission set for the corps attack regiment, it is not the best use for the division attack helicopter battalion. The heavy division attack helicopter battalion is best employed in conducting shaping operations between the division coordinated fire line (CFL) and the division forward boundary (DFB), as well as conducting close attack operations in support of the brigade combat teams. The geographic area that defines heavy division shaping operations is that terrain between the CFL and the DFB where, based on the availability of fires and CAS, the area may serve as a fires sanctuary for an enemy force not yet in contact. Based on procedural fires dead space, enemy forces may not be serviced by either the corps or division fires nodes. The heavy division attack aviation is the ideal platform to deny the enemy the sanctuary that may be created. The employment of attack aviation in this area facilitates the destruction of forces prior to entering the main battle area (MBA) or assists in maintaining operational tempo during offensive operations to destroy forces that can influence the attack axis with direct or indirect fires. Lessons Learned
Topic C - Command and Control of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Assets Observation Synopsis Prior to deployment, the 4th Brigade worked with the division support command (DISCOM) commander and the division medical operations center (DMOC) on the best command and control (C 2 ) and sustainment relationship for medical companies (air ambulance) during combat operations. The issues addressed focused on situational understanding, maintenance, sustainment, and aviation planning staffing at the forward support battalion (FSB) and BCT level. The recommendation that was approved by the division was the centralized C 2 and sustainment of these aircraft under the 4th Brigade with decentralized execution in support of the BCTs. This relationship was especially critical because the primary means of evacuation to higher echelons of care was by air assets. This relationship worked extremely well and provided responsive evacuation of over 400 U.S. and Iraqi casualties. The brigade was able to provide all necessary maintenance; forward, arming, and refueling point (FARP) support; Army airspace command and control (A 2 C 2 ) products; air tasking order (ATO) products; threat updates; routing and, as necessary, armed escort support to ensure the success of each evacuation. This support would not have been possible if these assets were placed under the control of the BCTs. On the two occasions these platforms were placed under the control of the BCT, aircraft launched without requisite knowledge of the threat and airspace control measures. High volumes of previously identified air defense artillery (ADA) systems engaged two aircraft and one aircraft flew within 300 meters of an active position area assessment (PAA). Neither the FSB, nor the BCT is capable of managing these operations based on their current staffing and often do not have electronic access to the air space tasking and control orders necessary to effect aviation. The C 2 and maintenance relationship exercised by the division is the preferred method of C 2 and sustainment and is supported by the 36th Evacuation Battalion Commander and the 30th MEDCOM Commander as the most preferred method of employment of direct support (DS) air ambulance assets at the division level. The division should continue to place DS air ambulance assets under the C 2 of the 4th Brigade to best support this low-density high demand asset within the division. Lesson Learned
Topic D - 4th Brigade as the Command and Control (C 2 ) Headquarters for Security Operations Observation Synopsis The 4th Brigade is staffed and organized with organic assets to perform the task of security operations for the division. This economy of force mission is critical to the success of the division in both offensive and defensive operations. The inherit ability of the brigade to move rapidly and transit the battlespace makes the 4th Brigade the best headquarters to command and control this mission set. Supplemented with fires and engineer assets, the 4th Brigade can perform the host of security operations with the required C 2 and baseline sustainment. The habitual air ground relationship with the division cavalry squadron and DIVARTY allow for the execution of this task with little preparation from mission receipt to execution. The doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are incorporated in the 100 series manuals and are outlined in the subordinate units� mission essential task lists (METL). This mission set was employed north of the Karbala Gap with great success, despite the lack of DS fires and a ground maneuver element to resolve the disposition of enemy units left between phase line (PL) Kinston and PL Vermont. Lesson Learned
Topic E - Operations in Urban/Built-Up Areas Observation Synopsis Army aviation proved effective during urban operations by using the cover of darkness, high-speed aircraft movement techniques, and running fire procedures. Additionally, Iraqi forces collocated critical assets with protected sites such as schools, hospitals, mosques, and residential areas to avoid coalition targeting. Throughout Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, air troops equipped with OH-58D Kiowa aircraft conducted operations in built-up areas. On several missions, they encountered heavy small arms and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fires. Due to the restricted visibility associated with operating in urban terrain, helicopters became vulnerable to small arms, RPGs, and shoulder fired surface to air (SA) weapons. Although several aircraft received damage while conducting combat operations, none were lost due to enemy fire. This was largely due to movement techniques used by the aircrews. Prior to introducing Army aviation assets in built-up areas, a thorough mission analysis must be conducted to identify the risk to aircrews. Based on this analysis, aircrews can modify mission TTPs as required in order to mitigate as much risk as possible. OH-58D aircraft operated at or below 50 feet above ground level while maintaining airspeed of at least 60 knots. Scout weapons teams maintained a separation of approximately 200-400 meters between scout and gun. Conducting operations at night will greatly increase aircraft survivability. Lessons Learned
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