December 23, 2024
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December 23, 2024 | |
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Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report - Operation Iraqi Freedon Return to Table of Contents Chapter 8 Force Modernization/Modification Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) As proven in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF), the equipment of the U.S. Army dominated the opposition. We could communicate better, shoot further, survive greater impacts, and move logistics more quickly than the enemy could dream about. Our new systems and older systems both proved to be very valuable. Our trained soldiers operating the best equipment in the world simply out performed the enemy in every aspect of the conflict. This chapter will discuss systems that worked well and systems that need improvement. Mechanized divisions desperately need an on-the-move, long distance communication system. The M1 and M2 proved to be both lethal and survivable. Combat Service Support (CSS) units must become more survivable. Lastly, haul capacities from division to company level are currently not adequate. These suggestions, along with other comments, will be addressed under four general topics: communications systems, lethality of systems, survivability of systems, and maintenance and logistics issues. While our equipment performed admirably during OIF, we must continue to strive to provide the best equipment possible for America�s soldiers. Topic A - Communications Observation Synopsis The Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID [M]) acquired a number of new command and control (C 2 ) systems in the months prior to combat operations in support of OIF. The success of the division was due in large part to a number of these systems that were able to overcome the constraints of the battlefield or current modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) communications systems. Success, however, was also the basis for criticism of some of the C 2 systems that the division traditionally uses. While most systems performed as expected, some systems did not function as required or were not acquired. Division C2 Enablers The single most successful C 2 system fielded for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was the Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2) blue force tracking (BFT) system. It is important to mention that the FBCB 2 system used during this operation was not fielded to facilitate division command and control, but rather to facilitate tracking of friendly forces at echelons above division. Even so, BFT gave commanders situational understanding that was unprecedented in any other conflict in history. It allowed the division to operate with common graphics on the move at all levels from company/team through division, to send short messages and graphics via email, and to locate and identify every unit on the battlefield that had a BFT system. BFT provided the ability for the operator to communicate beyond line-of-sight. This proved to be essential as many units operated in a battlespace exceeding the range of their traditional FM radio communications and did not have single-channel tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios available. FBCB 2 /BFT replaced mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) data systems as the division�s primary method to pass fragmentary orders (FRAGOS) once continuous offensive operations began. BFT was able to plot the location of other friendly units on a map and provide a ten-digit grid location during operations where traditional situational awareness was challenged, such as conditions of limited visibility or link-up with units outside of normal task organization. Perhaps the greatest limitation of BFT was its limited distribution. Approximately 150 systems were fielded to 3ID (M), resulting in a lack of distribution in several key areas. DIVARTY, DISCOM, engineers, aviation, the division cavalry, and the military intelligence battalion were not extensively fielded BFT and could have taken advantage of the increased situational awareness on the move and the ability to send quick command and control messages anywhere on the battlefield. The combat service support (CSS) community would have greatly benefitted from having a system that combines the functionality of the movement tracking system that it currently uses with the ability to communicate over long distances. The division signal battalion suggested that FBCB 2 could be used to track the location of nodes and provide signal units with technical data they need to establish the mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) network over beyond line of sight (LOS) distances. The consensus from the division was that FBCB 2 worked phenomenally well. The ability of our Army to digitally communicate without the constraint of terrain and to track our forces at near real time is an awesome ability that we must provide our units in order to remain a step ahead of the threat, regardless of symmetry. The use of satellites as a transmission pathway is an asset that removed virtually any range constraint from communicating. However, BFT was non-secure and had the potential to be monitored and exploited by a more technologically savvy enemy. The fielding of an encrypted system similar to this, that provides near-real-time