Leadership: Ukraine Attacks

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September 26, 2024: On August 6, 2024, Ukraine sent about a thousand troops and over thirty tanks and other combat vehicles into the Russian Kursk region. As of August 13th the Ukrainians had advanced more than 35 kilometers into Russia while surviving, and arriving, Russian forces were only trying to block further advances rather than counterattacking. Ukraine then sent in several thousand more troops as reinforcements in case there was a major response from the Russians.

At first the Russians could not believe that Ukrainians were invading Russia. This should not have been a surprise because the Russian offensive into Ukraine has been stalled for over a year. The Russians were unable to counterattack for a number of reasons, including fear of failure and too many soldiers who did not want to be in Ukraine.

There are other reasons for the different Ukrainian and Russian attitudes towards war. Ukrainian troops follow the rules while the Russians are expedient. Russian troops consider themselves as warriors while the Ukrainians strive to send trained soldiers into combat. Russia does have some well-trained and experienced troops in airborne and special operations units. These professionals will still slip into warrior mode when it suits them, or when ordered to do so. For the other ninety percent of Russian troops, warrior mode is often the default mode. By late 2023 there were few of Russian airborne and special operations troops left.

Heavy Russian losses in Ukraine since 2022 are one of the reasons Russia was unable to move many troops and armored vehicles towards the Kursk incursion.

Russian President Vladimir Putin did not expect such a bold Ukrainian attack into Russia and had little to say publicly. Instead he went off on a planned visit to another part of Russia while a few troops were sent to block the Ukrainian advance. Russian media were ordered to report little or nothing about the incursion. The media did publish vague reports of something happening in Kursk province, and most Russians were more afraid of their own government than they were of Ukrainian troops inside Russia. Putin enacted laws that punished critics of his policies in Ukraine. A few Russians were sent to prison and that was sufficient to frighten any other Russian critics of Putin’s policies.

Meanwhile Putin has his own problems dealing with the invading Ukrainians. Over two years of fighting in Ukraine have severely depleted the Russian armed forces. There were not enough troops available to block the Ukrainian advance, This was what the Ukrainians expected because Ukrainian military intelligence has monitored Russian soldiers using cellphones and interviewed Russia prisoners. Ukraine knew that there were not many Russian troops left in Ukraine and Russian morale was low.

Russia has not resorted to extreme measures to motivate their soldiers. In World War II methods were used to motivate reluctant troops that Russian does not believe will work 80 years after World War II.

During World War II Russia resorted to ancient traditions when deadly force was necessary to encourage reluctant Russian soldiers. In 2022 Russian officers were expected to use deadly force on their own troops in order to ensure obedience. This was often used during World War 2. During some major offensives NKVD (secret police) personnel would be brought in to operate machine-guns behind the troops who were taking part in a major offensive. The NKVD machine-gunners fired on any Russian troops leaving the front-line forces. Many nations consider desertion in the face of the enemy to be treason, but they don’t usually execute the traitorous deserters on sight. After 2022, Russians in Ukraine found that they could not get away with using NKVD methods. This meant there was no motivation to get reluctant Russian troops to move forwards. After more than two years fighting in Ukraine, Russian troops are often unable to motivate themselves into attacking. Even defending Russian troops will flee. The Ukrainians in Kursk are taking advantage of that and Vladimir Putin is receiving bad news he does not want to hear or deal with.

Meanwhile there are still manifestations of this ruthlessness with Russian recruits. For example, when there is time and medical personnel are available, new recruits will get their health checked to ensure they are physically able to fight. This exam often includes dentists to check for dental problems that can be taken care of before training begins. This often includes extracting problematic teeth that will progressively cause more pain until dealt with. These teeth are promptly extracted without painkillers. It’s just another way to remind these civilians that they are now in the mighty Russian army. They are expected to act as warriors, not armed civilians in uniform.

Until some overdue reforms are made, these flaws will not go away. The fighting in Ukraine reminded Russian military and political leaders that the long delay is already working on needed reforms so, they hope, that the next time Russian troops are in combat they perform better and perhaps even win. There have been several rounds of unsuccessful military reforms since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. One of the major causes of that collapse was their unaffordable and largely ineffective armed forces. In post-Soviet Russia there are far fewer restrictions on criticizing the military. Most Russians have a very negative attitude towards conscription and the reforms underway because of the Ukraine War disaster are typical of several previous efforts to remedy problems that continue to resist any fundamental change.

 

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