Midway Campaign - Battle of the Coral Sea

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The Battle of the Coral Sea was the first battle between aircraft carriers. As such, it was the first naval battle in which neither side could see each other. All the fighting involved carrier aircraft attacking enemy ships, including their carriers. The engagement, fought on 7-8 May 1942, set the pattern for all the other 1942 carrier actions. The Coral Sea operation was the result of Japan's desire to occupy New Guinea and the Solomon Islands.

In March, U.S. carrier aircraft had carried out a daring attack on Japanese ships landing troops on the north coast of New Guinea. Flying over the supposedly too high Owen Stanley Mountains by taking advantage of favorable thermals to catch the Japanese completely off guard, the U.S. aircraft had struck when the Japanese were not expecting it. The raid was only moderately successful, as the ships had already discharged their troops and cargoes. Had the U.S. carriers arrived a little earlier and caught the Japanese ships still loaded, the Japanese landing might well have been stopped entirely. As a result of this raid, the Japanese decided to occupy the balance of New Guinea.

Japanese forces, concentrated at Rabaul , were to sortie by ship into the Coral Sea and secure Port Moresby on the south coast of New Guinea and Tulagi in the Eastern Solomons . As with most Japanese plans, there was a plethora of task forces involved. The principal striking element was a task force built around were the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku , plus two heavy cruisers, and six destroyers. Earmarked for the occupation of Port Moresby were three light cruisers, five destroyers, a seaplane tender, a flotilla of smaller warships, and eleven troop carrying transports, plus various supply ships, all covered by a light carrier, four heavy cruisers, and a destroyer. Finally there was the Tulagi occupation force, two destroyers, a troop transport, and various small warships. The plan was for the carrier task force, under VAdm Takeo Takagi , to enter the Coral Sea from the east, and engage and destroy any Allied warships encountered, thereby enabling the landing forces to go about their business.

This did not seem an overly difficult assignment, as the Allies were believed to have only slender resource. This was true. Allied forces comprised RAdm Frank Jack Fletcher's Task Force 17, carriers Yorktown and Lexington , with eight American and Australian cruisers and eleven destroyers, supported by a fueling group of two oilers and two destroyers. Both sides, of course, committed some submarines and long range reconnaissance aircraft to the operation, and some land based fighters and bombers were within range.

The battle ranged over the Solomons Sea and the northern portions of the Coral Sea. On 3 May the Japanese occupied Tulagi unopposed, and a raid from Yorktown the next day did little damage. This gave away Fletcher's position, but the Japanese were unable to take advantage of the situation since their carriers had been ordered to drop off some fighters at Rabaul. Over the next two days each fleet maneuvered cautiously, trying to locate its opponent without revealing its own location. Reconnaissance was poor, and despite the fact that the two task forces passed within about 70 miles of each other at one point, neither side spotted the other. Not until the 7th was first blood drawn between the two fleets.

Early on 7 May, the dawn patrol from Shokaku and Zuikaku located the American oiler Neosho and destroyer Sims. Acting on an erroneous report that the two ships were a carrier and cruiser, Admiral Takagi ordered an airstrike, which quickly sent the two vessels to the bottom, at the cost of six aircraft lost. Meanwhile, U.S. carrier planes were also acting on a false lead, a Yorktown scout having reported "two carriers and four heavy cruisers" some 175 miles northwest of TF 17. Not until both American carriers had launched full deckloads of aircraft was it discovered that the scout had intended to say "two heavy cruisers and two destroyers" but miscoded his message. So the airstrike was aborted. Then Lady Luck, the true goddess of war, took a hand. Just as the American aircraft were preparing to return to their ships, they came upon the Port Moresby support group, steaming southeastwards in the Solomons Sea. They promptly jumped the light carrier Soho . It required only ten minutes before the cry "Scratch one flattop" went out over the radio waves, for the first time by an American pilot . This so upset VAdm Shigeyoshi Inoue, overall Japanese commander in the area, that he effectively aborted the Port Moresby operation.

Meanwhile, Fletcher , realizing that he had located the Port Moresby invasion force, ordered a cruiser squadron under British RAdm J.G. Grace to go after it, thereby weakening his defensive screen. Grace's mission turned into a wild goose chase, but he did successfully beat off an attack by 31 land based Japanese aircraft, immediately after which he had to endure another by USAAF B17s, which tried a high altitude bomb run on him, with no loss either time. The Japanese airmen reported two battleships and a heavy cruiser sunk, the American flyboys were almost as optimistic (even though they had attacked friendly ships).

Towards evening, Takagi sent out an offensive scouting mission, with orders to sink Fletcher's carriers. Intercepted by Fletcher's CAP (Combat Air Patrol), they were roughly handled, losing nine. Attempting to return to their ships after dark, six tried to land on Yorktown , and were duly shot down, while eleven others splashed making night landings on their own carriers.

So as of the end of the 7 May both sides had little to brag about, the U.S. having accounted for a light carrier and about 20 enemy aircraft and the Japanese for an oiler and a destroyer. Then came the 8th.

Each side sent out predawn reconnaissance patrols on 8 May, and each managed to locate the other's carriers. Each immediately launched massive strikes, the Japanese of 121 aircraft and the Americans of 122. Although the airstrikes were of virtually identical size, and indeed the two task forces were quite closely matched as well (U.S.: two carriers, five cruisers, seven destroyers; Japanese, two carriers, four cruisers, six destroyers), meteorological conditions favored the Japanese. The Japanese were operating from the Solomons Sea, just then overcast and subject to occasional rain squalls, while the Americans were in the bright and sunny Coral Sea, one of the calmest expanses of water in the world.

The American airstrikes went in first. At about 1057 Hours., Yorktown �s bombers, having failed to locate Zuikaku, took on Shokaku , scoring only two hits, but damaging her flight deck sufficiently as to prevent further air operations. Half of Lexington�s bombers missed the Japanese entirely, while the other half put another bomb into Shokaku at about 1240 Hours; Takagi immediately ordered her to retire on Truk . By this time Japanese airstrikes were working over Task Force 17. Between 1118 Hours and 1140 Hours Yorktown took a bomb hit, but Lexington took a real pounding, two torpedoes and two bombs, which left her listing and on fire. As both sides recovered aircraft, Takagi decided to leave the area, conceding a strategic victory to Fletcher , despite his heavier loss in ships (fleet carrier Lexington, which went down despite heroic damage control efforts, oiler Neosho and destroyer Sims, against only light carrier Soho). In addition to having their strategic intention frustrated in this action, the Japanese lost the services of two carriers, for Shokaku�s damage required about two months to repair, while Zuikaku 's plane and pilot losses required a month to make up. As a result, neither carrier was present for Midway .

The Coral Sea also revealed the bad habits, and inexperience at this new form of warfare, of both navies. Japanese communications were sloppy, with admirals being in the habit of not passing on vital information. This was a trait the Japanese were never able to overcome throughout the war. Their admirals tended to fight as if they were the only Japanese force engaged and constantly missed opportunities to coordinate with other Japanese forces, a real problem, given their propensity to scatter offensive elements thither and yon, apparently in order to deceive the U.S. forces as to where the main blow was to fall. The Japanese also lacked the rapid repair techniques of the Americans. While the heavily damaged Yorktown was repaired in time for the Battle of Midway, the less heavily damaged Shokaku was not ready until a week after Midway was over.

The major U.S. errors were largely due to inexperience. The Japanese had more experience in carrier operations and were able to more efficiently attack American carriers, expertly maneuvering their aircraft groups to search out and attack enemy ships. American officers closed this experience gap by the end of 1942.

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