messaging and situational awareness and an expanded bandwidth for data communications with interoperable C 2 systems, would be extremely beneficial and should become the standard for division command and control. The battlefield operating system (BOS)-specific C 2 systems utilized for both planning and execution of combat operations were largely successful. The systems that were the most beneficial for both planning and executing operations were the Advanced Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS), the All Source Analysis System-Light (ASAS--L) and the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS). ADOCS enabled the rapid dissemination of Army Airspace Command and Control (A 2 C 2 ) and targeting data for dissemination, deconfliction, and modification of fires. ASAS-L functions provided valuable intelligence BOS connectivity between the division level G2 nodes and the brigade combat team (BCT) level. AFATDS was a very reliable fire support tool that provided situational awareness and enabled efficient planning and execution of fires. Global command and control-Army (GCCS-A) also provided the division with a current, accurate common operational picture (COP), allowing key leaders to command and control the division across multiple battlefields. It provided the division staff a quick reference to unit locations, divisional boundaries, and general situational awareness through uploaded graphics. The GCCS-A and command and control personal computer (C 2 PC) overall were great systems that required minimal maintenance to keep them running. Acquisition of Radio Systems Just as there were some systems that worked in spectacular fashion, some systems did not meet expectations for varying reasons. The fielding of the PRC-150 Radio System illustrates the frustration involved with �just in time� fielding. The division received twenty-nine radios during February and early March 2003 to fulfill a requirement for a division high frequency (HF) command net as a long-range backup to TACSAT. Contractor-led operator training took place over the course of nine days. The division was fully operational on both division and corps nets at the start of combat operations, but began to suffer attrition due to destruction of antennae by enemy fire and coupler shorts. Fortunately, the success of single-channel TACSAT radio as a long-range C2 system meant the division did not need to rely on the PRC-150. There were two glaring inadequacies that may have been resolved as a result of a more rapid acquisition process. One of these was the unresolved requirement for a communications system for dismounted infantry at the squad level. The division has currently fielded three different tactical radio systems that can function effectively at a dismounted infantry squad level. The MTOE, however, for dismounted infantry squads and scouts does not include sufficient numbers or types of radios necessary to maximize C 2 for squad leaders, team leaders, and individual soldiers in any environment. The second unfulfilled radio requirement is the division-wide need for more single-channel TACSAT radios which operate on wide band. Single-channel TACSAT was the primary conduit of division command and control in conjunction with BFT. Future Division Communications The success of beyond line of sight (LOS) communications systems and electronic enablers in supporting command and control of units during OIF has set a new standard for the division. In the future, the division must rely more heavily on long-range communications to provide voice and data connectivity throughout the division. While the commanding general was able to command and control the division relying solely on long-range communications, BCT commanders had fewer long-range assets available. Our conduct of offensive operations illustrated the need for more robust beyond-LOS communications not only at division level, but also BCT and even down to the battalion level. The constant tempo at which we conduct our operations requires us to be prepared to communicate via both voice and data on the move. Communications systems supporting C 2 on the move must be built into the vehicles used by the leaders that need them. They must provide high-quality voice and data connectivity between all command posts over which the C 2 is exercised. It is also important to recognize the difference between the communications support requirements of �C 2 on the move� and those of a division conducting C 2 �at the halt� in support of consolidation and reorganization, refit, or stability and support operations (SASO). The increased information requirements associated with these types of periods imply a requirement for increased capability of the system or systems supporting them, such as bandwidth requirements. The idea of a common operational picture has advanced significantly with the advent of GCCS-A, FBCB 2 , and C 2 PC, but several of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) that should be interoperable proved not to be or to be too cumbersome. Each BOS has an information system to suit its particular requirements, and while some of these systems do communicate with one another, there was not enough commonality between user functions, graphical displays, and optional features, even to the level of computer operating system. The future requirement for these systems is a one-stop compatible hardware and