November 22, 2024
|
November 22, 2024 | |
|
Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 6 Embedded Media Introduction In the wake of the most recent military/media problems during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan, the Department of Defense decided to implement an ambitious media embed operation with U.S. military forces. The reasons were several, including the desire to have media tell the soldiers� story, but also to have the ability to counter the Iraqi propaganda machine. Prior to deploying in November 2002, the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) agreed to embed 50 news media representatives (NMRs) within the division. The division conducted extensive training exercises during December 02-January-03 where 3ID (M) embedded media in units for 3-4 day periods. Unit leaders and the public affairs section developed extensive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to support media in the event media were embedded for war. By the time the war started, the Marne Division crossed the Iraqi border with 97 NMRs from more than 60 media organizations. Observation Synopsis Embedding is a doctrinal term defined in FM 46-1 as ��the act of assigning a reporter to a unit as a member of the unit. The reporter eats, sleeps, and moves with the unit. The reporter is authorized open access to all sections of the unit and is not escorted by public affairs personnel. Rather, the unit is the public affairs escort. Reporters file their stories from unit locations and security is accomplished at the source, by establishing with the reporter what can be covered and reported on and what cannot be reported on, or when material can be reported.� (p 25). The military media relationship had been tenuous at best since Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and subsequent low intensity conflicts and stability and support operations (SASO) during the 1990s. Media received information during after-operations press briefings from an official spokesperson and were allowed to interview soldiers who participated in the operation. There was little firsthand information from observations made by media who were allowed to accompany troops during these embeds. Prior to deploying, the division had never trained with embedded media. Media training primarily dealt with encountering media on the battlefield. If we were going to embed media, then we would have to train as we would fight. The 3 ID (M) embedded media for 3-4 days at a time in December during Second Brigade Combat Team�s (2nd BCT�s) battalion task forces� live fire exercises (LFXs) that culminated with the BCT�s LFX in December 02. Feedback from the media was extremely favorable and the print and broadcast stories reflected that enthusiasm. Commanders and soldiers also started feeling more comfortable with media in their ranks. After the entire division received a deployment order and units arrived, media were embedded with them as part of their training program. These training exercises also offered media the chance to train as they would fight. We discouraged the transfer of broadcast tapes and news stories on daily runs out of the training area. Instead, we encouraged media to use technology that they would probably take to war to file with their editors and producers. Media were required to stay in the field for the duration of the four-day exercise. These training opportunities helped the division and media develop tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that would benefit both organizations. Chief among the TTPs was how media would be transported. Several vehicles were available and used in training including the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) in front line units. Sources of power were made available to recharge batteries for still and broadcast cameras. Inverters became a necessity for power from high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Clothing packing lists were also evaluated and refined. But the most important TTP was for the media understand the soldier and for the soldier to understand the media. Due to restrictive Department of Defense (DOD) public affairs guidance, media were not allowed to embed with 3ID (M) units from the United States early in the deployment cycle. This proved a hardship on local and regional media who could not afford the cost of airfare to Kuwait. This restriction also interrupted team building between units and media who covered the deployment from Fort Stewart. The team building would prove essential later when building trust between media and soldiers, a prerequisite for briefing the media on unit plans. Media were embedded in 3ID (M) units on March 11. The Coalition Press Information Center-Kuwait provided chemical protective equipment to include suits and masks. Public affairs assigned media across the division down to the brigade combat teams and to certain separate battalions including 3-7 Calvary, 3rd Military Police Battalion, and 1st Battalion 3rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment. Commanders had the flexibility to assign media anywhere within their brigades/battalions. Commanders had additional flexibility to move them among units to highlight different operations. When assigning media to brigades/battalions, every effort was made to distribute media owned by the same corporation evenly within a brigade to ensure greater coverage across the division. As an example, the four newspapers from the Tribune News Corporation: The Chicago Tribune, LA Times, Newsday, and The Orlando Sentinel were assigned to the 3rd BCT, 2nd BCT, 4th Brigade, and the 3rd Military Police (MP) Battalion respectively. The three major weekly magazines were each assigned to a different BCT. Every brigade and 3-7 Cavalry had a major network or cable broadcast station assigned. The three major wire services, Associated