software package to synchronize all of the BOS within the unit. The MSE network has continued to provide the division with voice, SIPRNET, and NIPRNET connectivity, successfully overcoming the constraints of distance and terrain through the establishment of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). However, the division�s frequent, rapid movements prevented the MSE network from attaining any real usefulness until units halted. In order to satisfy the requirement for a system that is more responsive to the dynamic, asymmetric warfare that we will probably fight in the future, the next generation replacement for the MSE system must be made smaller, farther reaching, and more survivable. The division became dependent on range extension assets to provide connectivity to units that moved and fought greater distances than in previous conflicts. Such capability needs to be distributed down to battalion level. Communications MTOE Requirements Two future communications MTOE requirements arise as a result of operations in Iraq. The first is FM radio assets. All vehicles need radios in order to provide command and control for convoys, for combat service support, and for independent operations. Dismounted infantry present another requirement that can be satisfied by either fielding hand-held radio systems or by acquiring additional SINCGARS radios in order to support military operations on urban terrain (MOUT), SASO, and C 2 between infantry slices and armor units. Combat engineer squads also require FM radios to support their dismounted operations and long-range FM communications requirements not addressed in the MTOE. In addition to combat arms, the CSS assets across the battlefield require increased density. The ability to command and control key logistical assets while on the move in convoy was vital to the success of our operations in Iraq. The second communications MTOE requirement is for armored vehicles in unit communications sections and signal units in order to increase their survivability. The division signal battalion is authorized crew-served weapons, but it requires armored high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and ring mounts to provide their units with adequate force protection. Additionally, brigade and battalion FM retransmission teams would greatly benefit from the added force protection that an armored HMMWV would provide. In conclusion, the division was able to talk over multiple forms of communication to successfully command and control subordinate units during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. 3ID (M)�s success was due in no small part to the division�s force modernization efforts, but ultimately our actions served as a basis for future force modernization requirements that will provide the division with an added edge against any threat. Lessons Learned
Topic B - Lethality Observation Synopsis The dynamics of this conflict and the associated low number of American casualties clearly demonstrate the effectiveness and lethality of the heavy armored systems, especially when coupled with new technologies such as the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS 3 ), the Javelin, and the new generation of tank killing field artillery rounds known as seek and destroy armor (SADARM). Some of this equipment was fielded to the division only days before crossing the border into Iraq. Often with less training time than desired, 3ID (M) soldiers employed these weapon systems and destroyed the enemy. The LRAS 3 is a huge combat multiplier that immediately impacted mission success in a multitude of roles. Scouts and brigade reconnaissance troops (BRT) effectively performed their reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) mission without closing within observation, detection, or targeting range of enemy weapons systems. As a fire support sensor, the long range standoff with 10 digit collection and targeting accuracy provided first round direct fire accuracy. If the LRAS 3 could be enhanced to be used on the move, it would truly be a phenomenal system. The only negative issue with the LRAS3 was that there were not enough to go around. A recommendation is that every section in a BRT, battalion scout, and combat observation and lasing team (COLT) has an LRAS 3 . Bradley fire support team (BFIST) vehicles and M3s in the division cavalry squadron could employ an LRAS 3 type system that could be mounted on their track vehicles. The LRAS 3 is a great system the Army must continue to field to units. The Javelin missile was an invaluable weapon in defeating enemy armored forces and reinforced positions to include bunkers, building, and revetments. There is no other weapon that can support dismounted infantry in fighting against these types of engagements. The command launch unit (CLU) provided day and night capability with the Javelin missile as well as provided vehicles without LRAS 3 and dismounted infantrymen with a means of thermal observation out to four kilometers. Javelins must be issued to BRTs and infantry, in addition to engineer and battalion scouts. The SADARM exceeded expectations and became the preferred precision munitions for field artillery (FA) battalions and their supported maneuver commanders. Out of 121 SADARM rounds fired, 48 pieces of enemy equipment were destroyed. Units also found they could fire substantially less than the doctrinal 24 rounds to achieve effects on target. Because of the success of SADRAM, unit tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) were four rounds in effect against a point target. The SADRAM truly added a quick-kill ability to the artillery of the 3ID (M). During OIF, the 3ID (M) proved to be a lethal machine, however, there are some areas of focus that could improve the division�s lethality. Of all suggested changes, the need for night vision goggles (NVGs) for every soldier stands out as the most important. Before crossing the line of departure (LD), units found it difficult to ensure that every driver and track commander (TC) had a set of NVGs. Combat support (CS) and CSS units were not the only units that were not well equipped with NVGs by MTOE. Currently, the BRTs are only authorized twelve PEQ-2As and thirty-six M68 close combat optics. These two systems together are invaluable and give our soldiers a decisive edge over any opponent. The BRTs need forty-eight of both the PEQ-2A and the M68. It is also important that the Army replaces all existing PVS7As with PVS7Ds or PVS14s and issue them to every soldier that has a weapon. Anyone who receives a weapon must also have the ability to fire at night. OIF taught us that CS and CSS units must be able to protect themselves at night if they are to move up and influence the fight. Another seemingly small but important issue is that all .50 cal and M240 machine guns must have a set of M22 binoculars as a part of the system. Tracer burnout for both of these systems is further than a gunner can identify and classify a target. Sufficient numbers of binoculars must be issued with these weapon systems to maximize their capabilities. For greater lethality in the MOUT environment, adjustments can be made to equipment to ensure greater success. M1s need flex mounts for the tank commander's (TC�s) .50 caliber machine gun. This will allow for more responsive fires on the enemy. Considering the wide range of missions performed in OIF, the BRT should be equipped with shotguns for quick building entry and with supplemental mounts that allow the M240 to be mounted simultaneously with the M2 or MK19. The M2 and MK19 are great weapons for open terrain, but the M240 is the weapon of choice for urban or restricted terrain. To add more lethality to the BFIST (M7), the ground vehicular laser, locator, designator (G/VLLD) needs improvement. The current system is too bulky and requires almost half of the interior storage of the M7. The current G/VLLD must be dismounted to use. The BFIST must have an LRAS 3 type long-range sight and a smaller, lightweight target designator that is an integrated part of the M7�s integrated sight unit (ISU). This would allow the BFIST to designate targets without dismounting the M7 and provide an overall more lethal system. Mortars at the company level would greatly help the effectiveness of fire support in the mechanized fight. The two main issues arising from the absence of mortars at the company level are responsiveness of fires and the ability to echelon fires. While our task force mortars were very responsive, they were a task force asset. Many times two company teams are without fires due to a lack of resources. Additionally, current mechanized companies cannot carry all personnel and equipment with only four M2s per platoon. An additional M2 should be added to mechanized infantry platoons, as well as one M2 for the company 1SG for added security in the company trains. This addition of 4 M2s per mechanized company would add to the lethality of not only mechanized platoons but also to the survivability of the company trains and causality evacuation (CASEVAC) situations. Finally, the engineer community needs equipment updates and fielding in order to maintain operational tempo and pace with the maneuver forces. Engineers fighting forward in the less survivable M113s have trouble keeping pace with their supported maneuver units. To provide the responsiveness and flexibility required by commanders, engineers should be fielded the Bradley. The armored vehicle launched bridge (AVLB) proved to be a significant maintenance challenge and should be upgraded to the Wolverine immediately. Additionally, engineers need an armored breaching vehicle. The mine clearing line charge (MICLIC) was ineffective against enemy emplaced blast-resistant mines, and sappers were forced to �lasso� the mines in order to reduce an obstacle. Engineer vehicles need to be based on the same chassis as maneuver vehicles - such as the M1 and M2 - to facilitate maintenance. Lessons Learned
Topic C - Survivability Observation Synopsis The M1 and M2 proved to be not only lethal, but exceptionally survivable as well. Throughout the conflict, M1s and M2s took thousands of hits from small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). Rarely were the vehicles affected, and even the few times they caught fire, nearly every soldier walked away unhurt. Even as the division moved hundreds of kilometers, 3ID (M) was able to maintain above a 90% combat capability for M1s and M2s. The M1 and M2 protected soldiers and proved to be the most survivable and durable equipment on the battlefield. However, the M2 needs a standard external rack system that will allow units to carry the required amounts of food, water, and personal equipment for extended combat operations. Another system that proved very survivable was the OH-58D. During OIF the