Press, Reuters, and Agence France Presse (AFP) were assigned to different brigades. AFP wanted greater coverage and asked that their print journalist and photographer be split between units. This decision offered AFP the only photographer assignment with the division�s aviation. Cox News, Hearst, and Knight-Ridder news services were treated similarly. On any day during operations, a wide variety of articles about different 3ID (M) units could be found across the various news media. What the division would tell the media about the plan, if anything, before crossing into Iraq was a big concern. The embed ground rules stated explicitly that media were not authorized access to classified information. However, the idea of embedding requires trust as implied in the doctrinal definition. Two days before the ground war, the 3ID (M) provided the media a broad overview of the plan, including tentative timelines, so that the media would understand the context of what they were observing and avoid filing stories that would tip intentions to the Iraqis. If media were not provided the context, they could report their observations and unknowingly provide the Iraqis sensitive information. Public affairs emphasized the ground rules concerning access to sensitive information and the penalties for knowingly releasing sensitive information prior to the briefing. For the purposes of the definition, sensitive information included any mention that the media was privy to classified plans. As the operation progressed, media were allowed unprecedented access to plans. We know of no media that violated the trust during the entire operation. After all, they were coming along. The 3ID (M) advocated media vehicles since units would have to carry media equipment in addition to military equipment and several days� basic load. Media could also bring additional support such as engineers, producers, and sound technicians. Media would be able to bring better transmission equipment; therefore, a better quality of video would be produced for the world to see our great soldiers. No vehicles traveled near the front of formations. The reporter or broadcast cameraman often traveled forward to gather footage, but the vehicle remained in the combat trains. When time allowed during a pause, vehicle and people linked up for broadcast. News media representatives and their vehicles all made it safely through the war. The world saw vivid pictures of disciplined, well-trained U.S. soldiers in action. The following criteria was established for a broadcast media vehicle: 1) Vehicles would be civilian equivalents to military vehicles, primarily HMMWVs and Land Rovers. 2) Vehicles would run on diesel fuel compatible with JP8. 3) Individual commanders would determine where vehicles were placed in formation. 4) Should vehicles break down, we would repair on a non-interference basis. If we could not repair the vehicle, media could abandon it and cross level only necessary equipment into military vehicles. During the war, the soldiers of the division had the opportunity to review articles written by embedded media, usually through the Early Bird. It was evident the program was working to our expectations. Media published and broadcast the great work of 3ID (M) soldiers around the world, accurately and unvarnished. As an example, William Branigan wrote about the family members near An Najaf that were killed when they ran a checkpoint from his own first hand accounts. Media often checked with unit personnel to ensure security before filing. Public affairs know of no instance when commanders required broadcast or print journalists to have news reviewed for security before filing. Embedded media had a more realistic understanding and were more optimistic in their accounts than media who were reporting from the Pentagon, from Central Command (CENTCOM) in Qatar, or from Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) in Kuwait. This was most evident during the extreme sandstorm near An Najaf. The commanding general (CG) had briefed the media before the war that 3ID (M) would consolidate at that point for 48-72 hours to rearm, refit, and refuel. The pause was placed in context when they filed, even with the unexpected heavy fighting nearby. Media outside Iraq immediately began suggesting a �quagmire� and flawed plan. In sum, the embedded media balanced the negative press from reporters outside Iraq. There were very few instances of media breaking ground rules. At times CFLCC and V Corps told embedded reporters from Fox News and Cable News Network (CNN) to shut down, although they had their unit commander�s permission to broadcast. There were only two instances that public affairs is aware of when injuries were announced in the paper before next of kin could be notified: Major Roger Shuck�s Bradley was hit by an rocket propelled grenade (RPG) and reported in The Washington Post and Major Ron Coffey sustained injuries which were reported in The Jerusalem Post and further reported in the States. There was only one instance when a reporter was asked to hold information until a spouse was notified and the reporter did not. The Long Island Newsday reporter filed a story that included a reference to1st Battalion 3rd Aviation Regiment Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Williams having a hard landing behind enemy lines the first night of the war. Overall, the ambitious media embed program executed by the 3ID (M) was an unqualified success. Media that became part of the team told first-hand accounts of the 3ID (M) fairly and accurately. Neither mission accomplishment nor the integrity of the media was compromised. The media we surveyed spoke highly of their experience and stated the embed far exceeded their expectations. Soldiers, media, and the American public were the true beneficiaries. Lessons Learned
|
|
| © 1998 - 2024 StrategyWorld.com. All rights Reserved. |