division�s OH-58Ds flew over 900 combat hours, and maintained fifteen of sixteen airframes throughout the operation. These hours were typically in support of ground troops in contact. While flying, these aircraft received fire from AK-47s, RPGs, and visually fired antiaircraft artillery (AAA) weapons. Survivability of the aircraft was due to constant movement, maneuverability, and the small size and signature of the aircraft. In order to properly support ground units and lead forces with real time reconnaissance in and around built-up areas, the Army should retain a small, maneuverable, light scout airframe. Relatively new equipment that worked well were items such as the OTV (interceptor vest), the deployable rapid assembly shelter (DRASH) tent system, and the M1114. The OTV saved numerous lives with the protection it provided, both with and without the small arms protective inserts (SAPI). The SAPI proved effective early by stopping a 5.56 round to the chest, fired at point blank range. By utilizing the �rack system� provided by the OTV, soldiers were able to simply wear the OTV without a load bearing vest (LBV) or load bearing equipment (LCE). The OTV allowed soldiers to carry all ammunition, water, and equipment that they would have normally carried on their LBV or LCE. The DRASH tent system worked well as a structure for division brigade level command posts. When the division tactical command post (DTAC) or division main command post (DMAIN) planned on being stationary for more than a week, they would employ one or more DRASH J-tents. J-tents provided ample space and good climate control. When combined with Biketrack flooring, the J-tent or combination of J-tents provided an excellent command and control environment. For a more mobile command post that would be in place for a shorter amount of time, the DTAC and BCTs used DRASH 6XBs. The 6XB and optional Biketrack could be hauled on one light medium tactical vehicle (LMTV) and trailer. However, the 6XB and necessary Biketrack could be set up and completely operational in under two hours. The 6XB required no inflatable bladder and could be lifted by soldiers. Size was the main limitation of the 6XB. No more than ten to fifteen could operate inside the 6XB, which proved challenging during shift changes and when space was needed to brief a large number of people. DRASH trailers and environmental control centers (ECUs) also had several maintenance problems from the constant moving and continuous use. Units must work with DRASH contractors to develop a slightly larger frame than a 6XB, but still maintain the ability to set up without the use of the time consuming inflatable bladder. DRASH must improve trailers and make them more durable. Lastly, if contractors do not travel with units, then soldiers must be trained on how to repair tents, trailers, and ECUs. An area where the Army must improve is survivability of its CS and CSS units. It should replace all M1025s and other soft-skinned vehicles with the M1114. On today�s battlefield, ambushes to rear elements are as much of a danger as engagements from T72s. The M1114 provides the extra protection that can protect commanders and small units as they move around the battlefield. Signal units such as retrans teams should use M113s and M577s instead of M998s. These are only a few examples of how the Army must restructure the vehicle MTOE of CS and CSS units in order to make them more survivable. While the Army must make its CS and CSS units more survivable, it must also continue to update the aging M113s and M577s. The division had to replace many of the engines and transmissions in these vehicles. During offensive combat operations with only minimal combat power to seize objectives, mechanized divisions need additional combat power to secure routes, division level command post (CPs), and high value assets such as aviation forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and Patriot batteries. As the 3ID (M) advanced towards Baghdad, it was difficult to commit combat power to other locations on the battlefield and take crucial assets away from maneuver units. The division desperately needed additional organic combat power to provide force protection for crucial assets. Without this, the division was forced to task BRTs, air defense artillery (ADA) units and even maneuver companies to secure routes and protect high value assets. No matter where the conflict, mechanized divisions will always have a requirement to provide force protection for key organic and echelon above division (EAD) assets, which will be further complicated under the Force XXI MTOE structure with three companies in each battalion. A recommended MTOE change for mechanized divisions is to add both an M1114 company and a mechanized company under division�s MTOE. These two companies would provide much needed combat power for security. Lastly, the Army must continue to develop a better system of combat identification for vehicles and personnel. The current combat identification panels (CIPs) were not very effective out to distances greater that 600 meters, and were not very durable. Thermal identification panels (TIPs) were more effective to identify friendly vehicles at greater distances; however, they were not very durable. The Phoenix lights worked well, but they were not standardized and batteries had to be replaced often. The Army needs to develop a more durable, integrated, and highly visible identification panel/marker to prevent fratricide during the chaos of battle. The panels/markers need to be standardized and visible in thermal, infrared, and visible spectrums. The signature needs to be active, where identification is immediate and does not require, for instance, an infrared light. Lessons Learned
Topic D - Maintenance / Logistics Observation Synopsis The 3ID (M) moved over 600 kilometers in under twenty days. This feat demonstrates the ability of the division to push all classes of supply over rough terrain and during adverse weather conditions. Even with the great logistical efforts of the division, several equipment and personnel shortages were identified. The MTOE of the division and the MTOE of all echelons above division (EAD) assets that support divisions must enable these units to move all assets simultaneously and sustain themselves over extended distances for extended periods of time. The division made numerous turns to move all assigned equipment and EAD unit equipment forward on the battlefield. This is the direct result of an inadequate number of prime movers and haul assets in the current MTOEs. To travel hundreds of miles in a short period of time requires a single lift capability across all units. During static operations or relatively slow and deliberate offensive operations, multiple lift requirements do not inhibit the advance of the attack. However, when conducting a rapid attack over extended distances, mobility and CSS equipment must maintain pace with the advance or the attacking force may lose the initiative while waiting for multiple turns. The division can accomplish sustainment across all classes of supply when operating over extended distances with additional haul assets and fuel assets resident within the division MTOE. The idea of a dedicated corps support group (CSG) works in a static environment, but the division needs dedicated assets to conduct rapid offensive operations over extended distances and accomplish the arduous task of resupply. The division�s current organization does not support sustainment over multiple days or moves. When multiple mechanized divisions are added under a corps headquarters, the problem is exponentially increased. Not only were haul capacities insufficient at the division level, they were also lacking at the BCT and TF level. One particular TF attacked with twelve M977 cargo HEMTTs (heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks) and two M916 5-ton Lowboy tractors with trailers. One tractor was hauling the TF M1A1 roller, and the other initially carried M1A1 V-packs and the TF Sanator. The twelve cargo HEMTTs were configured with eight carrying Class V, one carrying Class I, one carrying tents and soldier bags, and two carrying Class III (P). The TF needed all of this equipment and supplies to sustain its combat operations. To haul these requirements, it had already developed load plans and then left other headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) MTOE equipment in storage at Camp New York, Kuwait. The Army must increase haul capacity for armor battalions by adding at least four, if not six, HEMTT trailers to the MTOE. This change would enable TFs to configure Class V combat configured loads (CCLs) on trailers and move with M978 fuel HEMTTs as prime movers, to reduce the number of vehicles the company teams must control during LOGPAC and to free up M977 to haul critical items like mounted tires or major assemblies. The shortages of haul assets were reported throughout the division. Engineer units along with division artillery (DIVARTY) both reported they did not have enough haul assets to carry all personnel, equipment, and ammunition. The Army must reevaluate the allocation of haul assets throughout the Army. Another issue is MTOE shortages in the division cavalry squadron (Div Cav Sqn). Currently, mechanized battalions with only forty-four combat vehicles are authorized six M88A1 recovery vehicles, while the Div Cav Sqn has sixty-eight combat vehicles and is only authorized five M88A1s. The Div Cav Sqn often is separated by great distances from its aviation support battalion (ASB) and needs a minimum of two more M88A1s. Similar examples exist with the number of mechanics that are authorized in the squadron. Overall, the Army needs to overhaul the current MTOE of mechanized division cavalry squadrons to ensure they have the assets in equipment and personnel in order to maintain themselves. Lastly, divisional engineer battalions do not have organic Level I combat health support (CHS). Divisional combat engineer battalions do not have a battalion aid station with Level I CHS capabilities. A battalion was task organized with three companies of EAD engineers and required to move and operate as an independent element. The BCT could not support this as well as other organizations that were task organized with it. Divisional engineers need to have a Level I CHS capability in order to provide medical support to EAD units task organized to them. Divisional engineer battalions should be authorized a physician�s assistant (PA), additional enlisted medical personnel, and appropriate equipment (to include a field litter ambulance [FLA]) to provide Level I CHS in order to support EAD and organic engineer units task organized under engineer battalion control. Lessons Learned
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